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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
This thesis is about the value of shares. The focus is on analysing the norms of company 
law governing shares, shareholders’ rights, and share value. A central point is that 
according to company law the value of shares is merely a matter of fact and opinion. In 
brief, shareholders decide about their shares; thus, share value is more a question of 
markets than of law. On the other hand, law has a role in setting the value for shares.
The law determines which opinion should prevail if there is disagreement about 
valuation; furthermore, company law sets restrictions on shareholders’ power.
The equality of shares is one of the general principles of company law. Overall, 
when shares in a company have similar rights, these shares rank equally. This study 
emphasizes equality; its aim is to clarify what the equality of shares means in company 
law. My conclusion is that English company law supports the equality of shares 
although that cannot be an absolute principle of law.
Several commentators regard Short v Treasury Commissioners as a ruling 
stating that majority shares are more valuable than minority shares. This study explains 
case law differently. I consider that fair share value is generally determined on a pro rata 
basis, which view is expressed, for example, in O'Neill v Phillips. In sum, I propose that 
the governing idea is the equal value of shares. Yet, as share value is mainly beyond the 
scope of company law, this equality prevails only when the value is determined by the 
power of law.
PREFACE
As Prof Lowry says in the preface of his book, Core Text Series: Company Law, 
company law is a difficult subject1. This friendly warning appeared in the book during 
my PhD studies under his supervision, but I have been told that the disclaimer is not 
especially for me. In any event, I consider that company law is a fascinating subject; 
furthermore, it has been a pleasure to study this area of law in England, where the 
concept of modem company was bom.
I am very grateful to John Lowry for his excellent supervision during my studies 
in 2002 -  2005.1 am pleased that this co-operation has been possible both at Queen 
Mary (2002 -  2004) and University College London (2004 -  2005). This thesis owes its 
being to his support.
I am indebted to my second supervisors Dr Loukas Mistelis (QM) and Dr Philip 
Rawlings (UCL). The comments of Prof Stephen Guest on my ideas and in particular on 
the concept of equality have been helpful. In addition, I sincerely thank Dr Simon 
Williams, who has supervised my English with great care. Responsibility for any 
mistakes is still mine alone.
In this study, ‘CA 1985’ refers to the Companies Act 1985. References to books 
and articles are set out in full on first mention in every chapter, and for second and 
subsequent mentions the short reference is used in notes. Full details of references can 
be found in the Bibliography. Moreover, when I use the word ‘he’ in a general context, 
it applies equally to male and female persons.
The law is stated as at 1 October 2005.
London, October 2005 
Jyrki Knuutinen
1 Lowry, John and Dignam, Alan, Company Law (3rd edn Oxford 2005) v.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
I f  there were only one man in the world, he would 
have a lot o f problems, but none o f them would be 
legal ones.
David D. Friedman, Law’s Order (2000) 3.
1.1 Company law and capital
The focus of my research is on companies, shareholders, and in particular on the value 
of shares. My main aim is to examine legal rules and principles governing shareholders’ 
rights and share value. As stock markets fall within its realms, the study has both legal 
and economic dimensions.
The principal question of the research is whether the value of ordinary shares is 
equal in company law, although companies are governed by majority rule and shares are 
freely transferable. I consider that from the legal perspective share value should be 
related to shareholders’ rights: value is fundamentally a matter of rights.
Companies are pooling vehicles that aggregate capital; they gather in and pump 
out money. Capital in general means wealth, but in company law it has a more restricted 
meaning: a company receives capital from shareholders in exchange for the shares 
issued. Companies and shares belong to the heart of capitalism, and company law 
provides an important legal structure for the operation of the whole system. My special 
interest is the relationship between company law and capital; the fundamental point in 
this analysis is how company law governs the value and price of shares.
Capital for companies is channelled through stock markets; further, in a wider 
meaning company law regulates both companies and capital markets. I accept that
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company law includes securities regulation, which is also called capital markets law.
The main task of this regulation is to control marketing of shares and financial products. 
Thus, securities regulation offers investor protection, and this study is about 
shareholders’ protection too. Nonetheless, my main focus is on traditional company 
law, not on the regulation of stock markets, in general.
The prime interest is public companies, which are understood to be companies 
whose shares are quoted on the stock market. Significantly, public companies have a 
tighter regime under company law; in addition, companies with listed shares should 
follow the market regulation. But as equality is not a matter concerning public 
companies only, I review in this study both public and private companies.
1.2 Value of shares
Shareholders do not own the company or its assets1, but the value of shares depends 
strongly on a company’s business and its assets. It is said that the value of shares 
follows the fortunes of the company2. Moreover, shares in a way represent a 
proportionate part of an enterprise’s net assets; as a result, there is a strong 
correspondence between company assets and share value .
As mentioned above, my intention is to emphasize that shareholders’ rights are 
the starting point in share valuation. Even so, the value of shares is not simply a 
question of rights since there is no natural or right value for shares; therefore, even if the 
rights are known, the value of shares may still remain unknown. I stress that the 
valuation of shares is not just complicated, but it is predominantly a point of fact and 
opinion.
1 Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA); Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] 
AC 619 (HL).
2 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 (CA) 224.
3 Chapter 1
1.2.1 Valuation in the markets and law
Roscoe Pound states: “Wealth, in a commercial age, is made up largely of promises”4. 
Indeed, this is very true with shares whose value follows expectations on the markets. 
Still, the future success of a company’s business is unknown. Economic decisions are 
always made under uncertainty; hence, market price for shares is an estimation of future 
profits and incomes. Furthermore, share value is related to a wide range of 
macroeconomic factors, and so the value of particular shares does not depend only on a 
company’s own economic condition. In any event, share valuation is a task of markets.
It is a fundamental principle of the market economy that values are reached via function 
of markets, which operate through demand and supply curves. Put simply, markets 
determine the price of shares in the same way in which the prices of apples and oranges 
are set. If a more academic and general formulation is used, I may state that: “once the 
original entitlement is decided upon, the state does not try to decide [the] value”5. This 
study underlines that it is impossible to say whether a share price is right or wrong 
according to law because that is a point decided by the buyer and the seller, and more 
generally, by the operation of markets.
Share value is more a question of markets than law, but what the law and the 
courts can do is to follow the markets and to accept the value reached in the market as 
the right value. In consequence, the valuation of shares in quoted companies is often a 
straightforward exercise since reference can be made to their market price.
Yet, the value of shares is also a matter of law. First, the law gives shareholders 
the right to determine the value of their property. In addition, share value depends on 
shareholders’ rights and the level of shareholder protection. Therefore, when laws are 
protective, people are generally more willing to invest in stocks. The markets with these
3 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (a firm) [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 62.
4 Pound, Roscoe, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (New Haven 1922) 236.
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features are then broader, and financial assets have a higher value. In this sense, the 
support of law is very important for share valuation.
1.2.2 The value of shares in English company law
The value of shares is regarded as a question of fact and opinion in company law. For 
example, in Re Press Caps Ltcf, Wynn-Parry J formulated that: “A valuation is only an 
expression of opinion.” Naturally, “the question of value is obviously one about which 
opinions may differ”7. The general position of the law is that the courts do not interfere 
in matters of opinion8.
Since share value is a matter of fact, the courts should not value them. Can there 
then be a legal view about the value of shares? Significantly, leading English authors 
seem to have a clear idea about the value of shares. Davies9 refers to Short v Treasury 
Commissioners10 and notes that the law accepts that in principle controlling shares are 
more valuable than non-controlling ones. Sealy11 agrees and says that the dicta in the 
case support the view that when a majority shareholding is sold by a single seller to a 
single buyer, it is proper to value the holding more highly. Further, Pettet12, more 
generally, points out that the reasons for the discounted valuation of minority shares are 
obvious since a minority holding carries no control, can vote no director onto the board, 
can remove no director, and is dependent on the majority for any dividends. There 
seems to be a wide consensus among distinguished academics that majority shares are 
more valuable due to their power to control the company.
5 Calabresi, Guido and Melamed, A. Douglas, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089, 1092.
6 [1949] Ch 434 (CA) 447.
7 Re Grierson, Oldham & Adams Ltd [1968] Ch 17, 38 (Plowman J).
8 See especially Dean v Prince [1954] Ch 409 (CA).
9 Davies, Paul L., ‘The Notion of Equality in European Takeover Regulation’ in Payne, Jennifer (ed), 
Takeovers in English and German Law (Oxford 2002) 9, 13.
10 [1948] AC 534 (HL).
11 Sealy, L. S., Cases and Materials in Company Law (7th edn London 2001) 474.
12 Pettet, Ben, Company Law (Harlow 2001) 253.
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Back to case law: in Dean v Prince13, Harman J held that the value of a block of 
shares which conferred control should include something above their break-up value. 
But the Court Appeal14 reversed his decision with a statement that the court should not 
interfere on matters of opinion. The auditor was right in not attributing a special value 
to these shares on account of their carrying control, and from this perspective it is 
difficult to consider that there would be a rule that a majority block should include 
something above their pro rata value. Even more importantly, as Lord Hoffmann 
considered in O ’Neill v Phillips15, the fair value of minority shares is ordinarily a pro 
rata value, and he said that valuation on this basis reflects the existing practice. These 
cases raise doubts against commentators’ ideas of how English company law sees share 
valuation. The pivotal question in this study is what the law rules about the value of 
majority and minority shares.
The valuation of shares may be a puzzling issue. However, this study suggests 
that the value of ordinary shares, which are homogeneous commodities, should be 
considered equal in law. I do not thus share the view that the law would regard majority 
shares as more valuable than minority shares.
1.3 Research review
In this study, I review shareholders’ rights, the notion of equality, and the value of 
shares in company law. The central attempt is to emphasize that there is no mystery in 
English law about share value, but the current position of law is not accurately 
explained. In sum, my aim of research is to analyse, to explain, and partly to demystify 
the law.
13 [1953] Ch 590.
14 [1954] Ch 409 (CA).
15 [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (HL) 1107.
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1.3.1 Law, rules, and principles
Sir Francis Palmer’s view about company law is still relevant: “The Acts alone afford a 
very inadequate view of the law regulating companies”16. English company law rests 
strongly on the common law, and this applies to the value of shares too. Even so, as 
Palmer notes, “the Acts plus the decisions [of courts] constitute a great and, for the most
1 *7part, admirable system of company law” . The emphasis of this research is on judge- 
made law: my intention is to discover the current status of law from court decisions.
Company law is a system of rules, but it is also standards and principles. As the 
title of a leading company law book, Gower and Davies' Principles o f Modem
1 XCompany Law , implies, principles are important. Company law is based on the 
principles of common law and equity19.1 am particularly interested in the notion of 
equality as a principle of company law. In company law, as in law generally, principles 
are able to justify and explain more specific rules.
Rules and principles are together called legal norms, and this is norms-oriented 
research. The agenda of this study is prescriptive: I describe and analyse company law 
norms concerning shareholders’ rights and the value of shares.
1.3.2 Law, economics, and society
The company can be regarded as a social contract and a set of rules rationally adapted to 
the economic environment. It is an economic institution with social features. Company 
law organizes economic and social relationships. I support the view that the main 
function of company law is to govern the relationship between shareholders and to serve
16 Palmer, Francis Beaufort, Company Law: A Practical Handbook fo r  Lawyers & Business Men (4th edn 
London 1902) v; on the other hand, it is fair to say that UK company law is nowadays “predominantly a 
creature of statute”, as eg Griffin, Stephen, Company Law: Fundamental Principles (3rd edn Harlow 
2000) xi says it.
17 Palmer (1902) v.
18 Davies, Paul L., Gower and D avies’ Principles o f Modern Company Law (7th edn London 2003).
19 Eg Gower, L. C. B., G ow er’s Principles o f Modern Company Law (4th edn London 1979) ix, where the 
preface to the first edition of the book exists.
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their needs. Company law is an instrument and a tool to achieve economic and social 
purposes.
Companies and shareholders have an economic goal. The aim of companies is to
generate profit for shareholders. As a part of the study, I seek to explain how company
law serves shareholders’ economic needs.
The company is a co-operative activity with many similarities with society20.
Therefore, the corporation also faces the problems that typically exist in every 
0 1democracy . But the relationship between members of society is political and 
predominantly social in nature. In contrast, members’ relationship, especially in a public 
company, is fully economic and impersonal. Different kinds of societies should be 
governed by their own rules; further, equality as a principle cannot have the same 
meaning in politics and company law. Therefore, I do not try to draw any direct 
analogies between societies and companies. However, I propose that the co-operative 
notion of companies is an important point since the company as a concept is a collective 
action22.
Companies can operate successfully only under the rule of law. This is 
dominantly a study of law. On the other hand, I see that understanding of economics 
and sociology advances understanding of law. In effect, in this research company law is 
analysed in its functional context, and also some economic and social argumentation is 
used to explain shareholders’ rights and share value.
1.3.3 Ownership, rights, and value
Shareholders own their shares; I stress the point. In addition, they, like owners in 
general, can be called residual claimants. Due to shareholders’ residual right, a
20 For example, analogies can be drawn between the constitution of a company and a nation-state.
21 See eg Epstein, Richard A., Simple Rules fo r  a Complex World (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1995) 248.
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company’s profit ‘belongs’ to them. Overall, the company is a complex set of 
relationships between persons. My focus is on shareholders and the relationship among 
them inter se.
Shares are shareholders’ property; furthermore, they are a bundle of rights. The 
value of shares is a consequence of these rights, and my emphasis is on shareholders’ 
rights. I think that it is an important point to note that shareholders have those rights that 
company law and the company constitution give them. In practice, this mean that 
shareholders participate in company through their shares and their rights are attached to 
the shares.
My intention is not to explain what the value of shares should be on stock 
markets. The perspective is legal: the emphasis is on determination of value in 
accordance with law. In essence, I stress that there exist property and liability rules; 
therefore, share valuation does not follow similar principles under different rules. The 
conclusion is that there cannot be a single ‘right’ value for shares in law.
Finally, the aim is to show that, since the value of shares has features of fact, the 
law should not decide their value; instead, law often only accepts it. Share value from 
the perspective of law is typically a question of opinion. Yet, it is the law that 
determines whose and what opinion prevails if opinions differ. The valuation of shares 
might seem to be complicated and confusing. But the equal value of shares as a 
principle makes valuation clearer and more predictable. In sum, equality can be the 
most straightforward organizing principle in company law and share valuation.
1.4 The agenda of research
I start the discussion, in chapter two, with the analysis of shares and rights attached to 
them. Yet, my focus is more on the rights of shareholders than the nature of shares.
22 Eg Cooke, C. A., Corporation, Trust and Company (Manchester 1950) 7: the company “creates a
9 Chapter 1
Shareholders’ rights are a very important part of the study since the value of shares is a 
consequence of the rights.
The relationship between company assets and share value is discussed in chapter 
three. Company law does not rule that the value of shares is their proportionate part of a 
company’s assets. However, the value of shares is strongly related to the company’s 
business and assets as their value follows its fortunes. Therefore, I do not declare that 
the asset value is not the share value, but the point is analysed more deeply.
The function of stock markets is of special interest in this study. In chapter four,
I review markets and their pricing mechanism. That is done particularly to show that 
market prices are decided under uncertainty. In consequence, these prices cannot be 
right or wrong but they are the best available real prices. I emphasize that markets 
cannot really know right prices and values. Moreover, the value of majority shares is a 
special question in this study, so the aim of this discussion is to demonstrate that there is 
no general market rule directly supporting the idea that majority shares generally have a 
higher per share value.
Chapter five is about equality of shares. I stress that when shares in a company 
have similar rights these shares should be regarded as equal. But it is not enough only to 
argue that shares are equal, and this study goes further and seeks to clarify what this 
equality of shares means in company law. My conclusion is that English company law 
supports equality of shares, although it is not an absolute principle in company law.
Companies are governed by majority power, and thus it should be asked whether 
there can be any equality in a company between majority and minority shareholders. In 
chapter six, I demonstrate that company law balances the interests of a majority and 
minority. On the one hand, the company is governed by majority rule; on the other 
hand, law offers shareholder protection. I consider that interests of minority
common action where no common action is possible.’
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shareholders are protected in the most efficient way when company law supports 
equality.
In chapter seven, the value of shares is reviewed from the legal perspective: the 
focus is on their objective value. Significantly, my analysis of case law does not support 
the view that majority shares are generally regarded as more valuable than minority 
shares. In essence, the value of shares is a mixed point of fact and law. Moreover, there 
is no single rule that is fully capable to set their value. Yet, I propose that the current 
law mainly supports the idea that every share has the same value.
Chapter eight includes the main conclusions. I emphasize the importance of 
shareholders’ rights in share valuation. Nevertheless, as the hypothetical value of shares 
is a matter of fact and opinion, their value is normally determined by the support of 
expert evidence. Even so, the law has a pivotal role in share valuation. The idea in the 
law is not that the courts should fix the value of shares solely with reference to their 
hypothetical value. Company law really sets guidelines for share valuation. My prime 
conclusion is that the law and the courts favour the principle of equal share value. I 
consider that this idea is a proper and fair legal mode.
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CHAPTER 2
SHARES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHTS
The institution o f rights is therefore crucial, because 
it represents the majority’s promise to the minorities 
that their dignity and equality will be respected. 
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977) 
205.
2.1 The importance of shareholders’ rights
I start analysing shares and the rights attached to them. These rights are an important 
part of my study since the value of shares derives from them. Put simply, shares are 
valuable because of the rights.
Shareholders own their shares, which are private property. By contrast, 
shareholders do not own the company. Thus, it is accurate to say that shareholders own 
their shares and have shareholders’ rights1. In any case, they together have ultimate 
control over the company; therefore, share ownership has some distinctive collective 
features. In this chapter, I concentrate on shareholders’ individual rights.
The word ‘share’ may imply that shareowners share the company. Yet, that is 
not true. The word share might be even like a misnomer for shares2. Nevertheless, I 
argue that shares are real ‘shares’, especially in the relationship between shareholders. 
At bottom, shares are shares in a company but not shares o f a. company.
Shareholders have both economic and control rights. Because companies are in 
essence economic societies, I thus stress that the value of shares ultimately depends on 
shareholders’ economic rights.
1 Eg Davies, Paul L., Introduction to Company Law (Oxford 2002) 257; further chapter three 3.3.2.
2 For example, Davies, Paul L., Gower and D avies’ Principles o f  Modern Company Law (7th edn London 
2003)615.
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Companies acquire share capital by issuing shares. For shareholders, shares are 
their assets and transferable investments. The transferability of shares is a central point 
in my analysis.
2.2 Shares in a company
In general, a share is “a part of a larger amount which is divided among or contributed 
by a number of people”3. In a commercial context, the idea of dividing a business into 
shares derives from the Middle Ages. Shares permit the accumulation of large capital; 
by co-operation and contribution of capital, many men can undertake enterprises that a 
single man finds impossible. However, the company or its assets are not divided among 
shareholders, who share only rights in a company. I first analyse the nature of 
shareholders’ interest and the role of share capital.
2.2.1 Shareholders’ interest in the company
As the CA 1985 s 13(3) states, shareholders are a body corporate by the name contained 
in the memorandum. In general, the company used to be in English ‘they’ and not ‘it’4. 
But according to law, shareholders are not the company, and therefore a company 
cannot be them. A company is a legal entity distinct from its members: it has an own 
legal identity and personality. As a result, a company is “at law a different person 
altogether”5 from its shareholders. A shareholder is not the company, although he holds 
all the shares in a company6.
Still, shareholders’ interests are paramount in company law. The company itself 
is an artificial person, whose interests cannot be distinguished from the interests of
3 The Oxford Compact English Dictionary (2nd revised edn Oxford 2003) 1052.
4 See Sealy, Len, ‘Perception and Policy in Company Law Reform’ in Feldman, David and Meisel, Frank 
(eds), Corporate and Commercial Law: Modern Developments (London 1996) 11, 25.
5 Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL) 51 (Lord Macnaghten); Bligh v Brent (1837) 2 Y
6  C Ex 268, 295 (Alderson B): “the individual members of a corporation are quite as distinct from the 
metaphysical body called ‘the corporation’ as any others of his Majesty’s subjects are.”
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n
shareholders . So, the interest of the company as a whole must equate with the interest
Q
of shareholders as a group . A company is a vehicle for carrying on a business for the 
benefit of all shareholders9.
Company law considers that there exists indoor management rule: a company’s 
organs decide upon its business. Further, the main principle is that companies are 
governed by majority rule. However, my interest in this chapter is not how companies 
are governed but how their success is divided among shareholders.
Shareholders are investors, whose interest is to get a return on their capital. But 
they do not only require return as yield since their desire is also to make profit with their 
shares. Naturally, gains can be made when share value rises. The main interest of a 
rational shareholder is ordinarily the value of shares: the right to get dividends or to 
have the capital returned have less importance in practice10.
Yet, the rising share value is not a legal expectation and shareholders’ right. 
Obviously, the aim of company law cannot be to secure shareholders a gaining share 
value. In addition, company law does not guarantee that dividends are paid or 
shareholders’ investment is returned. Company law gives rights to shareholders; thus, 
share value rests on these rights.
The nature of an owner’s interest is generally residual: this idea applies to 
shareholders too. They have both residual income and control interest in the company. 
Shareholders’ residual economic interest means that they have a right to the company’s 
profit after other payments like wages for employees, charges for suppliers of materials,
6 Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619 (HL) 633 (Lord Wrenbury).
7 Brady v Brady [1988] BCLC 20 (CA) 40 (Nourse LJ); see also Caparo Industries pic v Dickman [1990] 
2 AC 605 (HL) 626 (Lord Bridge).
8 Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch 286 (CA) 291 (Evershed MR).
9 Eg Re a company (No 00370 o f  1987), ex p  Glossop [1988] BCLC 570, 576 (Harman J).
10 More below, chapter four.
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and interest to lenders of capital have been made. After these payments, all the profit 
belongs to them11.
In this way, shareholders are like owners in the corporate structure as the profit 
of a company is ‘their profit’. Therefore, it has been considered that, in a practical 
sense, the assets of a solvent company are their assets through the medium of the 
company12. However, in the legal sense, that is not true because a company’s profits and 
assets are always its assets and money. Shareholders do not have property rights in the 
company assets.
Furthermore, shareholders’ interest in the company is residual in another way: 
they can get their capital back in winding up only when all the other liabilities have 
been met. In an insolvent company, the assets of the company are in a practical sense its 
creditors’, whose interests should prevail13. Shareholders lose their residual interest and 
controlling votes when the company is in serious economic difficulties.
In sum, shareholders stand first as far as there are losses; on the other hand, they 
are last in line in the case of surplus. They share in the company both profits and risk. 
Naturally, shareholders’ residual interest makes their status very distinctive.
In general, ownership is a source of power, ie owners have residual powers. 
Ultimate power in companies rests on shareholders. But their ultimate control power 
does not make them owners of the company14. They have power in the company 
because they are residual claimants, and they need the power to protect their economic 
interests.
Although shareholders do not own the company, due to the nature of their 
interest, they are often recognized as beneficial owners. If a company has a single
11 Re a company (No 00370 o f  1987), ex p  Glossop [1988] BCLC 570, 577.
12 Kinsela v Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd (in liq) (1986) 4 NSWLR 722 (CA of the New South Wales) 730; 
quoted in West Mercia Safetywear Ltd (in liq) v Dodd  [1988] BCLC 250 (CA).
Ibid; Brady v Brady [1988] BCLC 20 (CA) 40 (Nourse LJ).
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shareholder, that person may then be regarded as “the beneficial owner of the 
company”15. Indeed, the aim of companies is to operate in the interest of shareholders: 
in this sense, they are the beneficiaries of the company. However, shareholders own 
only their shares, not the company. Furthermore, there is no need to call them 
‘beneficial owners’ of their shares16 since a shareholder is the legal owner of his shares. 
A beneficial owner can exist only when the legal and equitable interests are separated; 
for example, shares are registered in the name of a nominee shareholder, or there is a 
binding agreement to acquire shares17.
Shareholders have special interest in the company, and therefore the courts 
might hold that they have a ‘proprietary interest’18. Indeed, it is considered that it is 
“some sort of proprietary interest in the company though not in its property”19. Yet, the 
company is a legal entity separate from its shareholders; thus, the relationship between a 
shareholder and a company is not a relation between an owner and property. 
Shareholders do not have a legal or equitable proprietary interest in the company’s 
assets20. Therefore, their proprietary interest in the company is their shareholding.
In Borland’s Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co Ltd, Farwell J considered the nature 
of shares in this way:
A share is the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a sum of 
money, for the purpose of liability in the first place, and of interest in the
14 Although historically their status as owners has been the central explanation for shareholders’ control in 
the company; see eg Grantham, Ross, T he Doctrinal Basis o f the Rights o f Company Shareholders’ 
(1998) 57 CLJ 554.
15 See Raja v Van Hoogstraten [2004] 4 All ER 793 (CA) 824 (Chadwick LJ).
16 Contrast Tottenham Hotspur pic  v Edennote p ic  [1995] 1 BCLC 65, 66 (Rattee J), where Mr Venables 
was called the “indirect beneficial owner o f all the shares”.
17 Eg Re Ricardo Group pic  [1989] BCLC 566; about the terms, see Stapledon, Geof, ‘Analysis and data 
of share ownership and control in UK’ (undated); available www.dti.gov.uk/cld/other information.htm#e 
(16.10.2005).
18 Caparo Industries pic v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) 631 (Lord Oliver); Berg Sons & Co Ltd v 
Mervyn Hampton Adams [1993] BCLC 1045, 1064 (Hobhouse J).
19 Davies (2003)616.
20 See especially Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619 (HL).
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second, but also consisting of a series of mutual covenants entered into by all the 
shareholders inter se.21
First, shares are not a sum of money: they are just measured by a sum of money to show 
a shareholder’s liability for the payment of shares and his proportional interest. Shares 
are the measure of the proportion of the total interest in the company22. Moreover, the 
capital paid for shares is the property of the company. A shareholder is not like the 
creditor of a company23; for example, the dividend from a company is a debt to 
shareholders only when it has been declared24. Second, shares consist of mutual 
covenants entered into by shareholders. There exists a statutory contract between 
members inter se and between each member and the company. The corporate contract 
contained in the articles of association is one of the original incidents of the share. 
Shareholders’ rights depend particularly on the articles because these rights “spring 
from” the statutory contract25. In sum, the argumentation in Borland’s Trustee 
recognizes clearly the contractual nature of the company.
To conclude, shareholders’ interests are paramount in company law: the interest 
of a company must equate with their interest. A company’s profits fundamentally 
belong to its shareholders, who have control over it. However, shareholders, who have 
financial interest and legal rights in the company, do not own it or its assets. They 
participate in a company indirectly “through their shares alone”26.
21 [1901] 1 Ch 279, 288.
22 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Laird Group pic  [2003] 4 All ER 669 (HL) 679 (Lord Millett).
23 See Lee v Neuchatel Asphalte Co (1889) LR 41 Ch D 1 (CA) 23 (Lindley LJ).
24 Wood v Odessa Waterworks Co (1889) LR 42 Ch D 636; Godfrey Phillips Ltd v Investment Trust Co 
L td[ 1953] Ch 449.
25 Wedderburn, K. W., ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle' [1957] CLJ 194, 209.
26 Birch v Cropper (1889) LR 14 App Cas 525 (HL) 546 (Lord Macnaghten).
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2.2.2 Share capital and nominal value
Share capital is one of the essential features of the company. Every company limited by 
shares has a share capital; furthermore, shares have a nominal value. But as the term 
nominal implies, it is no real value for shares. Their nominal value is actually a matter 
of company law tradition and accounting. It gives very little useful information about 
shares. Still, share capital has a special role: it is one of the fundamental concepts that 
lie at the heart of company law. Therefore, it is difficult to understand the value of 
shares without knowing the roles of share capital and nominal value.
Share capital can be seen as a financial fund that the company has in order to 
operate. According to CA 1985 s 2(5), the memorandum of association must state the 
amount of share capital. This nominal or authorised share capital is the total amount of 
share capital that could be issued. The nominal share capital shows the maximum 
amount of share capital, but not the existing share capital of a company.
The CA 1985 s 2(5) also states that the share capital must be divided into shares 
of a fixed amount. The nominal share capital divided by the number of shares is the 
nominal value of a share, or the other way, the nominal value of shares multiplied by 
the number of all the shares is the nominal share capital. The relationship is 
mathematical, but it is not very informative since these two figures can together only 
tell how many shares there could be in the company if all the shares were issued. 
Furthermore, as the memorandum is alterable27, the nominal share capital is purely the 
current maximum amount for share capital.
There is no minimum amount for a private company’s share capital: it can be £1 
or even less. English company law has let companies determine their share capital 
without setting any minimum requirement. But in the case of a public company, the
27 See CA 1985 s 121.
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statutory minimum of share capital is £50,00028, which requirement comes from 
European Company Directives29. Nonetheless, for public quoted companies, taking into 
account the general size of their business, this amount of share capital is very low. 
Therefore, the amount of share capital is clearly a matter that is decided by companies, 
by their shareholders, and often by the requirements of their creditors. Company law 
mainly rules that companies should have a share capital.
The nominal value of shares is a question of the company constitution. A 
company can have one share, a hundred, a million, or as many shares as is determined 
by its constitution, and even though the share capital would be only £1. Public limited 
companies have a minimum requirement of two shareholders30; naturally, there should 
then be at minimum two shares. The practice in public companies is that shares are 
issued in small denominations. So, when a company has a large amount of shares, it can 
also have a large number of shareholders.
Shares should have a nominal value. The nominal value, or par value, is the 
value that the shares are nominally declared to have: it is given to them in a quite 
technical sense. But the nominal value has some role since according to company law 
shares may not be issued at a discount to their nominal value31. This is a very clear rule 
although, if the value of shares is below their nominal value, it is dubious whether the 
rule really protects anybody . The par value seems to be “a doubtfully useful 
concept”33, and “it is questionable whether at present the requirement to have par value
28 CA 1985 ss 117-18.
29 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC [1977] OJ L 26/1; UK has set a lightly higher minimum for 
public companies as the minimum requirement according to the Directive is 25,000€; see Article 6.
CA 1985 s 24.
31 Ooregum Gold Mining Co o f India Ltd v Roper [1892] AC 125 (HL); Welton v Saffery [1897] AC 299 
(HL); CA 1985 s 100.
32 The nominal value cannot protect the value o f shares already issued because if the real value of shares 
is less than the nominal value, it is good for the company and shareholders that somebody is able to 
subscribe shares at their real value, and when the real value of shares is more than their nominal value, the 
subscribers do not pay enough for shares if their issue price is only the nominal value.
33 Davies (2003) 231.
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for shares serves any useful purpose”34. In the Company Law Review, it was seen that 
the nominal value has become “an anachronism”35. However, the nominal value of 
shares is a rule of English company law, and in the case of public companies this 
requirement comes from the European Company Directive. Even so, nominal value 
might be more a source of confusion than any source of information, especially as far as 
it concerns real share value.
Further, the authorised share capital and the nominal value do not show the 
amount paid for shares. A company’s issued or allotted share capital is only the total 
nominal value of the issued shares. Yet, the interesting point is not this nominal value, 
but the amount paid for shares since, of course, it is the real capital that matters most.
As stated in Ooregum Gold Mining Co o f India Ltd v Roper , nominal value is the 
minimum price that shareholders have to pay for shares. They and the company can 
decide that the issue price of shares is their nominal value or anything above it. It is not 
a task of company law to limit the subscription price per share. The real issue price for 
shares is merely a matter of bargain and markets.
Company law requires that shares should be paid up in money or money’s 
worth37. Under CA 1985 s 103, a public company may not allot shares paid up 
otherwise than in cash unless the consideration for the allotment has been independently 
valued38. The no-cash consideration should have the value it is said to have. For 
example, in Re Bradford Investments pic (No 2) , shareholders failed to show that the 
company had received assets equal to the nominal value of issued shares, and therefore 
they were required to pay their shares to the company because the consideration was not 
independently valued.
34 McGee, Andrew, Share Capital (London 1999) 7.
35 Company Law Reform: M odem Company Law For a Competitive Economy -  The Strategic 
Framework (London 1999) 5.4.27.
36 [1892] AC 125 (HL).
37 CA 1985 s 99.
38 See also CA 1985 ss 104 and 108, and about the consequences, ss 105 and 112.
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Shares are issued at a premium when the issue price is more than their nominal 
value. The issue price has two elements: first, there is the nominal value, and second, 
there may be this premium attached to it. The subscriber of shares has to pay the issue 
price that can be anything above the nominal value. If there is no premium, the issue 
price is the nominal value.
In essence, the subscription price is a matter of contract: it is the price at which 
the company is willing to issue new shares and the subscribers are prepared to have 
them. A subscription of shares is a financial decision: the pricing mechanism in share 
issues is economic in its nature. Shares are typically issued at the market price. But 
according to company law, shareholders have a pre-emption right to subscribe the new 
shares issued by the company, and when shares are offered to shareholders in 
proportion to their existing shares, the issue price is of less importance40. The issue 
price of shares is decided in accordance with company law and the company 
constitution. However, the issue price is more a question of contract than law, although 
shareholders’ rights and protection have a role in share issues too.
Companies receive capital from shareholders in exchange for issued shares. In 
the company’s book-keeping, the received capital is share capital only to the amount of 
the nominal value of shares; the premium is credited to a share premium account. The 
share premium is not strictly share capital but it is a special statutory reserve and subject 
to rules that treat it as share capital. Therefore, in practice, the share premium is a part 
of the share capital in its wider sense. There is no real distinction between the share 
capital and the share premium account41.
The paid share capital includes the share premium account; these two elements 
show together how much subscribers have paid for shares and how much capital the
39 [1991] BCC 379.
40 About shareholders’ pre-emption right, see below, chapter five 5.5.
41 Company Law Reform - The Strategic Framework (1999) 5.4.27.
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company has received. The issue price of shares has much greater importance both 
economically and legally than their nominal value. Their issue price is more a real price, 
and the nominal value is mainly a book-keeping unit. However, the subscription price 
can only be a historical value: the price that has been paid for them. Furthermore, we do 
not know whether their price was a real market price, or just a price that was used when 
the shares were issued. Therefore, it is quite impossible to get any real information from 
share capital about share value.
The prime interest of company law is that shareholders pay issued shares. As 
Farwell J explained in Borland’s Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co Ltd*2, a share is the 
shareholder’s interest in the company measured by a sum of money to show his liability 
and interest. The limited liability in companies means that shareholders have an 
obligation to pay the issue price of subscribed shares, but nothing more. When issued 
shares are fully paid, a shareholder has no further liability to contribute capital to the 
company43. Moreover, in modem market practice, issued shares are also fully paid 
shares44. Shareholders typically pay shares when they are issued, and no further 
contributions are required.
The doctrine of capital maintenance is essential in company law; it ensures that 
the capital of the company constitutes a fund available for its creditors. As a part of this 
doctrine, shareholders are obliged to pay their shares fully, and the issue price may not 
be less than the nominal value. Still, the central parts of the doctrine are the rules 
concerning the maintenance of share capital, and therefore capital may be returned to 
shareholders only under the special requirements of company law45. For instance, to pay
42 [1901] 1 Ch 279, 288.
43 See Ooregum Gold Mining Company o f  India Ltd v Roper [1892] AC 125 (HL) 136 (Lord Watson).
44 Although company law recognizes partly paid shares and the calls o f payment; about partly paid-up 
shares in public companies, see especially CA 1985 s 101.
45 The central parts o f this doctrine are: 1) the capital may not be reduced except with the sanction of 
court; 2) a company may not redeem its own shares; 3) a company may not purchase its own shares; 4) a 
company may not provide financial assistance for the purchase of its own shares; and 5) dividends may be 
paid out of the profits o f the company only.
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a dividend, a company should have distributable profits46. Consequently, a company’s 
creditors can trust that share capital is maintained in the company in the legal sense. Of 
course, it is very natural that in companies where shareholders have a limited liability 
there should be special rules governing the maintenance of share capital. In sum, this 
doctrine of capital maintenance belongs to the heart of company law in the same way as 
share capital itself.
As explained, the nominal value of shares does not show their real value. 
Moreover, nominal value does not serve any useful purpose in company law. However, 
it is still part of company law47. Furthermore, every shareholder is responsible for 
contributing his share of the capital. The paid share capital shows the invested equity 
and the amount paid for shares, but it does not mean that the issue price is the real value 
of shares.
In conclusion, shares are shares in the company, but not shares of the company. 
As CA 1985 s 744 states: a share is “share in the share capital of a company”. Yet, the 
main interest of company law and this research is in shareholders’ rights, not in the 
nature of shares.
2.3 Shareholders’ rights
Company law provides the formal structure and framework for the operation of 
companies. Companies and shares are creatures of company law. In a way, the company 
is split up into shares, to which shareholders’ rights are attached.
The company is a separate legal entity; therefore, the rights of shareholders 
should be limited. The courts have partly sacrificed shareholders’ private rights to serve
46 CA 1985 s 263ff.
47 Company Law Reform C White Paper') (Cm 6456) (London 2005) 43 proposes that the requirement of 
authorised share capital is removed.
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the greater good available through the corporate personality48. As explained in 
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2)49, when a shareholder 
acquires a share, he should accept the fact that the value of his investment follows the 
fortunes of the company. In addition, a shareholder can only exercise his voting rights 
in general meeting. In brief, the law confers on him the right to ensure that the company 
observes the limitations of its memorandum and the right to ensure that other 
shareholders observe the rules imposed by the articles. The relationship in a company is 
contractual as shareholders’ rights are set by the company constitution. As a result, 
shares are rights of participation in the company on the terms of the articles50.
The articles of association regulate shareholders’ rights in the company and inter 
se51 . The memorandum and the articles determine shareholders’ rights: their rights 
under the articles of association and the Companies Act are “an exhaustive statement”52 
of their interests as members. Furthermore, a company is entitled to issue shares 
conferring any rights. However, I do not further explore how shareholders’ rights are 
set: the focus in this chapter is on shareholders’ rights in general.
The object of a company is to make profit for its shareholders, who are residual 
claimants in the company. The ultimate power in companies rests on them. Normally, 
shareholders have rights to receive dividends, if declared, rights in liquidation to receive 
a share of surplus, and rights to vote53. Due to the nature of their interest, shareholders’ 
rights are more in the company, not so much against the company.
Shareholders’ rights cannot be very exact because they are residual. Put simply, 
equities are shares that carry no fixed economic right. Shareholders’ rights cannot be
48 Dignam, Alan J. and Allen, David, Company Law and the Human Rights Act 1998 (London 2000) 219.
49 [1982] Ch 204 (CA) 224.
50 Ibid 223.
51 Welton v Saffery [1897] AC 299 (HL); Borland’s Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co Ltd [1901] 1 Ch 279; 
Ray fie ld  v Hands [1958] 2 All ER 194.
52 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 379 (Lord Wilberforce); Re a company 
[1986] BCLC 376, 379 (Hoffmann J).
24 Chapter 2
very clear since their economic claim in the company has an “open-ended nature”54. 
Their economic interest is not a “legally enforceable promise”55. These rights may be 
“the most ill-defined”56 in the company in purely contractual terms. Actually, in a way, 
shareholders expect and hope to earn a return, but do not have a specific right to one.
So, they need control rights to protect their economic interest. I next review separately 
shareholders’ economic rights and their control power.
2.3.1 Shareholders’ economic rights
In the company, shareholders participate in a venture, where each shareholder may 
claim his share in the wealth generated by the joint enterprise. Shareholders have a 
residual interest in the company, so the return of their investment is strongly related to 
the economic success of the company. Shareholders participate in the profits of the 
company; their lot is the gains and losses from its good or bad performance.
A share is primarily a piece of property conferring rights in relation to 
distributions of income and of capital57. Shareholders are entitled to share in the profits 
as dividends when the company is operating and a share in the distribution of the 
surplus assets when it is wound up58. But as mentioned, shareholders’ economic rights 
are not very exact. Shares do not pay any fixed return, and do not have a fixed maturity 
date. In addition, the Companies Act does not explicitly describe shareholders’ rights to 
dividends and participation as these matters are left to the internal regulations of the 
company.
53 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Joiner [1975] 3 All ER 1050 (HL) 1056 (Lord Wilberforce); Inland 
Revenue Commissioners v Laird Group pic  [2003] 4 All ER 669 (HL) 678 (Lord Millett).
54 Cheffins, Brian R., ‘Corporations’ in Cane, Peter and Tushnet, Mark (eds), The Oxford Handbook o f  
Legal Studies (Oxford 2003) 485, 493.
55 Davies (2002) 262.
56 Worthington, Sarah, ‘Shares and shareholders: property, power and entitlement’ (2001) 22 Company 
Lawyer 307, 311.
57 P eters’ American Delicacy Co Ltd v Heath (1939) 61 CLR 457 (High Court of Australia) 503-4 (Dixon
J).
58 Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619 (HL) 626-27 (Lord Buckmaster).
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A company’s profit is divided among its members in proportion to their shares; 
the payment of dividends is one of the major benefits to shareholders59. The basic idea 
of the joint stock company is to be a sort of machine into which shareholders put money 
and out of which they draw dividends60. A surplus61 in a company is for shareholders, 
but they do not have any legal right to demand it or any part of it to be paid out as a 
dividend. The paying a dividend depends on the recommendation of the board and the
f\0resolution of general meeting following it . Lord Davey stated the law in Burland v 
Earle in this way:
Their Lordships are not aware of any principle which compels a joint stock 
company while a going concern to divide the whole of its profits amongst its 
shareholders. Whether the whole or any part should be divided, or what portion 
should be divided and what portion retained, are entirely questions of internal 
management which the shareholders must decide for themselves, and the Court 
has no jurisdiction to control or review their decision, or to say what is a ‘fair’ or 
‘reasonable’ sum to retain undivided, or what reserve fund may ‘properly’ 
required.63
If the board does not recommend the payment of a dividend, it cannot be declared 
before the company has a board willing to recommend it. A shareholder has the right to 
get the dividend paid only in accordance with the articles64; it is so a discretionary
59 See eg Re a company (No 00370 o f 1987), ex p  Glossop [1988] BCLC 570, 576 (Harman J).
60 Maitland, Frederic William, The Collected Papers, vol III (Fisher, H. A. L., ed) (Cambridge 1911) 383.
61 CA 1985 s 263(3) rules that dividends are payable from a company’s accumulated realised profits only.
62 Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985 (T able A ’) art 102; see also Scott v Scott [1943] 1 All 
ER 582.
63 [1902] AC 83 (PC) 95.
64 See Wood v Odessa Waterworks Co (1889) LR 42 Ch D 636.
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payment from a company to its shareholders. Until a dividend is declared, shareholders 
have no right to it65.
To summarise, shareholders have a right to dividends that a company has 
declared to pay. Company law does not require that the profits of a company should be 
distributed either at all or at any particular date or rate66. From the perspective of an 
individual shareholder, company law rules that if a company makes profit and pays 
dividends these should be paid to shareholders in proportion to their shares.
Shareholders share both distribution and capital in a company. But as shares are 
perpetual securities, company law does not offer shareholders a withdrawal right. They 
are not allowed to exit the company at will: they cannot simply ‘divorce’ from it67. An 
individual shareholder does not have the right to demand that capital should be returned 
nor that the company should be wound up. Naturally, as the shareholders have ultimate 
control over the company, they can decide the winding up by special resolution68. In 
addition, as shareholders’ claim is residual, they have a right to the return of the capital 
only after the company has first paid its creditors69. In any case, public companies are 
rarely wound up voluntarily. Companies are generally immortal: it is not normal for 
them to return the capital. Yet, if a company and shareholders decide to do so, the net 
capital should then be returned to shareholders. In brief, shareholders do not have the 
right to get the capital paid but they have a right to share net assets if capital is returned.
As mentioned above, the company owns its assets, and shareholders own their 
shares. Furthermore, shareholders are not part owners of a company. Shareholders have 
no right to any item of the company’s property as they have no legal or equitable
65 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Laird Group pic  [2003] 4 All ER 669 (HL) 679 (Lord Millett).
66 Equitable Life Assurance Society v Ernst & Young (a firm) [2003] 2 BCLC 603 (CA) 666.
67 See especially O ’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (HL).
68 Insolvency Act 1986 s 84(1 )(b).
69 See Griffith v Paget ( 1877) LR 6 Ch D 511; Insolvency Act 1986 s 143 states that in liquidation the 
assets of the company should be “realised and distributed to the company’s creditors and, if there is a 
surplus, to the persons entitled to it.”
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70interest therein . In this sense, shares are not shares of the company because a 
shareholder has no direct share in its assets71. However, there is a relation between the 
assets of the company and the value of its shares, and this question is under discussion 
in the next chapter. But for now, it is enough to state that the relationship is economic, 
not legal in its nature.
The right to transfer shares is shareholders’ economic right that offers them a 
way to join and leave the company. Shareholders have an affiliation right that make it 
easy for them to enter or exit a company. However, it should be remembered that 
although shareholders have a right to transfer their shares, nobody has a duty to buy 
them. Therefore, the free transferability of shares is more an economic possibility than a 
legal right, and this point is discussed further later72.
Shareholders have duties too. Their main one is to pay the issue price of shares, 
which liability continues as long as anything is unpaid on a share73. But it is the 
fundamental principle of companies limited by shares that the liability of the members 
is indeed limited to the amount unpaid on the shares held by them74. From the 
perspective of a shareholder, limited liability is a privilege: a right to invest in shares 
while his liability is restricted. Limited liability, which promotes the transferability of 
shares and encourages share investments, is often regarded as the main advantage of 
incorporation.
Shareholders have no duty to subscribe more shares, even if the company 
urgently needs further capital. Naturally, this is a consequence of the principle of 
limited liability. Still, share offerings can be made to shareholders on a pre-emptive
70 Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619 (HL) 626 (Lord Buckmaster).
71 Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] AC 534 (HL) 545 (Lord Porter).
72 Below 2.4.
73 Ooregum Gold Mining Company o f  India Ltd v Roper [1892] AC 125 (HL).
74 CA s l(2)(a); the constitution cannot require shareholders to make further contributions after shares are 
fully paid; Bisgood v Henderson’s Transvaal Estates Ltd [1908] 1 Ch 743 (CA).
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basis. However, shareholders then have only a pre-emption right to new shares, but no 
duty to subscribe them.
Shareholders do not have the right to sell their shares to somebody who has an 
obligation to buy them. Similarly, they do not have a duty75 to sell their shares. But 
there is an exception to this principle in takeover situations, where the still-existing 
minority shareholders are obliged to sell their shares at the same price as the offeror has 
acquired nine-tenths of the shares to which the offer relates76. The idea is to limit 
minority shareholders’ lock-up power in takeovers. Furthermore, it is possible to 
consider that these rules give for the special majority of shareholders in a way a 
possibility to wind up the whole company through a sale of all the shares. Therefore, 
this right might be more a governance than economic right. By accepting the offer, the 
special majority decides on behalf of all the shareholders, and after that decision, the 
offeror has the right to buy out the shares of the still-existing minority77.
In conclusion, shareholders have economic rights, which are to have a dividend 
if that is declared and to have a share of company net assets if the company is wound 
up. In the legal sense, these are more like promises than any exact rights. On the other 
hand, the economic point is that shareholders know that they will have their 
proportionate share of dividends if they are declared and of company assets if the 
company is wound up. Obviously, these rights assure that shareholders really have a 
residual right to the company’s profits. So, shareholders have these legal promises, and 
shares are rights of participation in a company. These rights make shares valuable; in 
addition, they are fundamentally future rights: something that is promised to every 
shareholder in future under certain circumstances. Thus, the value of shares is very 
much a question of the future, and of course the value of economic expectations is
75 Companies can have redeemable shares, which are not typical in public companies; see CA 1985 s 159.
76 See CA 1985 s 428ff; and in takeover situations minority shareholders have a right to be bought out by 
the offeror; see s 430A.
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decided on markets. But as shareholders’ economic rights cannot be exact, they need 
control rights in the company.
2.3.2 Shareholders’ control power
In the company, votes are attached to common stocks. Shareholders’ right to vote 
follows their residual claim in the company. In a way, shareholders contract for votes, 
no rational shareholder would subscribe ordinary shares if control rights were not
7 0
attached . The voting power is a substitute since shareholders’ economic rights cannot 
be exact: shareholders need that to protect themselves in the company.
Shareholders use their control power by voting, where the basic rule is that there
70is one vote for every share . Shareholders voting rights, like their economic rights, are 
in proportion to their shares. In any case, they act in the company collectively and only 
through the medium of general meeting80.
The most important feature concerning control right is that companies are 
governed by majority rule. This means that the majority of shareholders is able to 
decide on behalf of the company, and the quorum is normally half of the votes. It is 
fundamental part of corporate governance that decisions made with the support of the 
majority bind every shareholder.
There are three main areas where shareholders control the company: first, they 
control its constitution; second, they have control over the management; and third, they 
control its economic surplus. Still, it should be noted that by their control power, 
shareholders are able to decide how companies are governed, but this power does not 
mean that the majority is able to decide how the success of business is divided among
77 More below, chapter seven 7.6.
78 Davies (2002) 262.
79 Table A art 54.
80 Caparo Industries pic v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) 630 (Lord Oliver).
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81shareholders . That division is a matter of shareholders’ economic rights, the company 
constitution, and company law.
The presumption of company law is that shareholders together make resolutions 
that follow their shared interest as the suppliers of share capital. This proposes that 
shareholders also make efficient decisions. When resolutions are made by majority rule, 
they are beneficial to the majority and are supposed to be for the benefit of the company 
as a whole. The decisions made by majority power should represent the interests of all 
the shareholders. However, their interests can be conflicting too.
Shareholders are entitled to use their votes for their personal interest82. They do 
not have fiduciary duties towards each other83, and they have a right to vote in the 
company as they please. But company law governs how the majority may use their 
power: the law offers protection to minority shareholders. I review minority protection 
later together with majority power84.
The term separation of management and ownership implies that it is undesirable 
if shareholders participate in the governance of a company. From the traditional 
perspective, companies should have strong managers and dispersed shareholders85. 
Shareholders’ powerlessness is a necessary result of the diffusion of “the old property
O i '
relationships” . Shareholders are distant, and they should not even be interested in 
using the power they might have in a company. An important reason for this attitude is 
that the investment portfolios of modem investors are diversified into many companies: 
holdings in single companies are relatively small. Shareholders may just be rational
81 Eg Griffith v Paget (1877) LR 6 Ch D 511.
82 Pender v Lushington (1877) LR 6 Ch D 70; North-West Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty (1887) LR 12 
App Cas 589 (PC).
83 Eg Northern Counties Securities Ltd v Jackson & Steeple Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 1133, 1144; Re Astec 
(BSR) pic  [1998] 2 BCLC 556, 584.
84 Below chapter six.
85 Berle, Adolf A., Jr and Means, Gardiner C., The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York 
1932); see also Roe, Mark J., Strong Managers, Weak Owners -  The Political Roots o f  American 
Corporate Finance (Princeton 1994).
86 Berle and Means (1932) 2.
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when they are more or less apathetic concerning a single company. Shareholders can be 
seen as bystanders in the company structure when their interest is more on the market
8*7than in individual companies . Shareholders are expected to express their views by
buying and selling shares rather than by trying to govern companies.
On the other hand, these opinions are no longer current because the corporate
governance movement means that shareholders have taken a more active role in
companies. The way in which companies are governed is evolving. Maybe we should
talk nowadays about the post-modern Anglo-American company where shareholders
have a greater role to play. Nevertheless, this is a legal study, and my conclusion is
clearly that shareholders have control power in companies. Company law places
88shareholders in the driving seat of the company : ultimate power and legal authority in 
the company rest on shareholders. Further, they have the right to decide not to use this 
power and to be passive. Company law does not set shareholders a duty to use their 
votes89. Naturally, if shareholders are passive, other shareholders, or even the 
management by proxies, are then able to use the power they would have.
To conclude, shareholders have their control power: only they have votes in the 
company. Shareholders use the votes to govern the company and to protect their 
economic interests. Shareholders have a right to vote in a company, but no duty to do 
so.
87 See Buxbaum, Richard M., ‘Corporate Legitimacy, Economic Theory, and Legal Doctrine’ (1984) 45 
Ohio State Law Journal 515, 526, where he describes the transformation of the shareholder from “king of 
the corporation to king o f the market.”
88 Davies (2002) 255.
89 Although some academics see that shareholders should regard the use of votes as a duty as well; see eg 
Dine, Janet, ‘The Role of the Non-Executive Director’ in Sheikh, Saleem and Rees, William (eds), 
Corporate Governance & Corporate Control (London 1995) 199, 208.
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2.3.3 Shares as a bundle of rights
As Bentham says, property is “entirely the work of law”, ie there is no such thing as 
natural property90. Rules, principles, rights, and duties make together the law, and in a 
very similar way shares are a bundle of rights and duties91. But this is no special feature 
concerning shares only since ownership can in general be understood as a bundle of 
rights92.
In Borland’s Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co Lt<f3, Farwell J explained that a 
share consists of mutual covenants entered into by shareholders. Shares can be regarded 
as a bundle of contractual rights. A share is an interest consisting various rights 
contained in the corporate contract. This bundle of rights makes up a share94. However, 
this definition is not enough. In Inland Revenue Commissioners v Laid Group pic, Lord 
Millett formulated the point in this way:
It is customary to describe [a share] as ‘a bundle of rights and liabilities’, and 
this is probably the nearest that one can get to its character, provided that it is 
appreciated that it is more than a bundle of contractual rights.95
A share is more than a contractual bundle of rights. The memorandum and articles of 
association together with the law define shareholders’ interest in the company96. So,
90 Bentham, Jeremy, The Theory o f  Legislation (Ogden C. K., ed) (London 1931) 111; see also Penner, J. 
E., The Idea o f Property in Law (Oxford 1997) 3: property is always a creature of the legal system.
91 Re Sir William Thomas Paulin [1935] 1 KB 26 (CA) 57 (Romer LJ): a share is “the totality o f his rights 
and liabilities as they exist under the provisions of the Companies Act and the constitution of the 
particular company.”
For example, like the ownership of land; eg Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb, Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions (New Haven 1919) 96; see the definition of ownership in Walker, David M., The Oxford 
Companion to Law  (Oxford 1980) 910.
93 [1901] 1 Ch 279, 288.
94 Eg Re Saltdean Estate Co Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 1844, 1850 (Buckley J).
95 [2003] 4 All ER 669 (HL) 678.
96 Commissioners o f  Inland Revenue v Crossman [1937] AC 26 (HL) 66 (Lord Russell).
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shares as a bundle of rights are acquired by contract, but they are in crucial respects 
“constituted, conferred and defined” by the law97.
Shares are property. Further, shareholders’ rights are their rights of property; 
therefore, shareholders are entitled to exercise their rights to protect their individual 
interest. As a result, they may vote as they please. Does this mean that shareholders 
actually own their rights?
Although the juridical nature of shares is not easy to describe98, the answer is 
clear: shareholders do not own their rights but the shares only. Shareholders have their 
rights since they are members of the company and owners of their shares. However, that 
does not work vice versa, ie nobody becomes a member of the company because he has 
rights there. For example, as stated in Table A art 54, the members have votes in the 
company, and they have this right because they own shares.
There exist some Commonwealth cases that explain the distinction between 
shares and shareholders’ rights. In Government ofMauritus v Union Flacq Sugar 
Estates Co Ltd" ,  it was held that the property owned by a shareholder is his share, and 
his right to vote in general meetings is “not property in its own right” but merely “an 
incident of the ownership of a share”. In addition, an explanation of the nature of shares 
as property can be found in the judgment of the High Court of Australia in Peters’ 
American Delicacy Co Ltd v Heath100. There was also considered that shares “are 
property, and the right to vote is attached to the share itself as an incident of property to 
be enjoyed and exercised for the owner’s personal advantage”101. These two rulings are 
very understandable. Shareholders rights are components of shares and no distinct items 
of property. Shares are items of property, and the rights that together make up them are
97 Ireland, Paddy, ‘Property and contract in contemporary corporate theory’ (2003) 23 LS 453, 471.
98 [2003] 4 All ER 669 (HL) 678 (Lord Millett); Pennington, Robert, ‘Can shares in companies be 
defined?’ (1989) 10 Company Lawyer 140.
99 [1992] 1 WLR 903 (PC) 909-10 (Lord Templeman).
100 (1939) 61 CLR 457.
101 Ibid 504 (Dixon J).
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not102. Shareholders own their shares but not their rights, which they have as the 
members of the company.
It is not possible to separate the voting rights from shares, which are “one 
indivisible piece of property”103. Someone who wants to buy a vote must buy a share. 
Although shareholders may transfer their votes by selling the shares, where votes are 
attached, they may not sell the votes independently of the shares. In the USA, some 
states explicitly ban the sale of votes by statute, and other states by judicial decisions104. 
This kind of rule may sound to be a curious limit on shareholders’ ability to make their 
own arrangements. However, the separation of shares from votes introduces a 
disproportion between the expenditure and reward. Thus, legal rules tying the votes to 
shares increase the efficiency of a corporate organization105. In contrast, the companies’ 
legislation in England does not include any explicit rule that would ban the sale of 
votes; in addition, there does not seem to be any direct court ruling concerning the 
point. On the other hand, the rule is that only the registered shareholders are entitled to 
vote in a company106. According to Table A art 59, on a poll votes may be given 
personally or by proxy: a possible buyer of votes is actually neither of them. 
Consequently, there may be reasons to note that a possible buyer of votes is not entitled 
to vote in general meeting. The agreement is efficient between the shareholder and the 
buyer, but the agreement does not bind the company. This idea applies to shareholders’ 
agreements, which cannot have a binding force in the company.
102 Pennington (1989) 144.
103 See Attorney-General v Jameson [1905] 2 IR 218, 228 (FitzGibbon LJ); quoted in Commissioners o f  
Inland Revenue v Crossman [1937] AC 26 (HL).
104 See Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R., The Economic Structure o f  Corporate Law 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts 1991) 63ff; Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R. ‘Voting in 
Corporate Law’ (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 395, 410ff; further, it is interesting to notice 
that Manne, Henry G., ‘Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics’ (1967) 53 Virginia Law 
Review 259, 276 sees that the rulings holding a sale o f votes illegal are errors made by the courts.
105 Easterbrook and Fischel (1983) and (1991); see also Berle, Adolf A., ‘The Price of Power: Sale of 
Corporate Control’ (1965) 50 Cornell Law Quarterly 628, 631: “ because the stockholder’s vote exists for 
[the interests of the corporation as a whole], he is not allowed to sell it.”
106 Wise v Lansdell [1921] 1 Ch 420.
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Yet, English company law accepts that a company may have different series of 
shares, when one series can even have all the economic rights and another series all the 
voting rights in the company107. Economic rights and control power do not have to be 
bundled together on a one-to-one basis. Thus, if shareholders want to separate votes 
from the equity interest in the company, they can do it collectively through the company 
constitution. However, from the perspective of an individual shareholder the separation 
of votes from the economic interest is not a right that company law supports.
In conclusion, I quote Maitland, who says: “Like the man, the corporation is a 
right-and-duty-bearing unit”108. Still, this term describes more shares rather than men or 
companies. Shares are right-and-duty-bearing units since the very fundamental point 
with shares is the rights attached to them.
The company signifies what law makes it signify. To explain the company, we 
must refer to the relevant legal rules109; in addition, company law is a set of working 
rules110. In a similar way, shareholders have the rights that company law and the 
company constitution provide to them: shareholders do not have any natural rights.
They share rights in respect of dividends, return of capital, and voting. It is possible to 
call shares a bundle of these rights.
2.4 Transferability of shares
Shares are transferable personal property that can be traded between buyers and sellers. 
The company is a distinct legal entity having its own independent and continuous 
existence. From the perspective of the company, the personality of shareholders is not 
generally an important point. A company is legally the same even if all the shares have
107 This kind of a special company with three series of shares can be found in Re Saul D Harrison & Sons 
pic [1995] 1 BCLC 14 (CA).
108 Maitland (1911) 307.
109 Hart, H. L. A., ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’ (first published 1953) in Essays in 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford 1983) 39.
110 See generally eg Commons, John R., Legal Foundations o f Capitalism  (New York 1924) 134ff.
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been sold to new shareholders. It is this separate corporate personality that makes the 
free transferability of shares possible.
Due to the incorporation, shareholders’ freedom to transfer their shares is both 
legally and practically attainable. A company is an association in which shares are 
transferable111. The transferability of shares is a feature in which companies clearly 
differ from partnerships which are not incorporated and where the relationship between 
partners is personal.
The Partnership Act 1890 s 1(1) states: “ Partnership is the relation which 
subsists between persons carrying on a business in common.” Partnerships are based on 
mutual trust in order to engage in a business for partners’ joint benefit; thus, having a 
new a partner or a change of a partner is a sensitive issue. Shares in partnerships cannot 
be freely assigned: a new partner may be introduced only by the consent of all existing 
partners112. An assignment of shares in a partnership is not efficient against other 
partners; therefore, the assignee is only entitled to receive the share of profits to which 
the assigning partner would otherwise be entitled113. Shares in partnerships are not 
freely transferable because that would be against the basic nature of partnerships.
However, the free transferability of shares is not a common feature in all 
companies either. Shares of private companies are rarely freely transferable due to the 
pre-emption clauses in their articles. As in partnerships, the relationship in these close 
companies among shareholders is personal in nature: transfers of shares are not typically 
allowed. In public companies, shareholders are investors, whose shares are freely 
transferable. I next analyse transfer of shares generally under the Companies Act, and 
then separately in private and public companies. Furthermore, I ask whether the 
transferability of shares can make them more valuable.
111 R v Registrar o f  Joint Stock Companies, ex p  Johnston [1891] 2 QB 598 (CA) 610 (Lindley LJ).
112 Partnership Act 1890 s 24(7).
113 Ibid s 31(1).
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2.4.1 Transfer of shares under the Companies Act
As the CA 1985 s 182(1) declares, shares are items of personal property that are 
transferable in the manner provided by the company’s articles. However, company law 
does not explicitly guarantee the transferability of shares. But as Blackburn J said in Re 
Bahia and San Francisco Railway Co Ltd114: “When joint stock companies were 
established, the great object was that the shares should be capable of being easily 
transferred.” Indeed, company law has a presumption that shares are freely transferable, 
and shareholders may deal freely with their shares and to transfer them to whomever 
they please115. It is a normal right of a shareholder that shares are freely transferable116. 
In Greenhalgh v Mallard, Lord Greene MR stated:
a share, being personal property, is prima facie transferable, although the 
conditions of the transfer are to be found in the terms laid down in the articles. If 
the right of transfer, which is inherent in property of this kind, is to be taken 
away or cut down, it seems to me that it should be done by language of 
sufficient clarity to make it apparent that that was the intention.117
Company law supports transferability of shares. The basic attitude in company law is 
very much opposite than in partnership law, where transferability is restricted.
In company law, there is a clear distinction between the company and 
shareholders. There are typically no negative consequences of a transfer of shares; it is 
generally no problem to the company and shareholders. Shares should then be bought, 
sold, and transferred freely. In Re Stockton Malleable Iron Co, Jessel MR declared:
114 (1868) L R 3Q B  584, 595.
115 Re Smith, Knight & Co, Weston’s Case (1868) LR 4 Ch App 20.
116 Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 (CA) 306 (Lord Greene).
38 Chapter 2
It is against the interest of companies to fetter transfers. The more free the 
companies make the transfers the better for them, and the better for their 
shareholders.118
Company law generally understands the transferability of shares in this way.
2.4.2 Private companies
Private companies provide their share capital from a limited number of people. 
Shareholders in these companies are normally personally related with each other. In 
private companies, shareholders are typically the entrepreneurs of the company’s 
business. In a partnership, the maximum number of members by the law used to be 20 
persons119, but there have been no legal restriction for the maximum number of 
shareholders in a private company. However, the nature of the company sets a 
restriction to the number of shareholders: there is no room for too many shareholders to 
keep the relationship in a private company personal. In practice, the normal number of 
shareholders in a private company is much less than 20 persons. This feature clearly 
distinguishes private companies from public companies.
Shares of private companies may not be offered to the general public120. The 
presumption of company law is that these companies should provide their capital from 
their founding members, and in no case from the general public. Company law clearly 
signals that private companies are not intended to raise equity capital from a large group 
of investors. As their name implies, these companies should be private.
117 [1943] 2 All ER 234 (CA) 237.
118 (1875) LR 2 Ch D 101, 103.
119 CA 1985 s 716(1); repealed by Regulatory Reform (Removal of 20 Member Limit in Partnerships) 
Order art 2.
120 CA 1985 s 81(1).
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Company law contained a requirement121 that every private company should 
place some restriction on transfer of shares in its articles. But since the Companies Act 
1980, this has no longer been necessary. Nevertheless, it remains common for private 
companies to place some restriction on the free transferability of shares. Some 
companies require in their articles that the directors should approve new members, and 
some have a pre-emption clause in favour of existing members. A company’s articles 
may impose any kind of a restriction on transferability of shares, but these clauses 
cannot prohibit transfers completely. Shares must be transferable to some extent. 
Further, the courts interpret the restrictions on transferability strictly: if there is an 
ambiguity or uncertainty, shareholders right to transfer shares freely is supported122. 
Lord Greene MR formulated this principle in Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd by these words:
the shareholder has such a prima facie right, and that right is not to be cut down 
by uncertain language or doubtful implications. The right, if it is to be cut down, 
must be cut down with satisfactory clarity. It certainly does not mean that 
articles, if appropriately framed, cannot be allowed to cut down the right of 
transfer to any extent which the articles on their true construction permit.123
The fundamental view of the law is also in the case of private companies that shares are 
freely transferable unless the articles or the terms of issue explicitly and clearly restrict 
it124.
Private companies have many similarities with partnerships; therefore, they are 
often called quasi-partnerships. Private companies are from the business and personal
121 Companies Act 1948 s 28; repealed by Companies Act 1980 s 88(2) and Sch 4.
122 See Re Stockton Malleable Iron Co (1875) LR 2 Ch D 101.
123 [1942] Ch 304 (CA) 306.
124 See also Stothers v William Steward (Holdings) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 266 (CA).
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point of view much more analogous to partnerships than to public companies125. 
However, in law all companies are governed under the Companies Acts126. Shares of 
private companies are freely transferable if the articles do not explicitly restrict their 
transfer. The essential difference between a partnership and a company is that the 
proprietary interest in a company is fundamentally transferable. But law does not 
encourage the general public to invest in the shares of private companies. Law actually 
forbids the offerings of these shares to the general public. However, nobody is 
forbidden to invest in and to have these shares; moreover, the law is unable to say what 
the right number of shareholders is in a close company. In sum, the nature of private 
companies is different, which point should be emphasized also in this context. While the 
mam focus of this research is on public companies, we move on to analyse 
transferability of these shares.
2.4.3 Public companies
Public companies are capital-raising vehicles that may offer their shares to the general 
public. They are capable to facilitate investments from a large number of people in one 
institution. The share capital of a public company is typically subdivided into a very 
large number of shares with a low denomination to allow investors widely to become its 
members. These modem Anglo-American companies have a ‘wide dispersed 
ownership’. The theory of modem company tells that ownership and management of 
these companies are separated, which process has been essential to create stock 
markets127. In public companies, shareholders have the role of investors, whose 
relationship with the company and other shareholders is not personal or close. The
125 Lord Greene [1942] Ch 304 (CA) 306.
126 See generally eg Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 380.
127 Berle and Means (1932) 285; further below, chapter three and four.
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shares of public companies are commodities that can be sold, acquired, and transferred 
freely.
It is an essential part of public companies’ nature that they have a large number 
of shareholders and their shares are transferable. Such as it was explained in Re 
Stanley12*, the company involves two main ideas: members are so numerous that it 
cannot be described as a partnership, and they may transfer their interest freely. These 
two features have a strong connection with each other. In the case of a public company, 
shares have to be freely transferable to get a large number of shareholders; on the other 
hand, if shares were not freely transferable, then investors could not widely have them, 
and actually they would not even be willing to have them. Free transferability of shares 
makes them marketable; in addition, to be listed shares must be freely transferable129.
Shares of public companies are marketable and liquid. Shareholders are free to 
leave the company when they please. The transferability of shares makes possible to sell 
shares to anybody who is willing to buy them. So, there are transactions and transfers of 
shares as the sellers and the buyers decide so: it is not up the directors to approve new 
members, and there is no a pre-emption clause with an obligation to offer the shares to 
the other members. Thus, the market determines the existence of transactions and the 
price of shares. Consequently, the price and value of shares are not questions decided by 
the company, its management, or company law generally; the sellers and buyers set the 
price of shares in their transactions. Shareholders are free to decide whether they sell 
shares: they have an exit right out of the company. It is part of Anglo-American stock 
market tradition that unsatisfied shareholders are supposed to sell their shares and leave 
the company.
Company law cannot guarantee that there are willing buyers for shares and the 
market is operating well. Company law gives a shareholder the right to transfer his
128 [1906] 1 Ch 131, 134 (Buckley J).
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shares, but it does not impose upon anybody a duty to buy them. Naturally, company 
law cannot rule the price in these transactions. In a legal sense, company law does 
“rather little”130 to secure that shareholders have a real right to transfer their shares at a 
right price. Shareholders’ ability to sell their shares and quit the investment may be “a 
useful self-help remedy”; on the other hand, the importance of the option should not be
1 T 1overstated . Law makes the function of stock markets possible, yet it is up to the 
market whether it operates well and whether share prices are fair. In addition, the 
regulation of stock markets is clearly a question of law too, but my intention is not to 
review deeply capital markets law in this research. However, it should be mentioned 
that in many cases the operation of markets and the market price for shares can offer 
shareholders more protection than company law and the courts are able to provide. 
Altogether, both company law and markets have their own roles, but from the strict 
market perspective, the task of company law is to make shares freely transferable and 
the function of markets possible.
The company is a distinct entity from its shareholders; therefore, shares are 
freely transferable. Indeed, freedom is a very fundamental value in company law. I next 
propose that it makes shares more valuable.
2.4.4 The value of free transferability
In a private company, whose shares are not freely transferable, a shareholder may find 
himself in an “unfortunate position, unable to exit the company or to do so only at an 
unrealistically low price”132. A shareholder can be “at the mercy” of the majority 
shareholders133. This kind of a shareholder is in practice very much locked into the
129 UKLA Listing Rules 2.2.4 (1).
130 Davies (2002) 23.
131 Blanchard, Julian, ‘Who Are Shareholders? -Search for Identity and Role’ (1999) 11 Corporate and 
Business Law Journal 165, 171.
132 Davies (2002) 23.
133 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 381 (Lord Wilberforce).
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company. The situation can be the same even if shares were under the articles freely 
transferable since the shares of private companies have no well-operating markets. For 
example, a minority shareholder might be willing to leave a private company because he 
is not happy with the company’s policy governed by majority shareholders. Still, as the 
relationship in private companies is personal, the question is not only whether 
somebody is willing to buy his shares: it is more about whether somebody is willing to 
step into his shoes and take his place in the company. The relationship between 
shareholders is more like in a family, not only a relationship between investors. This 
point makes selling and buying of these shares more complicated. In addition, if the 
existing minority shareholder is really disappointed with the company and its majority 
shareholders, the new possible shareholder may share this view too. The natural buyer is 
often the majority shareholder or somebody close to him, and if there is only one 
possible buyer, the seller cannot expect to reach the best price in the transaction. To sum 
up, it is very difficult to sell a private company’s shares in a fair price although these 
shares would be legally freely transferable. These shares do not have real markets; they 
are never freely transferable in practice.
It is different in quoted companies. Shares are not only legally freely 
transferable, but due to the stock market, they can be bought and sold every day and all 
time. There are always some investors willing to buy shares: companies get new 
members and existing shareholders buy more shares and vice versa. Market transactions 
are normal in these companies, and nothing exceptional as the case is in private 
companies. Moreover, the market is said to be functioning well when there are many 
transactions and shares are widely sold. The free transferability of shares together with 
operation of stock markets gives shareholders a real way to join and leave the company 
as they please.
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On stock markets, there is a great number of possible buyers for shares since 
every investor can become a member of the company. As there are many buyers and 
sellers, these markets are liquid. Shares are sold at a public auction that secures the best 
possible price for the seller: stock markets offer a very efficient way to carry out 
transactions. The transferability of shares and a functioning stock market together mean 
that there exists “easy come, easy go situation” for investors134. Overall, the market 
price is the best price for shares. So, the free transferability with the market mechanism 
makes shares, in fact, more valuable. The market has a wealth-creation function, and I 
analyse the relationship between markets and share prices more below in chapter four.
Due to free transferability of shares, shareholders may legally and economically 
be free to leave a company. But naturally, free transferability has no value for 
shareholders if there is a very limited number of possible buyers and no market for 
shares. Company law itself is unable to provide any value for shares: the price of shares 
is generally available only from markets. The value of shares is their market price, and 
when the market operates well, the higher is their value.
2.5 Rights and value
Proprietary interest in a corporate structure is split to investors, but shareholders 
participate in the company through their shares only. Shareholders’ rights are in 
proportion to their shares, which have economic value due to the rights. Free 
transferability makes shares marketable; moreover, shares are most valuable when stock 
markets operate well. Shareholders can expect to have periodic income from their 
shares as dividends are paid. In addition, they are able to get capital gains if the 
company’s capital is returned or when they sell their shares. But company law does not 
guarantee that dividends are paid, capital is returned, or there are buyers for shares.
134 Buxbaum (1984) 526.
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Shares are property, and as Bentham notes, property is “nothing but a basis of 
expectation”135. Shares are a bundle of rights which is transferable and valuable. The 
value of shares rests on shareholders’ rights, but their value itself is decided in the
markets. As Worthington states: “The law is concerned with entitlements; the market
1with expectations” . I conclude this chapter by noting that the law is about rights and 
the market about values. Therefore, although I have analysed shareholders’ rights, I am 
still unable to say anything firm about the value of shares.
135 Bentham (1931) 111.
136 Worthington (2001) 258.
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CHAPTER 3
COMPANY ASSETS AND SHARE VALUE
The meaning o f a corporation, like the meaning o f 
property and liberty, has been changing during 
decades and centuries, and when a corporation 
appears in court it takes on a variety o f shapes 
derived from different parts o f its history.
John R. Commons, Legal Foundations o f Capitalism 
(1924) 291.
3.1 Companies and shareholders
The important starting point is that companies are legal entities, which own their assets. 
Shareholders own their shares, but they do not own the assets of a company. Still, there 
is a connection between a company’s assets and the value of its shares because share 
value is related to the success of the company’s business and the value of its assets.
In this chapter, I analyse the relationship between the company and share value. 
The value of a company’s assets really has importance when shares are valued. Yet, my 
aim is to demonstrate that this relationship is more economic than legal in its nature. As 
a result, the law does not rule that the value of shares is their proportionate part of a 
company’s asset value.
In addition, I review the notion of ownership in company law. This study 
accepts that companies have features of two-tier ownership since shareholders are, in a 
way, the ultimate owners of a company but the company itself owns its assets. Overall, I 
stress that shareholders own the company only metaphorically but not legally.
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3.2 Company assets
The concept of a corporation is from Roman law. As a leading Roman jurist, Ulpian, 
explained, the property of a corporate body is not the property of its members. Ulpian 
underlined this point by saying that, even if a corporation consists of a single member, it 
is still a distinct and separate entity from this member. However, these Roman 
corporations were created by the state to serve special ends, so they were no commercial 
entities.1 Legal institutions of capitalism are not derived from Roman law2.
In England, the history of corporations is a millennium long. The first English 
corporations had a non-profit character: they were very much like their Roman 
ancestors. These corporations were monasteries, universities, hospitals, and other 
institutions having public nature. They were creatures of law, whose existence was 
confirmed by the sovereign power3. Due to their special nature, they enjoyed certain 
privileges, but these public corporations are beyond the interest of this study. While 
companies share the history of corporations that are their predecessors, the modem 
commercial company is mainly a creature of the past two centuries: it is a relatively 
recent development in Anglo-American law4. In fact, the first joint stock companies 
were large partnerships with a common transferable stock. Companies, indeed, have 
both corporation and partnership roots. I now review the role of assets in partnerships 
and companies.
1 About Roman law, see eg Tigar, Michael E., Law and the Rise o f Capitalism  (2nd edn New York 2000) 
31-32.
2 Stein, Peter, Roman Law in European History (Cambridge 1999) 121.
3 Case o f Sutton’s Hospital (1612) 10 Co Rep 23a, 26b: “the incorporation cannot be created without the 
Ring.”
4 The first typical joint stock companies appeared in the 18 century; see eg Cooke, C. A., Corporation, 
Trust and Company (Manchester 1950) 50; Formoy, Ronald Ralph, The Historical Foundations o f  
Modern Company Law (London 1923) 3, where he sees that towards the end of the 17th century 
“something very much like the modern organisation of companies” had developed but it had not yet 
obtained legal recognition or regulation.
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3.2.1 Assets in a partnership
A partnership is “the relation which subsists between persons carrying on a business in 
common with a view of profit”5. Naturally, also companies carry out business with a 
view of profit. But companies are not partnerships: they are explicitly excluded from the 
Partnership Act 18906. The main difference between companies and partnerships is that 
companies are legal entities while a partnership is not an organization in its own right 
with a separate legal personality. In Sadler v Whiteman, Farwell LJ stated:
In English law a firm as such has no existence; partners carry on business both 
as principals and as agents for each other within the scope of the partnership
n
business; the firm name is a mere expression, not a legal entity.
Partners are collectively the firm. “If anything is owed to the partnership, it is owed to 
the individual members and the individual members owe what is owed by the 
partnership,” as Lindley and Banks put it8. Partners own the assets of a firm, and they 
hold partnership property jointly as tenants in common9. They share the assets of a 
partnership: each partner has a proprietary interest in each and every asset in the firm10.
3.2.2 Assets in a company
Companies are extensions of partnerships. Further, company law has developed 
“seamlessly from the law of partnership”11. Yet, it should be remembered that
5 Partnership Act 1890 s 1(1).
6 s 1(2).
7 (1910) 79 LJ KB 786 (CA) 799.
8 1’Anson Banks, R. C., Lindley & Banks on Partnership (18th edn London 2002) 21.
9 Partnership Act 1890 s 20(1).
10 Partnership Act 1890 s 24(1); Manley v Sartori [1927] 1 Ch 157, 163 (Romer J): a partner “has an 
unascertained interest in every single asset o f the partnership.”
11 O ’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (HL) 1098 (Lord Hoffmann).
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companies are not partnerships, and company law is not partnership law12. The legal 
status of members in a company and in a partnership is not equivalent.
The House of Lords set the final seal on legal corporate existence in Salomon v
1TA Salomon and Co Ltd , where Mr Salomon and ‘his’ company were not regarded as 
the same person14. As Lord Macnaghten declared: “The company is at law a different 
person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum”15. Companies are legal 
entities that have their own personality.
Since companies have their legal personality, shareholders lack any proprietary 
interest in the company’s assets16. An incorporated company’s assets are its property, 
not the property of shareholders17. Simply, a company itself owns its assets which do 
not belong to shareholders. In Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd, Lord Buckmaster 
explained shareholders’ status in this way:
no shareholder has any right to any item of property owned by the company, for 
he has no legal or equitable interest therein. He is entitled to a share in the
profits while the company continues to carry on business and a share in the
18distribution of the surplus assets when the company is wound up.
The company owns its property both legally and beneficially19. It has its own assets and 
liabilities and its own creditors20. As Lindley and Banks state: “If anything is owed to
12 New Brunswick & C Co v Muggeridge (1859) 4 Drew 686, 700: it is a fallacy to call a joint stock 
company a partnership; see also Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 380.
13 [1897] AC 22 (HL).
14 Mr Salomon had 20,001 of 20,007 shares, and in the words of Lopes LJ in Broderip v Salomon [1895] 
2 Ch 323 (CA) 341, the remaining six shares were held by “dummies” and “puppets”, ie the members of 
his family.
15 [1897] AC 22 (HL) 51.
16 Segenhoe Ltd v Akins [2002] Lloyd’s Rep PN 435 (Supreme Court of New South Wales); quoted in 
Equitable Life Assurance Society v Ernst & Young (a firm) [2003] 2 BCLC 603 (CA) 665.
17 Re George Newman & Co [1895] 1 Ch 674 (CA) 685.
18 [1925] AC 619 (HL) 626-27.
19 Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA).
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an entire body, it is not owed to the individual members, nor do the individual members 
owe what is owed by the entire body”21. In essence, a shareholder has no direct share in 
the assets of the company22. Shares are not the same thing as the property that the 
company owns23.
Yet, a company’s property has importance to shareholders, who have a residual 
economic interest in the company. Shareholders’ proprietary interest in the company is 
their shareholding: they have shares and shareholders’ rights24. Further, shareholders 
have the rights defined by the company’s constitution and the Companies Act25. These 
rights do not include a right to the assets of the company. In sum, shareholders have a 
proprietary interest in the company, but no right in the property of the company26.
Sir Francis Palmer says: “A corporation, it must be remembered, is not, like a 
partnership or a family, a mere collection or aggregation of individual units”27. The 
company and its shareholders are distinct persons. A company is capable of enjoying 
rights and being a subject to duties that are not the same as those enjoyed or borne by 
shareholders. The property of a company is not shareholders’ joint property. In addition,
although a shareholder owns every share in a company, he does not own the assets of
28the company .
20 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (a firm) [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 61 (Lord Millett); John Foster & Sons Ltd v 
Commissioners o f  Inland Revenue [1894] 1 QB 516 (CA) 529 (Kay LJ): “property is vested in an entirely 
independent and separate body.”
21 I’Anson Banks (2002) 21.
22 Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] AC 534 (HL) 545 (Lord Porter); Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v Laird Group pic  [2003] 4 All ER 669 (HL) 678 (Lord Millett).
23 [1894] 1 QB 516 (CA) 530; Re Sir William Thomas Paulin [1935] 1 KB 26 (CA) 57 (Romer LJ): it is 
not possible “to treat a share as being an interest in the company’s assets.”
24 Birch v Cropper in Re Bridgewater Navigation Co Ltd (1889) LR 14 App Cas 525 (HL) 546: 
shareholders participate in the company “through their shares alone”.
25 Commissioners o f Inland Revenue v Crossman [1937] AC 26 (HL) 66.
26 [2003] 4 All ER 669 (HL) 678; Caparo Industries p ic  v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) 631.
27 Palmer, Francis Beaufort, Company Law: A Practical Handbook fo r  Lawyers & Business Men (4th edn 
London 1902) 45.
28 Raja v van Hoogstraten [2004] All ER 793 (CA) 824 (Chadwick LJ); Macaura v Northern Assurance 
Co Ltd [1925] AC 619 (HL) 633 (Lord Wrenbury); furthermore, the position in criminal law is no 
different as even the sole shareholders can be charged with theft o f a company’s property; see Attorney 
General’s Reference (No 2 o f  1983) (1984) 78 Cr App R 131; R v Philippou (1989) 89 Cr App R 290 
(CA); Iwai, Katsuhito, ‘Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and 
Comparative Corporate Governance’ (1999) 47 AJCL 583, 592: “If I take away a gadget from the factory
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The law is clear: shareholders own their shares and have shareholders’ rights, 
but they do not have rights in the property of the company. A company alone owns its 
assets. There is no direct legal relationship between shareholders and the company’s 
assets.
3.3 The two-tier union
Companies are legal entities and persons that are distinct from their shareholders. On 
the other hand, the company is not only a person: it is also a union. This duality makes 
it complicated to explain and understand what the company actually is. Altogether, it 
may be a difficult and confusing concept both for legal theory and the courts29.
In addition, the company is a legal entity having features of a contract. But 
companies are not contracts since the relationship in the company is not predominantly 
contractual30. Furthermore, some commentators claim that companies play a dual role in 
another way: the corporate is both a person and a thing31.1 next ask whether the 
company can be described as a thing or whether there exists a different kind of duality 
in the company. As a part of these analyses, I review a fundamental question: do 
shareholders own the company?
of the corporation I am shareholder of, I will be immediately subject to arrest as a thief. Why? Because a 
corporate shareholder is not the legal owner of the corporate assets.”
29 See eg Hart, H. L. A., ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’ (originally 1953) in Essays in 
Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford 1983) 21ff; Re Stanley [1906] 1 Ch 131, 134 (Buckley J): “The 
word ‘company’ has no strictly technical meaning.”
30 More below, chapter six 6.2.2.
31 Eg Iwai (1999) 583; see also Davies, Paul L., Gower and Davies' Principles o f Modern Company Law 
(7th edn London 2003) 616.
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3.3.1 Company as a thing
Companies are artificial persons that do not have any physical or real existence. They 
are products of law and creations of the jurist’s mind32. In consequence, corporate 
personality may be a convenience33. However, these artificial legal persons are as 
natural in law as natural persons34. In law, all persons, if we quote Maitland, are “right- 
and-duty-bearing units”35, although I propose that this term better describes shares that 
are bundles of rights36. In the legal sense, the company is not a myth or fiction; 
companies are as real as the law itself. It is “impossible to say at the same time that 
there is a company and there is not”37. When a company exists, it is a legal person and 
entity. In English law, companies are persons and subjects.
Persons may own property, and shareholders own their shares. From the 
perspective of shareholders, shares are the objects of their legal rights, ie shares are 
things owned by them38. One way to describe the basic relationship between persons 
and things in the market economy is the following:
Persons are subjects of property right, and things are objects of property right. 
Persons own things, and things are owned by persons. There is an absolute 
divide between persons and things. If persons own persons, we are back to the 
slave economy of the ancient past. If things own persons, we are perhaps trapped 
in the world of a science-fiction story. Indeed, it is because persons and things
32 Great Eastern Railway Co v Turner (1872) LR 8 Ch App 149, 152 (Lord Selborne LC): the company is 
“a mere abstraction of law”.
33 See Arnold, Thurman W., The Folklore o f Capitalism  (New Haven 1962) (originally 1937) 350; Pound, 
Roscoe, Jurisprudence, vol IV (St Paul 1959) 261.
34 Re Sheffield and South Yorkshire Permanent Building Society (1889) 22 LR QB 470, 476: “A 
corporation is a legal persona just as much as an individual,”; see also Commons, John R., Legal 
Foundations o f Capitalism  (New York 1924) 143; Kelsen, Hans, Introduction to the Problems o f Legal 
Theory (Oxford 1992) (originally 1934) 46ff.
35 Maitland, Frederic William, The Collected Papers, vol III (Fisher, H. A. L., ed) (Cambridge 1911) 307.
36 Above chapter two 2.3.3.
37 Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL) 31 (Lord Halsbury).
38 See the definition of things in Walker, David M., The Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford 1980) 1216; 
in addition, it should be noted that property does not only mean material things.
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are strictly opposed as subjects and objects of property right that it is possible 
for two persons to exchange the things they own in a market.39
This is understandable, but the relationship between subjects and objects is more 
complex. Subjects are possessors of legal rights and duties. Men and companies are 
subjects, ie they are right-and-duty-bearing units. Yet, shares are also these kinds of 
units: they are bundles of rights. Shares are subjects of rights too. On the other hand, 
shares are things, and more precisely, choses in action40. Shares may be both objects 
and subjects of rights. However, a subject does not mean in law a person, and things are 
not only objects. A share is the object of shareholders’ ownership, but beyond this, it is 
the subject of shareholders’ rights since these rights are attached to them. Furthermore, 
shares are property, but shareholders’ rights are not41. In essence, shares play a dual role 
in law by trespassing across the ‘great divide’ between subjects and objects. The 
conclusion is however that only shareholders and companies are persons: shares are 
things.
Naturally, persons can exchange objects in a market, and shares are 
commodities that are widely bought and sold. But it is not possible to buy or sell a 
company on the share market, where shares are quoted. Share transactions are indeed 
share transactions, although stocks are bought and sold as the shares of a company and 
because the company has some assets. Nonetheless, the ‘things’ transferred are shares 42 
The company is not property in itself43 since it is a person. Companies cannot be 
bought and sold because they are not property nor things. A company has its
39 Iwai (1999)587.
40 Re VGM Holdings Ltd [1942] Ch 235 (CA) 241 (Lord Greene MR); Colonial Bank v Whinney (1886) 
LR 11 App Cas 426 (HL).
41 See chapter two 2.3.3.
42 About transactions in securities and relating to securities, see Inland Revenue Commissioners v Laird 
Group pic  [2003] 4 All ER 669 (HL) 677; however, see also ibid 678: “The company is at one and the 
same time a juridical person with rights and duties of its own, and a res owned by its shareholders.”
43 Eg Cooke (1950) 17.
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independent legal existence; it remains the same, even if its every share is transferred to 
new shareowners. Furthermore, all the shares in a company are not the company44. The 
company is not divided among shareholders, who have their rights, but no property right 
in the company. As a result, a company is not shareholders’ property, and it cannot be a 
thing45. The company does not cross the border between persons and things.
A person is able to buy all the shares of a company. So, it is argued that the 
majority or single shareholder is de facto the company, although the company is still the 
sole legal owner of its assets46. But ownership is a legal concept, and therefore company 
law rules the ownership of the company. It should be remembered that in Broderip v 
Salomon the Court of Appeal accepted that Mr Salomon was the company47. In contrast, 
the House of Lords held in Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd that Mr Salomon was not 
the company48. The position of law is that “once the company is legally incorporated it 
must be treated like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities 
appropriate to itself’49. Another well-known case is Macaura v Northern Assurance Co 
Ltd, where Mr Macaura believed that the timber of the company was his as he was the 
sole shareholder. Of course, it was not. Lord Wrenbury formulated: “the corporator 
even if he holds all the shares is not the corporation”50. The law determines that the 
company is a separate and distinct entity from its shareholders. No shareholder is de 
facto a company according to company law. They do not carry on the business of a
44 Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA) 122.
45 Worthington, Sarah, ‘Shares and shareholders: property, power and entitlement’ (2001) 22 Company 
Lawyer 258, 259 summarises the current legal view that a share “does not give the shareholder any 
interest in the company’s assets or ownership of the company as a thing”; in addition, ibid 265: “if a 
company truly is a person at law, then it cannot also be a thing -  there is a fundamental disjunction 
between the two.”
46 Iwai (1999) 594; in addition, Hart, Oliver, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (Oxford 1995) 29 
sees that company A, which acquires company B, becomes in a legal sense the owner of company B ’s 
assets.
47 [1895] 2 Ch 323 (CA).
48 [1897] AC 22 (HL); Palmer (1902) 45 sees that the ruling of the Court of Appeal was “a melancholy 
instance of the legal quagmire into which the neglect of [corporate personality] may conduct even the 
most learned judges.”
49 [ 1897] AC 22 (HL) 30 (Lord Halsbury).
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company51. Shareholders can do so only “in a popular sense”, but not legally52. A 
shareholder is not “in truth the company”53, and anything else “is a fallacy from 
beginning to end”54.
To repeat, shareholders are not the company, which remains a distinct person 
from them. There is a clear distinction between the company and shareholders. In law, it 
does not matter whether the shares of a company are in the hands of one or many55. The 
acquisition of shares in a company offers no way to become a company.
Company law can be confusing: it is artificial and unnatural to think that 
companies are persons. The notion of legal personality may even hinder the 
understanding of corporations56. Corporate entities cannot be analysed as human 
persons, and so some commentators prefer to use the term ‘legal entity’ to describe their 
juridical basis57.
The company is not ‘they’, ie the shareholders, but the company is ‘it’, because 
the company has its own legal personality. That point has a “critical significance” in 
law58. Corporate personality has to be taken ‘seriously’ from the legal perspective59.
Should the company then be called ‘he’, since it might be easier to accept that 
the company has its own personality? Absolutely not, there is no need to personify and 
mystify the company any further. That is not the direction in which legal theory or 
practice should move. It is more appropriate that everybody attempts to understand that
50 [1925] AC 619 (HL) 633; in addition, the holder of a block of shares in a company is in not the owner 
of an appropriate part of the undertaking; see Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA).
51 Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd v Stanley [1908] 2 KB 89 (CA).
52 [1897] AC 22 (HL) 43 (Lord Herschell).
53 Ibid 35 (Lord Watson).
54 John Foster & Sons Ltd v Commissioners o f Inland Revenue [1894] 1 QB 516 (CA) 530 (Kay LJ).
55 [1897] AC 22 (HL) 53 (Lord Macnaghten).
56 Stoljar, S. J., Groups and Entities (Canberra 1973) 188; in addition, corporate personality raises 
difficult questions that “have been among the most controversial in law and legal theory”; see ibid v; 
Radin, Max, ‘The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality’ (1932) 32 Columbia Law Review 643.
57 Eg Hansmann, Henry and Kraakman, Reinier, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (2000) 110 
Yale Law Journal 387, 439.
58 Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (a firm ) [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 60 (Lord Millett).
59 Cheffins, Brian R., ‘Corporations’ in Cane, Peter and Tushnet, Mark (eds), The Oxford Handbook o f  
Legal Studies (Oxford 2003) 485, 486.
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companies are persons in law. This personality cannot be a piece of new information as 
the existence of corporations is an old story. Therefore, this study proposes that 
companies should be just companies, including the notion that companies are not things 
and property. Simply, a person is a person, not a thing, and this also applies to 
companies.
In summary, companies and shares may have features of property and contract. 
Still, companies, shares, and shareholders’ rights are products of law. It is significant 
that company law makes companies persons; therefore, they cannot be contracts or 
things.
3.3.2 Ownership of the company
Since the company is a person, it cannot be owned. Those who argue that the company 
is a set of contracts might conclude that nobody can own companies and markets60. That 
is true, and the reason is clear: they are not property. Yet, companies are neither 
contracts nor markets. For example, Coase says that the company and the market are 
“alternative methods of organization”61. Companies emerge when contracts are 
unsatisfactory; in the company, some market transactions might be eliminated and
f i ' )substituted by “the entrepreneur-co-ordinator” .
An important statement concerning shareholders’ position can be found in Short 
v Treasury Commissioners where Evershed LJ declared:
60 Fama, Eugene F., ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’ (1980) 88 Journal of Political 
Economy 288; see also Deakin, Simon and Slinger, Giles, ‘Hostile Takeovers, Corporate Law, and the 
Theory of the Firm’ (1997) 24 JLS 124, 126.
61 Coase, R. H., ‘The Nature of the Firm’ in The Firm, the Market, and the Law (Chicago 1988) 
(originally 1937) 33, 41; on the other hand, a company also resembles the market since it is a medium 
where buyers and sellers engage in free and willing exchange; see Cheffins, Brian R., ‘Using Theory to 
Study Law: A Company Law Perspective’ (1999) 58 CLJ 197, 209.
62 Coase (1988) 35.
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Shareholders are not, in the eye of the law, part owners of the undertaking. The
undertaking is something different from the totality of share-holdings.63
Indeed, the position in law is that: 1) shareholders do not own the assets of the 
company; and 2) neither they own the company. Instead, shareholders own their 
shares64.
Could there then be any room for confusion about the ownership of the 
company? Unfortunately, there have been different views as long as there have been 
companies. It is part of modem corporation theory that there exists separation of 
ownership and control in a company65. Directors control the company, and shareholders 
only ‘own’ it. But actually, shareholders do not own the company, and directors do not 
have ultimate control over it. The term ‘separation of risk bearing and management’ is 
more appropriate66. In sum, shareholders own the company neither in theory nor in 
practice.
Surprisingly, there exists case law that directly supports the notion that 
shareholders own the company67.1 analyse two rulings where shareholders were 
explicitly regarded as the owners of the company.
Re a company (No 00370 o f 1987). ex p Glossov 
In Re a company (No 00370 o f 1987), ex p Glossop, Harman J declared that:
63 [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA) 122.
64 Eg Dias, R. W. M., Jurisprudence (5th edn London 1985) 255; Demsetz, Harold, ‘Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights’ (1967) 57 American Economic Review, Supplement 347, 359: “What shareholders 
really own are their shares and not the corporation.”
65 Berle, Adolf A., Jr and Means, Gardiner C., The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York 
1932).
66 See eg Boros, Elizabeth J., Minority Shareholders’ Remedies (Oxford 1995) 5; Roe, Mark J., Strong 
Managers, Weak Owners -  The Political Roots o f American Corporate Finance (Princeton 1994) ix, 
where he sees that shareholders “specialize in risk-bearing”; and Fama, Eugene F. and Jensen, Michael 
C., ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics 301.
67 Eg Caparo Industries pic v Dickman [1989] QB 653 (CA) 680 (Bingham LJ).
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it is, in my judgment, right to say that directors have a duty to consider how 
much they can properly distribute to members. They have a duty, as I see it, to 
remember that the members are the owners o f the company [and] that the profits
ZQ
belong to the members.
Harman J clearly stated that shareholders are the owners of the company; in effect, the 
profits of the company belong to them. However, in legal terms neither is true. The 
assets or profits of the company do not actually belong to shareholders. Shareholders do 
not own the company as they do not have any property right in the company. In his 
ruling, Harman J emphasized the residual nature of shareholders’ interest in the 
company, and he did that by using rhetorical language and wording. Judgments can be 
oratories, which should not be understood literally. Thus, it is important to understand 
Harman J ’s message, but his exact words should not be quoted. This ruling does not, in 
fact, make shareholders the ‘real’ owners of the company.
Inland Revenue Commissioners v Laird Group pic 
Another ruling is from the House of Lords, and this case also concerns the residual 
nature of shareholders’ interest. Lord Millett stated in Inland Revenue Commissioners v 
Laird Group pic by these words:
The shareholders own the company, but they entrust the management of its 
undertaking to the directors. To enable the directors to carry out their functions, 
shareholders give them a discretion to decide how much of the company’s funds 
should be retained to pay creditors and carry on the business and how much can 
safely be returned to shareholders by way of dividend. By declaring a dividend,
68 [1988] BCLC 570, 577 (emphasis added).
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the directors effectively release funds due to the shareholders from their power 
to retain them in the business.69
In their Lordships’ ruling, Lord Millett clearly underlined shareholders’ residual interest 
in the company when he explicitly mentioned that the undistributed profits of a 
company belong to them. Therefore, the payment of a dividend was not a payment from 
the directors, but a payment from the shareholders to themselves . The payment of a 
dividend could not be a transaction relating to securities. Even so, neither can the 
payment of a dividend be a shareholders’ payment to themselves as the company is not 
a partnership and the assets of a company are not shareholders’ assets. Yet, their 
Lordships used metaphorical language to overturn the ruling of the Court of Appeal, 
where the payment of a dividend was regarded as a transaction relating to securities.
The House of Lords gave a clear message; but again, by taking their words literally, this 
ruling can be misunderstood. There is no reason to argue that Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v Laird Group pic overruled, for example the ruling in Short v Treasury 
Commissioners.
Both Re a company (No 00370 o f 1987), ex p Glossop and Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v Laird Group pic seem to accept the point that shareholders own the 
company. Still, these judgments do so only as supporting shareholders’ residual interest 
in the company. The legal issues decided in the cases did not directly concern the 
ownership of the company; as a result, they do not really rule that shareholders own the 
company. Shareholders’ ‘ownership’ in the company was part of the reasoning but not 
the ruling of the court. These cases do not change the law: shareholders do not own the 
company.
69 [2003] 4 All ER 669 (HL) 679 (emphasis added).
70 In Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (a firm ) [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 66 Lord Millett’s formulation was that in 
economic terms shareholders have “two pockets.”
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The conception of property has varied from period to period71, but the company 
has not become property. However, it is a popular view that shareholders ‘own’ the 
company72, and commentators use the same rhetorical language73. In contrast, I consider 
that the argument that shareholders own the company can only be used to emphasize 
shareholders’ residual interest in the company. While the correct way to state 
shareholders’ legal position in the company is formulate it similarly as, for example 
Davies does it: “shareholders own their shares, not the company”74.
Shareholders’ interests are predominant in the company, where they as a group 
have the largest and fullest interest. As explained above in chapter two, their interest is 
residual. Therefore, shareholders may even be called proprietors in the company75. But 
although shareholders’ position has some similarities with owners generally, it is not 
enough for the ownership of the company. The ownership is a question of law. The 
significant difference is that shareholders do not share property in the company. So, 
they can own the company only ‘loosely’ since they do not have property rights there. 
Ownership describes a situation when a person has a property right in something76. In
71 Commons (1924) 291; Goodhart, Arthur L., Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law (London 
1931) 40; Vandevelde, Kenneth J., ‘The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of 
the Modern Concept o f Property’ (1980) 29 Buffalo Law Review 325, 325: “the meaning of the term 
‘property’ has changed radically.”
Worthington (2001)258.
73 Eg Hollington, Robin, Shareholders’ Rights (4th edn London 2004) 68: “The shareholders are the 
owners of the company”; Palm er’s Company Law, vol 1 (25th edn London 1992) [6.001] (February 
2002): “the shareholder is the proportionate owner of the company”; Pettet, Ben, Company Law (Harlow 
2001) 164: “Reading the above, makes it possible to forget that the shareholders are the owners of the 
company” (emphasis original).
74 Davies, Paul L., Introduction to Company Law (Oxford 2002) 257; see also Lynch Fannon, Irene, 
Working Within Two Kinds o f Capitalism  (Oxford 2003) 81: “To talk of the shareholders as owners is not 
an accurate description of reality”; however, see Davies, Paul L., G ower’s Principles o f Modern 
Company Law (6th edn London 1997) 504, where he notes that: “Company law has always found it more 
difficult to identify the principles upon which the actions of controlling shareholders, the ‘owners’ of the 
company, should be regulated” (quotation marks original); Arnold (1962) 202 uses quotation marks too as 
he states that: “This meant that the organization itself was the ‘wealth’ or the ‘property’”; and ibid 353: 
“Then people dealing with these imaginary personalities deal with them as if they owned this sort of 
property” (emphasis original); furthermore, the message o f Berle and Means (1932), for example 6-7, is 
that shareholders are only ‘nominal’ owners in a company.
75 See eg Gower, L. C. B., G ow er’s Principles o f  Modern Company Law  (4th edn London 1979) 423.
76 Eg Penner, J. E., The Idea o f  Property in Law (Oxford 1997) 144: “‘Ownership’ simply describes the 
situation that obtains when a person has a property right in something”; in addition, as Pound, Roscoe, An 
Introduction to the Philosophy o f  Law (New Haven 1922) 224 says: “Ownership is a purely legal 
conception having its origin in and depending on the law.”
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sum, shareholders’ property is their shares, not the company. Overall, shareholders’ 
ownership does not sit in the definition of ownership since they do not have owners’ 
rights in the company77. In brief, in law shareholders are not the owners of the 
company.
The question is then: who owns the company? The answer is: nobody. Yet, there 
are commentators who argue that this answer is not enough78. Indeed, political 
scientists, sociologists, philosophers, economists, and jurists have for centuries debated 
the personality of the state and the company, and their ownership79. A discussion about 
the nature of corporate personality still continues, although the problem has several
OA
times been declared dead . The aim of this study is not to contribute anything extra to 
that discussion. The reason is simple: there is no need to view companies through the 
lens of ownership81.
Companies do not need owners, and neither does company law, which might be 
more understandable without any metaphysical owners of the company. For 
shareholders, it is not important whether they own the company: their interest is their 
shares and shareholders’ rights. Therefore, I formulate the point so that the ownership of 
a company is ‘split’ amongst shareholders in a such way that it disappears. Berle and 
Means state that the modem corporation destroyed shareholders’ ownership as they
77 See the definition of ownership: Walker (1980) 910; Penner, J. E., Mozley & Whiteley's Law 
Dictionary (12th edn London 2001) 250; Honore, A. M., ‘Ownership’ in Guest, A. G. (ed), Oxford Essays 
in Jurisprudence (2nd impression Oxford 1968) 107ff.
78 Deakin and Slinger (1997) 134: “Yet the argument that nobody has ownership rights within the 
corporation is perhaps taking this point too far.”
79 See eg Gierke, Otto, Political Theories o f the Middle Age (Maitland, Frederic William, trans) 
(Cambridge 1900); Hallis, Frederick, Corporate Personality (London 1930); Webb, Leicester C. (ed), 
Legal Personality and Political Pluralism  (Carlton 1958); Iwai (1999) 583.
80 Hart (1983) 36: “It is said by many that the juristic controversy over the nature o f corporate personality 
is dead”; Cheffins (2003) 486 says that the dialogue concerning personality “largely ended” by the 1930s; 
but Foster, Nicholas H. D., ‘Company Law Theory in Comparative Perspective: England and France’ 
(2000) 48 AJCL 573, 574 proposes that a revival o f company law theory and legal personality is taking 
place in the UK; about the corporate personality debate generally, see Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) 
438; Pound (1959) 19 Iff and 209ff; Willoughby, Westel W., The Fundamental Concepts o f Public Law 
(New York 1924) 44ff, where he sees that the roots of this long dispute run back to the differences 
between the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle.
81 Grantham, Ross, ‘The Doctrinal Basis o f the Rights of Company Shareholders’ (1998) 57 CLJ 554, 
588.
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exchanged their assets in the company for liquid shares82. As a result, the ownership of 
the company can be only nominal but not legal.
In capitalism, the suppliers of capital are generally owners. However, in 
corporate capitalism shareholders own their shares, not the company. Companies are 
legal entities that have no owners. The two-tier ownership in company law means that 
shareholders own their shares, and the company owns its assets. For this reason, 
ownership in the company structure remains an individual affair83.
3.3.3 Property and persons
Share capital distinguishes companies from incorporated bodies. Company law includes 
special requirements governing the maintenance of share capital84. Put simply, a 
company is the capital. The company as a going concern exists since it has its own 
capital and assets. A company makes business with its capital, and its assets are the
oc
source for the satisfaction of creditors’ debts . The prosperity of a company results
QZ
from its capital ; in addition, it can be argued that shares have no value unless the 
company has property87. Capital and assets play a special role in companies, which are 
some kinds of storehouses of assets and property88. Initially, joint stock companies were 
understood as capital funds and a sort of machine into which shareholders put money 
and out of which they draw dividends. Companies are fundamentally capital and assets.
82 Berle and Means (1932) 6-7 and 286.
83 See Demsetz (1967) 359; in contrast, the supporters of the form of ownership theory saw that the 
juristic person is not a person at all, but subjectless property destined for a particular purpose; thus, there 
exists collective ownership in a company; yet this conception seems to be “as false as useless”; see Pound 
(1959) 254ff.
84 See above, chapter two 2.2.2.
85 Flitcroft’s Case (1882) LR 21 Ch D 519 (CA) 533-34; Brady v Brady [1988] BCLC 20 (CA) 40.
86 Birch v Cropper in Re Bridgewater Navigation Co Ltd (1889) LR 14 App Cas 525 (HL) 546.
87 John Foster & Sons Ltd v Commissioners o f Inland Revenue [1894] 1 QB 516 (CA) 529 (Lindley LJ); 
ibid 530 (Kay LJ): “the property is a security for the value of those shares”; thus, if all the property of a 
company is ‘robbed’, the company and shares have no value; see Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman 
Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 (CA) 223.
88 Arnold (1962) 353.
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But company law has progressed further: the joint stock funds have become 
corporate bodies. The Acts of 1844 - 45 laid the foundations of the modem legal 
system: the company became a body of persons that associated together in a common 
purpose. Companies no longer had a joint stock since the entity itself was the joint stock 
company. Members of corporations did not associate at the level of assets but at the 
level of the company. The company as a concept was distinguished from partnerships, 
and the shadow of partnership law receded from companies. Companies and company 
law were bom. The central issue in companies was not the assets but the nature of the 
company itself.
Obviously, there were direct consequences for this development to company 
law. First, under these circumstances, it was a fallacy to regard the joint stock company
on
as a partnership . The courts recognized that there are immense differences between 
joint stock companies and ‘ordinary’ partnerships; for example, in a joint stock 
company a shareholder is not able to dissolve the ‘partnership’90. Companies started 
their own life, although in a great many aspects they still had partnership features.
Second, the nature of a company’s assets should not decide the nature of a 
company and its shares. Bligh v Brent91, a case concerning Chelsea Waterworks 
Company, was first cases to rule the point. The main assets of the company were the 
waterworks, and so real estate. Still, the ruling was clear: shares were personal property. 
As explained, the company controlled the joint stock, but neither the company nor the 
shares was this joint stock. In effect, the joint stock fund became the capital of the 
company92. The subscriptions of individual corporators constituted shares, which were
89 New Brunswick & C Co v Muggeridge (1859) 4 Drew 686, 700 (Kindersley VC); Birch v Cropper in 
Re Bridgewater Navigation Co Ltd (1889) LR 14 App Cas 525 (HL) 543 (Lord Macnaghten): “The 
answer, as it seems to me, must depend on the principles applicable to companies limited by shares, and 
on the provisions contained in the Companies Act, 1862. It is, perhaps, rather beside the mark to discuss 
the general doctrines of partnerships and to examine particular cases of partnership contracts.”
90 (1859) 4 Drew 686, 701.
91 (1837) 2 Y & C E x  268.
92 (1889) LR 14 App Cas 525 (HL) 546.
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regarded as money. Although that is not the current position of law93, this case clearly 
emphasized the independent nature of shares and the company. Consequently, the status 
of shares and a company remain the same whatever happens to the assets of the 
company94.
Third, as companies were no longer considered funds, their position required the 
full recognition of law. The landmark ruling is Salomon v A Salomon and Co Ltd95, 
where the House of Lords set the final seal on legal corporate existence. Companies 
became altogether different persons from their shareholders when they were accepted as 
‘real’ persons in law. The company was seen as more than the arithmetical sums of the 
individual human beings constituting it. Thus, the position of company law was that the 
“corporation is not a mere aggregate of shareholders”96. This is also the current status of 
companies in law.
The nature of shares does not depend on the company’s assets. In economic 
terms, the underlying assets have importance, but in legal terms there is no direct 
relationship between these assets and shares. This relationship between company assets 
and shares cannot be important in law.
As explained above, shareholders’ property is their shares, to which rights are 
attached. Due to the rights, companies have duties towards shareholders, and if we use 
Hohfeld’s terminology, these duties are correlatives of shareholders’ rights97. But it 
should be noted that shareholders’ rights are in the company, and also their duties are 
towards the company. Therefore, the basic relationships in the company exist between 
shareholders and a company.
93 See especially Borland’s Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co Ltd [1901] 1 Ch 279.
94 See CA 1985 s 182(l)(a).
95 [1897] AC 22 (HL); as Cooke (1950) 176 explains, joint stock funds were linked to the older 
corporation theory by this case.
96 Flitcroft’s Case (1882) LR 21 Ch D 519 (CA) 536.
97 See Hohfeld, Wesley Newcomb, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New Haven 1919) 5ff.
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The full picture of the company is more complicated as companies generally 
have several shareholders. The company cannot only be a relationship between each 
member and the company: it is also a relationship among shareholders. Company law 
and the articles of association regulate shareholders’ rights inter se98. The company, as a 
legal entity, mediates relationships between shareholders99. But since their rights are 
principally against the company, these rights by or against a member can only be 
enforced through the company100. This is the main rule, although in specific 
circumstances, members can directly enforce obligations against other members; one 
such area is shareholders’ pre-emption rights101. The company is a legal unit that
1 0 9distributes burdens and benefits for shareholders . These benefits are shareholders’ 
rights, and burdens are their duties.
Companies have creditors and directors: the company also mediates their 
relationships. Company law gives protection to creditors, and in an insolvent company 
the law makes creditors’ interests paramount103. The law sets duties for directors and 
governs the nomination of managers and their contracts104. However, shareholders have 
their rights and duties against the company, not against creditors and directors directly. 
This is the fundamental idea in company law even though it is in creditors’ interest that 
shareholders have an obligation to pay their shares. The payment of shares is never 
shareholders’ debt to creditors. It is a payment to the company, although the company 
might use the capital to pay its own debts. On the other hand, directors have duties in
98 Welton v Saffery [1897] AC 299 (HL); more below, chapter six 6.2.2.
99 Davies (2002) 10; Kelsen (1992) 49.
100 [1897] AC 299 (HL) 315.
101 Rayfield v Hands [1958] 2 All ER 194; about the differences between the older and more recent 
authorities; see Halsbury’s Laws o f England, vol 7(1) (4th edn London 2004 reissue) 221.
102 But this does not mean that the company is only an abbreviation of the various rights and duties that 
actually belong to particular individuals; about this bracket theory, see Stoljar (1973) 186ff; Pound (1959) 
250ff.
103 Eg Brady v Brady [1988] BCLC 20 (CA) 40.
104 See eg CA 1985 ss 303 and 319.
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companies, but they do not have these duties to shareholders. For example, directors do 
not owe fiduciary duties to single shareholders105.
The company links shareholders as a group to creditors and directors. 
Shareholders, creditors, and directors have rights and duties in the company, but all 
these rights and duties have their correlatives in the company. Company law does not 
establish direct legal relations between these groups. For example, in Salomon v A 
Salomon and Co Ltd106 there was one relationship between Mr Salomon and his 
company, and another relationship between A Salomon Co Ltd and its creditors. There 
was no ‘real’ relationship between Mr Salomon and the creditors. Consequently, even 
though company law governs the whole nexus of relationships, questions concerning 
every legal relationship should be decided separately.
In summary, the foundations of the company rest on property, but a company is 
not capital and assets. A share in the company is not a sum of money: instead, it a series 
of mutual covenants entered into by all shareholders. In the same way, the company is a 
relationship, in particular, among shareholders. In addition, there exist relationships 
between other groups of persons: the company is a “system of relationships”107. 
Company law is organizational law, and the company is a device organizing these 
separate rights and duties.
Companies have a dual nature: they are both unions of property and unions of 
persons108. But the most important point in companies and company law is not the 
relation between persons and assets. A unit of property cannot have power; the power in 
the company rests on the union of persons. The company and shares are a complex set
105 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421; Re a company (No 004415 o f 1996) [1997] 1 BCLC 479,491 (Sir 
Richard Scott VC): “it is long established and basic law that the directors of a company owe their 
fiduciary duties to the company not to the shareholders.”
106 [1897] AC 22 (HL); in addition, Mr Salomon was both a shareholder and a debenture holder in the 
company.
107 Coase (1988) 42.
108 Commons (1924) 292; Berle and Means (1932) 1: “The corporation has, in fact, become both a 
method of property tenure and a means of organizing economic life.”
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of relationships between persons. At the top of the company is the relationship among 
shareholders109, which is to my mind the most important point in company law.
Companies have partnership roots. Even so, property has a more central role in 
partnerships, where partners are the co-owners of the property. Property and assets have 
importance in companies because property is valuable. But property in a company can 
only have the role of underlying assets. Therefore, the emphasis of company law should 
be on the legal entity. The development of companies can be described in the following 
way:
As a union of property the corporation has expanded from the primitive notion 
of physical objects held for one’s own use to the notion of a going business 
operated by an association of persons in dealings with others. In this respect it 
avails itself of all the laws of creditor and debtor, principal and agent, employer 
and employee, buyer and seller, which have emerged out of the history of the 
common law, aided by the equity and statutes, and have built themselves up on 
the primary protection of title and possession of physical objects.110
Companies should not be thought of as property no more than they can be understood as 
individual human beings. Kelsen111 explains that companies as legal persons are 
expressions of the unity of a complex of norms, ie a legal system governing the 
behaviour of a plurality of persons. In essence, company law regulates relationships 
between persons.
There exist several legal relations in the company, which is a nexus of these 
relationships. They form and sum peculiar relations between members of the corporate
109 See Roe (1994) viii; and also Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) 433, where they consider that much of 
organizational law regulates relations among shareholders.
110 Commons (1924) 292.
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11"?group and between them and other members of society . The company connects 
people having rights and duties in the corporation structure. These relations are 
mediated through the company itself, and therefore company law does not normally 
create any direct relationship between shareholders, creditors, and directors. In a similar 
way, there is no direct relationship between shareholders and the assets of the company.
3.4 Share value and fortune
The remaining analysis in this chapter concentrates on two questions: 1) what is the role 
of asset value in company law; and 2) how does the value of shares follow the fortunes 
of the company?
3.4.1 The role of asset value in law
Obviously, the assets of a company have some value. But these assets are the 
company’s property, and shareholders’ property is their shares. The underlying 
corporate assets have importance, but in legal terms there is no direct relationship 
between the assets of a company and its shares. The assets of a company determine 
neither the nature nor the value of shares.
Shareholders participate in the company through their shares113. Shares are 
rights of participation in the company on the terms of the articles114. Shareholders have 
the rights set by the company constitution and company law. It is clear that 
shareholders’ rights do not include any direct right to the company’s capital and assets.
A shareholder cannot retire from the company115. Company law does not offer 
any general withdrawal right: an individual shareholder is unable to dissolve the 
company. But a shareholder can put an end to his own quality as a shareholder by
111 Kelsen (1992) 48.
112 Davis, John P., Corporations, vol 1 (New York 1905) 16.
113 Birch v Cropper in Re Bridgewater Navigation Co Ltd (1889) LR 14 App Cas 525 (HL) 546-47.
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transferring his shares to another person. Naturally, this person acquires the shares and 
becomes a shareholder. But as mentioned, the price paid for shares is a matter of 
contract. Company law does not rule that the price of shares should be the asset value 
per share. A ‘locked-in’ shareholder cannot require the company or other shareholders 
to buy him out at a price reflecting the value of the underlying net assets116.
Shareholders are not part owners of the company; they are not entitled to have 
their shares valued by apportioning among all shares the total value of an
117undertaking . The price of shares can be more or less than their proportional part of 
asset value: whatever the buyer and the seller decide and accept. A transaction price is 
not a question determined by the company or company law. Company law offers 
transferability for shares, but the transaction prices for shares are mainly beyond its 
scope.
Can we then say that there is no legal relationship between the assets of a 
company and the value of its shares? No, we cannot, because the law should not ignore 
a company’s assets. The property of the company is, in a way, a security for the value of 
shares118. To explain this relationship, I analyse a recent ruling by the House of Lords.
In Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (a firm )119, Lord Millett accepted that a 
company, which has its own assets and liabilities and its own creditors, is a legal entity 
separate and distinct from shareholders. In addition, he explicitly mentioned that the 
company’s property belongs to it, not to its shareholders. Still, his Lordship declared 
that:
114 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 (CA) 223.
115 New Brunswick & C Co v Muggeridge (1859) 4 Drew 686.
116 Re a company (No 004475 o f 1982) [1983] Ch 178, 191, where the asset value of the shares was 
£175,000, but the offer for them was only £112,000.
117 Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA).
118 John Foster & Sons Ltd v Commissioners o f  Inland Revenue [1894] 1 QB 516 (CA) 530; in addition, 
shares are ‘second order property rights’ and sometimes even like ‘money in the bank’; see Penner (1997) 
132; further, assets can be supposed to be back of ‘pieces of paper’, in the same way as gold was 
supposed to be back of the government issues of currency; Arnold (1962) 201.
119 [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 61.
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On the other hand, although a share is an identifiable piece of property which 
belongs to the shareholder and has an ascertainable value, it also represents a 
proportionate part of the company’s net assets, and if these are depleted the 
diminution in its assets will be reflected in the diminution in the value of shares. 
The correspondence may not be exact, especially in the case of a company 
whose shares are publicly traded, since their value depends on market sentiment. 
But in the case of a small private company like this company, the 
correspondence is exact.120
Lord Millett linked share value to the company’s net assets. The correspondence can be 
illustrated with an example where the sole asset of a company is a cash box containing 
£100,000. This is the example mentioned in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman 
Industries Ltd (No 2)n \  and in their decision Lord Millett quoted that case and the same 
facts. Indeed, it is most understandable that the value of a company and its shares will 
be nil if all the money is robbed. The value of shares reflects the changes of a 
company’s assets, which argumentation can be supported by the idea that a company’s 
undistributed profits belong to the shareholders122. In consequence, shareholders are 
economically in the same position whether they or the company have the assets. 
However, from the legal perspective this cannot be true since a company’s property 
belongs to it, not to shareholders. Lord Millett explained this point in their decision, too.
The view of Lord Millett is problematic. The correspondence between the 
company’s assets and share value works only when the value of shares is the company’s 
net asset value per share. Yet, we cannot say that the value of shares , even in the above­
120 Ibid 62.
121 [1982] Ch 204 (CA) 223.
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mentioned cash-box company, should be the asset value, ie £100,000 divided per share. 
If the total value of the company’s shares is £90,000 or £110,000, in both cases the 
exact correspondence is impossible. As Lord Millett mentioned, the correspondence is 
not exact in the case of a company whose shares are publicly traded, but the explanation
1 7 ^for this is not only the ‘market sentiment’ . Therefore, an exact correspondence can
only exist when the value of shares is the net asset value per share. The fundamental
problem with this correspondence is that nothing in company law rules that share value
is equal to the asset value. Shareholders do not have a right to retire from a company at
the asset value; the law does not declare that the proportional asset value is the right
value for shares. The value of shares may depend upon the amount of property the
company possesses124. Thus, I conclude this point by stating that there can exist this
kind of correspondence between a company’s assets and the value of its shares, but the
law does not rule that the asset value should be the right value of shares.
The question rises: how Lord Millett’s words should be understood? This study
sees that his view supports the assumption that the value of shares is their asset value if
nothing else is shown. The proportional asset value is like a “formal value”125 for
shares. However, the market price for shares in public companies is typically something
else than their net asset value. In addition, the law generally accepts that the market
1price is the right and true share value . But neither is the value of shares in private
1 97companies fixed to the asset value . Both in public and private companies, 
shareholders have the right to determine the value of their shares: nothing requires that
122 Lord Millett in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Laird Group pic  [2003] 4 All ER 669 (HL) 679; in 
[2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 66, he considered that the payment of dividends is like a transfer of “money from one 
pocket to the other”.
23 About market prices, see below chapter 4.
124 See John Foster & Sons Ltd v Commissioners o f Inland Revenue [1894] 1 QB 516 (CA) 530.
125 See Hadden, Tom, Company Law and Capitalism  (2nd edn London 1977) 68.
126 Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA) 125 (Evershed LJ); Re Grierson, Oldham & 
Adams Ltd [1968] Ch 17, 32 (Plowman J): “since this is not a case o f a purchase o f assets, but of a 
purchase of shares, the market price on the Stock Exchange of those shares is cogent evidence of their 
true value.”
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this decision should rest on the asset value. The asset value of shares has no function as 
a rule or principle in company law, but it is an assumption of the law. In conclusion, the 
law supposes that the company’s assets have importance in share valuation. What is this 
importance then? The point is generally a question of markets, and thus reviewed in the 
following chapter.
3.4.2 Value and fortunes
There is a clear relationship between share value and a company’s business. Simply, 
share value rises when companies are successful. In contrast, if they fail, there is a great 
risk that shares loose their value. Share value has a strong correspondence with a 
company’s economic success.
The Court of Appeal formulated the relationship between the shareholder and 
the company in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) in this 
way:
When the shareholder acquires a share he accepts the fact that the value of his
investment follows the fortunes of the company and that he can only exercise his
influence over the fortunes of the company by the exercise of his voting rights in 
1
general meeting.
The value of shares depends on the success and value of the company’s business. Share 
value generally fluctuates “in line with the fortunes of the company”129. The reason for 
this is shareholders’ residual interest in the company. All improvements in the 
profitability of the company are likely to be reflected in the share price. However,
127 See eg Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1959] AC 324 (HL) (Sc) 368, where the 
minority shareholders were entitled to recover more than only “the break-up value of their shares.”
128 [1982] Ch 204 (CA) 224.
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company law does not rule that share value should rise when a company’s business is 
successful. Actually, law and the courts are often even unable to say whether business is 
advancing or not. The questions of commercial judgment are not decided in the courts 
but in companies. There exists indoor management rule130, and the law cannot insist on 
success in business131.
The relationship between the success of a company and the value of its shares is 
a question of fact. The rising value of shares is an economic consequence from the gain 
in business. My formulation is that economics, and also common sense, says that there 
is this kind of relationship. The task of the law is to recognize this economic connection. 
The rising value of shares in prosperous companies is an economic market rule because 
investors generally think in this way.
In addition, the relationship between success and share value is more than an 
assumption. Therefore, I argue that it is actually a presumption of law: the law believes 
on this consequence. The regulation of insider dealing rests on this idea, and let us have 
an American example case:
1 T9In Securities and Exchange Commission v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co , the 
directors of the company had information that a remarkably rich ore drill core 
had been discovered from the company’s mineral exploration site. Some 
directors purchased personally and through their agents shares of the company 
on the basis of this material inside information. The use of this information was 
unlawful insider trading.
129 Re Elgindata Ltd [1991] BCLC 959, 1004 (Warner J).
130 See eg Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 (PC); Carlen v Drury (1812) 1 V & B 154.
131 Re Posgate & Denby (Agencies) Ltd [1987] BCLC 8, 14 (Hoffman J): “all decisions concerning the 
business o f the company involve the risk that other decisions may turn out to have been better.”
132 (1968) 401 F 2d 833 (United States Court Of Appeals Second Circuit).
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The found mineral reserves were both literally and legally ‘material information’. As
1stated earlier in List v Fashion Park Inc : “The basic test of materiality ... is whether a 
reasonable man would attach importance ... in determining his choice of action in the 
transaction in question.” This then encompasses those facts “which in reasonable and 
objective contemplation might affect the value of the corporation’s stock or 
securities”134. The information about these material reserves was a material fact as it 
affected “the probable future of the company” and also “the desire of investors to buy, 
sell, or hold the company’s securities”135.
Naturally, this is an American case from the field of insider regulation.
However, I consider that the case is capable of explaining more generally the 
relationship between the company’s success and share value. Company law ‘knows’ 
that the value of shares follows the fortunes of the company because reasonable men 
believe it, ie the market operates in this way. Yet, in individual cases shareholders 
decide the prices of shares. Shareholders and the market may also behave differently 
than it is anticipated136. Nevertheless, company law has this kind of presumption 
concerning share value.
In summary, there is no direct legal relationship between the assets of a 
company and its shares. Company law does not rule that the net asset value shows the 
value of shares although this value might be a formal value for them. In addition, it is an 
economic fact that share value follows the fortunes of a company but this point is 
economic rather than legal in nature. Overall, the company is a relationship between 
shareholders, and the value of shares is decided in this relationship. In the next chapter,
I examine how share prices are set on the markets.
133 (1965) 340 F 2d 457 (United States Court Appeals Second Circuit) 462.
134 Ibid quoting Kohler v Kohler Co (1963) 319 F 2d 634, 642.
135 (1968) 401 F 2d 833, 849; the Criminal Justice Act 1993 s 56(l)(d) uses term “a significant effect” on 
the price.
136 See Davies (2003) 766, where he considers that at the field of insider dealing it might be permissible to 
argue that information was not significant but the disclosure had just a bigger effect.
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CHAPTER 4
MARKETS AND SHARE PRICES
Everyone knows that the market gets things wrong. 
Few have the temerity still to cling to the perfect- 
market hypothesis. Those o f us who have 
experienced stock-market sentiment from the inside 
know that often there is no explanation other than 
psychology fo r  apparent failures to recognize value. 
Paul Lee, in Questions o f Value (2004) 4.
4.1 Introduction to value and price
A company, whose earnings are the source of shareholders’ return, is a system of 
financial relationships. Shares are valued for their expected payoffs1: the current market 
price is the present value of these payments. Yet, a company’s prosperity and 
shareholders’ return are unknown; therefore, share value can only follow economic 
expectations. Overall, the valuation of shares is complex.
Price and value have a different nature: price is an objective datum, but value is 
ultimately a matter of opinion and thus a subjective assessment of worth. Pricing in 
markets follows the ‘laws’ of supply and demand. Price is the ratio in which objects 
exchange. Further, market prices are normally public information. In contrast, value can 
only have meaning when it is related to a particular person: the process of valuation 
takes place in the individual mind. In addition, valuation is always a forward-looking 
activity since the current value of shares depends in a critical way on their future value.
1 Eg Davies, R., ‘Valuation of Shares’ in Firth, Michael and Keane, Simon M. (eds), Issues in Finance 
(Oxford 1986) 193, 194; Brealey, Richard A. and Myers, Stewart C., Principles o f  Corporate Finance (6th 
edn Boston 2000) 63: “We just discount the cash flows by the return that can be earned in the capital 
market on securities o f comparable risk”; see also Dean v Prince [1954] Ch 409 (CA) 420 (Evershed 
MR): “a sound and obvious basis of [valuation] would be in accordance with the expectation of profit for 
the future.”
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Nevertheless, these two concepts are linked together as price is a function of the 
valuation by parties.
The fundamental question is: who determines value for shares? Naturally, the 
main rule is that shareholders decide the value of their shares. The prime aim of this 
chapter is to explain the way in which share valuation occurs on the stock markets.
4.2 Investment and risk
Return, risk, and time are the central elements in investment. Investing means laying out 
money in the expectation of a future return2. The term ‘investment’ is wide, covering 
shares, bonds, unit trusts, pension schemes, life assurance policies, futures and options, 
bank accounts, and other ‘paper’ assets3.
In the economic sense, individuals’ objective is to maximize their welfare and 
lifetime consumption. Economic man invests to be able to enjoy the benefits of his 
increasing wealth later. Shares are investment assets that have an extremely important 
role in the savings and investment industry4. If bank accounts are ignored, company 
shares and government bonds are the fundamental investment products. Such financial 
assets constitute an important source of wealth in society.
Capital markets, where companies acquire share capital by issuing shares, 
provide and allocate investment funds. In order to grow and expand, companies should 
be able to attract funding from investors. In the company, share capital’s economic
2 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Rolls-Royce Ltd [1944] 2 All ER 340.
3 Commodities and goods can also be investments, for example diamonds and tulips, and one of the first 
economic crises was the tulip mania in 1636 - 37, where a rare tulip bulb reached the value of 12 acres of 
city-centre land; see Kindleberger, Charles P., Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History o f Financial 
Crises (4th edn Basingstoke 2002) 109 and 223; Cohen, David, Fear, greed and panic: The psychology o f  
the stock market (Chichester 2001) 19.
4 Black, Andrew, ‘Introduction’ in Questions o f Value (London 2004) xv, xv: “The value of corporations 
is of great importance to everyone in our society. Our future depends on it, since a lot o f our money is 
invested in the equity market in the form of pensions and other savings;” in addition, as he mentions, 
individual persons are predominantly indirect share investors through other financial products; in effect, 
more than 80% o f quoted shares in British companies are controlled by institutional investors; see eg 
Company Law Reform: Modern Company Law For a Competitive Economy — Final Report, vol I 
(London 2001) [6.22].
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function is to create more capital. The expectation of profits fuels share investments 
since a company’s surplus is the source of shareholders’ return. This profit ‘belongs’ to 
shareholders, who are the recipients of a company’s residual cash flow. In a similar 
way, if a company is unprofitable, there is no return for share investors.
A shareholder takes an economic risk when he invests in shares5. Share capital 
will be lost first if a company fails, and the strong variety of possible outcomes from 
share investment increases the risk. Equities are high-risk and high-return investments; 
naturally, the expected high return is the temptation but the uncertainty of return is the 
danger. Risk means that the actual return on investment can be lower than shareholders 
expected when the shares were acquired.
Shares offer return with risk. But as investment theory says, nobody commits 
funds unless his supposed return is in balance with the risk. Consequently, the return of 
shareholders should be more than a risk-free return6. Therefore, stocks are regarded as 
the best long-term investment, and shareholders expect to get an equity risk premium 
due to carrying risk7. Furthermore, the riskiest shares must offer extra return because the 
required rate of return should be proportional to the amount of risk. In other words, 
shareholders’ expected return should be large enough to compensate the risk.
Financial products are able to reduce investors’ risk through risk spreading and 
risk pooling; investors’ desire is to transform their risk, and equity risk is a specific risk 
that can be reduced in this way. Share investors minimize their specific risk by 
diversification, which is “by constructing portfolios of assets that exploit any offsetting 
risks between the returns on assets in the portfolio and thereby reducing overall risk”8. 
To diversify, shareholders invest in shares of several companies. Investors prefer
5 Re Elgindata Ltd [1991] BCLC 959, 1000 (Warner J); Brealey and Myers (2000) 61: “Everybody knows 
that common stocks are risky and that some are more risky than others.”
6 See eg Brealey, R. A., An Introduction to Risk and Return from Common Stocks (2nd edn Oxford 1983) 
142: “any extra return from common stock is a reward for taking risk.”
7 Siegel, Jeremy J., Stocks fo r  the Long Run (3rd edn New York 2002) 6: “the total return on equities 
dominates all other assets.”
8 Blake, David, Financial Market Analysis (2nd edn Chichester 2000) 8.
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portfolios that offer the highest expected return for a given degree of risk. These 
diversified portfolios are regarded as efficient.
The idea of diversification is not new, and the following example from the age 
of mercantile expansion in the sixteenth century explains it further:
the discovery of the compass and advances in astronomy were accompanied by 
new ideas in shipbuilding and in rigging. The result was an increase in the size 
and range of ships for both fighting and commerce, two activities which were 
not very far apart in this period. The period of Hakluyt’s ‘voyages’ begins; there 
are long expeditions across the great oceans to plunder and to trade. These 
expeditions involved great risks and a large capital outlay before the ship could 
sail, followed by a considerable period of waiting, running often into years, 
before a return on capital could be received. Hence, though there were individual 
shipowners of great wealth, possessing a number of vessels (as at Bristol), the 
commercial idea of a voyage was of a single venture. The wise man spread his 
risks, joining with others in their expeditions, chartering perhaps from a 
shipowner or becoming part-owner only in a ship.9
The economic ventures described were still partnerships; however, the idea of 
diversification is the same: investors spread their risk. They are most successful if they 
do not put ‘all of their eggs in one basket’10. Indeed, diversification, which has been 
practised for centuries, offers a powerful way to manage risks. This idea is crucial in
9 Cooke, C. A., Corporation, Trust and Company (Manchester 1950) 47-48.
10 Diversification is “the means by which a wise man could achieve security in his old age”; Arnold, 
Thurman W., The Folklore o f Capitalism  (New Haven 1962) (originally 1937) 267.
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modem portfolio theory, which sees that shareholders should reduce their firm-specific 
risk by diversifying their assets into shares issued by several companies11.
Because diversification decreases the amount of risk, the attractiveness of shares 
as investments increases. Investors are willing to pay a higher price for shares, which 
become more valuable as part of a diversified share portfolio. Thus, this method can 
both reduce risk and create wealth.
On the other hand, shares are not only risky; they do not pay a fixed cash flow 
during their life and do not have any maturity date. Share investors cannot know what 
their return will be: they can only have some economic expectations. Still, if the 
anticipated return is high, investors are willing to pay more for the shares, and vice 
versa. Furthermore, when there is an imminent risk that the business of the company 
may be unsuccessful, investors pay less for the shares even if the return in the case of 
success would be high. In sum, shares as investment products offer a trade-off between 
the expected return and risk as their value depends on both factors.
4.3 The function of markets
Markets advance economic welfare, and more precisely they maximize wealth through
I 9contractual transactions . The prime function of markets is to allocate resources 
optimally. Further, as prices in an efficient market reflect all the information, these 
prices are ‘right’. A well-operating market is both allocationally and informationally 
efficient.
Buyers and sellers interact in a market place: markets facilitate exchange.
Pricing in a market takes place through bidding and asking. But when a deal is reached,
11 Through diversification it is possible to cut the variability of returns by half, and most of this benefit is 
available with relatively few stocks; Brealey and Myers (2000) 167; moreover, the reduction of risk is 
called the insurance principle as the portfolio contains many independent sources of risk; see eg Bodie, 
Zvi and others, Investments (6th edn Boston 2005) 224.
12 The term ‘wealth maximization’ is introduced by Coase, R. H., ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ in The 
Firm, the Market and the Law (Chicago 1988) (originally 1960) 95, where he assumes that when there are 
no transaction costs negotiations always lead to an agreement that maximizes wealth.
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a contract is required for the exchange; it is fundamentally contract law that facilitates 
market transactions. In addition, markets promote welfare through reducing transaction 
costs, for example by standardized contract terms. A market is operationally efficient 
when the costs of its transaction services are low.
Companies and markets are institutions of capitalism. Anglo-American 
capitalism is stock market capitalism. In investment language, the term ‘market’ 
normally refers to the stock markets. Moreover, in genuine capitalism the stock markets 
measure the success of companies, and their market index may be a measure of national 
well-being13. Financial markets are vital for capitalism and for society.
Share markets have several special features. First, capital users and suppliers do 
not meet on the stock market. Shares are not issued to investors directly: instead, they 
are normally issued through financial intermediaries that have an important function in 
share offerings. But new issues of shares have no major role in stock markets since the 
function of the secondary market distributing existing shares among investors 
dominates the market. Second, investment markets are in their nature professional and 
global. Institutional investors, whose assets move fast between different investment 
products and from one country to another, govern stock markets. Third, share markets 
are very efficient. Share prices in the market are ‘real’ as the market ‘knows’ the value 
of shares. However, stock markets, like other markets, are never fully efficient, although 
economists used to suppose so14.
13 See Dore, Ronald, Stock Market Capitalism: Welfare Capitalism  -  Japan and Germany versus the 
Anglo-Saxons (Oxford 2000) 10.
14 Jensen, Michael. C., ‘Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency’, (1978) 6 Journal of 
Financial Economics 95, 95: “there is no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical 
evidence supporting it than the Efficient Market Hypothesis”; Firth, Michael ‘The Efficient Markets 
Theory’ in Firth, Michael and Keane, Simon M. (eds), Issues in Finance (Oxford 1986) 1: market 
efficiency “can now be regarded as the accepted model of share price behaviour”; but see Shleifer, Andrei 
and Summers, Lawrence H., ‘The Noise Trader Approach to Finance’ (1990) 4 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, No 2, 19, 19: the efficient market hypothesis crashed along with the rest o f the market on 
October 19, 1987; Allen, William T., ‘Securities Markets as Social Products: The Pretty Efficient Capital 
Market Hypothesis’ (2003) 28 Journal of Corporation Law 551, 553: “Were the ECMH true, it would 
reflect a mystery.”
81 Chapter 4
Markets have a pivotal role in the pricing of shares. In addition, market price is 
generally regarded as the true value of shares. How are values and prices determined in 
the market economy? What are the alternative methods in share valuation? I move on to 
these questions.
4.4 Value and price of shares
4.4.1 Market price and value
The history of finance theory is a mixture of abstract theorizing and practical 
application15. Indeed, the price and value of shares are both theoretical and practical 
issues. Furthermore, value and price are fundamental points in every market transaction, 
so let us start with a simple example:
Mary has an apple that John wants to have. Its worth is fifty pence to Mary, and 
thus it is equal for her whether she has the apple or fifty pence. John thinks that 
the apple’s value is one pound. They reach a deal as Mary sells the apple to 
John.
Since John values the apple higher, it is rational that he acquires it. The idea of wealth 
maximization is that the person who values assets highest should have them. The apple 
will be allocated optimally when this market transaction occurs. The transfer is an 
economic improvement that increases the total wealth in society by fifty pence, ie by the 
difference of John and Mary’s valuations.
15 Milne, Frank, Finance Theory and Asset Pricing (Oxford 1995) 3.
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What is the price for the apple, and who has the right to set it? There is no 
natural or right price for the apple because its price is a matter of bargain16. The price is 
a ratio of exchange, and Mary and John may price the apple as they please. This pricing 
is their business: they set its ‘true’ price, which is the monetary consideration given 
when the object is exchanged.
However, since price is a function of the parties’ valuations, the possible price in 
our example is something between fifty pence and one pound. Simply, if John offers 
less than fifty pence, Mary does not sell it; if Mary asks more than a pound, John does 
not buy it. Nevertheless, the highest possible price, one pound, is no right price. 
Naturally, a bargainer with great skills might get the apple for fifty pence; on the other 
hand, if the seller is determined, the price might be a pound. The setting of the price is 
like a game between Mary and John17. In this bargaining game, both of them may try to 
hide their true valuation. Yet, the price is whatever Mary and John agree, but if they 
disagree about it, there is no transaction at any price. The economic assumption is that 
Mary and John behave rationally and reach a deal.
Of course, one possible price is seventy-five pence, which can be used to 
illustrate the wealth maximization available through the transaction. In consequence, 
Mary is twenty-five pence better off as she has seventy-five pence in cash but the apple 
was only worth fifty pence to her. The value of the apple is one pound to John, who 
paid only seventy-five pence for it, so he is also twenty-five pence better off. There is an 
equation of exchange between Mary and John at this price. Although that might be a 
fair conclusion, we cannot say that it is in the economic or legal sense the right price. 
The legal rule is freedom of exchange since persons may exchange commodities on
16 Every commodity might have a natural price, but as Adam Smith explains, the actual price can be 
above, below, or exactly the same as the natural price; Smith, Adam, An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes o f the Wealth o f  Nations, vol I (Campbell, R. H. and Skinner, A. S., eds) (Oxford 1976)
(originally 1776) 72-73.
17 Generally about game theory, Von Neumann, John and Morgenstern, Oskar, Theory o f Games and 
Economic Behavior (3rd edn Princeton 1953).
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mutually accepted terms. Parties are generally free to choose whether they enter into a 
contract. In addition, a buyer and a seller may behave opportunistically; their self- 
interest may be the guide in dealings with others. Nonetheless, the net gain available in 
our example is fifty pence, and the actual price determines only how the increasing 
wealth is divided between Mary and John. It is possible that Mary or John gains all the 
fifty pence, and the other nothing; however, the wealth created remains the same18. The 
amount of wealth depends on the valuation, but the distribution of gain is a consequence 
of success in bargaining. As the story clearly shows, value and price have different 
meaning in economic transactions19.
Share transactions do not typically take place in this way. But the basic idea of 
pricing is identical: the price is a matter of bargain. Before I analyse the pricing of 
shares further, I change the story in my example:
Mary has a painting, which John wants to acquire. The painting is worth five 
thousand pounds to Mary, but John values it at ten thousand pounds. It would be 
possible for John to buy it at a price between £5,000 and £10,000; however, 
Mary organizes an auction.
An auction is the most efficient way to sell art and shares: it is a market with a large 
number of possible buyers. Mary calls people to her auction and promotes it. She is 
successful, and there are several people, but those of interest are Paul and Robert. Paul 
thinks that the value of the painting is £11,000, and Robert regards its worth as £15,000.
At the auction John offers £10,000, and Paul is willing to pay up to £11,000. 
However, as Robert offers £11,001, he gets the painting. The person who values an
18 The net gain is fifty pence even if John steals the apple, or a tyrant transfers it to him by force; see 
Dworkin, Ronald M., ‘Is Wealth a Value?’ (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies 191, 197.
19 See also Glover, Christopher G., Valuation o f  Unquoted Securities (London 1986) 11: “The price at 
which A sells his car to B is unlikely to coincide with any of the interior valuations of A or B.”
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object highest should have it, and thus this asset is allocated in an efficient manner. Yet, 
the auction is only about the pricing, and Robert gets the deal simply by bidding. There 
is no need to pay the ‘full’ price for the painting, ie £15,000, which is as the highest 
value also the ‘right’ value for it. The price, which is £11,001, remains different from 
the highest valuation although there is this auction. But still, the wealth maximization 
and the net gain available depend on the valuations. In this case, the gain to society is 
£10,000, of which Mary gains £6,001 and Robert £3,999 through the auction.
Markets and prices play key roles in an economic approach. Since Adam Smith, 
economists have assumed that individuals trade because it is advantageous for them. 
When people exchange assets on mutually acceptable terms, goods move to the highest- 
valued use. The market economy rests on this idea. Markets are able to increase wealth 
since they are not a zero-sum game, and share markets operate in this way too. Yet, 
economic efficiency is concerned with the size of net gain but not with who gets it. 
Therefore, the pricing of assets is irrelevant to efficiency and wealth maximization.
The general equilibrium theory is a central idea in market economy: prices 
follow the laws of supply and demand20. Market theory shows that “as the price of a 
good rises, less is consumed as the consumer reduces his purchases or turns to substitute 
goods”. On the other hand, as a price rises, the producers are willing to produce and 
supply more goods to the market. A market is in equilibrium when the quantity 
demanded is equal to the quantity supplied and neither consumers nor producers are 
willing to alter their actions.21 But market prices are not predictable since the
20 Choudhry, Moorad and others, Capital Market Instruments (London 2002) 3: “As in any market, 
pricing factors are driven by the laws o f supply and demand, and price itself manifests itself in the cost o f  
capital to a firm and the return expected by investors who supply that capital.”
21 Veljanovski, C. G., The New Law-and-Economics: A Research Review  (Oxford 1982) 31-33.
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equilibrium reached is always temporary in nature; in effect, the current price should be 
discovered22.
Apples and paintings are goods that are consumed23, but shares are financial 
assets and investment products. The utility of shares is very different from that of 
consumable goods since shares have value in exchange, not in use. The value of shares 
requires further explanation.
However, the basic ideas of value and price apply to shares. In the end, all 
values are subjective assessments of worth that take place in the individual mind. These 
interior values are in the eye of the beholder: the value depends on the view of the 
person valuing the object and the methods used in the valuation. Actually, it is therefore 
hard to determine any true values. By contrast, the price is an objective datum, so prices 
are real and generally well-known information. On stock markets, the price formation is 
open, and prices are public. Still, value and price have a different meaning in every 
market: the price is a consequence of bargaining. Understanding of both value and price 
is related to human motives and behaviour, which makes the valuation of shares more 
complicated24. Moreover, there exist several definitions for share value, which cannot 
thus be a simple concept25.1 next analyse asset value, intrinsic value, and market value.
22 Schwartz, Robert A. and Francioni, Reto, Equity Markets in Action (New Jersey 2004) 67: “The term 
price discovery identifies the process by which a market finds a new equilibrium after a change in 
investor demand to hold shares.”
23 However, art can be an investment; eg Heilbroner, Robert, Twenty-first Century Capitalism  (London 
1993) 30: “a Rembrandt painting, which is certainly an embodiment of wealth, does not become capital 
unless it is no longer wanted for itself, but as a stepping stone for amassing still more capital.”
24 Mossin, Jan, Theory o f  Financial Markets (1973 New Jersey) 1: “No theory of finance can give a 
satisfactory explanation of security valuation or investment behavior if it fails to take into account 
relationships among individual investors’ portfolio decisions”; Wicksell, Knut, Value, Capital and Rent 
(New York 1970) (originally 1893) 11: “without a reference to human motives and conduct there can be 
no understanding o f price.”
25 For example, Helfert, Erich A., Techniques o f Financial Analysis (1 1th edn Boston 2003) 390ff 
demonstrates eleven conceptions: economic, market, book, liquidation, breakup, reproduction, collateral, 
assessed, appraised, going concern, and shareholder value; in addition, companies and shares have 
discounted cash flow value (DCF), economic value added (EVA), current operations value (COV), future 
growth value (FGV), and value at risk (VAR); see eg Stern, Erik and Hutchinson, Mike, The Value 
Mindset (New Jersey 2004) 43ff, 65ff and 102.
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4.4.2 Asset value
The simplest value for shares is their asset value , which is the company’s net asset 
value per share. The basic idea in the asset value approach is to determine the value of 
shares from the perspective of the balance sheet. But the value of a company’s assets in 
its financial statements is only the book value. This is normally the price that has been 
paid for the assets, so the individual assets are stated on cost basis rather than on value 
basis. The assets’ book value is more a historical value than any real value since the aim 
of accounting principles is not to reflect actual business conditions27.
It is possible to calculate a real asset value per share. This calculation requires 
that the value of a company’s assets is known, but that is not generally so. The value of 
a company’s assets should then be estimated. Yet, this valuation can be useless. For 
example, an industrial estate and machinery have a value for the company in its 
business but there may be no buyers for these assets. The liquidation value of a 
company’s assets is typically less than the value of assets in a going concern. A 
company’s assets are normally most valuable in its business; liquidation and break-up 
typically destroy rather than create value.
Physical assets have a declining role as the importance of intangible assets has 
grown dramatically. Traditional assets do not have any predominant role in business 
since companies create value to a large extent through processes and activities that are 
based on knowledge and innovation. It is pointless to calculate an asset value, for 
example for Microsoft Corporation.
In brief, the value of a company is rarely based on its assets. Furthermore, there 
are companies whose shares are systematically quoted under their asset value. It is
26 Shares have a nominal value, but that has a very restricted role in company law, and nothing to do with 
the real value of shares; see above, chapter two 2.2.2.
27 Re Press Caps Ltd [1949] Ch 434 (CA) 441 (Somervell LJ): “but this figure, in accordance with what is 
very common practice, does not appear in the balance sheet as a valuation of the property as at the date of 
the balance sheet, but as its cost less depreciation”; Bodie and others (2005) 607: “The book value of a 
firm is the result o f applying a set of arbitrary accounting rules to spread the acquisition cost of assets 
over a specified number of years.”
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paradoxical to notice that the net asset value is no market price for investment 
companies’ shares; we know best their real asset value, however, these shares are 
generally traded at 20 per cent discount to it28. The asset value per share is no minimum, 
maximum, or real value of shares.
The value of shares follows the fortune of a company’s business, but the value 
of its assets does not have a similar role. The asset value is not directly related to the 
earning power. It is unusual that the market price for shares is equal to their asset value. 
As a result, the net asset value is no right value for shares. In a going concern, it can 
only have a supporting role in share valuation29. Still, the asset value may have more 
importance when no other value is available, which is a quite normal situation 
especially in the case of a private company. Furthermore, asset value has a very central 
role when a company is liquidated because shareholders are then entitled to the value of 
a company’s net assets30.
4.4.3 Intrinsic value
Intrinsic value is an investment value for shares. The fundamental point is that shares 
derive value from the cash flow they generate. As Brealey formulates: “Investors are a 
mercenary bunch, and they prize common stocks only for what they expect to get out of 
them”31. This return is available in two forms: 1) shareholders receive yield, which is 
paid as a dividend; 2) shareholders can get capital gains when share price rises.
Intrinsic value for shares is calculated on the basis of the discounted future cash 
flows. The value of shares is the cash flow stream that they are expected to generate
28 See Kraakman, Reinier, ‘Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of “Discounted” Share Prices 
as an Acquisition Motive’ (1988) 88 Columbia Law Review 891, 903; Jones, Charles P., Investments (8th 
edn New York 2002) 56; ‘Low-priced investment trusts offer good value’ Financial Times July 10 2004; 
and Shleifer and Summers (1990) 27: “When investors are bullish about closed-end funds, they drive up 
their prices relative to fundamental values, and discounts narrows or turn into premiums. When investors 
in contrast are bearish about closed-end funds, they drive down their prices and discounts widen.”
29 About this idea in company law, see above, chapter three 3.4.1.
30 See below, chapter five 5.4.3.
31 Brealey (1983) 67.
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over their life, which amount should be calculated in today’s money as a pound received 
today is worth more than a pound tomorrow. However, the main challenge for cash flow 
models is the nature of share investments: the return is unknown. Thus, the sum of 
future cash flows must be adjusted both by time and uncertainty. The value of shares 
then rests on the assumptions made.
Dividends, which are the periodic income from shares, have a fundamental role 
in share valuation. They are cash flows from the company to shareholders. The main 
benefit of shares is dividends; shares as objects are valuable in virtue of the utility of 
these payments. This is the central idea in dividend valuation models32, where the 
assumption is that the value of shares should rest on dividend payments33. According to 
these models, the value of shares is the present value of future dividends. In brief, when 
these methods are used, share value is a function of the expected dividends and a 
discount rate.
Nevertheless, the main problem with dividend valuation is that the payment of 
dividends is not directly related to the prosperity of a company. There is no requirement 
that a company should pay dividends. For example, Microsoft Corporation paid a 
dividend for the first time in its history in 2003. But, of course, Microsoft’s shares were 
valuable before that payment. Moreover, there is no sense to argue that Microsoft’s 
shares would have been more valuable if the company had paid dividends earlier. We 
do not know, and neither does any financial model. In fact, the research of Miller and 
Modigliani proposes that a company’s dividend policy has no impact on the valuation34. 
There should be no relationship between share value and dividend payments. On the
32 See Choudhry and others (2002) 374ff, and as they explain there exist also dividend growth models; 
Davies (1986) 196 sees that the constant dividend growth model has become “the most widely employed 
theoretical valuation model.”
33 Eg Kay, John, The Truth About Markets: Their Genius, their Limits, their Follies (London 2003) 156, 
where he expects that dividends will receive more weight in share valuation; Brealey (1983) 68: the value 
of shares is the “discounted value of a continuing stream of expected dividend payments.”
34 Miller, Merton H. and Modigliani, Franco, ‘Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares’ 
(1961) 34 Journal of Business 411; see also eg Copeland, Thomas E. and others, Financial Theory and 
Corporate Policy (4th edn Boston 2005) 688: “Dividend policy is irrelevant in all instances.”
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other hand, market oriented economists consider that a company’s dividend policy gives 
signals to the market35. Share investors systematically prefer current dividends to capital 
gains later although investment theory says that they should not do so. Therefore, the 
market prices for shares with expected dividend payments may be higher than of those 
companies that do not pay dividends. In valuation of shares, the payment of dividends 
has more importance in practice than in theory . Moreover, dividends have a different 
role in valuation of income and growth stocks. For these reasons, there seems be no firm 
answer to the role of dividends in share valuation.
Dividends are never enough for shareholders since they also expect to get 
capital gains due to the rising share price. Both dividends and capital gains are sources 
of cash flows to shareholders, who seek a return by way of income and anticipated 
capital gains. Simply, their total return is the sum of dividend payments and capital 
gains. In particular, when shares are ‘growth stocks’, the expected capital gains have 
much more importance than dividends. Naturally, dividends cannot have a crucial role 
when a company pays no dividends.
However, there is no sense just to suppose capital gains in future. Therefore, 
shares are generally valued by real business considerations and mainly on the basis of a 
company’s profits. The earning power of the company is the most important 
determinant in share valuation. Its earnings are the real source of the future cash flows 
to shareholders; the value of shares is their proportionate share of these earnings. The 
prime method in share valuation from this perspective is the price-eamings (P/E) ratio37, 
which figure shows the relation of share price to earnings per share.
35 Choudhry and others (2002) 378ff; Copeland and others (2005) 689; in addition, as they explain, due to 
the principal-agent concern and taxation, the payment of a dividend is never neutral to shareholders.
36 Shleifer and Summers (1990) 26: “the Modigliani-Miller theorem does not apply in a world where 
sentiment affect security prices.”
37 Bodie and others (2005) 622: “Much of the real-world discussion of stock market valuation 
concentrates on the firm’s price-earnings multiple”; Davies (1986) 200-1; and Siegel (2002) 95: “The 
most basic and fundamental yardstick for valuing stocks is the price-earnings (P-E) ratio”; however, he 
also sees, ibid 93, that the price of the stock is “always equal” to the present value of all future dividends
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P/E ratios are quoted in financial newspapers, but these figures may be the 
current share price divided by the most recent earnings. Share investors, however, are 
more interested in the price relative to the future earnings. The expectation of future 
earnings growth is the most important single variable in the P/E ratio approach. 
Obviously, this point makes the price-earnings ratio problematic since investors need 
future information. The earnings of a company should be assumed using some financial 
calculation method; therefore, the computation can never be straightforward.
Price-earnings ratio has a role of a yardstick in evaluation of share value. The 
current figure can be high or low, yet a high P/E might show that investors think that the 
company has good growth opportunities. On the other hand, the P/E can be low because 
earnings are expected to remain moderate. Price-earnings ratio can be a misleading 
indicator for valuation: the multiplier needs explanations. These ratios may offer more 
comparative information than any firm knowledge about share value. Furthermore, a 
company that does not make profit has an infinite P/E ratio. In conclusion, the price- 
earnings ratio gives some relative information about share value, but a singular ratio is 
never right or wrong.
Dividends and a company’s earnings are the fundamental points in stock 
valuation; still, neither of them is able to offer any right value for shares. Share 
valuation is more complex. Dealing with uncertainty requires sophisticated financial 
valuation methods, and during the last thirty years the fundaments of investment theory 
have transformed with huge steps. However, there exist strong controversies among 
academics and practitioners about the valuation. No theory or model is able to set the 
intrinsic value for shares since there are too many uncertain factors to reach a definite 
answer. It is almost impossible to prove whether a single calculation in the context of
and not the value of future earnings, and so the valuing of shares through the discounted value of future 
earnings is “manifestly wrong and greatly overstates the value of a firm.”
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share valuation is correct or incorrect38. A share can have many intrinsic values because 
every person who makes the valuation reaches his own conclusion39. An intrinsic value 
can only be an estimate since the value reached rests on the assumptions and beliefs. 
Therefore, different models can just explain and interpret the ideas of valuation. 
Efficient markets offer more reliable estimate for share value than even the most 
advanced financial mathematics can provide. The result of markets “contains a wisdom 
that the theorists could not have replicated with pencil and paper alone”40. Different 
valuation methods can only assist investors in their investment decisions. The 
fundamental idea is that investors determine share prices on stock markets, where the 
principles of share valuation are translated into real-world practice.
4.4.4 Market value
Markets indicate the value of objects. The price at which a commodity is generally sold 
is its market price. Markets typically operate so that the price of any commodity “tends 
to uniformity”41.
The market value of shares is what they are trading for today, ie the price that 
somebody pays for them at this moment. Shares obtain a value in exchange because 
their true value is the price available from markets. This current market price is 
normally an objective fact.
Since the volume of trades on stock markets is huge, shares can be bought and 
sold quickly, fairly, and efficiently. In efficient markets, the price of shares should be 
equal to their intrinsic value; in consequence, the market price forecasts the expected 
return from shares.
38 Jones (2002) 277.
39 Re Grierson, Oldham & Adams Ltd [1968] Ch 17, 38 (Plowman J): “the question of value is obviously 
one about which opinions may differ”; more below, chapter seven 7.3.2.
40 Cowen, Tyler and Crampton, Eric, ‘Introduction’ in Market Failure or Success (Cheltenham 2002) 25; 
Davies (1986) 205: “It is unlikely that any satisfactory valuation will be possible in the absence of a 
market.”
41 Stigler, George J., The Theory o f Price (4th edn New York 1987) 77.
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The pricing on stock markets is distinctive since there is a bid-ask spread in 
pricing: investors can sell shares at the bid price and buy them at the ask price. Due to 
this spread, share markets in a way offer one price for buyers and another for sellers. 
However, in efficient stock markets the spread between these prices should be small.
Naturally, share transactions are completed at a certain price, which is a matter 
of bargain. A buyer acquires and a seller disposes shares according to an accepted 
pricing. Therefore, the parties of a transaction agree with each other about the price, but 
it does not mean that they have the same opinion about share value. Stock markets 
match bids and asks for shares, ie the personal valuation of a buyer and of a seller 
“interact to produce the ‘exterior’ values evident in the realm of exchange”42. Pricing in 
a market is not a co-operative operation as the interests of sellers and buyers are 
conflicting. A buyer’s desire is a price that is as low as possible, and it is the opposite to 
the seller. Furthermore, every investor has an individual bid-ask spread because an 
investor’s selling price for shares should be higher than the price he would himself be 
willing to pay for the particular shares. A rational investor does not buy and sell shares 
simultaneously at the same price.
Investors disagree about valuation because their beliefs about the return on 
shares are not homogeneous. The difference of opinions is the ultimate reason for all 
market transactions43. If investors do not disagree about the merits of share valuation, 
there would be no market transaction as no exchange will take place unless each party 
perceives some possible advantage for himself. When an investor values particular
42 Glover (1986) 1.
43 Twain, Mark, P udd’nhead Wilson and Those Extraordinary Twins (New York 2002) (originally 1894) 
147 explains the basic idea of market transactions well: “it is difference of opinion that makes horse­
races”; indeed, the shareholder in a public company may view the corporation as the holder of a betting 
slip views a racehorse; see Lipton, Martin and Rosenblum, Steven A., ‘A New System of Corporate 
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors’ (1991) 58 University of Chicago Law Review 187, 
194.
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shares above their market price, he should acquire them44. In fact, share investors try to 
discover ‘value shares’, ie shares that are priced at a discount on their real value. By 
contrast, when an investor thinks that shares are less valuable than their current price, he 
sells them, and through the short selling he may sell shares even if he does not have 
them.
In reality, investors’ assets are limited, and therefore a shareholder may sell 
shares even if he values them higher than the current market price because he prefers to 
acquire a more promising investment45. Investors desire portfolios that offer the highest 
expected return at the current level of risk. Valuation and investment decisions are 
always related to the prices of alternative investment products. As valuation is a relative 
concept, shares cannot be valued in isolation. Yet, as the success of investment is 
uncertain, investors can never really know whether they should buy or sell particular 
shares at the current price. Share transactions are always some kinds of educated 
guesses that take place on the market.
Investment theory says that prices on stock markets do not depend on the 
decisions of individual investors since every investor has only the role of a price taker, 
not of a price setter. The transactions made by a single investor should not have an 
appreciable impact on the prevailing share price. If an investor wants to buy or sell 
shares, he can do so at the market price. Capital market theories are therefore more 
interested in the behaviour of the market generally than the decisions of individual 
investors. The fundamental ideas of market mechanism propose that when a share is 
mispriced investors “tilt their portfolios toward the underpriced and away from the 
overpriced securities”46. The market mechanism corrects the mistakes in pricing, and
44 Eg Epstein, Richard A., Simple Rules fo r  a Complex World (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1995) 250: 
“each person who acquires an interest in the firm will value it, at the time of purchase, more than the 
property or money paid to acquire that interest.”
45 Naturally, risk-seekers first ‘gear themselves up’ by borrowing money to increase their investment 
portfolio.
46 Bodie and others (2005) 349.
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the current price will immediately be the right one. As the anonymous market 
determines the prices of shares, Adam Smith’s invisible hand operates on the stock 
markets too. In sum, the general presumption of the market economy is that the market 
should set prices right.
But the markets do not actually set prices, which is the task of investors. Their 
demand determines the prices and allocation of existing securities among them. In 
addition, market prices are, in fact, average prices as there are always investors that 
would sell shares at a lower price and those who would pay more for them. Through 
efficient markets everybody gets and pays the market price, which is the current 
consensus value for shares. As a result, a market is a system of proportional 
representation47. The price formation on well-operating stock markets is equal and 
democratic to every investor.
The market value of shares rests on economic expectations since their value 
depends on the future return. This relationship to the future makes valuation of shares 
complicated and their prices volatile. Moreover, the future price is not a single number, 
but rather a process in moving in time and subject to uncertainty48. Market price is a 
phenomenon since it is available only at the single moment. Share prices change 
rapidly: the most current price is immediately part of financial history. Theory of stock 
markets says that it is impossible to predict the future prices for shares as they follow 
the random walk hypothesis49. The unpredictability of share prices is a centrepiece in 
the efficient capital market hypothesis. Modem financial economics rests very much on 
these two hypotheses; however, both the random walk and efficient capital markets
47 Friedman, Milton, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago 1982) (originally 1962) 23.
48 Luenberger, David G., Investment Science (New York 1998) 5.
49 Eg Malkiel, Burton G., A Random Walk Down Wall Street (7th edn New York 1999); but see also Lo, 
Andrew W. and MacKinlay, A. Craig, A Non-Random Walk Down Wall Street (Princeton 1999), where 
they argue that market prices are predictable to some degree.
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hypothesis are theories only50. The real stock market does not operate every time as 
predicted: economic reality is more complicated than theories51. Consequently, share 
markets are merely ‘relative efficient’52.
Share investment is not only science, but it is art too. The guessing of the market 
behaviour and the future share prices is central part of the investment business. Lord 
Keynes explains investment decisions in this way:
professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in 
which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred 
photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most 
nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so 
that each competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, 
but those which he thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all 
of whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case 
of choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest, 
nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have 
reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what 
average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I 
believe, who practise the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.53
50 About the collapse of the efficient market hypothesis, see above note 14; Grossman, Sanford J. and 
Stiglitz, Joseph E., ‘On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets’ (1980) 70 American 
Economic Review 393; ‘Market inefficiencies prove we’re only human’ Financial Times October 25 
2004.
51 See Fama, Eugene F., Foundations o f Finance (New York 1976) 168: economic models are “extreme 
simplifications of the world”; Coase, R. H., ‘The Nature of the Firm: Meaning’ in Williamson, Oliver E. 
and Winter, Sidney G. (eds), The Nature o f  the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development (New York 
1991) 48, 52: “when economists find that they are unable to analyze what is happening in the real world, 
they invent an imaginary world which they are capable of handling.”
52 Lo and MacKinlay (1999) 7; Allen (2003) 552: stock markets are “pretty efficient”.
53 Keynes, John Maynard, The General Theory o f Employment, Interest, and Money (New York 1997) 
(originally 1936) 156.
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Of course, investors hope that the prices of shares they own rise in future, so they 
should be able to predict those ones that other investors will prefer. In particular, stock 
pickers try to find these kinds of shares.
Valuation of shares is a matter of taste and sentiment, and there exist investors 
with a different appetite. Some investors desire growth stocks, and some prefer value 
stocks. Further, share portfolios can be passive or active, and shares defensive or 
aggressive. Investment business is trendy business, where enthusiasm can lead to 
market bubbles and strong overshooting in valuation. A bull market, where shares are 
traded in a herd-like manner, may drive investors’ expectations very high. For example, 
in the late 1990s the valuations of internet companies were absurd as the underlying 
motive to purchase shares was very speculative. Share prices separated from real values, 
but that bubble burst. Crashes and panics are part of security markets. In the end, the 
market will punish if shares are overvalued, and after crashes investors typically return 
to the basic valuation principles54. In general, stock markets are strongly driven by 
short-term price fluctuations. In addition, the structure of capital market incentives 
might push managers into ‘manic efforts’ to raise the price of shares. On the other hand, 
markets may undervalue shares if investors do not understand a company’s long-term 
value55. These unpopular companies may then become interesting targets for corporate 
raiders.
Altogether, economic behaviour can be “impulsive and capricious,” as Knight 
observes56. The wisdom of social science says: “the principal problem in understanding 
the actions of men is to understand how they think -  how their minds work” . As a 
result, share prices might sometimes be psychological rather than real. The common
54 Jones (2002) 15; ‘Back to basics’ Financial Times March 14 2005.
55 See eg Lee, Paul, ‘Investors and Long-term Shareholder Value’ in Black, Andrew (ed), Questions o f  
Value (London 2004) 3.
56 Knight, Frank H., Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Boston 1921) 53.
57 Bridgeman, Percy, Reflections o f a Physicist (2nd edn New York 1955) 450; quoted in Williamson, 
Oliver E., The Economic Institutions o f  Capitalism  (New York 1985) 2-3; about behavioural finance, see 
eg Shleifer, Andrei, Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance (Oxford 2000).
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expertise of markets can be wrong. However, the current market price is the most 
accurate value for shares whether there is boom or bust on the market. The market 
economy generally trusts on the operation of markets and their pricing.
Share value is not only linked to the prospects of a company since it follows the 
movements on stock markets in general, industry-wide conditions, and factors that are 
common to certain stocks. In addition, the value of stocks is related to macroeconomic 
climate. Normally, when interest rates rise, values of shares fall. For some companies, 
macroeconomic and industry circumstances may have a great influence on their profits 
and share prices. As markets pay a lot of attention to macroeconomic factors at national 
and international level, share investors may be more concerned about the 
macroeconomic development, for example in China than at the national level. Valuation 
of shares takes place in the overall financial environment. The valuation and pricing of 
shares is really an enormous guesswork.
The life of share investors may be hard: they have to deal with uncertainty. 
Valuation of shares is complex, and their value is a puzzle for the financial industry too. 
However, the main idea in market economy is that the operation of markets sets the 
prices, and through their common actions investors are expected to get share prices and 
values right. Shares are worth what investors pay for them, and shareholders should 
accept these prices if they want to buy or sell shares. The market can be right or wrong, 
but markets still offer the most reliable information about share value.
4.5 Liquidity of shares
Shares in public companies are marketable and mobile investment products. Liquid 
stock markets offer an exit option to investors. It is important that investors are able to 
convert their investment efficiently into cash. Shares are liquid when they can be bought 
and sold quickly with a relatively small price change.
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Investors need both liquidity and diversification. As explained above, an 
investor is expected to do the best by diversifying his assets to different companies 
since both theory and practice support the idea that these portfolios are less risky than 
the concentrated ones. In addition, a diversified investment portfolio is more liquid 
because shares issued by several companies are easier to dispose. For investors, 
illiquidity means uncertainty about share prices, so these kinds of shares are more risky. 
Therefore, liquidity, in the same way as diversification, can make shares more valuable.
4.5.1 Liquidity versus control
Shares are transferable assets; on the other hand, shareholders have ultimate power in
c o
the company . Shares offer liquidity on the market and control power in the company. 
Shareholders, like members of any organization, face a choice between ‘exit’ and 
‘voice’59. Further, liquidity and control are opposite and “antithetical” as there is a 
tension between them60.
Investors who require liquidity do not desire control power. For these stock 
traders, a large share position in a company is typically unacceptable since that is not 
liquid. The Anglo-American stock market tradition sees that investors prefer liquidity to 
control. Modem corporations, where shareholders exchange control in a company for 
liquidity in the market, have a ‘dispersed ownership structure’61. Share investors 
purchase liquidity at the cost of control . In general, on stock markets exists preference 
for liquidity.
58 See above, chapter two 2.4 and 2.3.2.
59 Hirschman, Albert O., Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1970).
60 Coffee, John C., Jr, ‘Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor’ (1991) 
91 Columbia Law Review 1277, 1287-88.
61 Berle, Adolf A., Jr and Means, Gardiner C., The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York 
1932) 286.
62 Coffee (1991) 1329.
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An investment portfolio that consists of shares in a single company is illiquid 
and hard to dispose. Indeed, selling of substantial share blocks is “a tricky exercise”63.
A sale of a share block normally depresses the market price, and this discount is called 
‘blockage’64. Institutional investors with large share positions must accept price 
discounts in order to liquidate their shares65. Financial professionals and regulators 
understand that the selling of a big amount of equities causes a fall to share price66. For 
instance, new issues are generally sold below the price that shares subsequently trade 
because investors are encouraged to acquire the new shares. The Listing Rules accept 
that in open offers this issue discount can be up to 10 per cent of the current market
f \ lprice . Naturally, share offerings and markets should not offer any real discounts but 
large stock transactions exert pressure on the market price of the particular shares. In 
brief, the pricing of shares follows laws of supply and demand.
In a similar way, buying a large block of shares raises the market price68. The 
law of demand plays an evident role in company takeovers, where an acquiring 
company is generally presupposed to pay a premium over the market price for the 
target’s shares to get its control69. However, the ideas of share valuation do not require 
that a takeover price should be higher than the current market price, which is always the
63 Cheffms, Brian R., Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation (Oxford 1997) 634; however, ibid 
63, he also says that there are conflicting evidence about the prices at which blocks can be sold.
64 Eg Glover (1986) 30: On the Stock Exchange large blocks of shares typically change hands at a 
discount to current market price.”
65 Coffee (1991) 1288-89; see also Stedman, Graham, Takeovers (London 1993) 87: “investors who hold 
large blocks of the target’s shares may find that if they attempted to sell them in the market at the same 
time the price would fall”; still, some studies show that blocks are priced at substantial premiums, if 
large-block shareholders have been able to use their voting power to secure private benefits; see Barclay, 
Michael J. and Holderness, Clifford G., ‘Private Benefits from Control o f Public Corporations’ (1989) 25 
Journal of Financial Economics 371.
66 Eg Asquith, Paul and Mullins, David W., Jr, ‘Equity Issues and Offering Dilution’ (1986) 15 Journal of 
Financial Economics 61, 61.
67 UKLA Listing Rules 9.5.10.
68 Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Co Inc v American Fidelity Life Insurance Co (1979) 606 F 2d 
602 (United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit) 611: “Of course, any person having rudimentary 
knowledge of securities trading would realize that a course of purchasing stock would tend either to 
increase the price of the stock or to avert a decline in price that might otherwise occur.”
69 About premiums, see eg Franks, Julian R. and others, ‘Means of Payment in Takeovers: Results for the 
United Kingdom and the United States’ in Auerbach, Alan J. (ed), Corporate Takeovers: Causes and 
Consequences (Chicago 1988) 221.
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most accurate price for shares. It is the market mechanism that sets the premium since 
buying large quantities of shares inevitably bids up the price. As Stuart explains:
The takeover bidder who wishes to purchase the stock of a target firm from its 
current shareholders must offer a price that meets or exceeds the shareholders’ 
varying subjective estimates of value. Thus, purchasing larger and larger 
amounts requires the bidder to offer higher and higher prices.70
There will be no takeover if a bidder does not offer a price that shareholders of a quoted 
company widely accept. Obviously, a bid at the current market price offers shareholders 
nothing special. The bidder must pay a higher price to persuade them to sell shares to 
get the control in a company. The general ideas of supply and demand apply: more 
demand for shares means that their price rises until a new equilibrium through pricing is 
reached. Takeovers, like large share acquisitions in general, have influence on the 
market price. But pricing of shares cannot alone show whether these transactions create 
any extra wealth since it is this market mechanism that makes the premium71.
Combining liquidity and power is difficult as conditions are seldom favourable 
for any stable and optimal mixture of exit and voice . In companies, shareholders meet 
a trade-off between liquidity and control. Investors who strongly rely on exit have little 
interest in voice. In general, short-term investors prefer liquidity through markets, and 
long-term investors appreciate voting power in the company. Naturally, companies need 
both short and long-term shareholders, and capitalism should not focus too strongly on 
short-term market prices. In addition, both voice and exit can be overdone. Shareholder
70 Stout, Lynn A., ‘Are Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate 
Law’ (1990) 99 Yale Law Journal 1235, 1247.
71 However, a central idea in many takeovers is to integrate a company’s operations with those of the 
bidder, of course, there might then be available benefits that may make shares more valuable to the 
bidder; about takeovers, see more below, chapter seven 7.6.
72 Hirschman (1970) 125.
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activism may sometimes be a burden for the operation of a company; on the other hand, 
if shareholders sell strongly shares there is an immense danger of a price crash.
It is impossible to say whether liquidity or control is more important for 
shareholders. For some investors, the exit option prevails, and sometimes the voice 
option may be the main point. According to the Anglo-American stock market tradition, 
companies have dispersed shareholders that prefer liquidity to control. It is clear that 
liquidity is more valuable to shareholders with small blocks of shares because their 
shares are more liquid; therefore, these shareholders may ‘vote with their feet’. When 
liquidity exists, it is a tempting choice, and some investors’ sole interest is the liquidity. 
In contrast, power is more valuable to shareholders with large share positions because 
they ordinarily have real power in the company. In all institutions, the role of voice 
increases as the opportunities for exit decline. Moreover, a concentrated ownership 
structure in a company typically means that all the shares in the company become less 
liquid; thus, there are less liquidity benefits for any shareholder. But some investors, in 
particular, corporate raiders really want control power in companies. In conclusion, both 
liquidity and control are available through stock markets. Share investors have the 
choice since they may decide which one to desire. But due to the market mechanism, 
liquidity and control are costly, and therefore investors must be ready to pay a price 
premium to get them.
4.5.2 Value and price of liquidity
Every shareholder needs liquidity and markets for shares. Liquidity has an important 
role in investment decisions. Investors are willing to pay a higher price for liquid shares 
since these shares are easier to dispose. On the contrary, investors should get a financial 
compensation if they invest in illiquid shares. In general, small companies’ shares have
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a substantial liquidity risk73. Thus, investors are expected to pay a premium for liquid 
shares, and they get a discount for illiquid ones. Since the price of liquid shares is 
higher, liquidity increases the value of the particular shares. In contrast, illiquidity 
makes the price of shares lower, and so these shares are less valuable.
Illiquid shares are more risky to investors because of their market risk. But as 
investment theory says, markets should offer trade-off between risk and return. As a 
result, the expected return from illiquid shares should be higher: risks are priced through 
stock markets. Indeed, returns from shares with lower liquidity seem, on average, to be 
superior on the long run since shares that are “more sensitive to aggregate liquidity have 
substantially higher expected returns”74. Simply, share markets mechanism is able to 
price the liquidity of shares. Moreover, if the market operates efficiently, illiquidity is 
not only a risk to share investors because it is also an opportunity to get a higher return.
The idea in markets is clear: liquidity can increase share value. Markets set a 
price for liquidity, but the value of liquidity still rests on the decisions of investors. In 
consequence, it cannot generally be said how valuable liquidity is; we only know how 
liquidity is valued and priced on the stock markets.
4.5.3 Liquidity and the value of a company
A company’s value follows its fortunes, and share value depends on the prosperity of 
the company’s business. In principle, the value per share can be determined by dividing 
a company’s overall value and earnings to every share, which is the central idea in 
cumputation of eamings-per-share ratios. On the other hand, the value of a quoted 
company is often calculated by multiplying the number of its all shares with the current
73 Eg Jones (2002) 133; Pastor, Lubos and Stambaugh, Robert F., ‘Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock 
Returns’ (2003) 111 Journal of Political Economy 642.
74 Ibid 683; see also ‘Minnows back in investors’ favour’ Financial Times March 11 2005.
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market price. In this method, the value of a public company is derived from the price of 
its shares, not vice versa.
Yet, a company’s market value is only a theoretical figure. First, investors do 
not buy companies; they can acquire shares only75. The market value of a company can
n (\be an informative figure, but not any real value or price . Second, due to liquidity, we 
should not argue that the current market price for shares is the market value for all the 
shares. This kind of assumption is an oversimplification, which completely ignores the 
role of liquidity. The pricing of shares follows laws of supply and demand; therefore, to 
be able to buy every share in a company an investor should pay a market premium due 
to the market mechanism. In the same way, market price typically declines when blocks 
of shares are sold. In sum, the current market price for shares does not determine the 
value of all the shares in a company. As Stout explains: “the market value of the firm is 
the sum of the varying subjective valuations that each of its shareholders attaches to his 
or her holdings”77. A current market price for shares is not an accurate reflection of the 
market value of each and every one of a company’s outstanding shares. From the 
perspective of shareholders, we can even say that they consider the value of their shares 
higher than the prevailing market price. Because share investors think in this way, they 
have originally acquired those shares. In addition, since they value their shares higher, 
they do not liquidate their investment at the current price. Once again, the decision 
about share value rests on shareholders. Until there are real share transactions, the value 
of a company’s shares is unknown. Moreover, we should also notice that after these 
transactions, it is possible only to know the market price because the real value of 
shares may still remain hidden.
75 See above, chapter three 3.3.1.
76 As Glover (1986) 30 explains, the correct term is market capitalisation.
77 Stout (1990) 1264.
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Liquidity makes valuation of shares difficult because it can both increase and 
decline prices in share transactions. Liquidity means that a buyer must be willing to pay 
more to acquire a block of shares, which idea operates clearly in takeovers. Therefore, 
the value of a company’s all shares should generally be higher than the value calculated 
on the basis of the current share price. Still, we cannot generally know what their value 
should be because shareholders set the value for shares. In conclusion, I state that 
liquidity really has an important role in the pricing of shares.
4.6 Value of shares in economics
Shares are valued on the basis of shareholders’ expected return. A company’s success in 
business, which is the source of shareholders’ financial return, is the most important 
determinant in share valuation. However, as the future cash flows from shares are 
uncertain, the evaluation of shares is always an estimation resting on certain 
assumptions. Financial models are unable to set the intrinsic value for shares since there 
are too many unknown factors to reach a definite answer. Share value remains as a 
matter of an opinion.
In the market economy, markets determine prices, and this idea applies to shares 
too. Market value is the price at which buyers and sellers trade particular items in a 
marketplace. Market price is the real value for shares. In addition, due to market 
mechanism, liquidity has an important role in the setting of prices for shares.
As distinguished economists note: “Our world is a highly imperfect one, and 
these imperfections include the working of markets”78. On the one hand, it is true that 
stock markets are unable to set exactly right prices for shares since markets are never 
prefect. Share prices may diverge from the intrinsic share value. On the other hand,
78 Cowen and Crampton (2002) 24.
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economists and lawyers should not exaggerate the imperfections of markets79. Markets 
operate generally well, and market price is the most reliable value for shares. As a 
result, market prices deserve “substantial defence from courts and investors alike”80. A 
stock market quotation is “the best evidence of value” both in law81 and in economics.
However, market transactions occur when share investors disagree about the 
value. Value and price have different roles in every market. Significantly, a buyer thinks 
he should acquire shares at the current price, but the seller considers that he should 
dispose them. There is no need to reach a consensus between them about the real value. 
Therefore, economists do not say that investors should buy or sell shares at the current 
market price; they think that it is important that investors could do so. Those economists 
who are the most in favour of the efficiency of markets might even argue that it is 
indifferent whether investors buy or sell shares at the current market price82. In sum, 
shareholders should have freedom of exchange.
Economists and markets cannot offer the right value for shares. The pricing of 
shares must rest on the decisions of share investors: the wisdom of markets comes from 
shareholders. Economists let shareholders determine the value of shares; moreover, they 
see that share value depends on the property rights. The ideas of property rights and 
freedom of contract are really central in the market economy. In essence, shares are 
intangibles, whose “value lies in the rights they embody”83. Shares are valuable because 
of shareholders’ rights; further, shareholders have a general right to set the value for 
their shares. How are shareholders entitled to determine the value of shares? What law 
and the courts can say about share value? This theme is developed further in chapter 
seven.
79 See ibid.
80 Allen (2003) 563.
81 Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA) 125.
82 See eg Stout (1990) 1239.
83 Pennington, Robert R., The Law o f the Investment Markets (Oxford 1990) 2.
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CHAPTER 5
EQUALITY OF SHARES
The great aim o f the struggle fo r  liberty has been 
equality before the law.
Hayek, F. A., The Constitution o f Liberty (1960) 85.
5.1 The notion of equality
The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that equality of shares is a point of great 
significance in company law; however, the companies’ legislation does not explicitly 
declare shares equal. Rather, shareholders’ status is more a matter of the company 
constitution and common law.
My perspective is pragmatic: the focus is on how courts consider shareholders’ 
equal treatment under company law. The method used is inductive, ie the courts require 
that shareholders should be treated equally; thus, I argue that equality is a fundamental 
principle in company law. Since this argument rests on case law, my emphasis is on 
describing and explaining judicial reasoning. Further, as many important cases in the 
area are from the nineteenth century, I might have partly a historical view in this 
chapter. Even so, cases under review are still capable of demonstrating the current 
position of equality in company law.
Equality is not a simple concept. Moreover, it does not have any absolute nature 
since equality is not always “a standard to be rigidly applied”1. Yet, company law 
supports equality, and my intention is to review the equality that company law offers. 
The main point in this research is to propose that when shares have similar rights, their
1 Walker, David M., The Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford 1980) 423.
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value is equal in law. In this chapter, equality is reviewed generally, and share value 
itself is considered in chapter seven.
5.2 Equality and freedom
Equality and freedom are components of law, and they exist as elements in company 
law too. But legal concepts are often confusing, which point applies to both equality and 
freedom. Equality is a word with many meanings . In addition, it is fair to say that 
English lawyers, and in particular business lawyers, are not enthused about equality3.
5.2.1 Equality in law
It is said that equality is “at once the simplest and the most complex idea that shapes the 
evolution of the law”4. Nonetheless, this study tries to keep equality as simple as 
possible. My interest is equality before the law: in short, shareholders should be treated 
fairly according to the norms of company law. The aim of this study is to boost equality 
of rights and opportunities. To emphasize, my focus is not generally on economic5, 
distributive6, or natural7 equality.
2 Bix, Brian H., A Dictionary o f Legal Theory (Oxford 2004) 61: equality is “[a] basic concept in moral, 
political, and legal theory, but about which there is little agreement”; Dworkin, Ronald, Sovereign Virtue 
-  The Theory and Practice o f Equality (Cambridge, Massachusetts 2000) 2: “Equality is a contested 
concept: people who praise or disparage it disagree about what it is they are praising or disparaging”; 
Schwardzschild, Maimon, ‘Constitutional law and equality’ in Patterson, Dennis (ed), A Companion to 
Philosophy o f Law and Legal Theory (Cambridge, Massachusetts 1996) 156, 169: “Equality is shorthand 
for many values, some of which conflict with one another, and some of which conflict with other values 
such as freedom.”
3 See eg Guest, Stephen, ‘Why the Law is Just’ (2000) 53 Current Legal Problems 31, 38: “Equality 
makes people think of bureaucratic, freedom-squashing, levelled-down socialism”; and also Tawney, R. 
H., Equality (London 1931) 24: “In England inequality is almost a religion.”
4 Fletcher, George P., Basic Concepts o f Legal Thought (New York 1996) 121.
5 As Nagel, Thomas, ‘Equality’ in Clayton, Matthew and Williams, Andrew (eds), The Ideal o f Equality 
(Basingstoke 2000) 60, 60 explains, contemporary political debate recognizes four types of equality: 
political, legal, social, and economic.
It is true that justice is not synonymous with equality, which is then, however, understood as distributive 
justice; see generally Dias, R. W. M., Jurisprudence (5th edn London 1985) 65ff; and in the area of 
company law especially Cheffins, Brian R., Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation (Oxford 
1997) 472ff.
7 About equal humanity and equality of result, see Weinreb, Lloyd L., Natural Law and Justice 
(Cambridge, Massachusets 1987) 167 and 176ff.
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Consequently, as I see it, equality has two elements: equality in operation of 
legal rules and equality of opportunities to exercise one’s will and employ one’s 
substance8. First, shareholders are equal before the law, and those affected by the law 
are equal to one another. As a result, company law binds everybody: both majority and 
minority shareholders. Yet, this does not mean that every company law rule should have 
a similar effect on every shareholder9. Second, company law provides shareholders with 
similar opportunities when their rights are equal. On the other hand, a company might 
have different classes of shares, and obviously because the shares carry different rights 
they cannot be equal. But these kinds of shares are not a common practice in companies. 
In addition, their ‘natural’ inequality is a voluntary exclusion of the general principle. I 
stress that shareholders’ rights are predominant: company law should protect these 
rights and offer corrective justice to shareholders. Moreover, as companies are governed 
by majority rule, equality is needed particularly to protect the interests of the minority. 
Majority power in companies is “subject to those general principles of law and equity 
which are applicable to all powers conferred on majorities and enabling them to bind 
minorities”10. Equality is one of these principles. This study aims to emphasize that 
equality is required in company law also to protect the equal value of shares. I argue 
that equality has a fundamental role in company law.
5.2.2 Freedom in law
In capitalism, free men are responsible for their own destiny: capitalism provides 
economic freedom. Obviously, capitalism does not mean that everybody may do 
whatever he pleases. For example, when someone owns something, it is his private
8 Pound, Roscoe, The Spirit o f  Common Law (New Hampshire 1921) 142.
9 For instance, CA 1985 s 459 protects only minority shareholders but not majority shareholders; see Re 
Baltic Real Estate Ltd (No 2) [1993] BCLC 503.
10 Allen v Gold Reefs o f West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656 (CA) 671 (Lindley MR).
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property, and ownership gives rights to the owner but law restricts others. Thus, there 
exists both positive and negative freedom11. This idea also prevails in company law.
The relationship between law and freedom is never simple. On the one hand, 
law and legislation restrict individual freedom: every law is contrary to liberty12. On the 
other hand, “the end of Law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge 
Freedom”13. Further, without law the life of man would be “solitary, poore, nasty, 
brutish, and short,” as Hobbes formulates it14. In sum, freedom is not a state of nature 
but an artifact of civilization15. Moreover, the existence of free markets does not 
eliminate the need for law. Legislation and government are essential as a forum to 
determine the ‘rules of the game’ and as an umpire to interpret and enforce the rules 
decided on16. Law makes freedom possible, and capitalism provides both freedom and 
law. This point is very true in the context of companies, which themselves are creatures 
of the law.
Liberty is the positive law’s concrete recognition of individual freedom. The 
central legal elements in the capitalist society are property rights and freedom of 
contract. Therefore, law should offer protection to property rights and enforcement of 
contracts, which are of the utmost importance in the field of companies and shares too. 
Freedom in corporate capitalism is protected, supported, and restricted by the law. 
These restrictions of liberty are inevitable because shareholders’ rights are created and 
shareholder protection is offered at the expense of some freedom.
11 Berlin, Isaiah, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in Liberty (Hardy, Henry, ed) (Oxford 2002) 166ff.
12 Bentham, Jeremy, The Theory o f  Legislation (Ogden C. K., ed) (London 1931) 94.
13 Locke, John, Second Treatise in Two Treaties o f Government (Laslett, Peter, ed) (Cambridge 1960) 
(originally 1690) sec 57.
14 Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan (Waller, A. R., ed) (Cambridge 1904) (originally 1651) ch 13.
15 Hayek, F. A., The Constitution o f Liberty (London 1960) 54.
16 Friedman, Milton, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago 1982) (originally 1962) 15.
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5.2.3 Synthesis of liberty and equality
Equality and liberty may contradict each other: attempts to advance equality might 
come at a cost in terms of freedom, and vice versa. However, Locke, Rousseau, and 
Kant, for example, consider that justice is found in a synthesis of liberty and equality. 
Justice can be realized by deducing social control through society from a postulated pact 
guaranteeing liberty and equality.17 In a just social order, liberty and equality can be 
consistent18. Moreover, freedom can be derived from equality19.
My argument is that company law supports both liberty and equality. It is a 
normal task of law to balance conflicting interests and values, although this might be 
difficult. Yet, company law sometimes prefers freedom and sometimes equality: in 
consequence, these principles cannot be absolute in their nature.
Company law aims to maximize satisfaction for the company as a whole, but it 
should also secure shareholders’ fair participation in a company. It is possible to 
formulate this point by using the language of the law-and-economics movement: 
company law is interested in both the size of the pie and the slicing of it. This chapter 
reviews how this balance is kept in company law.
5.3 Equality as a presumption in company law
When all the shares in a company have similar rights and duties, these shares are equal.
  9 0
This equality, as in law generally , is based on proportionality: shareholders have in 
proportion to their shares an equal right to have a dividend in a going concern, and they 
get an equal share of the surplus if the company is wound up. Further, every shareholder 
has one vote for every share at general meeting. As the word share implies, shareholders 
share rights in the company.
17 Pound, Roscoe, Justice According to Law (New Haven 1951) 24.
18 Weinreb(1987) 10.
19 Guest (2000) 42.
20 See eg Finnis, John, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford 1980) 163.
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In the company, as in a partnership21, there is a presumption of equality in the
99absence of agreement to the contrary : both partnership law and company law still 
recognize the old maxim ‘equality is equity’23. Equality should prevail if there is no 
good reason for any other basis for division24. This presumption is an important starting 
point in company law.
Shares are equal unless otherwise stated. But in a company with different classes 
of shares, shareholders’ rights depend on the class of shares they hold. Further, shares 
may be issued with such rights and restrictions as the company by ordinary resolution 
determines25. The rights of those shares are then determined by the terms of issue or by 
the company’s constitution.
However, quoted companies rarely have different classes of shares. Markets 
prefer companies with a straightforward share structure, and listed companies typically 
have only shares with similar rights. To focus on the heart of equality, I concentrate on 
companies where all shares fall within one class, and therefore the discussion does not 
cover special points concerning different classes of shares. Nevertheless, this study does 
not ignore different classes of shares because equality between different classes of 
shares is of great importance in company law. Moreover, case law on the equality of 
shares consists mainly of rulings governing companies with different classes of shares 
since this legal question has arisen especially when companies have ordinary and 
preference shares. Even so, those cases that have their main focus on class rights are 
very capable of explaining the equality of shares in general.
21 Partnership Act 1890 s 24(1).
22 Sealy, L. S., Cases and Materials in Company Law (7th edn London 2001) 446.
Eg Re Accrington Corporation Steam Tramways Co [1909] 2 Ch 40, 44 (Swinfen Eady J); in the case 
of husband and wife, see Midland Bank pic  v Cooke [1995] 4 All ER 562 (CA).
24 McGee, Andrew, Share Capital (London 1999) 8.
25 Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985 Table A (T able A ’) art 2; by contrast, in the early case 
law it was held that a company could not alter its articles to issue preferred shares; see Hutton v 
Scarborough Cliff Hotel Co Ltd (1865) 4 DJ & S 672.
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As mentioned, equality is one of the general principles of company law26. 
Further, the Second Company Law Directive Article 42 requires that Member States’ 
laws “shall ensure equal treatment to all shareholders who are in the same position”27.
In sum, I conclude that in English company law shareholders must be treated equally.
To clarify the equality, I next review separately the notion of shareholders’ equality in 
the case of economic surplus or loss, shareholders’ pre-emption rights, and transfer of 
shares.
5.4 Equal economic surplus
Dividends and sharing net assets are the means by which shareholders are able 
to obtain their part of a company’s economic surplus. A dividend is the company’s 
profit paid to shareholders, and in a winding up shareholders share the value of a 
company’ net assets.
Share capital has a central role in companies. Furthermore, a shareholder’s main 
duty is to pay his shares. Hence, I start this review by analysing shareholders’ equality 
in the payment of shares.
5.4.1 Payment of shares and responsibility for losses
Share capital represents equity investment in the company. It can be regarded as a 
financial fund that the company must have in order to operate. As shareholders’ liability
26 See eg Davies, Paul L., ‘The Notion of Equality in European Takeover Regulation’ in Payne, Jennifer 
(ed), Takeovers in English and German Law (Oxford 2002) 9, 13; Davies, Paul L., Gower and D avies’ 
Principles o f  Modern Company Law (7th edn London 2003) 618; further, Cheffins (1997) 492 sees that 
the presumption of equality “may play a useful role” in company law; in contrast, Drury, Robert, 
‘Fundamental Values in Company Law?’ in Economides, Kim and others (eds), Fundamental Values 
(Oxford 2000) 339, 342 argues that equality is only a minimal presumption, but not a principle since 
companies may have several classes o f shares.
27 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC [1977] OJ L 26/1, which applies to public companies; see 
Edwards, Vanessa, EC Company Law (Oxford 1999) 57, where she sees that this principle “is reflected ” 
in UK company law; in addition, according to the UKLA Listing Rules 9.3.1, a listed company must 
ensure equality of treatment for all shareholders.
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is limited, payment of share capital has particular importance if a company’s business is 
unsuccessful and there are losses.
The main duty of shareholders is to pay their shares and this liability continues 
as long as anything is unpaid28. Ultimately, it is a fundamental idea in company law that 
shareholders’ liability is limited. They are only obliged to pay the issue price of the 
shares that they have subscribed: their liability is limited to the amount unpaid on their 
shares29. This issue price must be at a minimum the nominal value of the shares30. But 
the issue price of shares is merely a matter of contract because there are only a few rules 
governing issue price in company law31. The current issue price is decided when 
particular shares are issued. The basic attitude of the law is freedom of contract in share 
issues32. In any case, shareholders’ equality in this context means that every shareholder 
is responsible to pay his shares. In addition, limited liability has a central role in 
ensuring that all shareholders experience the same proportional gains and losses in the 
company33.
If shares are unpaid, the pro rata principle means that losses should be borne by 
shareholders in proportion to the subscribed capital. This ruling can be found in E xp  
Maude34, where Mellish LJ explained this as the true construction and meaning of 
company law. He observed that if any other idea were adopted it would make the way in 
which losses are borne depending upon the accident of whether the assets of a company 
could be immediately realized, or whether it is necessary to make a call in order to pay 
the debts. Therefore, losses should be divided along the lines found in partnerships, ie in
28 See Ooregum Gold Mining Company o f India Ltd v Roper [1892] AC 125 (HL) 136.
29 CA 1985 s l(2)(a).
30 [1892] AC 125 (HL); CA 1985 s 100
31 Hilder v Dexter [1902] AC 474 (HL) 480 (Lord Davey): “I am not aware of any law which obliges a 
company to issue its shares above par.”
32 For shareholders’ pre-emption rights, see below 5.5.
33 Hansmann, Henry and Kraakman, Reinier, The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (2000) 110 
Yale Law Journal 387, 424; see also Manne, Henry G., ‘Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and 
Economics’ (1967) 53 Virginia Law Review 259, 262, where he notes that the lack of limited liability 
would discourage particularly wealthy individuals’ share investments.
34 Re Hodges’ Distillery Co, exp  Maude (1870) LR 6 Ch App 51.
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proportion to the amounts that shareholders have agreed to pay35. For this reason, in the 
case of an unsuccessful business, shareholders bear losses in proportion to the 
subscribed capital, whether some shares happen to be fully paid or not. As Lord 
Macnaghten explained in Birch v Cropper, where Ex p Maude was followed:
“[a shareholder] does not by such payment acquire any further or other interest 
in the capital of the company. His share in the capital is just what it was before. 
His liability to the company is diminished by the amount paid. His contribution 
is merged in the common fund. And that is all.36
Indeed, equality prevails between fully and unpaid shares: no shareholder should be at 
an advantage or disadvantage if some shares are not fully paid37.
In summary, shareholders have an equal duty to pay their shares. Further, if 
shares are not fully paid, responsibility for losses is divided between shareholders in 
proportion to the amounts they have agreed to pay for their shares.
5.4.2 Dividends
Companies normally pay dividends to shareholders. The doctrine of capital 
maintenance38 requires that dividends can be paid from distributable profits only39. But 
my aim is not to explore the rules restricting distribution of dividends: the focus is on 
cases where dividends are declared; in other cases, it can simply be noted that 
shareholders have an equal right not to have a return40.
35 Ibid 56.
36 (1889) LR 14 App Cas 525 (HL) 543.
37 (1870) LR 6 Ch App 51, 57 (James LJ).
38 See above, chapter two 2.2.2 note 45 and text thereby.
39 See CA 1985 s 263ff
40 About the right to a dividend, see above, chapter two 2.3.1.
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In the CA 1985, there is no explicit provision requiring that payment of 
dividends should be pari passu or on any other basis41. Table A art 102 states that 
dividends should be declared “in accordance with the respective rights of the members.” 
But fundamental ideas in company law in this point still follow partnership law. As 
North J explained in Re Bridgewater Navigation Co:
The implication of law between partners is, that they share equally in profits 
unless their contract provides to the contrary, and the right of shareholders to an 
equality in dividend in the absence of any provision to the contrary, rests on the 
same principle rather than any implication as to the construction of the 
memorandum 42
Apart from any special provision the maxim ‘equality is equity’ should apply43. Further, 
if we take more precisely a company law perspective, we can note that in Harrison v 
Mexican Railway Co Jessel MR stated that:
all the holders of shares are entitled to rank equally as regards dividend, without 
any preference or priority between themselves; but if it does clearly appear upon 
the articles of association that that was not the meaning of the original contract, 
then there is no such implication of law as to the meaning of the memorandum 
of association, that implication being rebutted by the clear terms of the
44contemporaneous instrument.
41 See also McGee (1999) 8.
42 (1888) 39 Ch D 1 (CA) 9.
43 Re Accrington Corporation Steam Tramways Co [1909] 2 Ch 40, 44 (Swinfen Eady J).
44 (1875) LR 19 Eq 358, 365.
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In addition, in Hutton v Scarborough Cliff Hotel Co Ltd, Lord Westbury simply 
considered that shares are “inter se equal and of equal rights and privileges” 45.
The fundamental view of the law is that a company’s shareholders share its 
profits, which means that they have an equal right to dividends, unless the company 
constitution, or the terms of share issue, state otherwise. Further, while shareholders’ 
rights are different in a particular company, there must exist different classes of shares. 
Actually, it is worth noting that when there has been disagreement about the equality of 
dividends, such companies typically have both ordinary and preference shares: in fact, 
all three quotations above are from these kinds of cases. Yet, when the main point is the 
right of ordinary shares to dividends, it is possible to quote Davies’ canons of 
construction:
Prima facie all shares rank equally. If, therefore, some are to have priority over 
others there must be provisions to this effect in the terms of issue.46
Ordinary shares have an equal right to dividends. As Lord Macnaghten said in British 
and American Trustee and Finance Co Ltd v C oupe/1 \ “it follows as a self-evident 
proposition that the interests of the shareholders in respect of their shares as regards 
dividend and everything else must be equal.”
But before I leave the question of dividends, there is one very important 
dimension to review, which is the relationship between the payment of shares and the 
amount of dividends. I discussed above the notion of losses if some shares are unpaid.
45 (1865) 4 DJ & S 672, 677, it should be noted that in this decision equality of all shares was seen as a 
part of the company’s nature and as a fundamental principle; thus, it was considered that it is not possible 
to alter the articles to allow the issue of preferential shares, but this ruling was later explicitly overruled 
and alteration authorised by Andrews v Gas Meter Co [1897] 1 Ch 361 (CA).
46 Davies (2003) 621; it should be mentioned that in the current edition there is no reference to any case 
but there was still an explicit reference to Birch v Cropper in the 4th edition of the book; see Gower, L. C. 
B., G ower’s Principles o f Modern Company Law (4th edn London 1979) 421.
47 [1894] AC 399 (HL)417.
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Now I explore the sharing of profits under the similar circumstances. Naturally, the 
significant point is whether dividends should be paid in proportion to the nominal value 
or the amount really paid upon when a company has partly paid shares.
The House of Lords’ decision in Oakbank Oil Co v CrumA% gives explicit 
answers to this question. The company’s articles stated that the dividend is “to be paid 
to the members in proportion to their shares”49. However, it actually paid dividends in 
proportion to the amount paid upon shares. A shareholder, who was a recent purchaser 
of shares, challenged the principles on which dividends had hitherto been allocated.
This shareholder was successful since the House of Lords affirmed the decision of the 
court: all shares were entitled to participate equally in dividends, without regard to the 
amount paid upon them. Because the articles stated that the dividend should be paid in 
proportion to shares, there was no doubt that the term ‘shares’ could only mean their 
nominal value. English company law still follows this decision: dividends are payable to 
shareholders in proportion to the nominal value of shares, and thus irrespective of the 
amounts paid up. This principle is affirmed by The House of Lords, in particular, in 
their decision of Birch v Cropper50.
Of course, it is possible to ask whether it is fair that partly paid shares, or even 
totally unpaid ones, get an equal dividend with fully paid shares. First, the main 
argument against payment of dividends in proportion to the paid-up capital is that it 
would totally ignore the point that shareholders are in any case liable to pay for their 
shares because their “whole liability remains to the extent to which it has not been 
satisfied by paying it,” as Lord Selbome noted in Oakbank Oil Co v Crum 51. In this 
case, he further explained shareholders’ liability in these words:
48 (1882) LR 8 App Cas 65 (HL) (Sc).
49 It was a copy of the Companies Act 1862 Table A art 72.
50 (1889) LR 14 App Cas 525 (HL).
51 (1882) LR 8 App Cas 65 (HL) (Sc) 70.
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a man may make himself liable to a large amount for the engagements of the 
company, which he may eventually be called upon to pay, and that he has, until 
he has actually been called upon to make that payment, no interest which can 
possibly make it reasonable that he should share in a dividend in respect of what 
has not been paid up, does not seem to me to be a proposition so plainly and 
obviously reasonable as to make it wise to approach the construction of any 
instrument with the presumption that this must certainly be its meaning.52
The relationship in a company is not so simple that it would be possible to say that it is 
right and fair to pay dividends in proportion to the amounts paid up on shares. 
Shareholders do not by such payment acquire any further interest in the capital of the 
company53.
Second, as Lord Selbome stated, the right to dividends must depend “entirely 
upon the true construction of the contract contained in the memorandum and articles of 
association of this company”54. There was no reason to argue whether it is fair or not to 
pay an equal dividend to every share when it was fair and right to pay shareholders 
those dividends that were agreed to pay. This was the correct way, although it might 
have been reasonable and fair that dividends in this particular company had been paid in 
proportion to paid-up capital55, but those particular articles stated otherwise. As Lord 
Blackburn declared, it was not a matter for their Lordships to consider what the right or 
the best course was; by contrast, they decided the true construction of these articles and 
the actual contract in this company56. Their arguments clearly support the contractual 
nature of the company and shareholders’ rights. In sum, shareholders should participate
52 Ibid.
53 (1889) LR 14 App Cas 525 (HL) 543.
54 (1882) LR 8 App Cas 65 (HL) (Sc) 69.
55 See ibid 70 (Lord Selborne) and 80 (Lord Fitzgerald).
56 Ibid 75-76.
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in dividends equally, also in the case of unpaid shares if it is not particularly agreed 
otherwise.
On the other hand, in accordance with CA 1985 s 119, a company authorised by 
its articles may pay dividends in proportion to the amount paid upon each share. A 
company can, through its constitution, determine that shareholders are not entitled to 
receive the same dividend if there exist shares that are not fully paid. Really, the articles 
generally do so while Table A art 104 declares that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 
the rights attached to shares, all dividends shall be declared and paid according to the 
amounts paid up on the shares.” In fact, art 104 has thus turned the assumption in 
Oakbank around because dividends are paid according to the paid up amounts if it is not 
determined otherwise by the company constitution.
While quoted companies do not typically have unpaid shares, the rule governing 
the payment of dividends to unpaid shares might not have particular practical 
importance. Nevertheless, both common law and statutory rules clearly imply that there 
is a strong presumption for shareholders’ equal dividend: the payment of dividends in 
proportion to the amount paid up on shares is possible only if it is authorised by the 
articles. Although art 104 of Table A generally does it, the main presumption of law 
remains that every share should get the same dividend. Shareholders are entitled to 
participate in dividends equally unless the contrary is stated. In addition, since my prime 
interest is fully paid ordinary shares, it is clear that these shareholders have an equal 
right to dividends.
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5.4.3 Sharing of net assets
Shareholders share a company’s surplus assets if the company is wound up, which can 
be done voluntarily by a decision at general meeting or compulsorily by the order of the 
court57.
In the context of the sharing of a company’s net assets, the story of Bridgewater 
Navigation Company is of special significance. There are four reported cases 
concerning this company and the sharing of assets in a winding up: 1) a decision by 
North J and the Court of Appeal58, 2) which was reversed by the House of Lords59; and 
3) one further decision by North J60, 4) which this time was varied by the Court of 
Appeal61. In this research, there have been some references to the first two cases, which 
are the most interesting ones in this saga.
The facts, described briefly, were that Bridgewater Navigation Company was a 
canal company, whose working plant was transferred by a special Act of Parliament to 
another company. Because all the business had been sold, it was decided that the 
company should be wound up with a view to distribute the purchase money to 
shareholders. The company had both ordinary and preference shares, and furthermore 
some of its shares were not fully paid. According to the company’s articles, preference 
shareholders were entitled to a preference dividend of 5 per cent but they had no 
preference to capital. After the payment of such a preference dividend, all the remaining 
profits were divisible among shareholders.
However, first it should be mentioned that the legal question considered in the 
series of cases was not the paying of dividends, because the litigation arose during the
57 See Insolvency Act 1986 ss 84 and 122.
58 Re Bridgewater Navigation Co (1888) LR 39 Ch D 1 (CA).
59 Birch v Cropper in Re Bridgewater Navigation Co Ltd (1889) LR 14 App Cas 525 (HL).
60 Re Bridgewater Navigation Company [1891] 1 Ch 155.
61 Re Bridgewater Navigation Co [1891] 2 Ch 317 (CA).
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f%0winding up. A company can no longer pay dividends at this stage . Further, both 
preference and ordinary shareholders had received their dividends. The articles clearly 
stated preference shareholders’ right to the dividend and that dividends should be paid 
in proportion to the amount paid up on shares. Dividends were paid in accordance with 
the articles; in effect, there was no disagreement about their payments. Overall, the 
ruling in Oakbank Oil Co v Crum was followed in this case although nothing was 
explicitly declared about dividends. Obviously, there was no need to rule anything 
about shareholders’ right to dividends since that was not the main point in the case. But 
significantly, Birch v Cropper is a case that rules about the division of profits and net 
assets more generally than Oakbank did. Therefore, it might be possible to refer just to 
Birch v Cropper when it is argued that in accordance with English company law 
dividends should be paid in proportion to the nominal capital, and thus irrespective of 
the amounts paid up . Yet, I think that the main authority as far as it concerns payment 
of dividends is Oakbank as explained above.
The disagreement in Birch v Cropper was about the sharing of net assets since 
the articles stated that the dividend should be paid in proportion to the paid up capital, 
but the articles contained no provision governing the distribution of assets in winding 
up. In addition, ordinary shares were partly paid up, but preference shares were fully 
paid. Therefore, these preference shareholders, of course, argued that net assets should 
be divided in proportion to the paid up capital; in contrast, ordinary shareholders were 
in favour of a division in proportion to the nominal capital. In any case, in the 
dissolution the company first returned to all shareholders their paid-up capital, and in 
this process the liquidators adjusted shareholders’ unequal contributions64. As a result, it 
was first calculated whether there existed any surplus to share among shareholders. In
62 Eg Re Crichton’s Oil Company [1902] 2 Ch 86 (CA) 95 (Stirling LJ): “after the commencement of a 
winding-up dividend is no longer payable.”
63 For example, Morse, Geoffrey, Charlesworth Company Law (17th edn London 2005) 491.
64 In accordance with Companies Act 1862 s 133.
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this case, there remained a large part of the purchase money that should be divided to 
shareholders.
In their ruling of Re Bridgewater Navigation Co65, the Court of Appeal held that 
“the true equitable mode”66 is to share net assets in accordance with the amounts paid 
up on shares. Yet, the House of Lords considered otherwise: their Lordships reversed 
this decision by the Court of Appeal. In Birch v Cropper , it was ruled that liability of 
shareholders for the unpaid balance of their shares must not be regarded. Therefore, net 
assets should be divided, not in proportion to the amounts paid on shares, but in 
proportion to the shares held. As Lord Herschell explained their ruling, this point was to 
be “determined upon general principles of equity”68, and thus “the determination of the 
question at issue must be arrived at upon principles wider and of more general 
application”69. He further observed that no principle can be laid down ensuring perfect 
equality, but the principle adopted by the Court of Appeal appeared in his view “to raise 
the inequality to a maximum”70.
What were their Lordships’ main arguments in their decision? First, they 
followed explicitly Ex parte Maude71: since the articles were silent, it would be natural 
and equitable that both losses and benefits should be shared in the same proportion, 
which is pro rata in proportion to the subscribed capital. Second, their observations were 
similar to those in Oakbank Oil Co v Crum : shareholders’ liability must have special 
importance, and it should be treated as a contribution as valuable as the actual paid 
capital. Lord Herschell gave an extreme opposite example of thought when he explained 
that if all ordinary shares were actually totally unpaid, then these shares would have no
65 (1888) LR 39 Ch D 1 (CA).
66 Ibid 25 (Cotton LJ).
67 (1889) LR 14 App Cas 525 (HL).
68 Ibid 531.
69 Ibid 533.
70 Ibid.
71 Re H odges’ Distillery Co (1870) LR 6 Ch App 51.
72 (1882) LR 8 App Cas 65 (HL) (Sc).
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economic right or interest in the company if it were seen that shareholders share net 
assets only according to the amount paid up on shares. Naturally, this idea could not 
pass any test of equity.73 As a result, the ruling of the House of Lords was that net assets 
ought to be divided among shareholders in proportion to the shares held, not in 
proportion to the amounts paid up on them. This is the ruling of Birch v Cropper, which 
as a principle governs division of losses, dividends, and net assets in English company 
law.
In addition, it should be noted that the House of Lords in Birch v Cropper was 
clearly willing to distinguish companies from partnerships. By contrast, in Griffith v 
Paget74 Jessel MR considered that the general principles of partnerships should apply to 
companies that actually, in his view, are commercial partnerships although subject to 
certain statutory limits. In this case, the Master of the Rolls formulated the status of 
partnership law in this way:
When the partnership comes to an end, the right to the share of profits comes to 
an end also; and you distribute the assets, after providing for the profits earned 
up to the time of the dissolution, in proportion to the partners’ shares of the 
partnership capital. That is the general rule of law in a commercial partnership.
Indeed, according to then prevailing partnership law on a final settlement of accounts 
the capital of the business should “be divided amongst the partners in the proportions in 
which they contributed it and not equally” .
73 (1889) LR 14 App Cas 525 (HL) 535.
74 (1877) LR 6 Ch D 511.
75 Ibid 515.
76 Lord Lindley in his Supplement on the Partnership Act 1890; quoted from I’Anson Banks, R. C., 
Lindley & Banks on Partnership (17th edn London 1995) 500; but in modern partnership law the point is 
differently; see ibid 500-1 and 541.
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But their Lordships pointed out very explicitly in Birch v Cropper that 
companies are not partnerships, and therefore partnership law does not apply to them.
As Lord Fitzgerald formulated it:
The error seems to me in supposing that there is an exact analogy between an 
ordinary commercial partnership and a statutable undertaking called into 
existence under the Joint Stock Companies Act and regulated by the statute and 
its own memorandum of association and articles. There may be likeness in some 
particulars, but there is no real analogy.77
In a very similar way, Lord Macnaghten considered that shareholders’ rights depend on 
the principles applicable to companies and the provisions of the Companies Act, but as 
he added, it was “rather beside the mark to discuss the general doctrines of partnerships 
and to examine particular cases of partnership contracts”78. He continued that “[t]he 
scheme of the Act and the directions to be found there are, I think, a safer guide than 
any analogies can be”79.
Their Lordships in this decision formulated a company law principle from the 
background that companies are really companies, not partnerships, which are governed 
by their own act and the company constitution. The questions of company law should be 
decided in their own scheme, and rules in company law can be different from 
partnership rules. Hence, Birch v Cropper is an important case in the development of 
company law. It is part of the story of how company law became a discrete subject.
In essence, Birch v Cropper was a ruling concerning different classes of shares, 
and so the legal question in the cases where it has been explicitly followed has typically
77 (1889) LR 14 App Cas 525 (HL) 541.
78 Ibid 543.
79
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been the same: whether preference shareholders have a right to participate in the 
company’s surplus assets. For example, as Astbury J stated in Re Fraser and Chalmers 
L td 80: “All shareholders are entitled to equal treatment unless and to the extent that 
their rights in this respect are modified by the contract under which they hold their 
shares.” Thus, the provision that gave preference shareholders a priority for repayment 
of capital in winding up did not negate their right to participate in surplus assets. It was 
generally considered that although preference shareholders have a preference to
Q 1
repayment of capital, they still share surplus assets . So, if the memorandum and 
articles contained no provisions for the point of surplus, net assets must be divided 
equally in winding up among all shares. This idea was prevailing in company law after 
Birch v Cropper as far as it concerned the rights of ordinary and preference shareholders 
in winding up. Although my special interest is not the rights of different classes of 
shares, I cannot leave the story of Bridgewater Navigation Company before mentioning 
three important points.
The first one, preference shares in Bridgewater Navigation Company were 
entitled to a preference dividend of 5 per cent, but the rest of the annual profits belonged 
to ordinary shareholders. On the other hand, following the House of Lords’ ruling in 
Birch v Cropper, all shareholders were after that payment equally entitled to surplus 
assets in winding up. The problem is: what were profits and what were surplus assets? 
This explicit question arose in the following Re Bridgewater Navigation CoS2 cases, 
where the Court of Appeal declared that the special funds in the company were actually 
profits, not assets. However, it might be very artificial, and even absurd, to investigate 
the origin of any surplus assets, as Lord Simonds in Scottish Insurance Co Ltd v Wilson
80 [1919] 2 Ch 114, 120.
81 See eg Re Epsuela Land and Cattle Co [1909] 2 Ch 187; Re William Metcalfe and Sons Ltd [1933] 1 
Ch 142 (CA).
82 Re Bridgewater Navigation Company [1891] 1 Ch 155; [1891] 2 Ch 317 (CA).
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& Clyde Coal Co Ltcf3 later pointed out. In that case, Viscount Maugham declared he 
had doubts about whether the Court of Appeal reached the correct decision in their 
above-mentioned decision 84. But in English law there seems to be no case that actually 
overrules this Court of Appeal decision in Re Bridgewater Navigation Co. Still, that
Of
decision is generally just distinguished by the courts . As Davies notes, the last one of
oz
Bridgewater cases can be ignored . I do so since my prime focus is on the rights of 
ordinary shares. Yet, my conclusion is that the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Re 
Bridgewater Navigation Co about this point has never explained the real position of law 
well.
The second matter, which later arose as the legal question in several cases, is 
whether the rights of preference shareholders as mentioned in the articles are 
exhaustive. In this point, the House of Lords ruling concerning preference shareholders’ 
right to dividends in Will v United Lankat Plantations Co LtdF1 has distinctive 
importance. In this company, preference shareholders were entitled to a cumulative 
preferential dividend at a rate of 10 per cent per annum on the amount for the time being 
paid up on shares. However, there was nothing explicitly mentioned about whether 
preference shares are entitled in any other way to share profits. But almost twenty years 
after preference shares had been issued in accordance with the company’s general 
meeting resolution, there arose disagreement about how the substantial profits should be 
distributed among ordinary and preference shareholders.
The House of Lords held that in the distribution of profits preference shares 
were not entitled to anything more than 10 per cent dividend. They affirmed the ruling 
of the Court of Appeal that preference shareholders’ right to dividends stated by the
83 [1949] AC (HL) (Sc) 462, 489.
84 Ibid 482; however, the report of the case, ibid 463, mentions that Re Bridgewater Navigation Co [1891] 
2 Ch 317 (CA) was approved.
85 Re Catalinas Warehouses and Mole Co Ltd [1947] 1 All ER 51; Dimbula Valley (Ceylon) Tea Co Ltd v 
Laurie [1961] Ch 353; Re Saltdean Estate Co Ltd [1968] 1 WLR 1844.
86 Davies (2003) 622.
87 [1914] AC 11 (HL).
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company’s articles was exhaustive: consequently, these shares were not entitled to
oo
participate in any further profits. In their judgment, Viscount Haldane made an 
observation that the case raised “a question of great interest from a business point of 
view, but it is difficult to see how it can be said to raise any question of general legal 
principle,” because he considered that the point of dispute is one of construction that is 
always related to the terms of the particular instrument, which in this case was the 
articles of association. He added: “it is only to a limited extent that other cases decided 
upon different documents afford any guidance.” His fundamental point was that their 
Lordships should only decide what the rights of preference shareholders were in this 
case and under the particular articles of this company.
In their ruling, Viscount Haldane stressed the contractual nature of the articles 
with the following words:
My Lords, I should have thought that if we were dealing with an ordinary case 
of two individuals coming together, and if a document were produced saying 
‘You are to have a cumulative preferential dividend of 10 per cent.’ or whatever 
might be the equivalent in the circumstances of the bargain, it would be 
naturally concluded that that was the whole of the bargain between the parties on 
that point. You do not look outside a document of this kind in order to see what 
the bargain is; you look for it as contained within the four comers of the 
document.89
He did not hold that the articles are silent about the terms of distribution; thus, it was 
reasonable to expect to find all the rights regarding dividends specified in the terms of
88 Ibid 15ff.
89 i n
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issue. Earl Lorebum90 agreed and considered that the right of preference shareholders 
should be construed as they stand in the articles. In addition, he regarded the whole case 
as “an attempt to add to terms of the contract by screwing something out of the articles 
which the framers of the contract... [n]ever thought of.” Lord Atkinson91 shared their 
view and came “to the conclusion that the dividend prescribed was the only dividend 
the shareholder was to receive.” As a result, preference shareholders were entitled to 
their preferential dividend only.
Ultimately, this House of Lords’ ruling in Will v United Lankat Plantations Co 
Ltd shows the current status of law as far as it concerns preference shareholders’ right to 
dividends. The rights as stated in any relevant document are exhaustive since preference 
shareholders have a right to the dividend expressly stated, but they do not share any 
further dividends92.
The third point is an inevitable consequence of the second one: if the right of 
preference shareholders to dividends is exhaustive, the question arises whether the same 
idea applies to net assets. Scottish Insurance Co Ltd v Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltcf3 is 
the landmark case in the area, and in this case the ruling of Birch v Cropper in Re 
Bridgewater Navigation Co Ltcf4 was explained. While in Birch v Cropper Lord 
Macnaghten pointed out that preference shareholders “must be treated as having all the 
rights of shareholders, except so far as they renounced those rights on their admission to 
the company”95, by contrast, in Scottish Insurance Co Ltd v Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co 
Ltd Lord Simonds explained these remarks in this way:
90 Ibid 18-19.
91 Ibid 19.
92 See Re Isle ofThanet Electricity Supply Co Ltd [1950] 1 Ch 161 (CA) 171 (Wynn-Parry J).
93 [1949] AC 462 (HL) (Sc).
94 (1889) LR 14 App Cas 525 (HL).
95 Ibid 546.
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But, in my opinion, Lord Macnaghten can have meant nothing more than that 
the rights of the parties depended on the bargain that they had made and that the 
terms of the bargain must be ascertained by a consideration of the articles of 
association and any other relevant document, a task which I have endeavoured in 
this case to discharge. I cannot think that Lord Macnaghten intended to 
introduce some new principle of construction and to lay down that preference 
shareholders are entitled to share in surplus assets unless they expressly and 
specifically renounce that right.96
Indeed, in common law the future generations of judges develop law further. In this 
case, Lord Simonds and the majority of the House Lords97 performed this task when 
they held that there is no rule in law that preference shareholders should equally share 
surplus if otherwise is not explicitly and specifically stated in the articles. Their 
Lordships clearly considered that the consistency of preference shareholders’ rights in 
law is important. As Lord Normand expressed the point:
I see no ground on which it may be supposed that the declaration of rights as 
regards dividends is exhaustive, but the declaration of rights as regards property 
is not exhaustive. There is as good reason and it is equally easy to define 
exhaustively the one set of rights as the other.98
96 [1949] AC 462 (HL) (Sc) 490.
97 Lord Morton dissenting.
98 Ibid 496.
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Therefore, while until 1949 “the balance was strongly”99 in favour that preference 
shareholders also have a right to further participation in the case of surplus assets, by 
this ruling the House of Lords overruled this assumption in company law.
The ruling of Scottish Insurance Co Ltd v Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd explains 
the current status of law too. The presumption of the law is that if preference 
shareholders have a preference as far as the repayment of capital, the rights set out in 
the document describe the totality of their rights to capital. In the same way as with 
dividends, the description of their rights is exhaustive. In brief, when a preference to 
capital is given to preference shareholders, they do not participate in any surplus 
remaining after that capital has been repaid unless an express right is given100.
All three points above mean that, in fact, the cases of Bridgewater Navigation 
Company were only a start in a saga of rulings governing preference shareholders’ 
rights. Further, quite a long series of court rulings after them has not been a very 
rational story. For example, Davies notes that “the courts have had to evolve various 
canons of construction which, even more unfortunately, have fluctuated from time to 
time, thus overruling earlier decisions and defeating the legitimate expectations of 
investors who purchased preference shares in reliance on the construction adopted 
earlier”101. However, he is able to add that: “a reasonably clear finale now appears to 
have been reached”102. In summary, the prevailing idea in law is that preference 
shareholders’ rights are exhaustive in their stated form.
Nevertheless, the story of Bridgewater Navigation Company explains the 
present notion of shareholders’ equality. Case law after Birch v Cropper has mainly
99 Mackinnon, K. W. and Buchanan-Dunlop, R. (eds), Palmer’s Company Precedents, vol 1 (17th edn 
London 1956) 779.
100 Re Isle ofThanet Electricity Supply Co Ltd [1950] 1 Ch 161 (CA).
101 Davies (2003) 621.
102 Ibid.
131 Chapter 5
103focused on the presumption concerning preference shareholders’ rights . The general 
presumption of company law is, however, that shareholders have equal rights in the 
company unless otherwise agreed by the issue documents, by the articles, or by the 
memorandum. Fundamentally, in the case of ordinary shares there is no reason to 
consider that the rights of these shares could be different. To conclude, ordinary 
shareholders should equally share the net assets of a company in the same way as they 
are responsible for losses and share dividends.
5.4.4 Reduction of capital
Share capital can be returned to shareholders following the statutory procedure 
concerning reduction of capital. In consequence, shareholders share the assets of the 
company, and the only aim of a reduction can be distributing a company’s assets to its 
shareholders104. Further, there are many similarities with division of net assets and 
reduction of capital. But it is important to notice that reduction of capital is governed by 
its own special rules under company law.
Under CA 1985 s 135, a company may reduce its share capital subject to 
confirmation by court. In addition, a special company resolution is required, and in the 
articles there must be an authorisation to do so105. A company might wish to reduce its 
share capital when that is much greater than its net assets, or just return money to 
shareholders. In the latter case, capital is simply divided to shareholders. Nevertheless, 
due to the nature of share capital great importance is placed on the interests of creditors 
when share capital is reduced, but that is not the prime subject in this study. The focus is 
on how assets should be divided among shareholders in reduction of share capital.
103 Thus, the onus of proof about their rights is thrown to preference shareholders, but the rights of 
shareholders is a matter of the particular documents; see Re Isle ofThanet Electricity Supply Co Ltd 
[1950] 1 Ch 161 (CA) 167; 173 (Wynn-Parry J); Re Powell-Cotton’s Resettlement [1957] 1 Ch 159.
104 Scottish Insurance Co Ltd v Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co Ltd [1949] AC 462 (HL) (Sc).
105 See also Table A art 34.
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Overall, CA 1985 s 135 authorises a company to reduce its share capital “in any 
way”; therefore, any scheme of reduction can be sanctioned by the court106. According 
to CA 1985 s 135(l)(c), a company may pay off any paid-up share capital that is excess 
to its wants. When the court is satisfied that the interests of creditors are secured, it may 
in accordance with CA 1985 ss 136 and 137 make an order confirming the reduction on 
such terms and conditions as it sees fit. The principal purpose of requiring the 
confirmation from court is to ensure that formalities especially protecting creditors have 
been strictly observed and that the reduction treats shareholders fairly107.1 ask how 
shareholders are treated fairly.
In Re Jupiter House Investments (Cambridge) Ltd, Harman J explained the way 
in which shareholders should be treated and the court’s discretion in this way:
The discretion ... will, however, only be exercised in favour of confirmation of 
the reduction where the court is satisfied (a) that the proposed reduction affects 
all shareholders of equal standing in a similar manner, or that those treated in a 
different manner from their equals have consented to that different treatment.108
He put it clearly and precisely: shareholders should be treated equally in reduction of 
capital; moreover, shareholders may be treated in a different manner only if they accept 
it. As a result, court practice requires that shareholders must be treated equally109, ie in a 
similar way. If shareholders are treated in another way, the court does not accept the 
reduction of capital. In brief, shareholders’ equal treatment is the requirement of the 
courts in the reduction of share capital.
106 Poole v National Bank o f China Ltd [1907] AC 229 (HL).
107 Davies (2003) 243-44; about matters relevant to confirmation, see also Gore-Browne on Companies, 
vol 1 (45th edn Bristol) (loose-leaf) 26[5] (Update 50).
108 [1985] 1 WLR 975, 978.
109 Re Ratners Group pic  (1988) 4 BCC 293, 295; Re Thorn EMI pic  (1988) 4 BCC 698, 701 (Harman J), 
where he used the word “equitably”.
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On the other hand, the courts have discretion in reduction of capital. In Re 
Barrow Haematite Steel Co110, it was explicitly stated that it is not essential that the 
reduction should be made equally on all shares, although prima facie in the absence of 
any agreement to the contrary the reduction ought to made in that way. North J 
explained:
The Act provides for the reduction of the capital, and the capital of the company 
may be reduced, for instance, by-one fourth, either by reducing the shares all 
around by one-fourth, or by reducing half of them by half, and the other half not 
at all.111
As he stated, it is possible that the reduction may be applied to some shares only. The 
reason for the partial reduction in this case was the loss that the company had sustained. 
Therefore, North J adopted the rule that the reduction must be borne by those shares 
upon which the loss sustained ought to fall. As a conclusion, he ruled:
If, by contract among the shareholders, some of the shares are primarily liable to 
bear the loss to the relief of others, those are the shares upon which the reduction 
should be made. If, on the other hand, all the shares ought to bear the loss, the 
reduction ought to be applied to them all, either equally, according to the 
figures, or rateably, if the shares happen to be of different amounts, and, in my 
opinion, the law is clear, that the reduction to be made must be prima facie 
equal, according to the position of the parties, and prima facie it must be made
110 (1888) LR 39 C hD 582.
111 Ibid 594.
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on all the shares of the company, unless there is some express provision to the 
contrary.112
North J considered that in the particular case no injustice was done to shareholders; 
thus, the proposed reduction was fair. Moreover, he said that if an attempt had been 
made to reduce all shares, or even for some reason not to reduce preference shares at all, 
he would have had a right to refuse to sanction the resolution. But in the current case, 
there was nothing unjust or inequitable in the proposed reduction of capital; in fact, a 
very large majority of preference shareholders themselves were of the same opinion.113 
The case explicitly shows that the equal reduction of share capital is not always fair and 
equitable because under the special circumstances an uneven reduction of capital might 
be the only fair way. The decision in Re Barrow Haematite Steel Co has subsequently 
been followed in other cases, for example in Re Agricultural Hotel Co] 14, where 
Kekewich J sanctioned the resolution to reduce the whole company ordinary capital 
apart from any reduction of its preference capital. Still, the judge explicitly hoped that 
the Court of Appeal would settle the rules governing reduction of share capital115.
Indeed, appeal decisions were to come, and the most important of these cases is 
the House of Lords ruling in British and American Trustee and Finance Co Ltd v 
Couper116. In this case, the company had carried on business in England and the United 
States, but it was found impossible to operate in this way any longer. Therefore, it was 
decided that the company should cease to carry on business in the United States, and the 
aim was to transfer its American investments to its American shareholders. 
Consequently, their shares in the British-American company would be cancelled 
through a reduction of capital. The idea was that only English shareholders remained as
112 Ibid 594-95.
113 Ibid 602-3.
114 [1891] 1 Ch 396.
115 Ibid 398.
116 [1894] AC 399 (HL).
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shareholders in the ex-British-American company. Shareholders approved this 
arrangement at two extraordinary general meetings. Yet, there was one shareholder 
against the scheme.
The dissenting shareholder, Mr Couper, who opposed the confirmation was first 
successful as North J dismissed the petition; in addition, the Court of Appeal affirmed 
his decision. But the House of Lords reversed their decisions and held that the reduction 
was within the powers of court. Since the arrangement was fair and equitable, there was 
no reason why it should not be confirmed. In their reasoning, their Lordships observed 
that the statutes do not prescribe the manner in which reduction of capital is to be 
effected. As a result, the court has discretion in confirming a scheme. They did not see 
any danger in the conclusion that the court has a power to confirm the particular 
scheme, or reasons to have doubts that this had not been the intention of the legislature. 
About the interests of minority shareholders, Lord Herschell explicitly pointed out that:
There can be no doubt that any scheme which does not provide for uniform 
treatment of shareholders whose rights are similar, would be most narrowly 
scrutinised by the Court, and that no such scheme ought to be confirmed unless 
the Court be satisfied that it will not work unjustly or inequitably. But this is 
quite a different thing from saying that the Court has no power to sanction it.117
The confirmation of the scheme was held to be within the power of the court: there was 
no ground for refusing to do so. Further, the scheme did not involve any result either 
unjust or inequitable. The House of Lords confirmed the resolution to reduce share 
capital.
117 Ibid 406.
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Obviously, this scheme of capital reduction did not deal with every shareholder 
precisely in the same fashion. But as Lord Watson118 stated, if that had been the law it 
would have been manifest that in some cases the result might be unfortunate. He also 
pointed out that a scheme where some members retain their shares unreduced and the 
shares of others being extinguished upon their receiving a just equivalent, can be greatly 
to the advantage of the company. The House of Lords considered that this was so in this 
particular case. Lord Macnaghten explained the interest of the company and its 
shareholders further in this way:
The person whose shares are bought gets money or money’s worth. The persons 
on whose behalf the company buys have their own shares improved by the value 
of the shares extinguished. If the parties to the transaction come to the 
conclusion that the bargain is a fair one, why should the Court say that there is 
preference on the one side or on the other? If there is nothing unfair or 
inequitable in the transaction, I cannot see that there is any objection to allowing 
a company limited by shares to extinguish some of its shares without dealing in 
the same manner with all other shares of the same class. There may be no real 
inequality in the treatment of a class of shareholders although they are not all 
paid in the same coin or in coin of the same denomination.119
The reduction of share capital was approved although all shareholders were not treated 
exactly similarly since there was no real inequality or unfairness in the arrangement.
The House of Lords clearly observed that the company and the great majority of 
shareholders were more capable of saying what was good and fair for the company and 
its shareholders than the single opposing shareholder, who was actually not even
118 Ibid 408ff.
119 Ibid 415-16.
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suggesting that the majority would have been acting oppressively in the case. The 
House of Lords took a pragmatic view: what is good for the company and its 
shareholders should not be against the law when it is not unfair or inequitable120. The 
ruling follows the general idea in English company law: it is up to the company and its 
shareholders to decide company matters, and therefore it is not the task of the courts “on 
every Occasion to take the Management of every Playhouse and Brewhouse in the 
Kingdom”121. If the point is formulated in a more modem way, it is possible to state that 
the mling in British and American Trustee and Finance Co Ltd v Couper is a good 
example of law-and-economics thinking in company law. The law should support the 
business of a company, and this decision really did.
There is still one important case to explore, which is Re Chatterley-Whitfield 
Collieries Ltd122. The case is, again, about a company with two classes of shares. The 
preference shares had a right to 6 per cent cumulative dividend, and on the case of 
winding up these shares were entitled in priority to repayment of capital together with 
any arrears of dividend, but they did not have any further participation right in the 
company’s assets. When the company’s colliery undertaking was nationalised under the 
Coal Industry Nationalisation Act 1946, it ceased to carry on its principal business. The 
company was going to receive special compensation under the Act, but before the 
payment the company was willing to reduce its share capital and return to preference 
shareholders their whole share capital. Yet, some preference shareholders were against 
the resolution to reduce capital in the proposed manner and opposed the petition to 
confirm it.
120 In Poole v National Bank o f China Ltd [1907] AC 229 (HL) 240 Lord Macnaghten formulated his 
view very similarly to sanction the proposed reduction of capital: “I can see no objection to it if it is a 
prudent and businesslike measure, not unfair to any shareholder and not detrimental to the public.”
121 Carlen v Drury (1812) 1 V & B 154, 158 (Lord Eldon); see also Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers and Co 
(Maidenhead) Ltd [1927] 2 KB 9 (CA) 23.
122 [1948] 2 All ER 593.
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Preference shareholders suggested that there should be a reduction of capital 
falling equally on two classes of shares. These dissenting shareholders were, also in this 
case, successful at first since Peel J123 refused the confirmation of the resolution because 
he regarded it as unfair. But the Court of Appeal124, by a majority, reversed his decision 
and confirmed the proposed reduction of capital: they held that preference shareholders 
should not be entitled to object to the repayment of their shares. Greene MR justified 
their decision with the following passage:
It is, of course, the case that the company will not be precluded from producing 
some other scheme, but the only scheme which has been suggested as being fair 
and equitable is one providing for a pari passu reduction of both classes of 
shares. Such a reduction would still leave the company saddled with £100,000 of 
preference capital carrying a rate of dividend which in present circumstances it 
is not to be expected that the company will be able to earn, and in so far as the 
preference capital thus left does not ‘earn its keep’ it will have to be fed at the 
expense of ordinary shareholders. This does not appear to me to be fair and 
equitable. And what perhaps is of almost equal importance, it appears to me to 
be bad finance and bad business in the case of a continuing company.125
The reasoning shows distinctive economic thinking: what is not good finance and 
business cannot be good law either. The Master of the Rolls also mentioned that since 
preference shareholders were not entitled to participate in the surplus assets, the 
possible reasonable expectations of preference shareholders were not enough to make 
their treatment inequitable in the reduction of capital at the level of practice or principle.
123 Re Chatterley-Whitfield Collieries [1948] 1 All ER 911.
124 [1948] 2 All ER 593.
125 Ibid 599-600.
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In contrast, ordinary shareholders would have been treated unfairly if the company had 
carried the burden of capital that it did not need. His point was that the “obscurely 
drafted” section in the special Act displaying a certain amount of “amateurishness” did
1 0 f \not affect the power of court to confirm the reduction of capital.
Asquith LJ in his opinion pointed out that the proposed reduction was fair, 
although the alternative pari passu reduction might have been equally fair, or even more 
nearly to ideal justice. But as he said, it has never been laid that the capital reduction 
scheme must be perfect: it was enough that the scheme was fair. By contrast, it was not 
fair and reasonable that preference shares should have been kept alive, “as it were, on 
oxygen hoarded” by the other class of shares. Thus, he was sceptical about the superior 
equity of pari passu repayment, and in any case he did not hold that the existing scheme 
would be unfair. As a result, the proposal was confirmed although Evershed LJ was 
dissenting.127 Subsequently, the House of Lords128 held that the proposed reduction was 
fair and equitable and should be confirmed because there was no ground to suppose 
anything else under the provisions of the special Act.
Both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords accepted that the reduction of 
capital in Re Chatterley-Whitfield Collieries Ltd was fair and equitable because it was 
carried out in accordance with preference shareholders’ rights in winding up. Therefore, 
as the case shows, there is a clear relationship between reduction of capital and winding 
up. The reduction of capital in that case was fair because “the well known practice of 
the courts ... is based on the recognised analogy of priorities as to capital in winding- 
up”129. Obviously, there should be analogy to both directions. The equality of shares in 
the reduction of capital supports the idea that in the same way there must be equality as
126 Ibid, in particular, 594-95 and 598.
127 Ibid 601-2 (Asquith LJ) and 602-9 (Evershed LJ); the dissenting argumentation is not covered here.
128 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Chatterley-Whitfield Collieries Ltd [1949] AC 512 (HL), where their 
Lordships followed the majority ruling, with one dissentient, in Scottish Insurance Co Ltd v Wilsons & 
Clyde Coal Co Ltd [1949] AC 462 (HL) (Sc).
129 [1948] 2 All ER 593, 596 (Greene MR).
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far as it concerns the division of company surplus. This point of view prevails although 
the court does not have similar discretion in the winding up as it has in the reduction of 
share capital. Even so, there is a clear link between winding up and the reduction of 
capital since they are actually alternatives to each other. However, both these 
alternatives are not always available, and winding up a company can sometimes be 
“disastrous”, as it was in British and American Trustee and Finance Co Ltd v 
Couper130. Therefore, as Lord Macnaghten formulated: “It is for the company, and for
1 T 1the company alone, to judge of the prudence of the course proposed” . In sum, 
shareholders should be able to decide what is done, but it is the law that secures the fair 
and equal treatment of all shareholders.
Shareholders should be treated in reduction of capital similarly and equally if 
otherwise is not agreed. However, the court may use its discretion, and it can authorise, 
under special circumstances, a scheme where shareholders are not treated exactly 
similarly. In these cases, this uneven reduction should be in the interests of the company 
and its shareholders; furthermore, it should be in any case fair and equitable to every 
shareholder. As clearly mentioned in British and American Trustee and Finance Co Ltd 
v Couper, if the scheme does not provide uniform treatment of shareholders with similar 
rights, it is the task of the courts to scrutinize most narrowly these arrangements. The 
equal economic treatment must in these arrangements be reached in the manner that the 
court confirms. Therefore, I conclude this part stating that shareholders’ treatment in the 
reduction of capital should always be economically equal, and it is the task of the courts 
to ensure that it happens.
In summary, shareholders should share a company’s surplus and loss equally. 
Dividend and net assets can be divided unequally only if it has been agreed, and in the 
case of preference shares this agreement can be done implicitly too. But as far as it
130 [1894] AC 399 (HL)413.
131 Ibid.
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concerns ordinary shares, their right to dividends and net assets is equal. The courts can 
authorise the reduction of capital otherwise than equally only if shareholders are, in any 
case, treated fairly and equitably. In brief, company law really secures shareholders’ 
economic equality.
5.5 Shareholders’ pre-emption right
A company can increase its share capital by issuing new shares when it is authorised to 
1do so by the articles . The general idea in company law is that shareholders determine 
the share capital of a company133. In addition, share offerings rest on the principle that 
shareholders have a pre-emption right to subscribe the new shares issued. The 
Companies Act 1862 Table A art 27 already declared that “all new shares shall be 
offered to the members in proportion to the existing shares,” which provision was 
contained in Table A until 1948. Companies have thus through their articles determined 
that shareholders have this pre-emption right134. Yet, in English common law there has 
never been any strict rule that recognizes shareholders’ pre-emptive rights135. But the
i  o z
Second Company Law Directive changed the status of the law. Since 1980, the pre­
emption right has been a statutory principle: in consequence, CA 1985 s 89 requires that 
a company should offer the new shares to shareholders on a pre-emptive basis.
The objective of the pre-emption rule is to protect shareholders from the dilution 
of their residual rights in the company137. When there are more shareholders sharing the 
profits and net assets of the company, there is a risk that less will be available for
132 CA 1985 s 121 and Table A art 32.
133 Fraser v Whalley (1864) 2 H & M 10, 29 (Wood VC): “That is a matter wholly for the shareholders”; 
see also Punt v Symons & Co Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 506, 516-17 (Byrne J).
134 Furthermore, the Listing Rules has required the existence of shareholders’ pre-emption rights; see the 
current provisions in the UKLA Listing Rules 9 .5 .Iff.
135 See MacNeil, Iain ‘Shareholders’ Pre-emptive Rights’ [2002] JBL 78.
136 Second Council Directive Article 29.
137 See generally Pre-emption Rights: Final Report - A  study by Paul Myners into the impact o f 
shareholders’ pre-emption rights on a public company’s ability to raise new capital ( ‘Paul Myners’ 
Report’) (London 2005).
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existing shareholders as dividends or in liquidation. Moreover, if a company issues new 
shares directly to investors, there is a danger that fewer investors will be willing to buy 
existing shares, or they may be willing to do so only at a lower price than before the 
share issue. Naturally, this risk is imminent if a company makes a share issue to 
outsiders at a price below the prevailing market price. The pre-emption right is a part of 
shareholder protection but it is also at the same time a shareholders’ right. Shareholders 
have a right to subscribe the new shares, and every shareholder may personally decide 
whether to have them.
Ultimately, the main rule in share issues is that new shares have to be offered to 
existing shareholders in proportion to their shares138. These rules include that the issue 
price of shares must be the same for each shareholder. Shareholders are treated equally 
when shares are allotted to every shareholder in proportion as nearly as practicable 
equal to his existing proportion in nominal value of his holdings of the aggregate of 
relevant shares139. They must be offered in this way to existing shareholders before an 
offer can be made to the general public. Moreover, it should be noted that when shares 
are issued in proportion to existing shares, it does not typically have any significant 
effect on existing shareholders’ real position whether new shares are issued at a 
discount to the market price140. It is possible to say that shareholders’ pre-emption rights 
effectively protect shareholders’ rights in the company and their equality there.
Still, shareholders’ pre-emption right is only a default rule, which can be set 
aside by a decision of the company141. The CA 1985 s 80 allows pre-emptive rights to 
be overridden by general authority given to the directors; further, under CA 1985 s 95 
the rights may be removed by special resolution. The excluding of shareholders’ pre-
138 See CA 1985 ss 89-96.
139 Ibid s 89(l)(a).
140 See MacNeil (2002) 81.
141 Eg Companies Act 1862 Table A art 27 stated that shareholders’ pre-emptive right is “[s]ubject to any 
Direction to the contrary that may be given by the Meeting that sanctions the increase of Capital.”
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emption right is understandable because companies should be able to raise capital 
through the most appropriate method142.
Obviously, shareholders need more protection from the law if new shares are not 
offered to them on a pre-emptive basis. Company law protects shareholders’ interest in 
the context of share offerings in several ways. The first step is that shareholders must 
accept the issue of shares to outsiders by the articles or by a special resolution143. 
However, in practice, statutory pre-emptive rights “can be disapplied with relative ease 
and afford an individual equity shareholder precious little assurance”144. Shareholders’ 
protection cannot rest simply on majority authorisation, and this is particularly so in the 
case of shareholders’ equality.
Second, the authority of the directors to issue shares may be for a particular 
purpose only145. Although their authority is general they must use their powers to issue 
shares bona fide interest for the benefit of the company146; further, that power should be 
used in proper purpose147. For example, in Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltdu% 
the Privy Council considered that it is unconstitutional for the directors to allot shares 
having a purpose to try to destroy an existing majority in order to create a new one. The 
directors had improperly exercised their powers: the allotment was invalid. The aim of a 
share issue may not be to change the balance between shareholders, so the directors 
should use their power to the extent that a shareholder should be able “to maintain his 
proportionate equity”149. Company law really restricts how the directors could use their 
fiduciary power to issue new shares.
142 See eg Pre-emption rights: Paul M yners’ Report (2005) 3.
143 CA 1985 s 95(1).
144 Davies (2003) 635.
145 Fraser v Whalley (1864) 2 H & M 10.
146 More generally laid down in Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421; in the case of share issue, see eg 
Piercy v S Mills & Co Ltd [1920] 1 Ch 77.
147 Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 (CA); especially about an improper motive in the share issue, 
see Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 254; share issues is an area where directors’ improper purpose has 
generally been under the courts’ review, see eg Davies (2003) 385ff.
148 [1974] AC 821 (PC).
149 Katzowitz v Sidler (1969) 301 NYS 2d 470 (CA of New York) 477.
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Third, company law restricts the way in which shareholders can by majority 
vote decide to issue shares. The power to disapply shareholders’ pre-emption rights can 
be given by the articles or by a special resolution, and in both cases there is a 
requirement for a three-quarters majority of shareholders150. A simple majority is not 
enough to decide that shareholders’ pre-emption right is disapplied. Further, there are 
more restrictions for majority power. As in general, shareholders must exercise their 
votes “bona fide for the benefit of the company as a whole”151, which refers to the 
interest of shareholders as a group152. This consideration can be done by taking an 
“individual hypothetical member” and asking “whether what is proposed is, in the 
honest opinion of those who voted in its favour, for that person’s benefit”153. So, if 
shareholders’ pre-emptive rights are overridden, that could be done by majority 
resolution when it can be said to be beneficial to all shareholders. Moreover, even 
though it is normally for shareholders, not for the courts, to determine whether the 
resolution is bona fide for the benefit of the company, the courts may intervene if the 
decision can not reasonably be regarded as being in the interests of the company and its 
shareholders154. Sometimes, the interests of the company and a hypothetical shareholder 
have been explicitly equated with the interest of a minority shareholder. In the area of 
share issues in a private company, Clemens v Clemens Bros Ltd155 is this kind of special 
case, where the majority shareholder was prevented from authorising a share issue, 
because as a result, the shareholding of the minority shareholder would have fallen 
below 25 per cent. Yet, the ruling in Clemens might be a quite special one, and the case 
has seen partly undermining majority rule in company law156. Nevertheless, in this part 
of the study it is enough to conclude that even if shareholders can by majority power
150 CA 1985 ss 9 and 95.
151 Allen v Gold Reefs o f West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656 (CA) 671 (Lindley MR).
152 Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch 286 (CA).
153 Ibid 291 (Evershed MR).
154 Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers and Co (Maidenhead) Ltd [1927] 2 KB 9 (CA).
155 [1976] 2 All ER 268.
156 Joffe, Victor, ‘Notes of Cases -  Majority Rule Undermined?’ (1977) 40 MLR 71.
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override shareholders’ pre-emptive rights, the law restricts the majority’s power to do so 
as it does in the case of directors’ power. In sum, company law protects shareholders’ 
right to new shares issued in several ways.
Since my prime interest is equality of shareholders, Mutual Life Insurance Co o f 
New York v Rank Organisation Ltd151 is a case of paramount importance in this field. 
The company offered for sale to the public 20 million shares, and half of them were 
made available on a preferential basis to existing shareholders, except those resident in 
the United States or Canada. These shareholders, and their agents, were excluded from 
the offer because of the securities legislation in those countries. Mutual Life Insurance 
Co of New York and other plaintiffs, who were Americans, alleged that the company 
discriminated against American shareholders. They argued that shareholders were not 
treated equally.
Goulding J dismissed the action since he held that shareholders in this particular 
case had been treated fairly. The directors exercised their powers in good faith and in 
the interests of the company. The reason for excluding American shareholders from 
participation in the offer was their personal situation; moreover, their exclusion did not 
affect the existence of their shares or the rights attached to them. It was explicitly 
mentioned in the case that shareholders do not have any right to expect that their interest 
remain constant in the company. In conclusion, it was not required that all shareholders 
should be treated identically when there was a special reason why the American 
shareholders could not be treated in a similar way. Equality was not seen as an absolute 
principle in company law. As a result, shareholders could be treated differently since 
there was a very good reason for it, and furthermore the treatment of all shareholders 
was fair.
157 [1985] BCLC 11.
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It is interesting to note that the case has many similarities with another Anglo- 
American shareholders’ equality case, ie the House of Lords ruling in British and
1 SRAmerican Trustee and Finance Co Ltd v Couper . The reduction of share capital there 
was approved, although all shareholders were not treated exactly similarly when there 
was nothing unequal or unfair in the arrangement. The reduction of share capital in the 
proposed way was seen as a good business decision in that case. Both Mutual Life 
Insurance Co o f New York v Rank Organisation Ltd and British and American Trustee 
and Finance Co Ltd v Couper show very well that requirement of absolutely equal 
treatment should not override arrangements that have been reached in the best interests 
of the company when shareholders are treated fairly. I conclude this point so that 
company law supports the company in its function, but it should not be a restriction on 
business operations when those are good for the company and its shareholders.
However, conclusions from the decision in Mutual Life Insurance Co o f New 
York v Rank Organisation Ltd should be drawn carefully. The case does not declare that 
a company can in a share issue offer new shares to some shareholders and exclude 
others if there is a special reason to do so. First, in the case shares were not offered to 
any shareholder on a pre-emptive basis since the transaction was an offer for sale, not a 
rights issue. As Goulding J explained, the purchasing of shares was “not tied in any way 
to the holding of any particular number of shares”159. Shares were not offered to any 
shareholder in proportion to his shareholding, and therefore the exclusion of American 
shareholders did not affect the existence of their shares or the rights attached to them. 
The case, in fact, rather implies that if the transaction had been a rights issue, American 
shareholders could not have been excluded in the way that was done in the offer for
158 [1894] AC 399 (HL).
159 [1985] BCLC 11,25.
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sale160. As explained in the case, the company was also advised not to do the transaction 
in that way.
Second, since the arrangement was done at the market price, there was no real 
discount in the share price, but existing shareholders were only given preferential 
treatment in the allocation. As Goulding J stated, it was not even known “whether the 
transaction had any effect upon [shares’] market price”161. In consequence, it is possible 
to imply that if there had also been a special discount for the non-American 
shareholders, the transaction would not have been acceptable. It should be noted that in 
this case the legality of the share offer was not challenged at all as far as it concerned 
shares offered to the general public, and it is quite difficult to see how the situation of 
shareholders could generally be better if all the shares had been offered to the public 
without giving this preferential treatment to the non-American shareholders. I 
summarise these two points by saying that the ruling of Mutual Life Insurance Co o f 
New York v Rank Organisation Ltd does not show that equality is not required in share 
offerings. As Goulding J formulated, “equality of individual shareholders in point of
1 A1)right, does not always require an identity of treatment” . Accordingly, this case 
explicitly recognized equality between shareholders in share offerings.
Pre-emption rights in share issues provide equal protection to shareholders 
against a dilution of their interest in the company. If shareholders’ pre-emption right is 
disapplied, company law controls how the majority and the directors may use their 
power in these decisions. The fundamental idea of the law is that shareholders should be 
treated similarly in share offerings if there is no special reason to do otherwise; in
160 In addition, Davies (2003) 637 considers, in general, that these kinds of arrangements would be fairer 
if the rights of the American shareholders were sold for their benefit; naturally in Mutual Life Insurance 
Co o f New York v Rank Organisation Ltd this would not have been possible as it was an offer for sale; in 
sum, I understand Davies’ words so that if that had been a rights issue, the selling of the American 
shareholders’ rights would have been the only acceptable way to organize this transaction.
161 [1985] BCLC 11,24.
162 Ibid.
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addition, shareholders should always be treated fairly as Mutual Life Insurance Co of 
New York v Rank Organisation Ltd clearly requires.
5.6 Right to transfer shares
Shareholders have the freedom to choose whether they become members of a company. 
In addition, they decide whether to subscribe new shares even if they are issued on a 
pre-emptive basis. Still, my main interest is not how to become a shareholder, and thus I 
next set the focus briefly on shareholders’ equality in transfer of shares.
5.6.1 Free transferability of shares
Shares are generally freely transferable, and the right to transfer of shares is one of 
shareholders’ normal rights. In general, shareholders are free to transfer their shares
i
unless the articles explicitly restrict it .
In public companies, shareholders have legally full freedom to transfer their 
shares, which can be sold at the current price on the markets. These shares are 
commodities that are bought and sold in transactions between willing buyers and sellers 
as they please. Share transactions are matters of markets, but company law itself has no 
important role in these transfers.
Significantly, the current market price is available for all shareholders: it can be 
regarded as equal to them. However, the markets do not, of course, give any guarantee 
that all shares of a company are really saleable at the prevailing price. Real prices in 
share transactions depend on the depth and breadth of the market, ie on demand from 
other investors.164
163 See Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 (CA); about the transferability of shares, see more 
above, chapter two 2.4.
164 See above, chapter four.
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In private companies, transferability of shares is related to the particular 
provisions in the articles. As mentioned in chapter two, it is normal for private 
companies to place some restriction on the free transferability of their shares.
If the transferability of shares is restricted, those provisions bind every 
shareholder. Moreover, shareholders should be treated equally in cases where shares are 
transferred. For example, as explained in Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd165, the directors 
must use their power to accept a share transfer in the same way as all their fiduciary 
powers: “They must exercise their discretion bona fide in what they consider ... is in the 
interests of the company”166. The directors should use their power for the benefit of the 
company: they may not discriminate against shareholders if the interests of the company 
do not give them a reason to use their discretion. Shareholders should be treated in these 
cases both equally and fairly, but naturally the directors are able to refuse a transfer of 
shares since they have this power under the articles when that decision is in the interests 
of the company167. Yet, as we can notice, also in the case of a private company, the law 
protects shareholders’ right to transfer their shares, although private companies
1 ARnormally have in their articles some kind of restriction on free transferability .
Shareholders in public companies are free to decide whether to sell their shares; in 
effect, they have an equal exit right out of the company through the markets. On the 
other hand, the restrictions on free transferability bind every shareholder in private 
companies; thus, these shareholders’ right to transfer their shares is legally equally 
restricted.
165 [1942] Ch 304 (CA).
166 Ibid 306 (Lord Greene).
167 However, when the directors are able to approve the new members they “presumably act according to 
the majority view,” as Evershed MR saw it in Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch 286 (CA) 
292.
168 Shareholders’ pre-emption right in share transfers and the fair price under these provisions is under 
review below, chapter 7.3.2.
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5.6.2 A company’s power to purchase own shares
Free transferability of shares achieves new dimensions if the acquirer of shares is the 
company itself. Shareholders’ equality has more importance in these cases. Further, 
since company law recognizes the doctrine of capital maintenance, a company’s power 
to purchase its own shares cannot be a simple matter.
When a company acquires its own shares, the transaction has actually the same 
effect as the reduction of share capital: assets are transferred from the company to its 
shareholders. Indeed, the courts have noticed this point too. Therefore, the House of 
Lords in Trevor v Whitworth169 ruled that a company has no right to acquire its own 
shares. The House of Lords reached this conclusion although the articles authorised the 
company to purchase shares, since their Lordships took the view that reduction of share 
capital is exceptional and inconsistent with the nature of the company. Lord Herschell 
pointed out this relationship, declaring that: “the stringent precautions to prevent the 
reduction of the capital of a limited company, without due notice and judicial sanction, 
would be idle if the company might purchase its own shares wholesale, and so effect the 
desired result”170. Thus, the company capital should not be reduced otherwise than in 
the manner permitted by the statutes, and the employment of company money in the 
purchase of its own shares was considered illegitimate. The interest of creditors was the 
main reason why the House of Lords ruled that a company has no power to purchase its 
own shares, and therefore these purchases were ultra vires. As Lord Macnaghten 
explained, the power to purchase own shares would have been void even if the right
169 (1887) LR 12 App Cas 409 (HL); in addition, it should be mentioned that before this decision there 
were cases where the purchasing of company own shares was not regarded as illegal; eg Re Dronfield 
Silkstone Coal Co (1880) LR 17 Ch D 76 (CA), where the purchasing was accepted to get rid of a 
shareholder who caused difficulties.
170 (1887) LR 12 App Cas 409, 416.
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were set in the memorandum171. As a result, the memorandum and articles together 
were not able to authorise a company to purchase its own shares172.
The general rule of the law in CA 1985 s 143(1) is still that a company may not 
acquire its own shares. But since the Act of 1981 and under CA 1985 s 143(3), the 
general rule does not apply when shares are purchased in accordance with Chapter 
VII173. These exceptions are nowadays so wide that it is possible to argue that the 
general rule is, in fact, that a company may purchase its own shares174. Yet, a company 
is permitted to acquire its own shares only if the correct procedure is followed, 
otherwise the purchase is illegal. The aim of these rules is above all to protect the 
creditors of a company, but the purchase of own shares is also a matter of shareholders’ 
equality.
A company may purchase its own shares when it is authorised to do so by the 
articles , and it may acquire only shares that are fully paid . The protection of 
creditors’ interest requires that a public company must fund purchases out of 
distributable profits177. The shares acquired should be cancelled, and the company’s 
share capital should be reduced178.
My prime interest is the way in which shareholders’ equality is protected. As the 
main risk to shareholders in share issues is that new shares are issued at too low a price, 
in the purchase of own shares the danger is that the company acquires shares from some 
shareholders at too high a price. Therefore, first the terms of each purchase must be 
approved in general meeting. There are different detailed procedures for authorising 
purchases through private deals and via the Stock Exchange: the protection of
171 Ibid 436.
172 Re Denver Hotel Co [1893] 1 Ch 495 (CA) 506 (Lindley LJ).
173 CA 1985 ss 159-181.
174 Dine, Janet, Company Law (4th edn Basingstoke 2001) 140-41.
175 CA 1985 s 162(1); and the standard authorisation is in Table A art 35.
176 CA 1985 s 143(3).
177 Ibid ss 160(l)(a) and 162(2); and the exception in the case of a private company can be found in s
17 Iff.
178 Ibid s 160(4).
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shareholders varies depending whether the purchase is an off-market or market 
purchase. When shares are listed and the purchase is on the exchange, that is a market 
purchase, and otherwise it is not179. Market purchases create less risk to equality 
shareholders since the rules of the Stock Exchange transactions will apply and 
purchases will be executed at the current market price180.
Under CA 1985 s 164, off-market purchases may be made only on the terms that 
are authorised by special resolution of the company. It should be noticed that this 
resolution is not effective if a shareholder whose shares are to be purchased exercises 
his voting rights181. A company may also enter into a contingent purchase contract 
where the company becomes entitled or obliged to purchase those shares182. Yet, it is 
very obvious that these kinds of contracts are not typically useful for quoted companies 
because the price of these transactions is difficult to determine beforehand.
Market purchases should under CA 1985 s 166 get authorisation in general 
meeting, but in this context only ordinary resolution is required. This authorisation may 
be general or limited to a particular class, and it may be conditional or unconditional183. 
The maximum number of shares to be acquired, and the maximum and minimum prices, 
must be specified184. However, in the case of a market purchase members are not able to 
approve the actual contracts of purchase that take place on the market by the company’s 
stockbroker. In any case, CA 1985 s 169 provides that the company should disclose the 
purchases of its own shares. In addition, these market transactions should be executed 
following the rules of the Stock Exchange. Chapter 12 of the UKLA Listing Rules sets 
out special rules that apply to companies wishing to purchase their own listed securities,
179 Ibid s 163.
180 See eg Davies (2003) 257.
181 See CA 1985 s 164(5); in contrast, generally shareholders that have a special interest are entitled to 
vote; see North-West Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty (1887) LR 12 App Cas 589 (PC); Greenhalgh v 
Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch 286 (CA).
182 CA 1985 s 165.
183 Ibid s 166(2).
184 Ibid s 166(6).
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whether as a market purchase or an off-market purchase. There are, for example, special 
requirements for substantial market repurchases. The repurchases of more than 15 per 
cent of a company’s shares must be carried out by a tender offer to all shareholders185.
In summary, English company law accepts that companies may purchase their 
own shares. During recent years, this statutory facility has become more popular. It can 
be said that these share buy-backs are an essential component in quoted companies’ 
financial armoury186. Overall, it is important that companies may purchase their own 
shares, which is indeed in the interests of the company and its shareholders. However, it 
should be noted that company law and market rules offer special protection to 
shareholders’ equality when a company’s own shares are purchased.
5.7 Equality of shareholders
The basic idea of equality in law is that equals should be treated alike. Company law 
supports and protects shareholders’ equality. Shareholders are entitled to expect that 
their treatment is equal in a company where they have shares with similar rights. In 
addition, their equal treatment might generally be regarded as “the most straightforward 
organizing principle” in company affairs187. As a result, shareholders share a company’s 
surplus and loss in proportion to their shares: dividends should be paid them equally, 
and they have a proportional right to the company’s net assets. The rule of law is that 
even unpaid shares are entitled to the same dividend and to an equal share of net assets, 
unless the contrary is stated.
Yet, it is possible to specify the rights attached to shares by the company 
constitution. Dividends can be paid only to the paid share capital, which is actually the 
general practice according to the current articles. In addition, if a company has different
185 UKLA Listing Rules 12.4.2.
186 Pettet, Ben, Company Law (Harlow 2001) 309.
187 Cheffins (1997) 490; but see also, ibid 495, where he considers that “policy-makers should resist being 
side-tracked by arguments based on the idea of equal treatment.”
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classes of shares, it is obvious that these shares cannot be equal since they explicitly 
have different rights. Further, the prevailing presumption in company law is that 
preference shares’ rights are exhaustive, not equal. But this inequality is a special 
feature of different classes of shares; therefore, we should not be confused by preference 
shares’ rights. In contrast, the rights of ordinary shares are equal in their nature.
In reduction of share capital, the courts require that shareholders should be 
treated in a similar manner, and prima facie equally. On the other hand, the courts have 
accepted that under special circumstances, and under their strict control, reduction of 
capital is possible even if shareholders are not treated absolutely similarly when they are 
treated fairly and equitably. Still, shareholders must be economically treated in the same 
manner. Although “they are not paid in the same coin,” shareholders should get equal
1 Rftproportion in “money or money’s worth” . So, if the rights of shareholders are 
different in a company, the law can even require that shareholders should not be treated 
equally, but this idea does not, of course, apply to ordinary shares.
Shareholders have an equal pre-emption right to subscribe the new shares in 
share issues in proportion to their existing shares. However, this pre-emption right is a 
default rule, which can be set aside by a company’s decision. When it is in the interests 
of the company and its shareholders, this right can be disapplied, and under very special 
circumstances a company may, in an offer to sale, offer its shares only to part of its 
shareholders. But there must be good and special reasons to do so, and shares must then 
be offered at the market price.
Shareholders have the right to transfer their shares. Their freedom is naturally 
greatest in quoted companies, where shares are freely transferable. In these companies, 
shareholders are legally free to buy and sell shares. On the other hand, restrictions on 
free transferability bind every shareholder in private companies. In addition, the general
188 British and American Trustee and Finance Co Ltd v Couper [1894] AC 399 (HL) 415-16 (Lord 
Macnaghten).
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rule of company law has been that companies have been prohibited from purchasing 
their own shares but the statutory facility has permitted it when the correct procedure is 
followed. In the same way as in issues of new shares, so also in these share buy-backs, 
interests and equality of shareholders are protected under special requirements of 
company law and market rules.
The rights and interests of shareholders in the company are in proportion to their 
shares. The ordinary shares of a company are equal, and equality is proportionality. But 
the companies’ legislation has never explicitly stated that all shares should be equal. 
Therefore, the status of shareholders has been explained in cases like Birch v Cropper, 
where Lord Fitzgerald pointed that:
My Lords, I am clearly of opinion that the only equitable principle to be acted 
on in this case is that of equality. That is an equitable principle, and, in giving 
effect to that rule, each and every shareholder should receive in respect of his 
share an equal proportion of this surplus.189
Lord Herschell formulated the idea in the same case in this way:
shareholders are on the same footing, equally members and holding equal shares 
in the company, and it appears to me that they ought to be treated as equally 
entitled to its property. It may be that the principle which I recommend your 
Lordships to adopt will not secure absolutely equal or equitable treatment in all 
cases, but I think that it will in general attain that end more nearly than any other 
which has been proposed.190
189 (1889) LR 14 App Cas 525 (HL) 542 (emphasis original).
190 Ibid 538.
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Obviously, what Lord Herschell explained is not a recommendation, but it is the 
position of English company law. According to company law, shares are equal unless 
otherwise stated. Therefore, it might be possible to argue that shares are generally bom 
free and equal in law. The exceptions of absolutely similar treatment in the reduction of 
share capital, or under the special circumstances in an offer for sale, are not able to 
change this major principle of law. In summary, the courts have clearly recognized 
equality as a principle of company law.
Still, the courts have been unwilling to declare equality as a principle that 
overrides the interests of a company and its shareholders; furthermore, they have been 
unwilling to limit their own discretion. Thus, in English company law equality is not 
absolute in nature. The view of English law has been more pragmatic than dogmatic; 
indeed, English law generally works in this way. However, it should be noted that in the 
cases where shareholders have not been treated identically, there is no reason to say that 
their treatment in economic terms has not been equal since this has been the requirement 
of the law and the courts. I conclude this chapter by stating that ordinary shareholders 
should be treated equally, and thus shareholders’ economic equality is a fundamental 
principle in company law. At the end, I quote Lord Macnaghten, who observed in 
British and American Trustee and Finance Co Ltd v Couper that:
it follows as a self-evident proposition that the interests of the shareholders in 
respect of their shares as regards dividend and everything else must be equal.191
That is the real equality of shares in company law: the principles of law require that 
shareholders must be treated equally.
191 [1894] AC 399 (HL)417.
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When shares have equal rights in the company, they rank equally. Shareholders’ 
interest in a company is proportionate to the number of their shares. But whether 
majority and minority shareholders can ever have any real equality in companies that 
are governed by majority rule is a point under review in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
MAJORITY POWER AND MINORITY PROTECTION
What, then, is this law business about? It is about 
the fact that our society is honeycombed with 
disputes. Disputes actual and potential; disputes to 
be settled and disputes to be prevented; both 
appealing to law, both making up the business o f the 
law.
K. N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (1930) 12.
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the relationship between majority and minority shareholders is 
examined. On the one hand, the main principle is that companies are governed by 
majority rule, which means that power rests on the majority. A consequence is that 
companies are sometimes identified with their majority shareholders. On the other hand, 
all shareholders have, in proportion to their shares, rights in the company. As explained 
above in chapters two and five, the rights of ordinary shares are equal. Yet, the idea in 
company law is not only to provide rights to shareholders but also to offer protection to 
them. Overall, company law must balance the interests of individual shareholders and 
the company as a whole.
My analysis here starts with an overview of constitutional matters in the 
company. Thereafter, I explore the principle of majority rule, minority rights, and the 
statutory protection offered against oppression by the majority. The intention is to 
demonstrate that minority shareholders are not at the mercy of majority shareholders 
since the law protects them. The important point is that this minority protection may 
make their shares more valuable.
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6.2 The company constitution
The memorandum and articles govern a company’s constitutional structure. They have 
an essential role in setting shareholders’ rights, which are fundamentally contractual in 
nature. Through the company constitution, it is possible to determine that a company 
has shares with different rights. However, my focus is not on different classes of shares. 
Instead, the aim is to emphasize that the company constitution is subordinate to the law.
6.2.1 Memorandum and articles of association
The memorandum and the articles of association form the constitution of a company. I 
formulate their function very briefly: the memorandum is the company’s outward- 
looking informative document, and the articles are an inward-looking set of rules 
governing the running of the company. As my interest is the relationship between 
shareholders, I concentrate on the articles.
The formation of a company requires that the registrar of companies is provided 
with a memorandum and the articles1. The term company implies that a number of 
people associate for a common object. The CA 1985 s 13(3) states that from the date of 
incorporation the subscribers of the memorandum of association “shall be a body 
corporate”. Although the statute declares so, however, incorporators do not become a 
company. They merely set it up together: in consequence, companies are “made by them 
but not o f them”2. The word association does not describe the company as a thing that is 
formed; it rather describes the act of associating and the formation of a company3.
The essential feature of the company as a legal entity is its public registration: a 
company is formed by the registration. From the date of registration, it becomes
1 CA 1985 s 10.
2 Ireland, Paddy, ‘Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’ (1999) 62 MLR 32, 42 
(emphasis original).
3 Smith v Anderson (1880) LR 15 Ch D 247 (CA) 273 (James LJ).
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“capable forthwith of exercising all the functions of an incorporated company”4. 
Moreover, if it is a public company, it needs a trading certificate from the registrar 
before it can start its business5. In brief, it is the law that empowers the creation of 
companies with a distinct corporate personality, and the main enabling function of 
company law is to make this formation of companies possible. Companies are indeed 
creatures of law.
As the company is registered, the memorandum and the articles bind the 
company and its members6. Subscribers to the memorandum become the first members, 
and the memorandum, among other points, states the amount of the share capital and the 
division of it into shares of a fixed amount7. The articles of association form the core of 
a company’s organizational structure; they are primarily concerned with the internal 
affairs of the company. In general, companies adopt a model set of articles provided by 
the Companies Act8. In any case, the articles and company law together place 
shareholders at the centre of corporate power structure, and this power is my prime 
interest in this chapter. But before analysing this power, I first explore the contractual 
nature of the company constitution and its alteration.
6.2.2 Contractual nature of the company constitution
The basic relationship in a company is contractual since companies exist only because 
some people want to incorporate a business and become shareholders. It is natural that 
CA 1985 s 1(1) states that:
Any two or more persons associated for a lawful purpose may, by subscribing
their names to a memorandum of association and otherwise complying with the
4 CA 1985 s 13(4).
5 See ibid s 117(1).
6 Ibid s 14(1).
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requirements of this Act in respect of registration, form an incorporated 
company.
Further, the CA 1985 s 14(1) stresses the contractual relationship, declaring that “the 
memorandum and the articles, when registered, bind the company and its members to 
the same extent as if they respectively had been signed and sealed by each member.” In 
essence, the memorandum and the articles are the fundamental documents of the 
company, and there cannot be a company without them.
The CA 1985 s 14(1) does not explicitly state with whom members are to be 
deemed to have covenanted. This section seems mainly to describe the formation of the 
company, but it does not explain what the company is. The section even ignores the 
company as a separate legal entity when it merely mentions “as if ... signed and sealed 
by each member” without saying anything about the company itself. As a whole, the 
wording of this section is “difficult to construe or understand”9. However, the role of 
the company constitution has been widely explained in case law: the memorandum and 
the articles are regarded as a statutory contract between each member and the company, 
and furthermore the articles regulate shareholders’ rights inter se10. The articles of 
association govern the rights of shareholders11, and the basic idea is that shareholders 
have such rights as the memorandum and the articles give them12. A company’s 
constitution has contractual force between shareholders; in addition, this artificial
7 Ibid s 2(5)(a).
8 Ibid s 8 and Companies (Tables A to F) Regulations 1985 Table A (hereinafter ‘Table A ’).
9 Hickman v Kent or Romney Marsh Sheepbreeders’ Association [1915] 1 Ch 881, 897 (Astbury J); Allen 
v Gold Reefs o f West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656 (CA) 671 (Lindley MR), where it was considered that 
the exact nature of this contract is very difficult to define.
10 Welton v Saffery [1897] AC 299 (HL) 315 (Lord Herschell); see also Wood v Odessa Waterworks Co 
(1889) LR 42 Ch D 636, 642 (Stirling J); Salmon v Quin & Axtens Ltd [1909] 1 Ch 311 (CA); affirmed by 
[1909] AC 442 (HL).
11 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 375 (Lord Wilberforce).
12 Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] AC 534 (HL) 545 (Lord Porter).
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contract binds future shareholders too. In sum, the articles compose a bargain between 
shareholders13, who are contracted with each other under these terms.
But as the first words of CA 1985 s 14(1) states, the company contract is: 
“Subject to the provisions of this Act.” Indeed, this statutory contract has many 
distinctive features. The memorandum and articles derive their binding force from the 
terms of the statute, and only the registration of the company can make the articles a 
statutory contract. In addition, shareholders are entitled to rely on the memorandum and 
articles as they are registered. Therefore, the articles bind members as registered even if 
they are not in this form in accordance with the concurrent intention of signatories14.
The articles cannot be rectified on the grounds of mistake, and it is not possible to imply 
a term into them in order to give business efficacy15. Investors in a public company 
should be entitled to assume that the whole constitution is contained in the articles16. In 
sum, the statutory contract in the company differs very considerably from normal 
contracts.
The purpose of the memorandum and the articles is to define the position of 
shareholders in this role, but not to bind them in their capacity as individuals. The 
definition of shareholders’ position must be consistent with the statutes; for example, an 
attempt to define the company’s constitution in a way that members were required, after 
their shares were fully paid, to make further contributions was regarded as invalid17.
The articles do not give rights to persons, or bind them, in a capacity other than that of a 
member18.
13 See Will v United Lankat Plantations Co Ltd [1914] AC 11 (HL) 16-17 (Viscount Haldane).
14 Scott v Frank F Scott (London) Ltd [1940] Ch 794 (CA).
15 Bratton Seymour Service Co Ltd v Oxborough [1992] BCC 471 (CA); on the other hand, the articles are 
a business document, and thus they should be construed to give them reasonable business efficacy when 
the particular construction is admissible on the language of the articles; see also Holmes v Keyes [1959] 
Ch 199 (CA) 215 (Jenkins LJ).
16 Re Blue Arrow pic [1987] BCLC 585.
17 Bisgood v Henderson’s Transvaal Estates Ltd [1908] 1 Ch 743 (CA).
18 Hickman v Kent or Romney Marsh Sheepbreeders' Association [1915] 1 Ch 881; Beattie v E & F 
Beattie Ltd [1938] Ch 708 (CA).
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The memorandum and articles are subordinate to the statute. Companies are 
creatures of the law: they owe their being to the statute to which they are bound19. A 
clause contained in a company’s articles is invalid if it seeks to override a provision of 
the Companies Act. For instance, a shareholder’s ability to petition for the winding up 
of a company cannot be excluded or limited by the articles20. Furthermore, even if the 
rule of the statute were enabling, this does not mean that it can be displaced. The 
company cannot fetter its statutory powers, although individual shareholders may 
lawfully make a private agreement on their own behalf21. However, such private 
contract does not bind the future shareholders22. The power of shareholders to bind 
themselves through the corporate contract is more limited than through a private 
contract.
Shareholders’ rights are created by statute and contract. But it is difficult to 
propose that the relationship in the company would be predominantly contractual in 
nature23. Company law is not contract law24; therefore, companies should not be 
reduced to nexus-of-contracts25. Shareholders’ rights are not just a bundle of contractual 
rights26. Nonetheless, the statute does not purport to settle the rights of members inter se 
but leaves them to be determined by the articles27. In addition, it should be noted that
19 Welton v Saffery [1897] AC 299 (HL) 324 (Lord Macnaghten).
20 Re Peveril Gold Mines Ltd [1898] 1 Ch 122 (CA).
21 See Russel v Northern Bank Development Co Ltd [1992] 1 WLR 588 (HL).
22 [1897] AC 299 (HL) 331 (Lord Davey): “Of course, individual shareholders may deal with their own 
interests by contract in such way as they may think fit. But such contracts, whether made by all or some 
only of the shareholders, would create personal obligations, or an exceptio personalis against themselves 
only, and would not become a regulation of the company, or be binding on the transferees of the parties to 
it, or upon new or non-assenting shareholders.”
23 The effect of case law is that the memorandum and articles “fall short o f being a contract in any 
ordinary sense”; Company Law Reform: Modern Company Law For a Competitive Economy -  Company 
Formation and Capital Maintenance (London 1999) 2.6.
24 See eg Hansmann, Henry and Kraakman, Reinier, ‘The Essential Role of Organizational Law’ (2000)
110 Yale Law Journal 387, 440: “At its essential core, organizational law is property law, not contract 
law”; yet, it should be remembered that the company is not a relation between persons and property but a 
relationship between persons; see above, in particular, chapter three 3.3.3.
25 See especially Ireland, Paddy, ‘Property and contract in contemporary corporate theory’ (2003) 23 LS 
4 5 3 ,457ff.
26 Inland Revenue Commissioners v Laid Group pic [2003] 4 All ER 669 (HL) 678 (Lord Millett); 
Commissioners o f Inland Revenue v Crossman [1937] AC 26 (HL) 66 (Lord Russel).
27 [1897] AC 299 (HL) 315 (Lord Herschell).
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only members are involved in the formation of a company because it as a distinct person 
does not yet exist. As a result, I consider that the term contract might imply the way in 
which a company is formed and shareholders’ rights are set but it cannot explain the 
nature of the company and the relationship between shareholders.
To conclude, the law makes companies, and the company constitution as a 
contract is subordinate to it. The company, which is a legal person, gets its existence 
from the statute, not from a contract. Moreover, the articles can be regarded as a social 
contract regulating shareholders’ rights28. The relationship in the company between 
shareholders is more social than contractual; in short, it is company law that governs 
this relationship.
6.2.3 Alteration of the company constitution
The company constitution is alterable, but unlike contracts generally the corporate 
contract may be altered without the consent of all the contracting parties. The articles 
can be altered by special resolution, ie by three-quarters majority vote of those members 
who are entitled to vote at general meeting29. This is extremely important because 
company contract is long-term in its nature: it is necessary that companies and 
shareholders can adjust themselves to the changing circumstances of business 
environment. Company law gives a special majority of shareholders power to modify 
the company constitution.
Company law regards a company as an ongoing organization: for this reason,
30any regulation or article purporting to deprive the power to alter the articles is invalid .
28 Ibid.
29 See CA 1985 ss 9 and 378; in addition, s 2(7) provides that a company may not alter its memorandum, 
except in cases where an express provision is made by the Act, but in practice everything in the 
memorandum is alterable; see ss 2(2), 4, 17, 28, 121 and 135.
30 Allen v Gold Reefs o f West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656 (CA) 671 (Lindley MR); Walker v London 
Tramways Co (1879) LR 12 Ch D 705.
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A company cannot contract out power to alter its articles . In a company, shareholders 
enter into a contract made upon the terms of alterable articles , and they are not entitled 
to assume that the articles remain in a particular form.
Since the company constitution is subordinate to company law, a company may 
not alter its articles to override the provisions of companies’ legislation. For example, 
CA 1985 s 16 explicitly states that a company may not, without the consent of the 
members, alter the terms of its articles to increase members’ liability. Moreover, the 
articles cannot be altered in a way that would be inconsistent with the terms of the 
company’s memorandum33.
The company constitution can be altered by the support of a special majority. 
But there is one very central check on this ability to alter the articles: the majority must 
exercise their power in good faith, and the alteration of the articles should be beneficial 
to the company as a whole. As Lindley MR explained in Allen v Gold Reefs o f West 
Africa Ltd'.
the power conferred by it must, like all other powers, be exercised subject to 
those general principles of law and equity which are applicable to all powers 
conferred on majorities and enabling them to bind minorities. It must be 
exercised, not only in the manner required by law, but also bona fide for the 
benefit of the company as a whole, and it must not be exceeded. These 
conditions are always implied, and are seldom, if ever, expressed.34
31 Punt v Symons & Co Ltd [1903] 2 Ch 506.
32 Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers and Co (Maidenhead) Ltd [1927] 2 KB 9 (CA) 26 (Atkin LJ).
33 In addition, if a provision in a company’s memorandum conflicts with one contained in the articles, the 
provision in the memorandum takes preference; see eg Welton v Saffery [1897] AC 299 (HL).
[1900] 1 Ch 656 (CA) 671.
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The power in a company should be exercised bona fide in the interests of the company, 
but not for any collateral or non-corporate purpose35. The validity of a special resolution 
requires that majority shareholders use their voting power in good faith and for the 
benefit of the company as a whole. In Greenhalgh v Ardeme Cinemas Ltd, Evershed 
MR explained the meaning of this phrase in the following way:
In the first place, I think it is now plain that ‘bona fide for the benefit of the 
company as a whole’ means not two things but one thing. It means that the 
shareholder must proceed upon what, in his honest opinion, is for the benefit of 
the company as a whole. The second thing is that the phrase, ‘the company as a 
whole’, does not (at any rate in such a case as the present) mean the company 
as a commercial entity, distinct from the corporators: it means the corporators 
as a general body.36
In addition, the Master of the Rolls mentioned that:
I think that the matter can, in practice, be more accurately and precisely stated 
by looking at the converse and by saying that a special resolution of this kind 
would be liable to be impeached if the effect of it were to discriminate between 
the majority shareholders and the minority shareholders, so as to give the 
former an advantage of which the latter were deprived.37
The interests of a company equate with the interests of its shareholders38. Therefore, 
those who use the power in a company have to regard the interests of all shareholders.
35 About the discretion of directors, see especially Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 (CA); 
Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd [1974] AC 821 (PC).
36 [1951] Ch 286 (CA) 291.
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Company law does not only give power to the majority to alter the constitution; it also 
offers protection to the minority. In cases where majority shareholders act in a 
discriminatory way, it is the task of the courts to protect minority shareholders. For 
example, the addition of a provision in order to enable the majority to expropriate the 
minority shareholders was not justified because it was not made in good faith and for 
the benefit of the company as a whole39. The majority could not force this kind of article 
by the power provided by the Companies Act. If the majority fails to purchase the 
shares of a minority by agreement, it cannot do so compulsorily through an alteration of 
the articles40.
On the other hand, company law does not require that shareholders in voting for 
a special resolution “dissociate themselves altogether from the prospect of personal 
benefit and consider whether the proposal is for the benefit of the company as a going 
concern”41.
Peter Gibson J formulated this principle bluntly in Re Ringtower Holdings pic*2: “The 
law is not so foolish as to prevent a shareholder from voting in his own private interests 
provided that the resolution is not discriminatory.” Thus, the majority may use power in 
the company and decide what is in the interests of the company, and the courts generally 
assume that decisions have this basis. The interests of a company may then equate with 
the interests of the majority43. But company law sets a clear borderline: the majority 
may not use power in the company to discriminate the minority.
37 Ibid.
38 Brady v Brady [1988] BCLC 20 (CA) 40 (Nourse LJ).
39 Brown v British Abrasive Wheel Co Ltd [1919] 1 Ch 290; Dafen Tinplate Co Ltd v Llanelly Steel Co 
[1920] 2 Ch 124.
40 [1919] 1 Ch 290, 295-96 (Astbury J); it should be noted that the compulsory acquisition of the 
minority’s shares has been possible under the statutory rule since 1928; CA 1985 ss 428-30 are under 
review later in this study; see below, chapter seven 7.6.2.
41 [1951] Ch 286 (CA) 291; see also North-West Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty (1887) LR 12 App Cas 
589 (PC); Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 (PC); in contrast, Clemens v Clemens Bros Ltd [1976] 2 All ER 
268.
42 (1989) 5 BCC 82, 101.
43 See Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 381 (Lord Wilberforce).
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Significantly, the company constitution has contractual elements, which prevail 
particularly when a company is formed. Hoffmann LJ explained the role of the articles 
in Re Saul D Harrison & Sons pic in this way:
The articles of association are just what their name implies: the contractual terms 
which govern the relationships of the shareholders with the company and each 
other. They determine the powers of the board and the company in general 
meeting and everyone who becomes a member of a company is taken to have 
agreed to them.44
The contract contained in the articles is one of the original incidents of the share45. But 
as mentioned, this company contract is subordinate to company law. Further, company 
constitution is, and should be, alterable by special resolution with the support of special 
majority. The alteration of the articles should then be beneficial to the company as a 
whole, and the majority may not use the power in a discriminatory way. On the one 
hand, company law together with the articles gives power to the company and the 
majority shareholders; on the other hand, the law sets restrictions on the use of the 
power to protect the minority. Next, I analyse the role of majority rule, and after that I 
review closer the special protection offered to minority shareholders.
6.3 Company power and majority rule
Companies are controlled by shareholders, who is the only group having votes in the 
company. Majority rule is a democratic and pragmatic principle in company law. In 
addition, in a company the interests of the majority are paramount in the last resort46.
44 [1995] 1 BCLC 14 (CA) 17.
45 Borland’s Trustee v Steel Brothers & Co Ltd [1901] 1 Ch 279, 288 (Farwell J).
46 See also Wedderburn, K. W., ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v. FIarbottle’ [1957] CLJ 194.
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However, if all questions were decided only by majority rule, there would be little need 
for any other company law rules governing the relationship between shareholders. 
Further, if the minority were completely at the mercy of the majority, there would be 
few persons willing to become minority shareholders. At bottom, the scope of majority 
rule is restricted by other rules and principles of company law.
6.3.1 Ultimate power and company organs
The object of companies is to make profit for shareholders. Consequently, ultimate 
power in companies rests on shareholders, who use their power by votes attached to 
shares. They are entitled to exercise powers of the company and to control its 
operations. In brief, it is shareholders’ business to manage their own affairs in a 
company47. Moreover, it is up to them to set the company constitution and to control its 
directors. Company law places shareholders in the driving seat of the company48; they 
are the highest masters in a company49.
Naturally, as a legal person, the company, like associations and collectives 
generally, needs a structure for institutional decision-making. It is possible to use a 
metaphor describing companies as group-persons having a group-will50, and from this 
perspective company law regulates shareholders’ common action. Indeed, in the 
company shareholders act collectively through the medium of general meeting51.
A large number of shareholders cannot run a company; rather, the directors 
conduct its business. In particular in public companies, shareholders are investors but 
the company needs professional managers to govern its business. The board of directors
47 See eg Carlen v Drury (1812) 1 V & B 154; MacDougall v Gardiner (1875) LR 1 Ch D 13 (CA); Re 
Langham Skating Rink Co (1877) LR 5 Ch D 669 (CA).
48 Davies, Paul L., Introduction to Company Law (Oxford 2002) 255.
49 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, 493 (Wigram VC): the members at general meeting are “the 
supreme governing body” of the company.
50 Like eg Maitland in Gierke, Otto, Political Theories o f the Middle Age (Maitland, Frederic William, 
trans) (Cambridge 1900) xxvi.
51 Caparo Industries pic v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) 630 (Lord Oliver).
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must steer the company’s business, and modem capitalism is managerial capitalism . 
The board of directors, together with general meeting, are the principal organs of the 
company53. Moreover, the role of the directors is described simply: they are the agents 
of the company. As a legal person, the company cannot act itself: it can only act through 
its directors54. Directors and managers represent the directing mind and will of the 
company, and in practice they control what it does55. In the company, the directors 
control the business, and shareholders control the directors. Therefore, shareholders can 
always by an ordinary resolution remove the directors56. In sum, in the company’s legal 
structure, shareholders’ power is above the board of directors.
However, the Companies Act does not state that the management of the 
company has to be vested in the directors. The allocation of decision-making power 
over the company’s business policy is a matter of the articles of association57. In any 
case, Table A art 70 declares that “the business of the company shall be managed by the 
directors who may exercise all the powers of the company”. But this authority of the 
directors is subject to the provisions of the Companies Act, the memorandum and the 
articles, and furthermore to any directions given by special resolution. Thus, the general 
meeting “may curtail the future powers of the directors by a special resolution”58. 
Shareholders may, in fact, usurp power from the directors without altering the articles59
52 In general, about the point, see Berle, Adolf A., Jr and Means, Gardiner C., The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property (New York 1932).
53 But shareholders are not organs of the company; in contrast, see eg Farrar, John H., ‘The Duties of 
Controlling Shareholders’ in Takeovers, Institutional Investors, and the Modernization o f  Corporate 
Laws (Auckland 1993) 383, 386, where he says that: “In a sense, both the majority and minority are 
themselves organs of the company.”
54 Ferguson v Wilson (1866) LR 2 Ch App 77, 89 (Cairns LJ); as Rajak, Harry, Sourcebook o f Company 
Law (2nd edn Bristol 1995) 66 formulates the general point: companies are “independent in law but 
dependent in fact.”
55 H L Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T  J Graham & Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 159 (CA) 172 (Denning LJ).
56 CA 1985 s 303(1); in addition, shareholders, in general, appoint the directors; see Table A art 73ff.
57 But the general meeting must have exclusivity in certain matters: CA 1985 ss 2(7) and 9 the alteration 
of the memorandum and articles; s 80 the authority to allot shares; ss 121 and 135 the alteration and 
reduction of share capital; and the Insolvency Act 1986 s 84: winding up of the company.
58 Davies, Paul L., Gower and D avies’ Principles o f Modern Company Law (7th edn London 2003) 303.
59 Contrast, before the existing wording of Table A 1985 art 70 the conclusion was the opposite; see John 
Shaw and Sons (Salford) Ltd v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113 (CA) 134 (Greer LJ); and generally Scott v Scott 
[1943] 1 All ER 582, 585, where Lord Clauson formulated that: “the professional view as to the control
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when that is done by special resolution60. Altogether, shareholders have ultimate power 
in the company but they can use this power only at general meetings and under the 
requirements of the company constitution and company law61.
6.3.2 Majority rule
Shareholders collectively have ultimate control over the company. Still, their power in 
the company is the power of a majority since company law does not require 
shareholders’ unanimity. The majority has power to bind the minority in matters within 
the powers of the company. Companies are governed by majority rule, and the majority 
is normally a simple majority of members’ votes.
It is a cardinal rule of company law that the majority is entitled to exercise the 
powers of the company and to control its operations. The powers of a company are 
vested in the majority, which generally has the power to decide for the company by 
decisions made at general meeting.
Ordinary shareholders have one vote for every share62; as a result, in general 
meeting they have votes in proportion to their equity investment. Democracy in 
companies is thus a democracy of capital. Yet, voting takes place in the first instance on 
a show of hands, where every member has one vote, but shareholders have the right to
of the company in general meeting over the actions of directors has, over a period of years, undoubtedly 
varied.”
60 Thus, the ruling of Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd v Cuninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 
(CA) is still valid: the directors cannot be compelled to comply with the resolution o f general meeting 
passed by a simple majority.
61 However, it is argued that shareholders only have formal control in the company since they are not in a 
position to exercise it; in particular, the fragmentation of share ownership in the Anglo-American 
company has shifted shareholders’ power to managers: in consequence, according to Roe, Mark J., Strong 
Managers, Weak Owners -  The Political Roots o f American Corporate Finance (Princeton 1994) 6, this 
restructuring actually turned the “corporate law on its head”; but I have in this study a legal perspective, 
and thus I underline that shareholders have both the right to use and not to use their control power in the 
company; see more above, chapter two 2.3.2.
62 Table A art 54.
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demand a poll where the amount of shares and votes matter63. The majority of a 
company is a majority of the shares represented at the general meeting64.
Companies are mainly governed by simple majority rule; therefore, more than a 
half of members’ votes in general meeting is needed for ordinary resolution. Companies 
appoint65 and remove66 the directors by ordinary resolution, supported by the majority 
of shareholders. In addition, since the directors are nominated by majority rule,
f k lshareholders have no right to appoint directors in proportion to their shares . 
Consequently, in this way the majority of shareholders are the masters in a company.
The company is a separate legal entity, and following the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle the company, not individual shareholders, is the proper plaintiff even if the 
wrong has been done against the company itself. The company should bring the action, 
and thus it is up to the directors or the company at general meeting to decide whether an 
action is brought in its name. A minority shareholder is not in a position to bring an 
action in the name of a company to enforce the company’s rights69. Simply, “the 
minority is a minority and not the majority” regardless of whether they are profoundly 
convinced that the decision not to sue is wrong70. As Mellish U  explained in 
MacDougall v Gardiner71, this point is not at all a technical question but it makes a very 
serious difference in the management of the company’s affairs: if every member had the 
right to file the bill, there is a real risk that everything concerning the affairs of the 
company would be litigated. Otherwise, as Kay LJ formulated it in La Cie de Mayville v
63 CA 1985 s 373 and Table A art 46.
64 Attorney General v Davy (1741) 2 Atk 212 (Hardwicke LC): “It cannot be disputed, that wherever a 
certain number are incorporated, a major part of them may do any corporate act; so if all are summoned, 
and part appear, a major part of those that appear may do a corporate act.”
65 Table A art 78.
66 CA 1985 s 303(1).
67 Ibid s 292 provides that each appointment shall be voted individually.
68 (1843) 2 Hare 461.
69 Beattie v E &  F Beattie Ltd [1938] Ch 708 (CA) 718.
70 Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v Greater London Council [1982] 1 WLR 2, 10 (Sir Robert Megarry 
VC).
71 (1875) LR 1 Ch D 13 (CA) 25.
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Whitley12, “we should have companies tom to pieces by litigation of this kind.” For 
these reasons, the rule is that unless there is a majority for the litigation, it should not 
proceed.
It is really an elementary principle in company law that the courts do not 
interfere with the internal management of companies73. In general, the majority of 
shareholders have ultimate power to decide the affairs of a company, and it is not the 
task of the courts to mle their business74. Company law supports the presumption that 
shareholders together make resolutions that follow their shared interests in the 
company. The law and the courts are not able to decide what is good for the company 
and its shareholders: as a result, shareholders by majority vote should have the final 
word to say.
Ordinary resolutions in the company are passed by a simple majority of 
shareholders’ votes75. However, important organic and constitutional changes require a 
special resolution and a three-quarters majority of shareholders’ votes. As explained 
above, the alteration of articles should be made through a special resolution with a
Hf\three-quarters majority . These fundamental decisions in a company demand stronger 
support from the shareholders than ordinary resolutions. Naturally, the wider support 
from shareholders ensures that the decision is beneficial to all shareholders and the 
company as a whole.
The majority principle is a pragmatic and efficient rule in company law since 
shareholders’ unanimity is not a realistic alternative, particularly in public companies. 
However, while decisions in the company are made by majority rule, there is a threat 
that the majority might use the power in the company to further their own interests to
72 [1896] 1 Ch 788 (CA) 807.
73 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 (PC) 93 (Lord Davey).
74 Carlen v Drury (1812) 1 V & B 154; Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers and Co (Maidenhead) Ltd [1927] 2 
KB 9 (CA).
75 About the definition of ordinary resolution, see Bushell v Faith [1970] 1 All ER 53 (HL) 56 (Lord 
Upjohn).
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the detriment of the minority. Therefore, company law cannot just accept majority rule; 
it should also safeguard minority shareholders against the abuse of majority power. In 
brief, the law must provide special minority protection.
6.3.3 Minority protection
Shareholders are presumed to make by majority vote resolutions that follow their shared 
interest as suppliers of equity capital. But it is possible that in certain cases there exists a 
conflict of interests between majority and minority shareholders. Moreover, the 
majority may abuse their position. Under certain circumstances, minority shareholders 
need special protection of law. I next analyse the exceptions of majority rule and 
minority shareholders’ specific rights.
6.3.3.1 Exceptions of majority rule
The companies’ legislation modifies majority rule: in certain matters, there exists a 
requirement of ‘supermajority’77, which is more than a simple majority of shareholders’ 
votes. According to CA 1985 s 378, a three-quarters majority of shareholders’ votes is 
required in extraordinary and special resolutions. As mentioned above, the CA 1985 s 9 
requires that the articles of association should be altered by special resolution. 
Obviously, the three-fourth-majority rule offers more protection to minority 
shareholders since the resolutions need wider support from shareholders. Furthermore, 
if the requirement were even higher, eg 90 per cent, or even unanimity, that would mean 
more protection to the minority. However, as noted, it is important that the company 
constitution is alterable; in addition, in constitutional changes the higher requirements 
of a majority would easily lead to deadlock situations, which are not good for
76 CA 1985 s 9.
77 In addition, this kind of requirement can be set by the articles.
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companies and their shareholders in general78. Company law sees that a majority of 
three-quarters in these situations is the right way to strike a balance between the 
interests of majority and minority shareholders. Nevertheless, the requirement of special 
resolutions in certain cases cannot be enough to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders.
79In Burland v Earle , Lord Davey considered that it is an elementary principle of 
the law relating to joint stock companies that the courts will not interfere with the 
internal management of companies when they act within their powers. His Lordship 
also pointed out that the courts have no jurisdiction to do so. However, as he noted, 
there is an important exception “where the persons against whom the relief is sought 
themselves hold and control the majority of the shares in the company, and will not 
permit an action to be brought in the name of the company”80. Consequently, the courts 
allow minority shareholders to bring an action in the name of the company in cases 
where the acts complained of have a fraudulent character, or where they are beyond the 
powers of the company. Overall, majority rule and the rule in Foss v Harbottle have 
exceptions. In Edwards v H alliwelf1, Jenkins LJ stated that there are four kinds of 
exceptions allowing an individual shareholder to bring an action on behalf of a 
company:
1) where the act complained of is wholly ultra vires the company;
2) where the matter in issue requires the sanction of a special majority;
3) where a member’s personal rights have been invaded;
4) where a fraud has been perpetrated on the minority and the wrongdoers
are in control in the company.
78 Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R., The Economic Structure o f Corporate Law (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts 1991) 233 simply state that: “the more power minority shareholders have, the more likely 
is deadlock.”
79 [1902] AC 83 (PC) 93.
80 Ibid.
81 [1950] 2 All ER 1064 (CA) 1066ff.
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To illustrate, first shareholders cannot by majority vote confirm illegal and ultra vires 
actions82. For this reason, a misapplication of the funds of a corporate body cannot be 
ratified by any majority of members83.
Second, a company is not enabled to disregard the regulations that require the 
passing of a special resolution as a condition of performing the act in question84. The 
court may also grant an injunction to an individual shareholder prohibiting the majority 
from acting in breach of the articles85.
Third, the rule in Foss v Harbottle has no application when shareholders’ 
personal rights are infringed. If majority shareholders are abusing their powers and 
depriving the minority’s individual rights, these shareholders are entitled to come before 
the court to maintain their rights86. A shareholder has a right to get the dividend paid in 
accordance with the articles once the company has declared it87. In addition, a member 
has a personal right to have his vote counted, and he can sue to enforce that right88.
Finally, there are cases of fraud on the minority where the wrongdoers 
themselves control the company, and therefore the rule should be relaxed in favour of 
the aggrieved minority89. Fraud in this context bears a wide equitable meaning: the 
essence of the matter is an abuse or misuse of majority power90. Accordingly, majority 
shareholders may not propose a benefit themselves at the expense of a minority; for 
example, the majority may not sell assets of the company and keep the consideration 
because the minority should be entitled to their share of profit91. Since shareholders’
82 See also Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 (CA); Smith v 
Croft (No 2) [1988] Ch 114.
83 Taylor v National Union o f Mineworkers (Derbyshire Area) [1985] BCLC 237, 254 (Vinelott J).
84 Cotter v National Union o f Seamen [1929] 2 Ch 58 (CA) 70 (Romer J); see also Baillie v Oriental 
Telephone and Electric Co Ltd [1915] 1 Ch 503 (CA).
85 Salmon v Quin & Axtens Ltd [1909] 1 Ch 311 (CA); [1909] AC 442 (HL).
86 MacDougall v Gardiner (1875) LR 1 Ch D 13 (CA) 25-26 (Mellish LJ).
87 Wood v Odessa Waterworks Co (1889) 42 Ch D 636.
88 Pender v Lushington (1877) LR 6 Ch D 70.
89 Russell v Wakefield Waterworks Co (1875) LR 20 Eq 474,482.
90 Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v Greater London Council [1982] 1 WLR 2, 12 (Sir Robert Megarry 
VC).
91 Menier v Hooper’s Telegraph Works (1874) LR 9 Ch App 350, 354.
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right to participate in a company is protected, the majority is not allowed to use their 
power to get themselves money, property, or other advantages that belong to the 
company92. Indeed, majority shareholders are not permitted to make presents to 
themselves and in this way to oppress the minority93. In these cases of fraud, the 
minority are entitled to sue to protect what really belongs to the company and indirectly 
to them.
Altogether, these exceptions of majority rule give minority shareholders power 
to protect themselves and their rights in the company. Furthermore, one of the 
exceptions explicitly requires wrongdoers’ control in the company; in fact, this fraud on 
the minority exemption is often regarded as the only real relaxation to the rule of Foss v 
Harbottle94. So, company law recognizes that the existence of a majority shareholder 
means that minority shareholders need even more protection of the law. In sum, the 
exceptions of majority rule allow minority shareholders to challenge in court decisions 
made by majority power.
Yet, the general idea is that decisions in companies are made by the support of a 
majority, and the exercising of this power is not a reason to challenge a decision in 
court. Shareholders are not debarred from voting or using their voting power to carry a 
resolution in circumstances where they have a particular interest in the subject matter of 
the vote95. In North-West Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty96, it was held that the 
resolution of a general meeting to purchase a vessel from the majority shareholder was 
valid although it was carried by the votes of the majority shareholder. Thus, all 
shareholders, including the majority shareholder, may use their voting power to protect 
their personal interests, and they are not required to dissociate themselves altogether
92 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 (PC) 93.
93 Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554 (PC) 564 (Lord Buckmaster).
94 See Wedderburn, K. W., ‘Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v. Harbottle’ [1958] CLJ 93, 93.
95 [1902] AC 83 (PC) 94.
96 (1887) LR 12 App Cas 589 (PC).
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from their own prospects97. The vote of the majority must prevail unless the adoption is
Q O
brought by unfair or improper means . The task of the court is not to substitute the 
opinion supported by the majority by its own opinion but rather it should assess whether 
the decision-making process is vitiated by being or being likely to be directed to an 
improper purpose99. Moreover, as the majority has the power to decide that proceedings 
are brought in the name of the company, in the same way it also have the right to decide 
the opposite. Vinelott J formulated this point in Taylor v National Union o f 
Mineworkers in the following way:
it is open to a majority of the members, if they think it is right in the interests of 
the corporate body to do so, to resolve that no action should be taken to remedy 
the wrong done to the corporate body and such a resolution, if made in good 
faith and in what they considered to be for the benefit of the corporate body, will 
bind the minority.100
In essence, it is up to the company and the majority to decide whether an action should 
be brought in the name of the company. An individual shareholder cannot bring an 
action before the question is decided by general meeting. Further, a shareholder cannot 
bring it if the irregularity of a company’s internal affairs is cured by members’ decision 
in general meeting101.
However, majority power does not give majority shareholders unrestricted 
power to bring an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to the minority. The 
power that majority shareholders control is not their power but the power of the
97 Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch 286 (CA) 290 (Evershed MR).
98 (1887) LR 12 App Cas 589 (PC) 600 (Sir Richard Baggallay).
99 Smith v Croft (No 2) [1988] Ch 114, 186 (Knox J).
100 [1985] BCLC 237, 254-55.
101 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 (CA) 210, 222; 
MacDougall v Gardiner (1875) LR 1 Ch D 13 (CA) 25.
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company, which should be exercised in the interests of the company and all its 
shareholders. Company law does not allow the power to be used in an unfair or 
improper way: the use of power may not be illegal, fraudulent or oppressive towards 
those shareholders who oppose it102. The right of a shareholder to vote in his selfish 
interests does not entitle him with impunity to injure his fellow shareholders103.
Majority shareholders cannot appropriate the property of a company to themselves and 
use their own votes at general meeting to prevent their being sued by the company104. 
They cannot ratify fraud on the minority, and it is both the right and duty of the courts 
to prevent that kind of oppression being imposed on the minority105. In addition, when 
wrongdoers are in control, it is required that this decision should be made by the support 
of independent shareholders only106. Therefore, majority power in these situations 
should rest on the majority inside a minority.
To conclude, the principle of majority rule has exceptions that offer special 
protection to minority shareholders. Company law empowers minority shareholders, 
within the exceptions of the rule of Foss v Harbottle, to challenge majority decisions in 
court. However, the courts have never strongly supported minority shareholder 
litigation. On the contrary, the aim of the rule in Foss v Harbottle itself was to stop this 
kind of litigation107. Only in exceptional cases, minority shareholders have been able to 
claim the protection of court, and therefore they have often been “virtually 
defenceless”108. The attitude of the courts is still that a minority shareholder should have 
a case strictly within the properly defined boundaries of the exceptions to proceed with
102 North-West Transportation Co Ltd v Beatty (1887) LR 12 App Cas 589 (PC) 594.
103 Estmanco (Kilner House) Ltd v Greater London Council [1982] 1 WLR 2, 16.
104 Atwool v Merryweather (1867) LR 5 Eq 464n; see also Peters’ American Delicacy Company Ltd v 
Heath (1939) 61 CLR 457 (High Court of Australia) 505.
105 Brown v British Abrasive Wheel Co Ltd [1919] 1 Ch 290, 294 (Astbury J.)
106 Smith v Croft (No 2) [1988] Ch 114.
107 See eg MacDougall v Gardiner (1875) LR 1 Ch D 13 (CA) 25 (Mellish LJ).
108 Hoffmann, L. H. H., Foreword to First Edition in Hollington, Robin, Shareholders’ Rights (4th edn 
London 2004) xi.
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his action109. The law has actually been more like a handbrake for shareholder activism 
through litigation110. In sum, company law supports rather than restricts majority power 
in the company. However, the courts do not compromise shareholders’ individual 
rights, which rest on the company constitution and company law. The rule in Foss v 
Harbottle does not apply when shareholders’ personal rights have been infringed.
6.3.3.2 Minority shareholders’ specific rights
Since companies are governed by majority rule, the rights of individual shareholders
should be restricted111. In any case, shareholders have both economic rights and control
112power in the company . Shareholders’ rights are their interests, which are protected by
1 i  “j
legal rules . In addition, it is possible to say that, as in societies generally, 
shareholders’ individual rights are legal promises from those who use the majority 
power114.
In the first stage, shareholders can protect their economic interests in a company 
by using their voting power in general meeting. However, the majority uses power in 
the company. This power protects shareholders as a group but it cannot offer protection 
to an individual shareholder when the interests of shareholders are conflicting.
By contrast, shareholders’ economic rights are in proportion to their shares. 
Consequently, all shareholders have an equal economic participation right in the 
company, and therefore it should not matter whether they are minority or majority 
shareholders. Ultimately, every ordinary shareholder should receive the same dividend, 
and he should get his proportionate share of a company’s net assets if the company is
109 See especially Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 (CA).
110 Eg Blanchard, Julian, ‘Who Are Shareholders? -Search for Identity and Role’ (1999) 11 Corporate 
and Business Law Journal 165, 166.
111 [1982] Ch 204 (CA).
112 See above, chapter two 2.3.
113 Generally eg Fitzgerald, P. J., Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th edn London 1966) 217.
114 See especially Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (6th impression London 1991) 204-5.
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wound up115. Even if majority shareholders have the power to govern a company’s 
business, they do not have the right to decide how its success should be divided among 
shareholders116. Economic rights remain proportional to the amount of shares although 
the company is governed by majority rule. Shareholders’ individual rights are indeed 
their rights, not the rights of the company. In addition, as already mentioned, company 
law gives minority shareholders power to sue the majority and the company if their 
individual rights are invaded117.
Company law provides some governance rights to individual shareholders or a 
group of them. For example, shareholders having one-tenth of a company’s share capital 
can require the directors to convene an extraordinary general meeting118. Members 
holding one-twentieth of the total voting rights, or 100 members, may ask the company 
to give notice concerning a resolution at the next general meeting119. So, minority 
shareholders can even take an initiative to alter the company’s constitution, although in 
practice the articles are rarely changed by an initiative from individual shareholders. 
Furthermore, a shareholder has the right to give notice to propose a person as a director 
of the board120. Nonetheless, these rights do not change the fact that decisions in a 
company are made by majority rule, but these rights make it possible that minority 
shareholders can take an active role in certain matters.
Minority shareholders have some special statutory rights to challenge in court 
decisions made by the support of a majority. This kind of issue is the alteration of the 
constitution since CA 1985 s 5 allows minority shareholders that hold at minimum 15 
per cent of share capital to challenge the purported alternation of the objects clause in 
the memorandum. Moreover, if the status of a public company is altered by a special
115 More above, chapter five 5.4.
116 Eg Griffith v Paget (1877) LR 5 Ch D 894: a majority cannot decide the mode of distribution among 
members since the division should be in accordance with shareholders’ rights.
117 Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 (CA) 1067 (Jenkins LJ).
118 CA 1985 s 368.
119 Ibid 376(l)(a) and (2).
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191resolution, and it becomes a private company , this change is fundamental for the 
company and its shareholders. The status of a public company is specially protected due 
to its importance to shareholders. The application to re-register a public company as a
private one may be challenged by shareholders representing not less than 5 per cent of
122shares, or by not less than 50 company members . But the normal way to take public 
companies private is to make a takeover offer and to buy out minority shareholders. The 
possible change of a company’s status is typically done after these operations. Thus, this 
example might be a theoretical rather than practical way to protect minority 
shareholders in public companies123.
In summary, the specific rights of minority shareholders do not change the main 
principle that companies are governed by majority rule. Yet, the legislation gives some 
rights to minority shareholders in relation to the governance of the company. 
Furthermore, in special cases, minority shareholders may challenge decisions made by 
majority power. Majority shareholders indeed exercise power in a company but 
company law restricts the use of it and also gives minority shareholders rights to protect 
themselves and their interests.
6.4 Oppression of minority shareholders
While company law gives power to majority shareholders, there is no reason to argue 
that minority shareholders should generally be protected from the use of this power. 
However, company law should protect minority shareholders from abuse of majority 
power. Yet, the distinction between use and abuse of power is not always absolutely 
clear. But as explained above, fraud on the minority is one area where common law 
steps in to protect the minority. In addition, company law protects minority shareholders
120 Table A art 76(b).
121 See CA 1985 s 53ff.
122 Ibid s 54(2).
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from oppression by the majority, which is regarded as a tyrannical misuse of power124. 
Before exploring minority shareholders’ statutory remedies against oppression and 
unfair prejudice, I first analyse briefly the relationship between shareholders in different 
kinds of companies.
6.4.1 Relationship in public and private companies
Company law governs both public and private companies. But since relationships in 
these companies have their own special features, different company law rules and 
principles apply on companies with peculiar nature. This point is very true in the case of 
remedies available against unfair prejudice by majority shareholders.
In a small private company, the shareholders are often the real entrepreneurs of 
its business: such shareholders are typically directors and employees in the company. A 
private company can be very much like a partnership, where shareholders are said to be 
quasi-partners125. Shareholders in a private company can be in substance partners that 
carry on their business by means of the machinery of a limited company . These 
companies have a strong partnership background, and in cases of small private 
companies company law still recognizes many ideas of partnership law127. It is difficult 
to find any ‘separation of ownership and control’128 in these close companies. Private 
companies are not peculiarly capital-raising devices. Therefore, shareholders’ 
investment in share capital does not play such a central role in these companies, and 
shareholders’ contributions as full-time workers and directors of the company may have
123 For takeovers and squeeze-out, see below, chapter seven 7.6.
124 See Re Baltic Real Estate Ltd (No 2) [1993] BCLC 503, 507 (Knox J).
125 Although, as Lord Wilberforce observed in Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 
380: “A company, however small, however domestic, is a company not a partnership or even a quasi­
partnership.”
126 Re Yenidje Tobacco Co Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 426 (CA) 434 (Warrington LJ).
127 Re Smith and Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 (CA) 306 (Lord Greene): ’’Private companies are in law 
separate entities just as much are public companies, but from the business and personal point of view they 
are much more analogous to partnerships than to public corporations.”
128 About this term, see above, chapter three 3.3.2.
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129more importance . It is possible that all the profits of a private company are distributed
as directors’ remuneration130. In contrast, in public companies the relationship between
members and the company, and among the shareholders inter se, is not as personal as it
is in close companies and partnerships. Shareholders in quoted companies are plain
investors, whose interest is their shares and shareholders’ rights.
The relationship in private companies has special features: in these companies,
company law protects also shareholders’ interests and their legitimate expectations. In
1^1Re Sam Weller & Sons Ltd , Peter Gibson J observed that: “The word ‘interests’ is
wider than a term such as ‘rights’”. He also considered that the term suggests that
“members may have different interests, even if their rights as members are the same”132.
1 ^In Ebrahimi v Westboume Galleries Ltd , Lord Wilberforce explained that 
shareholders “are individuals, with rights, expectations and obligations inter se which 
are not necessarily submerged in the company structure”. In effect, shareholders in these 
companies can be in substance partners, or quasi-partners. As a result, equitable 
principles derived from partnership law apply to private companies. These equitable 
considerations arise in particular when the company is a small one, but that alone is not 
enough. Lord Wilberforce put the idea in this way:
The superimposition of equitable considerations requires something more, 
which typically may include one, or probably more, of the following elements:
(i) an association formed or continued on the basis of a personal relationship,
129 Manne, Henry G., ‘Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics’ (1967) 53 Virginia Law 
Review 259, 278 describes private companies in this way: “ Generally, in small business, a few 
individuals, perhaps each with some specialized function to perform, associate in order to exploit an idea. 
Their contribution may be capital; it may be an invention; it may be a long-term employment contract; it 
may be organizational ability; or it may be some other form of property, such as land, machinery, or raw 
materials.”
130 Eg the company in Ebrahimi v Westboume Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) had never paid any 
dividends.
131 [1990] Ch 682, 690.
132 Ibid.
133 [1973] AC 360 (HL) 379.
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involving mutual confidence -  this element will often be found where a pre­
existing partnership has been converted into a limited company; (ii) an 
agreement, or understanding, that all, or some (for there may be ‘sleeping’ 
members), of the shareholders shall participate in the conduct of the business; 
(iii) restriction on the transfer of the members’ interest in the company -  so that 
if confidence is lost, or one member is removed from management, he cannot 
take out his stake and go elsewhere.134
On the whole, equity enables “the court to subject the exercise of legal rights to
equitable considerations; considerations, that is, of a personal character arising between
one individual and another, which may make it unjust, or inequitable, to insist on legal
rights, or to exercise them in a particular way”135. The interests of members in private
companies are not limited to the strict legal rights under the constitution of the 
1company : the legal relationships do not tell the “whole story” in quasi­
partnerships137. Therefore, these companies are not governed only by strict majority 
rule. A shareholder in a private company has still to demonstrate some special 
relationship of mutual confidence, or special circumstances, which create a legitimate 
expectation beyond the articles of association138.
On the contrary, when the relationship between shareholders is not personal and 
“the association is a purely commercial one”, their relationship is then “adequately and 
exhaustively laid down in the articles”139. The requirements from partnership law do not
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 See Re a company [1986] BCLC 376, 378 (Hoffmann J); Re Fildes Bros Ltd [1970] 1 All ER 923, 926 
(Megarry J), where it was seen that in a private company one must have regard not merely to the articles, 
but also to what the parties are shown to have agreed in any other manner.
137 CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Demarco Almeida [2002] 2 BCLC 108 (PC) 117 (Lord 
Millett).
138 Re Posgate & Denby (Agencies) Ltd [1987] BCLC 8; Re a company (No 00314 o f 1989), ex p  Estate 
Acquisition and Development Ltd [1991] BCLC 154.
139 [1973] AC 360 (HL) 379.
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govern the relationship in public companies, where equitable considerations should not 
arise between shareholders. In public companies, there is little room for shareholders’ 
legitimate expectations outside the articles: the legitimate expectation is that the affairs 
of a company are properly conducted within the framework of its constitution. For 
example, a shareholder in a public company cannot have a legitimate expectation to 
remain a director and to have a participating role in the affairs of the company140. 
Further, a shareholder does not have a legitimate expectation that the articles would not 
be altered by special resolution in a way that enables his office to be terminated141.
In a public company, it is very difficult to argue that there could be legitimate 
expectations beyond the rights arising by the articles of association. The concept of 
legitimate expectation does not apply in the context of public companies142, where 
equitable considerations should not restrain the majority from using the power that they 
have under the company constitution and company law. In the absence of a personal 
relationship, a shareholder in a public company cannot reasonably and legitimately 
expect more than that the affairs of the company will be conducted in accordance with 
its articles and the Act143. On the other hand, this means that shareholders in listed 
public companies are entitled to assume that the whole constitution is contained in the 
articles, which should, in any case, be read together with the companies’ legislation144.
There is one important further dimension to mention about public quoted 
companies. A company has a majority shareholder when there exists a single 
shareowner that holds more than a half of voting power. This shareholder holds legal
140 Re Tottenham Hotspur pic [1994] 1 BCLC 655.
141 Re Blue Arrow pic  [1987] BCLC 585, 590 (Vinelott J).
142 Re Astec (BSR) pic [1998] 2 BCLC 556, 589-90 (Jonathan Parker J); Re Saul D Harrison & Sons pic 
[1995] 1 BCLC 14 (CA).
143 [1998] 2 BCLC 556,588.
144 [1987] BCLC 585, 590; however, in Re a company [1986] BCLC 376 evidence could be brought to 
show that a shareholder in a public company had a legitimate expectation to remain a director when the 
company was not listed, and thus in practice there was no market where shares could be sold; but in this 
study the public company is understood as a company with quoted shares, and therefore the company in 
this particular case was not a ‘real’ public company.
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control in the company. Yet, often this majority shareholder is not actually a single 
shareholder but a group of shareholders like a family. However, sometimes the biggest 
shareholder who has less than a half of voting power might have an actual majority 
when the ownership of shares is dispersed. But from the perspective of a minority 
shareholder, control of the company is still “elsewhere”145 since he cannot elect a 
director onto the board, cannot remove a director, and is dependent on the majority for 
any dividends. In general, that is the position of all shareholders in public companies: 
none of them has control in the company but they all have it. I formulate this point by 
stating that in listed companies every shareholder is a minority shareholder146. In 
consequence, the need for protection of minority shareholders against oppression by a 
majority is not similar in public companies.
To conclude, the exercise of majority power in private companies is subject to 
equitable considerations. By contrast, in public companies there is little room for equity 
derived from partnership law. Shareholders in public companies do not have legitimate 
expectations outside the articles of association since the relationship between these 
shareholders is set in the company constitution. In addition, in public companies there 
does not typically exist any majority shareholder. Thus, remedies against unfair 
prejudice and just and equitable winding up are mainly available only in the case of a 
private company. I next set the focus on these remedies.
6.4.2 Unfair prejudice
The concepts of unfair prejudice and just and equitable winding up are analogical with 
each other. Overall, the history of winding-up orders is longer but the statutory remedy 
against unfair prejudice is more a recent concept. Yet, I start the following discussion
145 Re H R Harmer Ltd [1958] 3 All ER 689 (CA) 705 (Jenkins LJ); about the control in the case of a 
public quoted company, see Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 
(CA).
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with unfair prejudice because that is the most important minority shareholder remedy in 
this area.
In their report in 1945, the Cohen Committee considered that there was a need to 
strengthen private companies’ minority shareholders in resisting oppression by the 
majority147. They recommended a new section in the Companies Act, under which the 
court should be empowered, instead of making a winding-up order, to make such other 
order, including an order for the purchase by the majority of the shares of the minority 
at a price fixed by the court148. This recommendation was translated into the Companies 
Act 1948 s 210. The current provision in CA 1985 s 459(1)149 states that:
A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order under 
this Part on the ground that the company’s affairs are being or have been 
conducted in a manner which is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of its 
members generally or of some part of its members (including at least himself) or 
that any actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including an act or 
omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial.
The CA 1985 s 461(1) provides that if the court is satisfied with the idea that the 
petition is well founded, it may make “such order as it thinks fit for giving relief in 
respect of the matters complained of.” The court may make all or any of a number of 
orders specified in CA 1985 s 461(2), which include orders regulating the future 
conduct of the company’s affairs, requiring the company to do or refrain from doing 
some act, and an order under CA 1985 s 461(2)(d) providing for the purchase of the 
petitioner’s shares by other members of the company or the company itself. The last one
146 See also Boros, Elizabeth J., Minority Shareholders’ Remedies (Oxford 1995) 14-15.
147 Report o f the Committee on Company Law Amendment ( ‘Cohen Committee’) (Cmd 6659) (London
1945) [60].
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is the most common remedy, and my interest is in these minority shareholders’ buy-out 
orders150.
In essence, if a company’s affairs are conducted in an oppressive way against 
the interests of the minority, the court orders an appropriate remedy. In Scottish Co­
operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer15 \  the parent company was ordered to 
purchase the shares of minority shareholders because it had behaved in an oppressive 
manner. It was held that the majority shareholder had exercised its power and authority 
in the company “in a manner ‘burdensome, harsh and wrongful’”152. Still, CA 1985 s 
459 does not only give protection against illegality and invasion of legal rights: unfairly 
prejudicial is deliberately imprecise language chosen by Parliament since the earlier 
attempt in the Companies Act 1948 s 210 had been too restrictively construed. As the 
Jenkins Committee formulated: “if the section is to afford effective protection, it must 
extend to cases in which the acts complained of fall short of actual illegality”153.
According to CA 1985 s 459, the criterion by which the court decides whether it 
has jurisdiction to grant relief is fairness. The test of unfairness is objective, and 
therefore it is not necessary for petitioners to show that the persons in control of a 
company have acted knowingly unfair or in bad faith154. Moreover, courts are free from 
technical considerations of legal rights because they have wide power to do what 
appears to be just and equitable. The CA 1985 s 461 enables, but does not compel, the 
court to make an order under this section. Although the court has very wide discretion,
149 As amended by the Companies Act 1989.
150 There are some very rare cases where the majority shareholder is ordered to sell his shares to the 
petitioner, eg in the case of a football club in Re a company (No 00789 o f 1987), ex p  Shooter [1990] 
BCLC 384.
151 [1959] AC 324 (HL) (Sc).
152 Ibid 342 (Viscount Simonds).
153 Report o f  the Company Law Committee ( ‘Jenkins Committee’) (Cmd 1749) (London 1962) [203], 
whose recommendations were put into effect by the Companies Act 1980 s 75.
154 Re Bovey Hotel Ventures Ltd (31 July 1981 unreported) (Slade J); quoted in Re R A Noble & Sons 
(Clothing) Ltd [1983] BCLC 273, 290; Re Sam Weller & Sons Ltd [1990] Ch 682; Re a company (No 
004415 o f 1996) [1997] 1 BCLC 479.
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“it does not sit under a palm tree”155. Justice and fairness indeed mean different things 
to different men, and the court cannot do whatever an individual judge happens to 
regard as fair. The CA 1985 s 459 offers fairness in the business context, and unfairness 
to a member requires some breach of the terms in the company’s affairs156. As 
Hoffmann J said in Re Posgate & Denby (Agencies) Ltd157: “Section 459 enables the 
court to give full effect to the terms and understandings on which the members of the 
company became associated but not to rewrite them”. In addition, the conduct must be 
both prejudicial and unfair, and if the conduct is only unfair or prejudicial, the
i co
requirements of the section are not satisfied .
The standard example of CA 1985 s 459 cases is a company where shareholders 
have entered into association upon the understanding that each of them will participate 
in the management of the company. For instance, in Re a company 159 a minority 
shareholder of an unlisted public company had a legitimate expectation that he would 
continue to be employed as a director; hence, his exclusion from the management was 
unfairly prejudicial to his interests as a member. Even though every director of a 
company is subject to the possibility of being removed by majority resolution, the 
special circumstances can be grounds for a complaint under s 459160. Further, the 
amount of directors’ remuneration is not only a commercial decision. If majority 
shareholders decide by majority power to pay themselves excessive directors’ fees, they 
may conduct the affairs of the company in a manner that is unfairly prejudicial to 
minority shareholders’ interest161.
155 Re J E Cade & Son Ltd [1992] BCLC 213, 227 (Warner J).
156 See especially O ’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (HL); Re Saul D Harrison & Sons pic  [1995] 1 
BCLC 14 (CA).
157 [1987] BCLC 8, 14.
158 Re a company (No 005685 o f 1988), ex p  Schwarcz (No 2) [1989] BCLC 427, 437 (Peter Gibson J).
159 [1986] BCLC 376.
160 See Re Estate Acquisition & Development Ltd [1995] BCC 338, 349-50 (Ferris J); but in this particular 
case the member was unable to point the special circumstances, and so the petition was dismissed.
161 Re a company (No 002612 o f 1984) (1986) 2 BCC 99,453; affirmed Re Cumana Ltd [1986] BCLC 
430 (CA); see also Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 1042 (CA).
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Managerial decisions in a company cannot normally amount to unfairly 
prejudicial conduct162, although the decisions of the management are unwise or 
inefficient. It is not for the court to resolve disagreements on matters of commercial 
judgment. Yet, serious mismanagement could constitute unfairly prejudicial conduct. A 
remedy under s 459 is available in cases where what is shown is really mismanagement, 
rather than a difference of opinion on the desirability of particular commercial 
decisions, and further this mismanagement is sufficiently serious163. In addition, if 
majority shareholders exercise their power for an improper purpose and use assets of a 
company for their personal benefit, the remedy under s 459 is available164.
The intention in this study is not to cover all situations where the courts have 
found the behaviour of a majority unfairly prejudicial against the minority. But I 
consider some more examples concerning the constitutional relationship in the 
company. First, the company constitution is alterable by the decision of special 
majority. But under special circumstances, the passing of a resolution to alter the 
company’s articles could be unfairly prejudicial to the interests of minority 
shareholders165. Second, payment of a dividend to shareholders depends on the 
recommendation of the board and the resolution of general meeting to follow it. 
Companies are not required to pay any dividend even if they are profitable. Still, the 
payment of low dividends is capable of amounting to conduct unfairly prejudicial to the 
interests of minority shareholders166. In practice, it is often the combination, like 
excessively high directors’ remuneration and unjustifiably low dividends, which 
constitutes unfairly prejudicial conduct towards the minority. The test of unfairness 
under CA 1985 s 459 is objective, and if the remuneration and dividends cannot be
162 Re Sam Weller & Sons Ltd [1990] Ch 682, 694 (Peter Gibson J).
163 Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 354,404-5 (Arden J); compare Peter Goldsmith QC (sitting 
as a deputy judge) in Re Legal Costs Negotiators Ltd [1999] 2 BCLC 171 (CA) 185, where he held it 
possible but generally unlikely that serious mismanagement could constitute unfair prejudice.
164 Re Elgindata Ltd [1991] BCLC 959.
165 Re Kenyon Swansea Ltd [1987] BCLC 514.
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justified by commercial criteria, the conclusion might be that the company has been
1 A7managed in a way unfairly prejudicial to the minority shareholders. Third, a company 
can increase its share capital by issuing new shares provided it is authorised to do so by 
the articles, and share offerings rest on the principle that shareholders have a pre­
emption right to subscribe the new shares issued by the company. Nevertheless, even if 
it is a rights issue to all shareholders on a pro rata basis at a proper share value, the 
decision concerning share issue is capable of being unfairly prejudicial when it is 
known that some shareholders are unable to take up the shares offered. The court may
1 ASgrant an injunction against increasing company’s share capital by majority power.
But the idea is not that CA 1985 s 459 would offer no-fault divorce to 
shareholders in a private company. A minority shareholder cannot demand that his 
shares are purchased although he has lost trust and confidence in other shareholders.169 
What is required is an act or omission by the company and majority shareholders, which 
should be unfairly prejudicial to a minority shareholder in his capacity as a member of 
the company. Therefore, s 459 does not enable a locked-in minority shareholder to 
require the company or majority shareholders to buy him out at a price that he considers 
adequately to reflect the value of his shares170. As Lord Hoffmann explained in O ’Neill 
v Phillips, what s 459 really does is setting of equitable restraints to majority 
shareholders to exercise the rights under the articles in an unfairly prejudicial way. But 
the concept of shareholders’ legitimate expectation “should not be allowed to lead of a 
life of its own,” and equitable restraints should not be set in circumstances where they
166 Re Sam Weller & Sons Ltd [1990] Ch 682.
167 Re a company (No 004415 o f 1996) [1997] 1 BCLC 479.
168 Re a company [1985] BCLC 80; affirmed sub nom Re Cumana Ltd [1986] BCLC 430 (CA); see also 
Re a company [1986] BCLC 362.
169 O ’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (HL) 1104 (Lord Hoffmann).
170 Re a company (No 004475 o f 1982) [1983] Ch 178; Re Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd [2003] 1 BCLC 76 
(CA).
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traditionally have no application171. As a result, this ruling has eliminated fanciful but 
legally baseless expectations of minority shareholders172.
In summary, in cases of unfair prejudice the main questions determined by the 
court are: 1) whether the affairs of the company have been conducted in a manner that is 
unfairly prejudicial to the interest of minority shareholders; 2) if so, whether the 
appropriate remedy is to order the majority shareholders to purchase the shares of the 
minority; and 3) if so, on what basis the price of shares should be determined173. In this 
study, I do not explore any further when the remedy under CA 1985 s 459 is available 
for minority shareholders. Yet, I conclude that one situation in which a member of a 
company may bring himself within s 459 prevails when he is able to show that the value 
of his shares has been seriously diminished or jeopardised by the unfair conduct by 
those who control the company174. Overall, unfair prejudice can make the value of 
minority shares lower. Still, the points concerning the value of shares are discussed in 
the next chapter. Therefore, I move on to review just and equitable winding up.
6.4.3 Just and equitable winding up
Shareholders have been enabled to petition for winding up of companies since 1848175, 
which orders have been made especially in cases where members are in substance 
partners and the particular facts could justify dissolution of partnership between them.
176In Re Yenidje Tobacco Co Ltd , the winding up of a private company was seen just 
and equitable as there was a deadlock between two opposing shareholders. The 
winding-up order was the way to put an end to the state of things that could not have 
been contemplated by the parties when the company was formed.
171 [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (HL) 1102.
172 Pennington, Robert R., Pennington’s Company Law (8th edn London 2001) v.
173 See Re Elgindata Ltd [1991] BCLC 959, 961 (Warner J).
174 Re Bovey Hotel Ventures Ltd (31 July 1981 unreported); quoted in Re R A Noble & Sons (Clothing)
Ltd [1983] BCLC 273; and [1991] BCLC 959.
175 The Joint Stock Companies Winding-up Act 1848 s 5.
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The statutory power to wind up companies is set in the Insolvency Act 1986 s 
122(l)(g) that states: “A company may be wound by the court if the court is of opinion 
that is just and equitable that the company should be wound up.” Indeed, ‘just and 
equitable’ are words of the widest significance: they do not limit the jurisdiction of the 
court to any particular case. In consequence, each case depends on its own special 
circumstances.177 But just and equitable winding up is draconian in nature since it ends 
a company and distributes the value of its net assets to shareholders. A winding-up
178order is like the execution of a company by the order of the court ; of course, the
courts should be careful when they are asked to pass a death sentence on the company
on the grounds that it is just and equitable to do so. It is a drastic decision to take against
the wishes of the majority in a solvent company.179
But courts have this jurisdiction, and a private company was wound up by the
1 80court’s order in Ebrahimi v Westboume Galleries Ltd , which is the classic case in this 
area. The company made good profits, which were totally distributed as directors’ 
remuneration, and therefore no dividends were ever paid. The House of Lords 
considered that the shareholders had joined in the formation of the company on the 
basis that all shareholders were entitled to participate in its management. While the 
majority repudiated that relationship between shareholders, the minority shareholder 
lost his right to share the profits of the company. The proper course under these 
circumstances was to dissolve the company by a winding-up order since the minority 
shareholder was at the mercy of the majority shareholders and unable to dispose his 
interest in the company. The just and equitable provisions came to the assistance of the 
minority shareholder.
176 [1916] 2 Ch 426 (CA).
177 Re Bleriot Manufacturing Aircraft Co Ltd (1916) 32 TLR 253, 255 (Neville J).
178 Carr, C. T., The General Principles o f the Law o f Corporations (Cambridge 1905) 124.
179 Re a Company (No 00314 o f 1989), ex p  Estate Acquisition and Development Ltd [1991] BCLC 154, 
161 (Mummery J).
180 [1973] AC 360 (HL).
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The prime aim of this study is not to review winding-up cases widely, but I take 
some examples more. In Loch v John Blackwood Ltdm , the managing director with his 
wife had the control power in the company, and he managed the business as his own. 
The directors did not recommend any dividend since their intention was to keep other 
shareholders in ignorance of the company’s position and affairs to acquire their shares 
at an undervalue. In the circumstances of the case, and regarding the domestic character 
of the company, the minority shareholders were entitled to a winding-up order. 
Similarly, in Re a company (No 00370 o f 1987), exp  Glossopx%1 the board and majority 
shareholders consistently refused to recommend and pay dividends, and therefore the 
minority shareholder’s legitimate expectation of getting dividends from the company 
was defeated. The judge held that such conduct could make it just and equitable to wind 
up the company. In Virdi v Abbey Leisure Ltdm , it was accepted that there had existed 
understanding between shareholders that the company would not be involved in other 
businesses without the consent of all shareholders. It was equitable to ignore the 
provisions of the company’s constitution, which entitled the directors to carry the 
company’s operations after all the business was sold. In addition, due to the particular 
circumstances of the case, the minority shareholder had a right to refuse to sell his 
shares under the provisions contained in the articles of association. Thus, the minority 
shareholder’s petition for a winding-up order should not have been struck out.
Managerial decisions do not normally amount to unfairly prejudial conduct 
under s 459184; thus, it is very understandable that the misconduct by the directors 
cannot be grounds upon which the courts consider it just and equitable to wind up a 
company185. In addition, although the company might be unprofitable, or the situation in
181 [1924] AC 783 (PC).
182 [1988] BCLC 570; relief under CA 1985 s 459 could not be granted because of the technical objection 
that was removed by the amendment of the Companies Act 1989.
183 [1990] BCLC 342 (CA).
184 See above note 162ff.
185 Re Anglo-Greek Steam Co (1866) LR 2 Eq 1.
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the company may not be economically hopeful, that is not itself a reason for winding up
1 RAon just and equitable grounds . A winding-up process cannot be used as a means of 
evoking a judicial decision concerning the probable success or non-success of a 
company in its business.187 Business decisions should be made in the company, not in 
the courts. However, if it is really impossible to perform the business of a company, a 
winding-up order may be available even in the absence of insolvency188. But the 
impossibility of the business must then be a proven fact, not just a question of different 
commercial opinions. Further, a winding-up order is available if all the company’s 
commercial objects as set in the memorandum are unattainable189.
In cases of oppression and unfair prejudice, a minority shareholder is typically 
locked into the company. As Lord Cross explained in Ebrahimi v Westboume Galleries 
Ltd}90, what the minority shareholder really wants is not to have the company wound up 
but to get a proper price for his shareholding. It is not in the interests of a minority 
shareholder that the company is wound up; however, that may be the best way for him 
to get his share of the value of the business. In Ebrahimi v Westboume Galleries Ltd, a 
winding-up order was given since the minority shareholder had lost his entitlement to 
management participation. Since the relationship between shareholders was broken, the 
conclusion was that the association must be dissolved. In fact, liquidation can be a clear 
way to dissolve a business. In addition, a liquidator is in a better position than any other 
valuer to determine the value of shareholders’ claims as considered in Virdi v Abbey 
Leisure Ltdm .
186 Re Langham Skating Rink Co (1877) LR 5 Ch D 669 (CA); Re Anglo-Continental Produce Co Ltd 
[1939] 1 All ER 99; it should be noted that in this case the petition was presented by the company as an 
outcome of a resolution passed by the majority of shareholders, but not by a three-fourths majority.
187 Re Suburban Hotel Co (1867) LR 2 Ch App 737.
188 Ibid.
189 Re Perfectair Holdings Ltd [1990] BCLC 423.
190 [1973] AC 360 (HL) 385.
191 [1990] BCLC 342 (CA).
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On the other hand, the making of a winding-up order can be unfairly prejudicial 
to minority shareholders. For example, a company may have a lot of goodwill, as the 
case was in Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer192, where the House 
of Lords ordered the purchase of the petitioner’s shares notwithstanding it could have 
wound up the company on the just and equitable ground. Minority shareholders were 
entitled to get more than only the break-up value of their shares. As the Cohen 
Committee mentioned in their Report: “In many cases, however, the winding-up of the 
company will not benefit the minority shareholders, since the break-up value of the 
assets may be small, or the only available purchaser may be that very majority whose 
oppression has driven the minority to seek redress”193. Naturally, there is no sense in 
arguing that in these situations the law could offer remedy to minority shareholders if it 
actually just offers to the majority a way to buy out the minority at a bargain price. As a 
result, in certain circumstances a winding-up order is a fair remedy, but there are also 
situations in which it is not. The alternative that was preferred by the courts in Virdi v 
Abbey Leisure Ltd and in Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer was the 
one that offered a better remedy to the minority shareholder and thus a higher value for 
his shares. Still, the aim of remedies against unfair prejudice is not to offer the best 
available price for minority shares. The court fixes shares a price that is fair to both 
minority and majority shareholders; in addition, that price should correct the unfair 
prejudice to which minority shareholders have been subjected194. However, as 
mentioned, I do not analyse this point any further in this context because the value of 
shares is an issue under discussion in the next chapter.
192 [1959] AC 324 (HL) (Sc).
193 Cohen Committee [60].
194 Re a company (No 004415 o f 1996) [1997] 1 BCLC 479,488 (Sir Richard Scott VC).
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There is a strong parallel between the notion of just and equitable and the notion 
of fairness in CA 1985 s 459. As Lord Hoffmann observed in O’Neill v Phillips195: “The 
parallel is not in the conduct which the court will treat as justifying a particular remedy 
but in the principles upon which it decides that the conduct is unjust, inequitable or 
unfair.” Therefore, the conduct can be unfairly prejudicial although it does not justify an 
order to wind up the company. In practice, petitioners often claim relief under CA 1985 
s 459 and alternatively a winding-up order on the just and equitable ground under s 
122(l)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986. But a winding-up order on the just and equitable 
ground is always a remedy of last resort196. According to the Insolvency Act s 125(2), 
the company should be wound up only if the court sees that as fair and equitable “in the 
absence of any other remedy”197. In general, this other available remedy is an order 
under CA 1985 s 459 for the purchase of minority shareholders’ shares, which is the 
main remedy available for minority shareholders in cases of unfair prejudice.
Ultimately, company law should support companies in their function. Overall, 
the death sentence of a company in the form of a winding-up order is available only 
under very special circumstances. In Re a company (No 00314 o f 1989), ex p Estate 
Acquisition and Development Ltd, Mummery J formulated the role of the courts in 
unfair prejudice cases in the following way:
Under ss 459 to 461 the court is not, therefore, faced with a death sentence 
decision dependent on establishing just and equitable grounds for such a 
decision. The court is more in the position of a medical practitioner presented 
with a patient who is alleged to be suffering from one or more ailments which
195 [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (HL) 1100.
196 Re a company (No 004415 o f 1996) [1997] 1 BCLC 479.
197 This statutory injunction has been supplemented by the Practice Direction dated 22 February 1990; see 
[1990] 1 WLR 490.
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can be treated by an appropriate remedy applied during the continuing life of the
198company.
A winding-up order on just and equitable grounds terminates the existence of a 
company but under CA s 461 there is a wider range of remedies available, although in 
practice the main remedy is a buy-out order concerning the shares of the minority 
shareholder. Still, both just and equitable winding up and CA 1985 s 459 confers on the 
court a very wide jurisdiction and discretion, which power should be controlled 
carefully in order to prevent it from becoming a means of oppression by dissident 
minority shareholders. The threat of proceedings should not be used to bring pressure 
on the majority to accept the price he demands for his shares.199 But where justice and 
equity require the courts should order as a remedy of last resort to liquidate the 
company. The prime remedy in these circumstances is, however, CA 1985 s 459; in 
consequence, the importance of just and equitable winding-up orders has actually 
declined.
6.5 Conclusions of majority and minority relationship
Companies are governed by majority rule: ultimate power in the company rests on a 
majority of shareholders. Therefore, as in societies generally, the policy of the company 
is set by majority power. Company law gives the majority shareholders power to decide 
on behalf of the company, and these decisions bind the dissenting minority. In addition, 
it is not a task of courts to resolve disagreements on matters of commercial judgment. 
Business decisions should be made in companies, not in the courts.
198 [1991] BCLC 154, 161.
199 Re a company [1986] BCLC 362, 367-68 (Hoffmann J); about the blackmailing actions, see also 
Pavlides v Jensen [1956] Ch 565, 569.
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Shareholders use their control power at general meeting, where they can vote 
with their shares as they please. Their motive is irrelevant unless it amounts to fraud or 
oppression. Yet, any power that majority shareholders control is not theirs but the power 
of the company that should be exercised in good faith and for the benefit of the 
company as a whole. Majority rule does not give a majority an unrestricted alibi to use 
power in the company for their own personal interests. Decisions made by majority 
power may not be discriminative towards the minority. Company law does not allow 
majority shareholders to oppress the minority; they may not exercise their power to 
bring an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to the minority. If the majority 
uses the power in a fraudulent way, the minority may challenge these decisions in court. 
Majority rule and the rule in Foss v Harbottle comprise exceptions, of which the most 
important is fraud on the minority when the wrongdoers control the company.
Therefore, although the task of the courts is not to substitute an opinion of the majority 
by its own opinion, company law and courts protect the minority when majority 
shareholders abuse their power. Majority power in the company is “subject to those 
general principles of law and equity which are applicable to all powers conferred on 
majorities and enabling them to bind minorities”200.
The memorandum and the articles of association set the constitutional structure 
in a company. The company constitution is a statutory contract between each member 
and the company; furthermore, the articles regulate shareholders’ rights inter se. A 
majority gets its power from the company constitution and the Companies Act. 
However, the exercise of majority power in private companies is subject to equitable 
considerations. The relationship in private companies has special features since 
company law does not only protect shareholders’ rights but also their interests and 
legitimate expectations. The concept of unfair prejudice enables the court to take into
200 Allen v Gold Reefs o f West Africa Ltd [1900] 1 Ch 656 (CA) 671.
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consideration not only the rights of the members under a company’s constitution but 
also their legitimate expectations arising from agreements and understandings of the 
members inter se. Yet, a shareholder that claims protection against unfair prejudice has 
to demonstrate some special circumstances that create a legitimate expectation. In 
essence, he must show that the behaviour of the majority is both unfair and prejudicial.
The protection against oppression and unfair prejudice is “an equitable 
supplement to the common law of the company”201. The legislator has seen that 
minority shareholders should have more protection than the common law has offered. 
Further, in a wider sense these remedies against oppression are exceptions to the rule in 
Foss v Harbottle because in the cases of just and equitable winding up and unfair 
prejudice, a minority shareholder is empowered to bring an action against majority 
shareholders in his own name and on behalf of the company.
But the remedies against oppression and unfair prejudice are available only in 
small owner-managed companies. In public companies, there is little room for equitable 
considerations: instead, shareholders’ legitimate expectation is that the affairs of a 
company are properly conducted within the framework of its constitution. Remedies 
against unfair prejudice are not available in public companies, where shareholders’ 
rights under the articles of association and the Companies Act are “an exhaustive 
statement”202 of shareholders’ interests. Naturally, this also means that shareholders in a 
public company should be entitled to assume that the whole of the constitution is 
contained in the articles. Therefore, in cases of public companies the focus of company 
law should be clearly on the company’s constitution and companies’ legislation. 
Furthermore, it is understandable that company law offers less protection against 
oppression by the majority in public companies, which do not normally have any 
majority shareholders.
201 Ebrahimi v Westboume Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 384 (Lord Cross).
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The exceptions of majority rule provide extra protection to minority 
shareholders. In addition, they have some specific minority shareholders’ rights. 
However, I stress that the most efficient minority protection is available through the 
protection of shareholders’ rights. Even though companies are governed by majority 
rule, shareholders’ economic rights are in proportion to their shares. These rights are not 
at the discretion of the majority. So, majority shareholders may control the company’s 
business, and their opinion should prevail, but they do not have a right to determine how 
the success of a company is divided among shareholders. It is the company constitution 
and Companies Act that set shareholders’ rights. In addition, the law gives minority 
shareholders the power to sue the majority to protect their individual rights from 
invasion. Fundamentally, ordinary shareholders have an equal economic participation 
right in the company, and it should not matter in these terms whether they are minority 
or majority shareholders. I argue that the best shareholder protection is available 
through the efficient support of these participation rights.
“The ultimate problem of the law is balance”, and the courts need “a sense of 
tact and balance” in their judgments . This is very true in the case of company law 
since one of its central aims is to set a balance in the interests of individual shareholders 
and the company as a whole. Overall, minority protection in company law is a 
complicated area. The tension between the claims of justice in the particular cases and 
the position of the claimant as a member of a private company “has often proved 
difficult to resolve”204. Predominantly, English company law has mainly balanced in
AAf
favour of the majority . As a result, for most of the first century of company law
202 Ibid 379 (Lord Wilberforce).
203 Fuller, Lon L., Legal Fictions (Stanford 1967) 137.
204 Lord Justice Chadwick in the Foreword in Joffe, Victor, Minority Shareholders: Law, Practice and 
Procedure (London 2000) v.
205 The situation in the USA does not seem different if we share the view of Manne (1967) 281: “Unless 
minority shareholders in small corporations have made adequate advance preparation, they will not 
receive adequate protection from either the market or the legal system.”
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minority shareholders were “virtually defenceless”206. It is possible to formulate this 
point even more strongly as some commentators do:
Until recent years, the position of the minority shareholder in a private company 
was sufficiently precarious, and the protection afforded to him by the law and 
the courts was so restricted, that in general the wise course was not to invest in 
this way.207
Before the introduction of s 210 of the Companies Act 1948, minority shareholders 
were often unable “to obtain any redress from the courts to stop the majority acting in 
an oppressive manner”208.
On the other hand, during recent decades the law has provided more protection 
to minority shareholders in private companies, in particular under the statutory concept 
of CA 1985 s 459. In effect, the trend in company law has been towards the recognition 
of minority shareholder protection, and the position of minority shareholders is 
nowadays clearly stronger than it used to be. Remarkably, we can quote further the 
commentators above:
In consequence, taking up an investment as minority shareholder in a private 
company may now be regarded as a sensible investment proposition, provided 
the terms of entry are carefully framed.209
Naturally, that is the way in which company law should operate: to support companies 
to accumulate capital, but not to make share investments unwise. Yet, the position of
206 Hoffmann in Hollington (2004) xi.
207 Dawson, I. J. and Stephenson, I. S., The Protection o f Minority Shareholders (Croydon 1993) v 
(emphasis added).
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minority shareholders has been strengthened by the support of the statutes mainly in 
private companies. In public quoted companies, shareholders might still face particular 
difficulties as both the defective state of common law and the detailed design of 
statutory remedies cause them problems210. But since public companies are very 
different in their nature, shareholder protection in these companies should be available 
in a different way. I emphasize that these shareholders can often get more protection 
from the markets than from company law. In particular, as explained in the next chapter, 
the Takeover Code has a central role in the protection of quoted companies’ minority 
shareholders.
In chapter seven, I raise my main question: what is the value of shares in 
company law? The aim of this discussion is to give the answer to the question when 
share value is a matter of law and when a matter of fact. In addition, since value is 
generally a matter of opinion, I also ask whose opinion should prevail. In capitalism, 
every man is responsible for his fortune: in consequence, share value is more a private 
matter than a company’s affair. So, the answer to the value of shares is found mainly 
outside majority rule, although the majority has a special role in setting the value of 
shares too.
208 Re Legal Costs Negotiators Ltd [1999] 2 BCLC 171 (Ch) 178 (Peter Goldsmith QC).
209 Dawson and Stephenson (1993) v.
210 Boyle, A. J., Minority Shareholders’ Remedies (Cambridge 2002) 12.
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CHAPTER 7
VALUE OF SHARES IN LAW
Everyone knows that there is no topic about which 
greater differences o f informed opinion may 
sometimes exist than the value o f shares in a private 
company unless it be the authenticity and value o f 
certain pictures.
Lord Salmon, Sutcliffe v Thackrah [1974] AC 727 
(HL) 760.
7.1 Introduction
Shareholders own their shares and, according to property rules, owners are entitled to 
determine the value of their property. This is a central idea in the market economy and 
company law.
In reality, the legal framework in every society is complex since relationships 
cannot “be painted in any one picture”1. Share valuation is not purely a matter of private 
property. First, shareholders’ entitlements are protected by liability rules, in which 
situations the courts determine an objective value for shares. Second, companies are 
governed by majority rule, and this principle has importance in share valuation. For 
instance, the valuation accepted by a special majority is capable of binding every 
shareholder in a company takeover.
In this chapter, I review share value from the legal perspective; my focus is on 
situations where their value is determined objectively or collectively. The most central 
question is whether the value of majority and minority shares are equal in company law. 
I propose that company law fundamentally supports the equal value of shares.
1 Calabresi, Guido and Melamed, A. Douglas, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089, 1128.
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7.2 Property and liability rules
When an entitlement is protected by property rules, it can be removed from its holder 
only through a voluntary transaction. The idea of liability rules is to protect entitlements 
against invasions.
In voluntary transactions, the parties agree upon pricing. The fundamental point 
under property rules is that anyone may say what the value of an entitlement is. 
Consequently, prices in market transactions are matters of contract. A seller has a veto if 
a buyer does not offer enough: no one can take private property from the holder unless 
he is willing to sell it2. An owner has a right to value his entitlement subjectively.
Following these general principles, shareholders may determine the value of 
their shares; as a result, share value is a subjective assessment of worth. Shareholders 
have a right to accept whether to transfer their property at a price available, an idea 
which generally applies to both private and public companies.
Property rules are never enough in legal relationships: liability rules are required 
in order to protect entitlements in cases where a voluntary contract is not reached. These 
rules are important if an entitlement is destroyed or transferred by the power of law. 
Under liability rules, the value of property becomes objective; consequently, the 
decision about value must be taken by some organ of the state, not by the parties 
themselves. The owner can no longer set the value for the property but it is ultimately 
determined by the court. Further, the value is required in the context of compensation, 
not of pricing. Since valuation is collective, individual preferences about the worth may 
be ignored. In general, this hypothetical value is the price that the holder would receive 
if the entitlement were sold. Obviously, the value set by court is more a legal point than
2 The point is stated clearly in Silsbury v McCoon (1850) 3 NY 379 (CA of New York) 381 (Ruggles J): 
“It is an elementary principle in the law of all civilized communities, that no man can be deprived of his 
property, except by his own voluntary act, or by operation of law.”
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a price accepted by an owner under property rules. Liability rules are demanding 
because they require the courts to answer valuation questions3.
Liability rules step in when entitlements are destroyed or markets fail. Shares 
cannot be destroyed, but their value can be ruined. For instance, when the value of 
minority shares is damaged by oppression, CA 1985 s 459 offers a statutory remedy. 
Moreover, under certain circumstances, company law provides that shares should be 
transferred compulsorily. In these situations, an objective value for shares is required.
7.3 Objective value of shares
The valuation of shares is a challenging problem: 1) the value of shares rests on their 
expected future return4; 2) there is no abstract value for shares since their worth is 
related to specific circumstances5. Share value cannot be a single definite figure because 
the return is simply unknown: the worth is an estimation based on opinion. Further, 
evaluation always takes place in a particular situation, and thus shares may have several 
different values depending on the view of the person valuing them and the context 
where the valuation occurs. In brief, value is a word with many meanings.
A shareowner is entitled to value his shares subjectively, but when their value is 
determined by the power of law, valuation must have an objective basis. What is the 
objective value of shares, and how is it set? Naturally, the most objective value is the 
market price of quoted shares.
3 Whincop, Michael J., An Economic and Jurisprudential Genealogy o f Corporate Law (Aldershot 2001) 
126.
4 Above chapter four 4.4.3.
5 Eg Eastaway, Nigel A. and others, Practical Share Valuation (London 1998) 3: “There is no such thing 
as a value of share in isolation. There is however a value of a specific number of specific shares in a 
specific company in a given set of circumstances, real or hypothetical”; Solomon, Lewis D. and others, 
Corporations: Law and Policy -  Materials and Problems (4th edn St Paul 1998) 213: “In response to the 
question, ‘How much is a business worth?’, one must ask ‘Why do we want to know?’ Valuation of a 
business is best viewed as a process directed to a particular end.”
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7.3.1 Market quotation as value
Quoted shares have a market price, ie the price at which they currently trade in the 
market place. Law generally accepts the current market quotation as the true value of 
shares. In Re Grierson, Oldham & Adams Ltcf, Plowman J observed that “the market 
price on the Stock Exchange of those shares is cogent evidence of their true value”7. 
Moreover, to emphasize the point, it is possible to say that the price on the stock market 
is, “as a matter of law”, the real value of shares8. Due to the market price, the valuation 
of listed shares is typically “a fairly straightforward exercise”9. Indeed, these shares are 
valued with reference to the quoted price10.
Nevertheless, the value of shares is a question of fact. Law does not actually rule 
that the stock market price is their true value since share value is always related to 
particular facts. The market price might be a convenient way of getting at such a value, 
but there might be abnormalities affecting the market. Overall, matters of fact are 
capable of proof, and thus value is subject to evidence and demonstration. Market 
quotations can be replaced, while a market value is not “conclusive evidence” of the 
worth11.
The stock market price is “a satisfactory indication” of share value12; in other 
words, a stock market quotation is “the best evidence of value”13. The burden of proof 
rests on those arguing that the market price is not the real value of shares. But some 
criticism based on evidence against a market price is never enough to discharge the onus 
of proof since law generally supports market valuation. Those who want to “go behind
6 [1968] Ch 17, 32.
7 See also Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] AC 534 (HL) 542 (Lord Porter).
8 Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA) 125 (Evershed LJ).
9 Lowry, John and Dignam, Alan, Company Law (2nd edn London 2003) 222.
10 Salvesen’s Trustees v Commissioners o f Inland Revenue [1930] SLT 387, 390 (Lord Fleming).
11 Re Grierson, Oldham & Adams Ltd [1968] Ch 17, 32.
12 Re Press Caps Ltd [1949] Ch 434 (CA) 447 (Wynn-Parry J).
13 Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA) 125.
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the Stock Exchange markings” have a heavy onus14. In fact, it is difficult to find cases 
where this high burden of proof is successfully discharged; so, the market value of 
shares can be challenged more in theory than in practice15.
Market prices are consequences of investors’ decisions. Moreover, business 
people are more capable of judging their own affairs than courts16. This fundamental 
idea applies to share valuation: courts are extremely unwilling to displace a market 
value by the support of opposite evidence, even if it might be partly convincing. The 
views of shareholders should not be substituted for the view of court. Shareholders as 
the owners of their private property determine the value of their shares. As a result, the 
objective value for quoted shares is the subjective value accepted by shareholders. To 
repeat, company law lets shareholders set the value for their shares.
Market price is the best indication of share value. However, at the current 
market price some shareholders buy shares, and others sell them. Share transactions 
exist because investors disagree about the merits of share value. The prices in market 
transactions do not represent a real value to those shareholders who do not wish to sell 
their shares. Accordingly, even in the case of a quoted company, it is possible to argue 
that the value of shares is obviously higher than their market price since shareholders do 
not sell their investment at the current price. The market price is not always the right 
value for shares in law. In effect, the real value of shares might remain hidden although 
they have a public market price17.
In conclusion, market price is the objective value of quoted shares, but it cannot 
have an absolute role in law because individual shareholders may subjectively 
determine the value of their shares. Share prices are matters of contract; therefore, the 
market price is merely a question of fact. Broadly speaking, the value of shares becomes
14 Re Press Caps Ltd [1949] Ch 434 (CA) 447.
15 Eg Hollington, Robin, Shareholders’ Rights (4th edn London 2004) 258 sees that the value of shares in 
quoted companies is uncertain and a matter of opinion only to a “limited extent”.
16 Eg Re Bugle Press Ltd [1961] Ch 270 (CA) 276-77 (Buckley J).
17 See chapter four 4.5.3.
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much more important as a legal point when their value does not rest on the pricing 
accepted by every shareholder. Takeovers of quoted companies, which are under further 
discussion later in this chapter, are these kinds of transactions.
7.3.2 Fair value under the articles in private companies
Private companies typically impose restrictions on the free disposition of shares. 
Generally, the directors approve the new member to whom shares may be registered, or 
there might be a pre-emption clause in favour of existing members18. Further, the 
articles may, under certain circumstances, require shareholders, or their estate, to 
transfer shares to particular persons at a prescribed price. I explore the nature of these 
‘retirement’ provisions: my focus is on how share value is set under the articles.
The restrictions on transfer and the provisions for compulsory transfer are valid, 
ie company law accepts them. The landmark case is Borland's Trustee v Steel Brothers 
& Co Ltd19, where the articles stated that a shareholder is compelled to sell his shares to 
particular persons if he dies, becomes bankrupt, or is otherwise willing to transfer them. 
Under the terms of the articles, shares should be transferred at the ‘fair price’, which 
was further specified as their ‘par value’. Farwell J explained that the articles constitute 
a binding contract between shareholders, and the provisions were not void as being 
repugnant to absolute ownership. In addition, the requirements in the articles, which 
were fixed bona fide for every shareholder, were not against the bankruptcy law because 
the price was not shown to be less than what was otherwise obtainable.
The memorandum and the articles are a statutory contract between each member 
and the company; moreover, the articles regulate shareholders’ rights inter se20.
Through the statutory contract, shareholders may agree on restrictions that set a specific
18 See above, chapter two 2.4.2.
19 [1901] 1 Ch 279.
20 Welton v Saffery [1897] AC 299 (HL) 315 (Lord Herschell); see above, chapter six 6.2.2.
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91price for shares under certain circumstances . The basis of valuation is fundamentally 
contractual since shareholders have collectively accepted the provisions in the articles 
of association22. Shareholders should follow the contractual terms.
A transfer price, in accordance with the formula set out in the articles, binds 
shareholders who have agreed to it through the company constitution. The articles 
mainly produce a somewhat rough but ready machinery for the valuation of shares. Still, 
it is another question whether the transfer price, under the clause, may be of any value, 
even less than the current value of shares, or just their nominal value. In Phillips v
9^Manufacturers ' Securities Ltd , the price under the articles, which included a 
compelled selling of shares, was Is per share, or a higher price fixed by general 
meeting. The facts in the case clearly show that a shareholder was directed to sell his 
shares “at a gross undervalue”: his shares were obviously more valuable than this ‘fair 
value’ under the articles. Nevertheless, the construction of the articles authorised this 
compelled sale of shares at a price less than their real value. Further, there was no 
evidence that majority shareholders had acted oppressively or fraudulently, or otherwise 
had misused power conferred by the articles. In conclusion, the court accepted that the 
transfer price could be about 5 per cent of the true value of the shares.
On the other hand, it should be noted that in Phillips v Manufacturers'
Securities Ltd there was no bankruptcy. The provisions that set the transfer price below 
fair value may be against bankruptcy law as declared in Borland's Trustee v Steel 
Brothers & Co Ltd. Moreover, requirements in the articles are subject to equitable 
considerations, and therefore shareholders may challenge the unfair pricing of shares in
21 See also Attorney-General v Jameson [1905] 2 IR 218, 237 (Holmes LJ): these provisions in the 
articles are “legal, and bind the Company and its members as well as any outsider who is permitted to 
purchase a share.”
2 Provisions may even constitute a binding contract, ie a put option for a shareholder to require his shares 
to be acquired; Rayfield v Hands [1960] Ch 1.
23 (1917) 86 LJ Ch 305 (CA).
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court24. Obviously, if the price prescribed for shares is less than their fair value, there 
are serious doubts regarding the fairness of this provision. In sum, it is possible to argue 
that to be effectively binding the price under the articles must be at least the fair value 
of shares25.
Consequently, the transfer price under the articles, in their standard form, is the 
fair value of shares. Shares in private companies will not normally be transferred to 
persons who are not members as long as any member is willing to purchase them at a 
fair value. This is the typical idea when shareholders have a pre-emption right for 
existing shares. Similarly, if the company articles contain provisions compelling a 
shareholder to sell his shares, the set price under these clauses seems to be their fair 
value.
Who sets the fair value of shares? The pre-emption provision normally states 
that shareholders may mutually accept a fair value for shares, or otherwise the 
company’s auditor acts as an expert and values the shares. So, when a shareholder 
transferring his shares agrees the price with the purchasing member, the general ideas of 
property rules apply: the fair price is a matter of a specific contract. However, cases 
where the price is reached under consensual arrangements are less interesting from the 
legal perspective. My focus is on cases where the auditor determines the fair value.
Under these provisions, what is the fair value of shares? Above all, fair value is 
the view of the particular auditor since the articles do not typically give any formula for 
valuation. “A valuation is only an expression of opinion,” as Wynn-Parry J said in Re
24 Virdi v Abbey Leisure Ltd [1990] BCLC 342 (CA) 350 (Balcombe LJ): “If in the present case it may be 
equitable to ignore the provisions of the company’s constitution which prima facie entitle the directors to 
carry on the business of the company after the sale of the Pavillion, I do not see why it would not be 
equally equitable, if this had been a case where Mr Virdi was bound by art 27 to sell his shares to the 
majority at whatever price the accountant might fix, to ignore those provisions also”; in addition, see Re a 
company (No 00330 o f 1991), ex p  Holden [1991] BCLC 591\Arenson v Arenson [1973] Ch 346 (CA) 
363.
25 Tett v Phoenix Property and Investment Co Ltd [1986] BCLC 149 (CA) 163 (Robert Goff LJ): “there 
is, so far as I am aware, no principle of policy inhibiting an agreement between members of a company ... 
if other members ... are willing to buy [shares] at a price at least as great as their fa ir value” (emphasis 
added); Re XYZ Ltd (1986) 2 BCC 99,520; 99,527 (Hoffmann J): “I say nothing ... about cases in which 
the articles provide for some arbitrary or artificial method of valuation.”
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Press Caps Ltd . There are no strict rules of thumb or accountancy principles that can 
strictly fix the basis for calculation27. The fair value of shares is ultimately the personal
view of the person valuing them; in addition, there are several methods to value shares
28m a private company .
On the whole, the valuation of shares is a matter of controversy: “the question of 
value is obviously one about which opinions may differ”29. In Borland’s Trustee v Steel 
Brothers & Co Ltd, Farwell J explained the valuation of shares in a private company in 
this way:
It is impossible ... for any one to arrive at any actual figure, as to which it may 
be said it is clear that that is the value, or something within a few pounds of the 
value.30
In share valuation, many questions are matters of judgment31: it is illusory that an 
auditor can determine the correct or true value of shares. Naturally, the expert only 
gives his estimate of share value: one auditor determines one value, and another auditor 
another value. As Hoffmann LJ stated in Zubaida v Hargreaves , share valuation 
“involves questions of judgment on which experts may differ without forfeiting their
26 [1949] Ch 434 (CA) 447.
27 Gold Coast Selection Trust Ltd v Humphrey (Inspector o f Taxes) [1948] AC 459 (HL) 473 (Viscount 
Simon): “Valuation is an art, not an exact science. Mathematical certainty is not demanded, nor indeed is 
it possible”; Re Holt [1953] 1 WLR 1488, 1492 (Danckwerts J): “It seems to me that their opinions are 
indeed properly described as guesswork”; Joiner v George [2003] BCC 298 (CA) [101] (Sir Christopher 
Slade): “there cannot be said to be exclusively one correct answer.”
28 Eg Re Claridge Holt & Co Ltd, Times November 23, 1966 (Plowman J): “there is room for a fairly 
wide difference of honest opinion about values and methods of valuation.”
29 Re Grierson, Oldham & Adams Ltd [1968] Ch 17, 38 (Plowman J); see also Dean v Prince [1954] Ch 
409 (CA) 419 (Evershed MR); CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Demarco Almeida [2002] 2 
BCLC 108 (PC) 118 (Lord Millett).
30 [1901] 1 Ch 279, 291.
31 Gillatt v Sky Television Ltd [2000] 2 BCLC 103 (CA) 112 (Mummery LJ): “a valuation is pre­
eminently a matter of judgment for the independent accountant entrusted with the task.”
32 [1995] 1 EGLR 127 (CA) 128.
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claim to professional competence” . It is difficult to say whether the specified value for 
shares is right or wrong34. Further, the significant legal point is that the courts do not
o r
interfere in matters of opinion . Therefore, a judge’s view about the most appropriate
o r
approach in valuation can be irrelevant .
The basis of valuation can be difficult to establish: the expert is not obliged to 
give reasons for his decision37. Auditors do not generally state how the fair value of 
shares is reached in the particular case, ie they do not give ‘speaking’ certificates. 
Actually, case law earlier discouraged any reasoning because if a speaking valuation 
had been made on an erroneous basis, it could be impugned38. But there was no way of 
questioning a valuation if the auditors declined to give reasons for the result they had 
arrived at: the fewer details presented, the less the valuation could be brought into 
dispute. As Harman J noted in Dean v Prince, “silence is golden” used to be a sensible 
point in share valuation39. However, the legal distinction between speaking and non­
speaking awards is nowadays clearly rejected40.
Nonetheless, the fair value determined by the auditor binds the parties. In 
Campbell v Edwards, Lord Denning MR explained the force of an agreed valuation:
If two persons agree that the price of property should be fixed by a valuer on 
whom they agree, and he gives that valuation honestly and in good faith, they 
are bound by it. Even if he has made a mistake they are still bound by i t 41
33 See also Collier v Mason (1858) 25 Beav 200, 204 (Sir John Romilly MR): “I have frequently had to 
refer to the enormous discrepancy in bona fide  valuations.”
34 Dean v Prince [1954] Ch 409 (CA) 427 (Denning LJ): “it is so much a matter of opinion that it is very 
difficult to say it was wrong.”
35 Ibid.
36 Zubaida v Hargreaves [1995] 1 EGLR 127 (CA) 128.
37 See eg Re a company (No 00330 o f 1991), ex p  Holden [1991] BCLC 597.
38 See Burgess v Purchase & Sons (Farms) Ltd [1983] Ch 216.
39 [1953] Ch 590, 596; Re a company (No 006834 o f 1988), ex p  Kremer [1989] BCLC 365, 369 
(Hoffmann J): “If the independent valuer is well advised, he will do no more than certify the figure which 
in his opinion is the fair value of the shares.”
40 Jones v Sherwood Computer Services pic  [1992] 1 WLR 277 (CA).
41 [1976] 1 WLR 403 (CA) 407.
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At common law, the parties are bound by the figure fixed by the valuer42. When he 
arrives at a price fairly and honestly, and without bad faith, it must stand. For this 
reason, the opinion of the auditor is final, binding, and conclusive, ie the valuation will 
not be reviewed in court43. Although a valuer might make a mistake, in doing what he is 
authorised to do, the valuation is still binding44. However, if the expert, due to the 
mistake, departs from his instructions in material respect, for example he values a 
wrong company or a wrong number of shares, the determination can be subject to 
challenge in court45.
An expert should use his judgement and come to a result which is his fair 
opinion about the value of particular shares. In his task, the expert is a mutual valuer 
who acts impartially and holds the scales fairly between the opposing interests of 
parties. The determined value must be fair and equitable to both vendor and purchaser46. 
In setting the fair value, what the seller gives up in value and what the buyer acquires in 
value in the particular transfer should be taken into account. Shares should not be 
valued by reference only to their value in the seller’s hands but also to their value in the 
purchaser’s hands47. Altogether, the basic idea of these provisions is to determine a fair 
value and a suitable price for a retiring member’s shares.
Yet, in the market economy fair value and price is normally the market price. 
Therefore, the expert actually aims to determine a reasonable market price for shares,
42 Arenson v Arenson [1973] Ch 346 (CA) 363 (Lord Denning MR).
43 Baber v Kenwood Manufacturing Co Ltd [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 175 (CA): it would be wrong to 
frustrate the agreement by alleging a mistake in the expert’s opinion.
44 Ibid 179 (Megaw LJ): “[the parties] accept the risk, which applies equally either way, that an expert 
may err.”
45 Jones v Sherwood Computer Services pic  [1992] 1 WLR 277 (CA); Macro v Thompson (No 2) [1997] 1 
BCLC 626 (CA); moreover, the auditor could be liable for damages if he reaches an incorrect valuation 
through negligence; Arenson v Casson Beckman Rutley & Co [1977] AC 405 (HL), but it should be noted 
that a professional valuation is not negligently given even if it turns out to be wrong; Sutcliffe v Thackrah 
[1974] AC 727 (HL) 760 (Lord Salmon); see more below, in particular, note 97ff and related discussion.
46 See Re a company [1986] BCLC 362, 369 (Hoffmann J); CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v 
Demarco Almeida [2002] 2 BCLC 108 (PC) 118 (Lord Millett).
47 Eg Whiteoak v Walker [1988] BCC 122.
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which is the general idea of fair value48. The articles may explicitly mention that the fair 
value of shares is a hypothetical price between a willing buyer and a willing seller49. 
Generally speaking, the perspective of auditors is very much alike regardless of the 
exact provisions in the articles. In sum, auditors normally try to set a fair market price 
for the shares.
In his task, the auditor must carry out the valuation with reasonable professional 
skill50. An expert has a duty to act “in accordance with a practice of competent 
respected professional opinion”51. The fair value of shares should be a professional 
view, or a reliable and informed opinion, made on an objective basis. Yet, it is obvious 
that there exists no single and right method to determine fair value for shares. In 
practice, the bases for valuation of shares in a private company are: 1) dividend basis, 2) 
asset basis, and 3) earnings basis.
7.3.2.1 Dividend basis
Dividends are the cash flow from a company to its shareholders. Still, first it should be 
noted that the role of dividends is a controversial issue in market valuation52. Second, 
company law does not require that a company’s profits should be distributed as a 
dividend, which is a discretionary payment. As a result, although dividend yield has 
great importance, these payments are ordinarily unable to show the value of shares. 
Naturally, this is very true if no dividends have been paid for several years53.
Nevertheless, shares are valued on the basis of dividends since this income is a 
meaningful consideration. It is argued that an estimate of dividend yield demonstrates
48 See eg Sudbrook Trading Estate Ltd v Eggleton [1983] 1 AC 444 (HL) 487-88 (Lord Scarman).
49 Eg Goldstein v Levy Gee (a firm) [2003] All ER (D) 12; Re Castleburn (1989) 5 BCC 652.
50 Zubaida v Hargreaves [1995] 1 EGLR 127 (CA) 127.
51 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, 587.
52 Above chapter four 4.4.3.
53 Attorney-General o f Ceylon v Mackie [1952] 2 All ER 775 (PC); see also Re a company [1986] BCLC 
362, 369, where Hoffmann J considered that the value of a private company’s shares was related “hardly 
at all” to the prospect of dividends since they were unlikely to be paid.
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share value in a private company because these shares are not marketable54. Obviously, 
when this method is used, every ordinary share has an equal value. But experts mainly 
consider that dividend method is appropriate for minority shares only55. Indeed, 
majority shareholders, and their advisors, typically argue that shares of the minority 
should be valued on the dividend basis56.
Dividend yield has traditionally been of particular importance in estate duty 
valuations. However, as Lord Fleming pointed in Salvesen's Trustees v Commissioners 
o f Inland Revenue51, it would be “quite fallacious” to value shares merely on the basis 
of paid dividends. According to him, it is not right to ignore those company earnings 
that have not been distributed as dividends58. In the same way, in Re Lynall59 Plowman 
J noted that both the appropriate dividend yield and the prospective dividend affect 
share value; in addition, the possibility of capital appreciation should be considered. 
More generally, as Nourse J observed in Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltcf0, a dividend 
basis is relevant when a company has a record of paying significant dividends. 
Following these views, the focus in share valuation should be more on the profits 
available for distribution than on the actual dividend payments.
Overall, share valuation has developed; in effect, the role of dividend yield in 
the valuation of private companies’ shares seems to be declining. In case law, experts
54 Compare Re Sir William Thomas Paulin [1935] 1 KB 26 (CA) 47 (Lord Hanworth MR): “The price at 
which shares in a sound industrial undertaking will be sold on a stock exchange is not determined by the 
yield of the dividends alone.”
55 Livens, Leslie, Tolley’s Share and Business Valuation Handbook (5th edn Croydon 1999) 61; Glover, 
Christopher G., Valuation o f Unquoted Securities (London 1986) 191 and 264; Gregory, Alan and Hicks, 
Andrew, ‘Valuation of Shares: A Legal and Accounting Conundrum’ [1995] JBL 56, 64.
56 Eg Macro v Thompson (No 3) [1997] 2 BCLC 36; in this saga, a gross dividend yield basis was used as 
one of the elements in share valuation; see Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 354.
57 (1930) 9 ATC 43,48.
58 See also Re a company (No 004415 o f  1996) [1997] 1 BCLC 479, 488 (Sir Richard Scott VC): “if the 
court were to conclude that dividends have been kept at an unreasonably low level ... the court would not 
direct that the shares should be valued by reference to historical dividends.”
59 [1969] 1 Ch 421,444.
60 [1984] BCLC 195, 209.
218 Chapter 7
rarely value shares on the basis of dividend yield61, although some of them still regard 
dividends as the main method in the valuation of minority shares . In sum, court 
rulings in company law do not emphasize the importance of dividend yield in share 
valuation. At bottom, case law supports the idea that shares should be valued merely on 
the basis of a company’s earnings and net assets . For example, Nourse J accepted in 
Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltcf4 that the appropriate basis involves both these factors. 
Further, in CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Demarco Almeida65 Lord Millett did 
not mention dividend basis at all when he explained share valuation in unquoted 
companies. I completely agree: asset and earnings bases should be preferred to dividend 
yield when shares are valued.
7.3.2.2 Asset basis
Shareholders participate in a company, and it is obvious that a company’s assets have 
importance to shareholders66. In consequence, share value is related to these assets. Yet, 
it should be noted that the value of shares follows more the fortunes of the company 
than the value of its assets67.
The net asset value per share is problematic since the value of a company’s 
assets is mainly unknown and should be estimated. But even more importantly, in the 
legal sense it is not possible “to treat a share as being an interest in the company’s
61 Eg Guinness Peat Group pic v British Land Co pic  [1999] 2 BCLC 243 (CA), where the expert for the 
appellant regarded the dividend yield basis as appropriate for preference shares.
“  Eg Livens (1999).
63 Furthermore, a hybrid basis is a combination method where a company’s surplus assets are valued 
separately, and their worth is added to an earnings based valuation; see eg Richards v Lundy [2000] 1 
BCLC 376; Re a company (No 002612 o f 1984) (1986) 2 BCC 99,453.
64 [1984] BCLC 195, 209
65 [2002] 2 BCLC 108 (PC) 118; see also Gillatt v Sky Television Ltd [2000] 2 BCLC 103 (CA) 112 
(Mummery LJ): “there is more than one possible approach to such a valuation of shares in a private 
company: an earnings basis, an asset basis, a discounted cash flow basis, or a combination of these 
approaches.”
6 M ’Connel’s Trustees v Commissioners o f Inland Revenue [1927] SLT 14, 17 (Lord Fleming): “A share 
in a limited company gives the holder a right, not only to participate in a division of the profits, but also to 
participate in the division of the capital.”
67 See Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204 (CA).
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assets”68. Simply, shareholders are not part owners in a company69. It is not convincing 
to argue that the value of shares is their net asset value70.
A company’s assets do not ordinarily show its earning power, which is the most 
important factor in share valuation. An asset basis valuation cannot look forward in an 
appropriate way. Therefore, a company’s earnings rather than its assets are more 
significant in share valuation; the value based on an estimated profit stream is preferable 
to one based on net assets. A company as a going concern should generally be valued on 
an earnings basis71.
Case law widely supports the idea that shares are valued on the basis of 
company earnings. The capitalised value of a company’s earning capacity is capable of 
showing the value of shares72. As Lord Millett noted in CVC/Opportunity Equity 
Partners Ltd v Demarco Almeida13, it is difficult to find justification for an asset based 
valuation in the case of a going concern74. Further, in Attorney-General o f Ceylon v 
Mackie Lord Reid stated that the value of an established business as a going concern
nc
generally exceeds the total value of its tangible assets . If it were otherwise, 
shareholders should liquidate a company that has so negative goodwill and actually 
destroys capital. Finally, following the view of Staughton J in Buckingham v Francis76,
68 Re Sir William Thomas Paulin [1935] 1 KB 26 (CA) 57 (Romer LJ); see also Macaura v Northern 
Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619 (HL) 626 (Lord Buckmaster): “no shareholder has any right to any item 
of property owned by the company.”
69 Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA).
70 See above, chapter four 4.4.2.
71 Eg Parkinson v Eurofinance Group Ltd [2001] 1 BCLC 720.
72 See eg Re a company (No 002612 o f 1984) (1986) 2 BCC 99,453; 99,485 (Vinelott J).
73 [2002] 2 BCLC 108 (PC) 118.
74 See also Re Howie and Crawford’s arbitration [1990] BCLC 686; and (1986) 2 BCC 99,453; 99,483: it 
is unfair to deprive a shareholder of his share in the going concern value of the company.
75 [1952] 2 All ER 775 (PC) 779; however, as his Lordship mentioned, “that cannot be assumed to be 
universally true”; see also Jones v Jones [1971] 2 All ER 676, 680 (Ungoed-Thomas J): it is common 
ground that a going concern valuation materially exceeds a break-up valuation.
76 [1986] BCLC 353,354.
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the break-up value of the assets can be used as a long stop for the value of the
77company’s business if the value as a going concern is less .
In any event, as Denning U  said in Dean v Prince1*, an asset basis is an 
appropriate way in share valuation once the going-concem basis is rejected. If a 
company’s business is not profitable, or it is just barely profitable, the value of shares 
should be ascertained through the break-up value. Accordingly, as David Mackie QC, 
sitting as a deputy judge, explained in Plat v Plat19, valuation based on estimated future 
income stream is generally preferable to the method based on the net assets, but the 
uncertainties in the income position of the business meant that an asset value was 
preferable in this particular case. In sum, when an earnings basis valuation is possible, 
this method should be used.
Moreover, net asset method is used in particular to value shares of investment
on
companies. For instance, in Goldstein v Levy Gee (a firm) , the auditor adopted the net 
asset approach for the shares of a property company. In the typical way, once the 
method is used, the valuer first took the values of properties shown in the accounts, and 
then made adjustments to take account of the changes in the value of particular
properties81. Obviously, asset basis is most understandable in the case of a ‘money box’
82company, whose potential in business simply rests on its assets .
Yet, shareholders are unable to reach a company’s assets. In Re Macro (Ipswich) 
Ltd, Arden J explained the point in the context of minority holdings with the following 
words:
77 See also Re Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd [2002] 2 BCLC 556, where one of the experts decided to 
revise his valuation upwards to the net asset value; on the other hand, the net asset value may be used in 
the opposite way; eg Whiteoak v Walker [1988] BCC 122, where the auditor checked that the estimated 
profits had “a sound asset backing”.
78 [1954] Ch 409 (CA) 428.
79 [1999] 2 BCLC 745.
80 [2003] All ER (D) 12.
81 In addition, as generally on a break-up basis, the transaction costs, including the contingent tax, were 
deducted.
82 See Johnson v Gore Wood & Co (a firm) [2002] 2 AC 1 (HL) 62, where Lord Millett even saw that 
there is an exact correspondence between the assets of the company and the value of shares in a small 
private company; more above, chapter three 3.4.1.
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In principle I reject a valuation method which aims to find the fair value of the 
minority shareholding by reference to net asset value. The ability of the 
plaintiffs to unlock that value by liquidation is in my judgment uncertain.83
Indeed, as mentioned above, a share is not a proportionate share of the assets of the 
company. A shareholder who owns 10 per cent of shares in a company is not legally 
entitled to 10 per cent of its assets84. In effect, some experts consider that in the case of 
minority shares, the assets basis should never be used85. In addition, it is said that the 
liquidation value as a lower limit to share value is “a dangerous assumption” .
Nevertheless, not even majority shareholders are part owners of the company: 
this study understands the ruling of Short v Treasury Commissioners in this way. Law 
does not share the idea that a majority shareholder should be considered “for practical 
purposes” to be a part owner of the undertaking88. A company owns its assets, and 
shareholders’ entitlement is their shares, not the company’s assets, which are never 
shareholders’ property “in law”89.
A majority shareholding in a company does not in itself give a right to demand 
that these shares should be valued on an asset basis. In Guinness Peat Group pic v 
British Land Co pic90, the Court of Appeal disapproved the conclusion that the minority 
shares were actually valueless since it was possible that the majority shareholder,
83 [1994] 2 BCLC 354, 409; however, Arden J accepted a method where the net asset value per share had 
a role; see also Lloyds Bank pic  v Duker [1987] 3 All ER 193, 196, where John Mowbray QC, sitting as a 
deputy judge, considered that the value of minority shares should not be expected to reflect the asset 
value “to any appreciable extent.”
84 See also Re Howie and Crawford’s arbitration [1990] BCLC 686: the expression of fair market price is 
not equivalent to a proportional part of the net asset value.
85 Glover (1986) 238; see also Hamilton Baynes, T. A., Share Valuations (2nd edn London 1973) 101: the
value of minority shares “does not depend on, although it may be influenced by, the value of these
assets.”
86 Glover (1986) 39.
87 [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA); [1948] AC 534 (HL); more below 7.5.
88 Contrast Glover (1986) 62.
89 Re Duffy [1949] Ch 28 (CA) 32 (Lord Green MR).
90 [1999] 2 BCLC 243 (CA).
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through its preference shares, could get all the net asset value of the company in 
liquidation. Under these circumstances, the minority shares could have value because 
their value still remained as a question of fact that should be decided on the basis of 
evidence.
The focus of this study is on the equal value of shares. For this reason, I next 
explore whether the asset basis valuation may be used for minority shares with a 
discount due to their status. Generally speaking, there are commentators and experts 
who argue that this kind of discount is possible in this context91. Yet, there are company 
law cases where the point was considered differently, ie when an asset basis is used in 
share valuation, there should be no discount or premium for minority and majority 
shares. The following cases explain the conclusion.
Dean v Prince
In Dean v Prince, the company had no expectation of making a profit. Harman J92 held 
that the value of a block of shares conferring control should include something above 
their break-up value. But the Court of Appeal93 reversed his decision with a statement 
that the court should not interfere in matters of opinion, and the auditor could reject the 
going-concem basis of valuation. The auditor was right in not attributing a special value 
to these shares on account of their carrying control. All the shares were valued as a 
whole, and this value was divided rateably amongst every share equally94. Both 
majority and minority shares had the same value in this break-up basis valuation.
91 For example, Livens (1999) 99 says that minority shareholders are entitled to a pro rata share of the net 
asset value only “[i]n the event of impending liquidation”; moreover, she notes that the minority discount 
on an asset basis may be “50% or more”; Griffin, Stephen, Company Law: Fundamental Principles (3rd 
edn Harlow 2000) 142-43 considers that in asset valuation method the discount for minority shares is 
from 5 to 30 per cent; see also Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 354, where the opinion of the 
plaintiffs’ expert was that this discount is 10 per cent.
2 Dean v Prince [1953] Ch 590.
93 Dean v Prince [1954] Ch 409 (CA).
94 It should be mentioned that the articles of the company provided that “the fair value shall be the 
auditor’s valuation of the current worth of the company’s shares.”
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CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Demarco Almeida 
CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Demarco Almeida is a Privy Council ruling 
where Lord Millett explained generally the bases of share valuation. As he formulated:
There are essentially three possible bases on which a minority holding of shares 
in an unquoted company can be valued. In descending order these are: (i) as a 
rateable proportion of the total value of the company as a going concern without 
any discount for the fact that the holding in question is a minority holding; (ii) as 
before but with such a discount; and (iii) as a rateable proportion of the net 
assets of the company at their break up or liquidation value.95
His Lordship’s wording follows the idea in Dean v Prince: there is no discount in the 
case of a minority holding if shares are valued on an asset basis. The question about a 
discount can arise only when the going concern value, ie the earnings basis, is adopted. 
Lord Millett’s opinion is understandable: the net assets basis as a method means that 
shares are valued as if the company were liquidated. Since majority and minority shares 
have equal rights in liquidation, the approach should be similar in this ‘hypothetical 
liquidation’96. In essence, the idea of asset method is that the net value of company 
assets is divided amongst shareholders in proportion to their shares. This study 
considers the point in this way.
95 [2002] 2 BCLC 108 (PC) 118.
96 Of course, the situation becomes more complicated if a company has both ordinary and preference 
shares; see above, chapter five 5.4.3 and Guinness Peat Group pic v British Land Co pic  [1999] 2 BCLC 
243 (CA).
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Goldstein v Lew Gee (a firm)
Still, the valuation of shares is diverse, and even though asset basis is used, some 
experts argue that another reduction may be required in the case of a minority 
shareholding. In Goldstein v Levy Gee (a firm)91, the auditor adopted the net asset 
method for the shares of an unlisted property company. But his valuation included, 
among other points, an extra reduction of 12.5 per cent due to the company’s non-listed 
status.
Lewison J held that this reduction in portfolio based valuation “fell below the 
standard to be expected of a competent accountant”98. The discount for lack of 
marketability should not have been used since the valuation was made on the net asset 
basis99. However, to be negligent, the end result in the valuation should have fallen 
“outside of permissible range”100, and to determine this question, the valuation was 
assessed on the basis of what a competent accountant could have done. Lewison J 
considered that it was possible that even a competent accountant could generally make a 
similar deduction because of unmarketability of shares101. Thus, notwithstanding the 
mistake, the auditor’s valuation was still “within the bracket”, ie the result in valuation 
fell inside the margin of error102. The expert made an error in the method, and thus his 
valuation was wrong, but the valuation itself was not negligent103.
In summary, I propose that the three cases above share the idea that in valuation 
on a net asset basis there should be no discount for minority shares. Consequently, the 
view of company law is that the asset value for every ordinary share is the same. As
97 [2003] All ER (D) 12.
98 Ibid [93],
99 In his reasoning, Lewison J, [118], referred to Glover (1986) 209: “It hardly needs saying that such a 
discount is only appropriate where a capitalisation rate has been selected from marketable investments 
such as quoted securities.”
100 [2003] All ER (D) 12 [122],
101 Indeed, it might be that there is “no pattern at all in these discounts”; see Glover (1986) 209; Gregory 
and Hicks (1995) 67: “accounting profession undertakes valuations in a rather ad hoc fashion.”
102 See, in general, Merivale Moore pic  v Strutt & Parker [1999] 2 EGLR 171 (CA); South Australia 
Asset Management Co v York Montague Ltd [1997] AC 191 (HL).
103 To be negligent, the auditor must even reach a value that no reasonable valuer could have arrived at; 
see in particular Re Benfield Greig Group pic [2000] 2 BCLC 488; [2002] 1 BCLC 65 (CA).
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Lord Herschell noted in Birch v Cropper, shareholders are “equally entitled” to a 
company’s property104. According to the law, majority and minority shareholders have 
an equal right to company assets. Hence, the auditor has discretion to determine whether 
to use the asset basis, but if he uses it, shares should be valued pro rata. Indeed, some 
experts clearly share this view too105. Yet, there are also experts who think that a 
discount for minority shares is possible on an asset basis valuation, which was also the 
case in Goldstein v Levy Gee (a firm )106. As I see it, from the legal perspective 
accountants who do so make a mistake, but there will be legal consequences from their 
error only if the end result is outside the permissible range of valuations. Ultimately, 
Goldstein v Levy Gee (a firm) shows that share valuation made by auditors can be a risk 
for shareholders.
7.3.2.3 Earnings basis
As mentioned, the earning potential of a company is the most important determinant in 
share valuation. First, the value of its business is the capitalised sum representing its 
future profits. Second, shareholders are the ultimate beneficiaries of the enterprise: the 
value of their shares follows the fortunes of the company. Share value is principally set 
on an earnings basis, in which method the starting point is to evaluate a company’s 
business as a going concern.
However, future profits are unknown. They can only be estimated; thus, this 
estimate is a matter of opinion, fact, and evidence. Still, as case law shows, the 
assessment of future profits should be made on a ‘best guess’ basis107: the valuer must
104 (1889) LR 14 App Cas 525 (HL) 538.
105 Eg Glower (1986).
106 In addition, see Re a company (No 004415 o f 1996) [1997] 1 BCLC 479, 487, where Sir Richard Scott 
VC in the context of CA 1985 s 459 regarded a discount for minority shares as possible although the 
method is an asset based valuation.
107 Buckingham v Francis [1986] BCLC 353.
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perform his task without undue caution or exaggeration. The intention is to determine 
the most probable earnings for the enterprise.
A company’s future profits are normally estimated on the basis of past profits 
because the earnings record is the best indication for prospects. Valuation in this 
method starts by determining the maintainable profit108. This assessment is done on a 
going concern basis, where the idea is to set the normal or average yearly profit for the 
company: its profits are not likely to fall below this level in the absence of unforeseen 
and exceptional circumstances109. A company is supposed to earn this profit in the 
future110. As a result, this base earnings figure is not actually a profit forecast although 
the future trend of earnings matters in the estimation111. Moreover, if a company makes 
losses, it does not normally have a maintainable profit, so these unprofitable companies 
must be valued rather on an asset basis112.
i n
In Whiteoak v Walker , the auditor arrived at future maintainable profits for a 
company by using a three-year average; the court considered this method acceptable as 
a matter of judgment. In a similar way, in Matlaszek v Bloom Camillin (a firm)UA, the 
maintainable profit was regarded as a weighted average of the previous years. Still, the 
maintainable profits cannot just be calculated since some adjustments are required to 
past profits. One important adjustment in a business run by its proprietors seems to be 
making a deduction if the company has paid artificially low remuneration to
108 Eg Re John Reid & Sons (Strucsteel) Ltd [2003] 2 BCLC 319; Parkinson v Eurofinance Group Ltd
[2001] 1 BCLC 720.
109 Eg Re a company (No 002612 o f 1984) (1986) 2 BCC 99,453; see also Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd
[2002] 2 BCLC 556, 586, where one of the experts in his determination of the maintainable profits 
ignored the loss of the previous year since it was “atypical”, but Blackburne J found his valuation 
“somewhat unrealistic.”
110 Re a company (No 006834 o f 1988), ex p Kremer [1989] BCLC 365, 368.
111 See Re Ghyll Beck Driving Range Ltd [1993] BCLC 1126, where the probable future profits were 
accepted to include expected growth as the company had been running for a comparatively short time.
112 Matlaszek v Bloom Camillin (a firm) [2003] EWHC 2728, [9] (Park J).
113 [1988] BCC 122.
114 [2003] EWHC 2728.
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shareholders for their work115. Overall, the probable future level of earnings is typically 
a point of disagreement: it is an economic view resting on particular facts.
The assessment of profits must be translated into value of shares. In general, 
share value is reached when the maintainable profit is multiplied by a price-eamings 
(‘P/E’) ratio, which is the main tool in share valuation116. The idea is that every 
company or business sector has its own ratio related to its special factors. On the other 
hand, it is possible to say that the P/E as a multiplier shows the yield required from a 
particular business.
To arrive at a P/E ratio, an earnings per share figure is required. This calculation 
is simply mathematics where a company’s maintainable profit is divided by the number 
of all shares. In fact, it is the easiest part in share valuation. In addition, it is clear that 
every share in a company has the same earnings per share figure.
Determination price-eamings ratio is the most sensitive stage in share valuation: 
it is also the main arena for dispute between experts. But as Jacob J stated in Re Planet 
Organic Ltd117, the ratio has to be identified by some method or other. A typical way to 
select the figure is to begin with P/Es for quoted companies in the most comparable 
business sector118. This means that the valuer takes a market perspective with an aim to 
determine the market value for the estimated earnings per share. In consequence, the 
fair value for a private company’s shares is derived from stock market quotations. The 
expert makes a hypothetical question asking what the earnings multiple would be if the 
particular company were quoted.
Finding an appropriate P/E figure is problematic since there are several 
differences between quoted and private companies. Public and private companies are
115 See ibid; Re Planet Organic Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 366.
116 In the context of quoted shares, see above, chapter four 4.4.3.
117 [2000] 1 BCLC 366, 373, where he also considered that P/E ratio is “the near undecidable problem.”
118 See eg Re a company (No 002612 o f 1984) (1986) 2 BCC 99,453; in addition, in recent case law, there 
are also experts’ references to special private companies’ P/E indices; eg [2000] 1 BCLC 366.
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rarely similar to each other; they are typically “on a different planet”119: neither can 
their P/E figures be comparable120. Above all, private companies are much smaller than 
listed ones. Further, private companies do not ordinarily have a long history of 
consistent profits: their success in business is more uncertain121. Moreover, shareholders 
typically participate in private companies as full-time workers and directors: such a 
company is more a ‘people’ business, where share capital and shares do not have the 
most central role in its gain. All these factors mean that the price-eamings ratio in the 
case of a private company should be lower than those of quoted companies. Simply, P/E 
figures adapted from listed companies must be discounted when they are used in the 
valuation of a private company’s shares.
In addition, the marketability of shares adds to the value of shares in listed 
companies122. In contrast, shares of private companies are never freely saleable when 
the articles of association include restrictions on the transfer of shares. These restrictive 
articles typically have a depressing effect on share value. Obviously, when the auditor 
determines the fair value under these provisions, he cannot value shares as if they were 
freely transferable. Shares in a private company are never as liquid as quoted shares. 
The presumption is that these shares thus have a lower value. A further discount in the 
P/E figure is required because of the limited marketability of a private company’s 
shares.
The above-mentioned discounts for the P/E figure due to the status of a private 
company are mainly regarded as a single discount. It may then be called a discount for 
the lack of marketability123, although the factor is not related only to the marketability
119 Ibid 373.
120 Re Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd [2002] 2 BCLC 556, 588-89.
121 Re John Reid & Sons (Strucsteel) Ltd [2003] 2 BCLC 319, 331 (Kevin Garnett QC): “I understood the 
basis for [the discounted P/E] to be that there is generally less information available about a private 
company and a purchaser would therefore be more cautious”; see also Matlaszek v Bloom Camillin (a 
firm) [2003] EWHC 2728, [28],
122 See above, chapter two 2.4.4.
123 Eg Eastaway and others (1998) 11.
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of shares. For example, in Re a company124 the accountants, in their evidence, proposed 
a discount to reflect the unmarketability of a private company’s shares. Naturally, it is 
mainly an academic question whether there should be one or two discounts because of 
the status of a private company since it is the total amount of the discount that primarily 
matters.
In any case, the valuer takes a comparable P/E ratio from stock markets and 
discounts the figure to make it appropriate for a private company’s shares. The applied 
discounts for private companies seem generally to be about 50 per cent; ie these P/E 
figures are half those of the quoted companies’ shares in similar business sectors125.
However, the discount can be smaller or bigger, depending on the particular
1circumstances of the company, and also on the stock market condition.
Once the auditor, under the company articles, determines the value for shares, it 
is his task to set the right P/E. For instance, the risk related to the investment can be
incorporated into the selected price-eamings ratio127. Nevertheless, if a non-speaking
1award is given, the amount of any discount is quite impossible to specify . Still, if an 
auditor selects an unreasonably low or high P/E ratio, he might be negligent in his task. 
That negligence is a point decided by law, but the valuation itself stands and is not 
reviewed in court.
Re Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd 129 offers an example of how a P/E is determined 
if the court has jurisdiction to do that. In this case, one expert supported a 
“conservative” figure of 7, and another was in favour of an “overgenerous” figure of
124 [1986] BCLC 362; see also Re a company (No 002612 o f 1984) (1986) 2 BCC 99,453; 99,486, where 
Vinelott J called this point the “long-term holding factor”.
125 See eg Re John Reid & Sons (Strucsteel) Ltd [2003] 2 BCLC 319, 331, where an expert stated from 
her experience that discounts of between 33 per cent and 50 per cent are used, but in Matlaszek v Bloom 
Camillin (a firm) [2003] EWHC 2728, [28], the experts considered that in that particular case this 
discount should be 75 per cent or even more.
126 See an example of an expert’s report on the value of shares in Joffe, Victor, Minority Shareholders: 
Law, Practice and Procedure (2nd edn London 2004) 402ff.
127 Buckingham v Francis [1986] BCLC 353.
128 See Re a company (No 006834 o f 1988), exp  Kremer [1989] BCLC 365.
129 [2002] 2 BCLC 556; it should be noted that the decision concerning the applicability of CA 1985 s 
459, and also the valuation of shares by the court, was reversed by [2003] 1 BCLC 76 (CA).
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10.1. Blackburn J then did, as he said, the best he could and considered that the 
applicable figure is 8.1. Since P/E is a matter of fact, the ratio was set on the basis of 
expert evidence. The arguments of the expert supporting the conservative figure were 
more persuasive since the set P/E was nearer his opinion130. Yet, it should be noted that 
there was no disagreement about the point whether this private company’s shares should 
have a lower P/E than quoted stocks have. On the whole, in case law the determined 
P/Es for shares of private companies have typically been between 4 and 10131. As the 
level of these figures implies, the P/Es of comparable quoted companies are discounted 
when they are applied to the shares of private companies. In short, these shares do not 
attract premium price/eamings ratios.
My main interest is the value of majority and minority shares, so I raise the most 
important point in this matter. In CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Demarco 
Almeida132, Lord Millett noted that minority shares in a private company as a going 
concern are valued both without and with a discount due to their minority status. The 
question is whether auditors use a further discount for P/E figures when minority shares 
in a private company are valued on an earnings basis. Ultimately, there is a clear 
answer: auditors predominantly consider that there should be an extra discount for 
minority shares. As Lord Millett stated, it is “the common practice of auditors” to apply 
“a substantial discount” to minority shares when shares are valued under the articles133. 
In an auditor’s valuation on an earnings basis, it is extremely likely that minority shares 
will be subject to a special discount.
130 Judges generally seem to feel that a conservative view is more appropriate than a speculative one; see 
in particular Parkinson v Eurofinance Group Ltd [2001] 1 BCLC 720.
131 Ibid: P/E 3.5; Buckingham v Francis [1986] BCLC 353: P/E 4; Matlaszek v Bloom Camillin (a firm)
[2003] EWHC 2728: P/E 4.25; Richards v Lundy [2000] 1 BCLC 376: P/E 6; Re John Reid & Sons 
(Strucsteel) Ltd [2003] 2 BCLC 319: P/E 6; Marks v Sherred (Inspector o f Taxes) [2004] STC (SCD) 
362: P/E 10; Re Planet Organic Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 366: P/E 11.5.
132 [2002] 2 BCLC 108 (PC) 118.
133 Ibid; see also eg Macro v Thompson (No 3) [1997] 2 BCLC 36, 72 (Robert Walker J).
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Obviously, it is in the interests of majority shareholders to support the idea that 
minority shares are less valuable. For example, in Re Phoenix Office Supplies LtdUA the 
majority shareholders proposed that the purchase price for minority shares under the 
articles should be substantially discounted to reflect their minority status. Further, the 
majority shareholders preferred the valuation under the articles to the valuation under 
CA 1985 s 459 because under that provision shares are generally valued on a pro rata 
basis135. As the case plainly shows, different ideas are followed when minority shares 
are valued under the articles and under s 459.
Yet, the fundamental idea under the articles is that the auditor may determine
1 3 6the fair value for shares. In Re Castlebum , the auditor made a speaking valuation 
showing explicitly that a special discount was applied for a substantial minority of 44 
per cent in a private company. In consequence, a minority shareholder tried to challenge 
this valuation in court. Paul Bakes J considered that the articles did not require the 
auditor to value the shares on a pro rata basis, so the discount could be applied to a 
minority holding. The same conclusion was reached, for example, in Re a company (No 
006834 o f 1988), ex p Kremer137 by Hoffmann J. Overall, the auditors may use their 
discretion and decide that minority shares are valued with a special discount. In general, 
it is possible to say that minority shareholders, in fact, bear a risk that accountants, in 
carrying out a valuation under the articles, apply a further discount to their shares138.
The central question is, of course, why auditors apply a special discount for 
minority holdings. This study sees that there are three main reasons for their conclusion. 
First, minority shares are considered less valuable since they are supposed to fetch a 
lower price when they are sold. The higher value of majority shares is regarded as a 
fact, a view that auditors commonly seem to accept.
134 [2002] 2 BCLC 556; [2003] 1 BCLC 76 (CA).
135 Discussed further below 7.4.
136 (1989) 5 BCC 652.
137 [1989] BCLC 365.
138 See Virdi v Abbey Leisure Ltd [1990] BCLC 342 (CA).
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But more importantly, judges widely share this auditors’ view. From the legal 
perspective, the value of shares is a matter of fact, and commercial practice should 
matter in share valuation. As Wynn-Parry J said in Re Press Caps Ltd!39'. “A valuation 
... may be made on one of a number of bases, but the final test of what is the value of a 
thing is what it will fetch if sold.” The value of shares must be related to share pricing in 
practice.
In Ocean Coal Co Ltd v Powell Dujfryn Steam Coal Co Ltd, Farwell J explained 
pricing of shares in this way:
There may be... a considerable difference between the price at which a 
shareholder is willing to sell his shares, if he is desirous of selling a large or 
small number, and the price which he obtains for his shares may vary according 
to the number of shares he is proposing to sell ... [in] an offer of shares 
sufficient to give control of the Company, it may well be that a purchaser would 
be prepared to pay a much higher price for a number of shares sufficient for that 
purpose, whereas he would not be willing to pay such higher price if the number 
of shares was reduced below the necessary number.140
The judge clearly indicated that the price for a majority holding is generally higher per 
share. Further, Lord Salmon pointed out the same idea very precisely in Arenson v 
Casson Beckman Rutley & Co141, where he considered that “there is normally a 
substantial difference between the value per share of a small minority holding and the 
value per share of the entire holding in a private company.” Sometimes, this is
139 [1949] Ch 434 (CA) 447.
140 [1932] 1 Ch 654, 661.
141 [1977] AC 405 (HL) 434.
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formulated so that majority shares carry a control premium142. Finally, in Re Howie and 
Crawford’s arbitration143 Vinelott J explicitly ruled that in share valuation the size of 
the particular holding must be taken into account. In sum, judges generally accept the 
view that majority shares may be more valuable than minority shares.
Of course, this study should share the same view about this fact, even though 
questions of fact are never binding part in English precedents144. Nevertheless, I 
consider that the relationship between fact and law is more complicated since the value 
of shares is often a mixed matter of fact and law. Furthermore, this study emphasizes 
that English company law offers increasingly greater protection to minority 
shareholders. This protection is an important issue in share valuation too. Therefore, I 
review the value of minority shares in law more deeply later.
The second special point in valuation by auditors is that they are valuing the 
shares of a retiring member. The fundamental idea of the provisions under the articles is 
not that the transferor of shares should be able to get a ‘full value’ for his shares: 
discounts in share valuation might be appropriate. It is enough that a shareholder 
leaving the company gets a fair share price, which is typically less than their pro rata 
value. Indeed, neither commercial practice nor company law supports a practice that 
shareholders are allowed to leave the company at will and then ‘put’ their shares at their 
full value on other shareholders145.
Third, it is a fact that company law offers special ways for majority shareholders 
to leave a company. In Greenhalgh v Ardeme Cinemas LtdU6, majority shareholders 
desired to sell their shares to an outsider. But the articles, in their common form, gave 
every shareholder the right to purchase the transferred shares at a fair value; thus, the
142 Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] AC 534 (HL); Re a company (No 002612 o f 1984) (1986) 2 
BCC 99,453; 99,486 (Vinelott J); Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 354, 410 (Arden J).
143 [1990] BCLC 686.
144 See eg Goodhart, Arthur L., Essays in Jurisprudence and the Common Law (London 1931) Iff.
145 See O ’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (HL) 1104-5; Re Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd [2003] 1 
BCLC 76 (CA).
146 [1951] Ch 286 (CA).
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provisions were first altered by the support of the majority to sanction the transfer of 
their shares to the outside buyer. In brief, the majority shareholders ‘lifted the ban’ in 
the articles. As the case shows, the articles could not similarly restrict the transfer of 
majority shares; it is easier for majority shareholders to get the full value for their 
shares147. Ultimately, auditors seem to consider that majority power itself makes 
majority shares more valuable148.
Indeed, companies are governed by majority power, and majority shareholders 
are able to nominate the auditors by their votes. In practice, majority shareholders might 
be in favour of those auditors who appreciate the value of their shares. In addition, after 
the valuation of a retiring member’s shares, the auditors’ re-appointment and future 
remuneration may directly depend on the support of those shareholders who have 
acquired shares at the fair price. In consequence, auditors may be fairer to the remaining 
members than to the leaving ones. There is a risk of a conflict of interests when a 
company’s auditor values shares.
In North Holdings Ltd v Southern Tropics LtdU9, Morritt LJ explained that 
minority shareholders often have a “belief’ that “the auditor will feel beholden to the 
majority shareholders”. Therefore, he proposed that, in certain cases, the court should 
appoint the expert to value shares. This could decrease the risk that the experts act, if we 
use the wording of Mummery LJ150, like ‘hired guns’ in their task.
Case law offers a clear example where the interest of a minority shareholder was 
neglected in share valuation. In Re Benfield Greig Group pic151, the auditors 
compromised their ability to act as an independent valuer due to their earlier 
commitments to the company. The auditors gave a valuation of £2.10 per share even 
though there was a recent share placement at the price of £4 per share since they were
147 In addition, a special majority has power to liquidate a company.
148 About this point more below 7.6.1.
149 [1999] 2 BCLC 625 (CA) 639.
150 Guinness Peat Group pic v British Land Co pic [1999] 2 BCLC 243 (CA) 254.
151 [2000] 2 BCLC 488; [2002] 1 BCLC 65 (CA).
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more interested to confirm their lower valuation in the context of estate duty than to 
determine a fair value for the particular shares. In consequence, the Court of Appeal 
reversed the decision of Arden J and remitted the case back to the Companies Court.
Altogether, there are several reasons why auditors consider that minority shares 
should be subject to a further discount in the eamings-based share valuation. In any 
event, the lower value for minority shares is generally their honest opinion; furthermore, 
judges seem to accept this professional view as a question of fact. The argument goes 
that the value of shares must depend on the opinion of experts. Simply, auditors may 
determine whether a special discount for minority shares is applied in share valuation on 
an earnings basis. As Denning LJ stated in Dean v Prince152: “if the auditor was of 
opinion that that was a fair method, no one can say that he was wrong.” Overall, the 
fundamental idea under the articles is that the auditors set the fair value for shares.
7.3.2.4 Auditors’ discretion
Valuations under the provisions of the articles are typically unpredictable in their 
outcome but nevertheless normally immune from challenge153. Still, the question arises 
whether the role of the law is only to state that auditors may value shares how they 
please? Consequently, are minority shareholders in particular at their mercy on this 
point? As Harman J noted in Dean v Prince154, shareholders may be unwisely 
committing themselves to be bound by the opinion of the auditors although they might 
give a valuation that some members strongly distrust.
The starting point of law is, as explained above, that the parties are bound to the 
figure fixed by the expert. In blunt, shareholders cannot challenge auditors’ valuation
152 [1954] Ch 409 (CA) 428.
153 Macro v Thompson (No 3) [1997] 2 BCLC 36, 72 (Robert Walker J).
154 [1953] Ch 590, 596.
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even though the valuation is too low for minority shares155. The auditor has discretion in 
share valuation. In addition, mistakes in share valuation do not mean that experts are 
negligent. For example, that was the ruling in Goldstein v Levy Gee (a firm j 156, where 
the auditors erroneously applied a discount in valuation on an asset basis. In effect, the 
negligence of the auditors does not seem to have an important role in shareholders’ 
protection in the context of share valuation157.
But the status of company law is not that auditors may value shares however 
they prefer. First, the pro rata valuation of shares can explicitly be mentioned in the 
articles; it is increasingly common that the articles state so. Of course, auditors should 
then follow the terms of corporate contract158: shares must be valued on a pro rata 
basis159. The articles can rule how auditors should value shares. It is very 
understandable that minority shareholders require this principle to be included in the 
articles. As Oliver LJ noted in Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd16°, this point in the articles 
is a “rather important provision” for them. From the perspective of minority 
shareholders, such a provision secures the equal value of their shares.
Second, company law offers more protection to minority shareholders. The most 
important factor in this progress is CA 1985 s 459. The ruling of Virdi v Abbey Leisure 
Ltdm  explicitly shows that minority shareholders, under certain circumstances, may 
refuse to take the risk that auditors might value their shares at a discount. So, company 
law offers protection against unfairness in auditors’ valuation. Thus, the whole approach 
of the courts to the valuations by auditors has significantly changed, as Harman J
155 See Re Benfield Greig Group pic  [2000] 2 BCLC 488, 512-13.
156 [2003] All ER (D) 12.
157 Ibid [39], where Lewison J considered that it is difficult “to extract a coherent and principled approach 
to the question of valuer’s negligence”, and so there might be a need for a higher court ruling to resolve 
“the divergent streams of authority”.
158 See generally Jones v Jones [1971] 2 All ER 676.
159 Compare eg Re Castleburn (1989) 5 BCC 652.
160 [1985] BCLC 493 (CA) 505.
161 [1990] BCLC 342 (CA).
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explained in Re a company (No 00330 o f 1991), ex p Holden162. Case law clearly 
implies that judges do not always regard the fair value for shares set by the auditors as 
fair in law generally, in particular in cases of oppressed minority shareholders. The fair 
value of shares is really related to the particular context163. In brief, judges do not fully 
share the opinions of accountants about the value of minority shares.
In conclusion, in private companies it is typical that auditors may determine a 
fair value for retiring members’ shares. This value for shares is ultimately a professional 
view of the auditor. In the context of this study, it is important to notice that experts 
generally apply a special discount to minority shares, ie they mainly regard minority 
shares as less valuable than their pro rata value. Judges respect auditors’ views of the 
share value, but as mentioned, in CA 1985 s 459 cases there is normally no discount due 
to the minority status. On the whole, I propose that these s 459 cases better explain 
company law’s view of share value. Put simply, court rulings are legal judgments, and 
the valuations by auditors are mere commercial opinions. But before analysing case law 
under s 459 ,1 first review the hypothetical value of shares.
7.3.3 Hypothetical value of shares
It is common ground that shares are valued on the basis of a hypothetical sale164. Shares 
have a value “according to the market”165; ie their value exists in the realm of exchange. 
Hypothetical value is the price available, and in the case of quoted shares their value is 
the current stock market price. As Lord Fleming explained in Salvesen’s Trustees v 
Commissioners o f Inland Revenue166, there is no difficulty to determine the hypothetical 
value for quoted shares. For estate duty purposes, their value is the market price at the
162 [1991] BCLC 597,602-3.
163 Eg Hollington (2004) 259: ‘“fair value’ in [the context of pre-emption articles] is more limited than in 
the context of a share purchase order under s 459.”
164 Re Lynall [1969] 1 Ch 421, 430 (Plowman J).
165 Mcllquham v Taylor [1895] 1 Ch 53 (CA) 64 (Lord Lindley); Battle v Inland Revenue Commissioners 
[1980] STC 86.
166 [1930] SLT 387, 390.
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date of the death, which is both the “sufficient” and “best” criterion of the price in this 
context167.
Shares in a private company have a different nature because they do not have
well-operating markets: there is no real current market price and value for these shares.
Unquoted shares are, indeed, infrequently traded property; they do not have a
demonstrable commercial value. In effect, the price for these shares should be presumed 
1 6 8or even imagined .
What is the hypothetical value of unquoted shares? The general view of English 
law is that the principal value of all property is the price that it would fetch if sold169. 
Ultimately, the value depends on the available price: it is the price between a willing 
buyer and a willing seller170. As Wynn-Parry J said in Re Press Caps Ltd171: “the final 
test of what is the value of a thing is what it will fetch if sold.” Thus, shares of a private 
company are subject to market valuation. In Lynall v Inland Revenue Commissioners112, 
Lord Reid declared that the best way to determine the value of shares is to let the price 
be determined by economic forces by throwing a sale open to the competition. In sum, 
the hypothetical value of shares of a private company is the price that a hypothetical 
purchaser would pay for them on a hypothetical sale in the open market.
But the determination of a hypothetical price for a private company’s shares is 
problematic as there is no open market for them. The two important reasons for this 
situation are: 1) shares of private companies are not generally interesting as an 
investment; 2) restrictions in their articles may make these shares unmarketable. I
167 Commissioners o f Inland Revenue v Crossman [1937] AC 26 (HL) 47 (Lord Blanesburgh).
168 Re Holt [1953] 1 WLR 1488, 1492 (Danckwerts J): “The result is that I must enter into a dim world 
peopled by the indeterminate spirits of fictitious or unborn sales.”
69 The idea comes from fiscal law; Finance Act 1894 s 7(5): “The principal value of any property shall be 
estimated to be the price which, in the opinion of the Commissioners, such property would fetch if sold in 
the open market at the time of the death of the deceased.”
170 See also Re Howie and Crawford’s arbitration [1990] BCLC 686.
171 [1949] Ch 434 (CA) 447.
172 [1972] AC 680 (HL) 695.
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explore these factors, focusing on the hypothetical value of majority and minority 
shares.
In a private company, shareholders are typically more participants than 
investors: the relationship among them is personal. Further, shareholders do not 
participate only through share capital but they are normally also directors and workers 
in the company173. Share capital and shares have a different role in private companies.
An acquisition of shares in a private company, in practice, means that the buyer 
should step into the seller’s shoes. This makes the selling of shares more complicated 
since there may be some personal requirements for the buyer. In addition, he should be 
willing to take the role of a shareholder with its personal features. After all, the typical 
buyer for shares in a private company is, as Danckwerts J noted in Re Holt114, “rather 
the exceptional kind of investor who [has] some special reason for putting his money 
into shares of this kind.”
There are fewer willing buyers for shares of private companies. Shareholders 
may find that it is difficult to ‘get rid of’ these shares because there is no adequate 
market. Of course, the limited number of possible buyers decreases share price, an idea 
which coincides with the practice that in share valuation these shares are regarded as 
less valuable than the shares in comparable public companies.
The common traditional view is that minority shares in a private company are 
quite uninteresting because those “shares do not give a purchaser the opportunity to 
control the company, or to influence the policy of the directors to any great extent”175. 
Following the same idea, Peter Smith J put the position of a minority shareholder in 
Rock Nominees Ltd v RCO (Holdings) pic (in liquidation) in this way:
173 See Re a company [1986] BCLC 362, 369, where Hoffmann J considered that the value of a private 
company’s shares in a going concern was most related to shareholders’ ability to pay themselves 
remuneration by way of salary.
174 [1953] 1 WLR 1488, 1501.
175 Ibid.
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“It is self-evident to my mind that ordinarily, such a small shareholding [of 2.48 
per cent] in a private unlisted company has little or no worth in the sense that its 
ability to receive dividends is likely to be restricted, its ability to influence the 
board is likely to be restricted and its ability to sell the shares is likely to be 
restricted.”176
A minority shareholder in a private company may feel himself quite disabled. In effect, 
shares of a private company are rarely attractive as investments. Some commentators 
have a view that it used to be so that the best advice was not to invest in these shares at 
all177.
17RShares of a private company typically have “a close and small market” , ie 
their market is among existing shareholders. In Re a company, it was considered in this 
way:
The purchaser would be able to get little or nothing for his shares on a sale to a 
third party but they would be worth more to the majority shareholders179.
Simply, the evident buyers for these shares are the majority shareholders. This as a 
starting point gives them a strong bargaining position if minority shareholders sell their 
shares. In economic terms, there is no need to pay the full value for these shares;
176 [2003] 2 BCLC 493, 513; see also Pettet, Ben, Company Law (Harlow 2001) 253: “the minority 
holding carries no control, can vote no director onto the board, can remove no director, and is dependent 
on the majority for any dividends.”
177 Dawson, I. J. and Stephenson, I. S., The Protection o f Minority Shareholders (Croydon 1993) v; see 
also above, chapter six 6.5.
178 Re Sir William Thomas Paulin [1935] 1 KB 26 (CA) 44 (Lord Hanworth MR).
179 [1986] BCLC 362, 368; the same idea can be found in CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v 
Demarco Almeida [2002] 2 BCLC 108 (PC) 118 (Lord Millett): “An outsider would normally be 
unwilling to pay a significant price for a minority holding in a private company.”
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therefore, a minority shareholder might be able to exit a private company “only at an 
unrealistically low price”180.
Still, if nobody is willing to buy the particular shares, they are not valueless, 
even if that might be true in economic terms. In law, the point is different. For example, 
in Re Ghyll Beck Driving Range Ltdm  Vinelott J considered that the investment value 
of the minority shares could be taken “for practicable purposes as nil”. However, this 
was not his conclusion under CA 1985 s 459. It is clear that company law does not 
support the idea that if majority shareholders are not willing to pay anything for 
minority shares, they can have these shares for free. As Denning LJ noted in Dean v 
Prince:
“Test it this way: suppose it had been Prince who had died, leaving only 30 
shares. Those 30 shares, being a minority shareholding, would fetch nothing in 
the open market. But does that mean that the other directors would be entitled to 
take his shares for nothing? Surely not.”182
Similarly, the willingness of other shareholders to buy shares does not determine their 
hypothetical value. The intention is to set a reasonable price for shares, not the price that 
the buyers would really pay for them183. Moreover, the hypothetical price as a concept is 
based on an assumption of an open market from which no buyer is excluded184.
180 Davies, Paul L., Introduction to Company Law (Oxford 2002) 23.
181 [1993] BCLC 1126, 1131.
182 [1954] Ch 409 (CA) 427-28.
183 Battle v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1980] STC 86, 91 (Balcombe J): “one does not postulate a 
particular vendor or a particular purchaser”; Commissioners o f Inland Revenue v Crossman [1937] AC 26 
(HL) 50 (Lord Blanesburgh): “it is unnecessary to inquire by whom the property would hypothetically 
have to be offered.”
184 Re Sir William Thomas Paulin [1935] 1 KB 26 (CA) 43 (Lord Hanworth MR); Re Holt [1953] 1 WLR 
1488; Inland Revenue Commissioners v Gray (surviving executor o f Lady Fox deceased) [1994] STC 360 
(CA) 372 (Hoffmann LJ): “The concept of the open market involves assuming that the whole world was 
free to bid, and then forming a view about what in those circumstances would in real life have been the 
best price reasonably obtainable.”
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Yet, the hypothetical value of shares is a question of fact185; as a result, the price 
available must be ascertained on expert evidence. Overall, as mentioned above, auditors 
and other experts typically consider that the value of minority shares per share is lower 
than the worth of majority shares186. Lord Millett noted the same point in 
CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Demarco Almeida1*1, stating that the common 
practice of auditors is “to apply a substantial discount to reflect the fact that the shares 
represent a minority holding.” Since experts of share valuation widely think that the 
hypothetical price for minority shares is less than their pro rata value, the courts have 
also accepted this as a matter of fact in their decisions188.
In particular, for fiscal purposes the governing idea is that the value of shares is 
related to the size of the particular shareholding. For example, in Lloyds Bank pic v 
Duker1*9, John Mowbray QC, sitting as a deputy judge, held, on the basis of the 
evidence before him, that a majority shareholding in a private company was “worth 
markedly more” per share than minority holdings in the same company. In addition, he 
noted that the value of the assets was expected to find “at least a substantial reflection” 
in the value of majority shares190. By contrast, the value of minority shares was not 
expected to reflect the net asset value “to any appreciable extent”. Following similar 
ideas, in Battle v Inland Revenue Commissioners191 Balcombe J considered that the 
value of a minority holding would represent “a substantial discount on the asset value of
185 Gold Coast Selection Trust Ltd v Humphrey (Inspector o f Taxes) [1948] AC 459 (HL); Duke o f  
Buccleuch v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1966] 1 QB 851 (CA) 872 (Danckwerts LJ); Guinness Peat 
Group pic v British Land Co pic  [1999] 2 BCLC 243 (CA) 253 (Mummery LJ).
186 Eg Glover (1986) 67; Hollington (2004) 263: “In the real world the value of a minority shareholding in 
an unquoted private company is usually much less than its pro rata value.”
187 [2002] 2 BCLC 108 (PC) 118.
188 Eg Re Macro (Ipswich) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 354, 409 (Arden J): “Because this was a private company, 
the market value of a share forming part of a minority shareholding would be very small” (emphasis 
original); Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd [1984] BCLC 195, 201 (Nourse J): “it is a matter of common 
occurrence for a shareholder to acquire shares from another at a price which is discounted because they 
represent a minority holding.”
[1987] 3 All ER 193.
190 Ibid 196.
191 [1980] STC 86,91.
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those shares”192. Indeed, it should be mentioned that in the field of estate duty the 
statute law has explicitly ruled that majority shares should be valued by reference to 
their asset value instead of the market value used in the case of minority shares193. 
Therefore, tax law even requires that different methods should be used in setting a 
hypothetical value for majority and minority shares. In sum, it seems to be very clear 
that in the field of taxation the value of majority and minority shares is not equal.
Further, the decisions in tax cases reflect the notion that the hypothetical value 
of minority shares depends on the particular size of a minority holding. In Hawkings- 
Byass v Sassen (Inspector o f Taxes)194, the special commissioners decided that it was 
appropriate to value the largest shareholding in a private company with a premium of 20 
per cent. The determined value for the 18.16 per cent holding was £307 per share, but 
the value for both the 11.09 and the 9.09 per cent holdings was £256 per share. The 
view of the special commissioners was that these minority shareholdings could 
reasonably be expected to fetch different prices on an open market. As this case 
explicitly shows, all minority shares do not have the same value in tax law.
However, it should be remembered that valuation always takes place in a 
particular context. Therefore, majority shares might be widely considered to be more 
valuable in tax law, but the inevitable conclusion is not that it would be the same in 
company law. As Evershed MR explained in Dean v Prince195, the analogy is not 
“conclusive” between cases where shares are valued for estate duty purposes and in
, 196company law .
192 See also Re a company (No 004475 o f  1982) [1983] Ch 178, where an offer for shares based on an 
open market was £112,000 but the net asset value of the shares was regarded as £175,000.
193 See Barclays Bank Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1961] AC 509 (HL); Re Duffy [1949] Ch 28 
(CA) 32 (Lord Greene MR): by this scheme, an existing state of law is “pulled to pieces, and as a result 
something is deemed to be a person’s property that, in law, it is not.”
194 [1996] STC (SCD) 319.
195 [1954] Ch 409 (CA) 420.
196 See also eg Murdock, Charles W., ‘The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders 
and Its Impact Upon Valuation of Minority Shares’ (1990) 65 Notre Dame Law Review 425, 472: “While 
such discounts make sense in the tax setting, they are wholly inappropriate in a state court proceeding in 
which a minority shareholder seeks to be bought out because of oppressive conduct by the majority.”
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The ruling of Re Benfield Greig Group pic197 offers an illustrative example of 
these different perspectives. The general aim of shareholders for tax purposes may be to 
reach a value that is as low as possible. In this case, the auditors were indeed successful 
in this part of their task because they managed to persuade the Inland Revenue to accept 
a low value for shares. Yet, when the auditors valued the shares of a minority 
shareholder on the same basis under the articles of the company, the Court of Appeal 
remitted the case back to the Companies Court. Accordingly, even if a valuation may be 
acceptable for tax purposes, it can be the opposite in company law. I consider that the 
decisions of tax cases are typically quite unable to show the value of majority and 
minority shares in company law198.
But other than tax cases also suggest that in share valuation the size of the 
shareholding has particular importance. For example, in Re Bird Precision Bellows 
Ltd199 Oliver LJ observed that the ordinary valuation principles take into account the 
proportionate size of the holding in relation to the issued share capital as a whole and 
the control of the company. In Re Howie and Crawford's arbitration200, Vinelott J 
considered it in the same way by stating that the market price of shares normally 
depends on the proportion of the shares of the company comprised in the holding. 
Therefore, I do not argue in this study that the hypothetical value of majority shares 
would be regarded as higher only in the field of tax law. Still, I propose that the real 
position of company law is mainly found from CA 1985 s 459 cases, which I analyse 
below.
Finally, the restrictions in the articles on the transfer of shares may make shares 
in a private company unmarketable: the sale of shares to outsiders can be forbidden. The 
situation is typically that there “cannot be a real sale in the open market under the
197 [2002] 1 BCLC 65 (CA).
198 Contrast eg Sealy, L. S., Cases and Materials in Company Law (7th edn London 2001) 474-75, where 
he explicitly refers to valuation in tax law.
199 [1985] BCLC 493 (CA) 499.
200 [1990] BCLC 686, 689.
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9 5 2 0 1articles” , and thus the market of shares is ‘closed’. As a result, it is impossible to find
a market value for these shares, as Farwell J stated in Borland's Trustee v Steel Brothers
202& Co Ltd . Furthermore, the greater is the restriction on transfer, the greater is the 
effect on share value. In brief, these restrictions may have “considerable effect in 
depreciating the value of the shares”203.
How is the hypothetical value determined for shares that cannot have an open 
market value? The House of Lords settled these principles for the purpose of estate duty 
in their decision in Commissioners o f Inland Revenue v Crossman204. According to the 
ruling, the hypothetical value of shares is the price that they would fetch if the bidder 
were entitled to be registered as a shareholder but the acquirer would then become 
subject to the restrictions on transfer in the articles. In practice, shares are valued with 
an assumption that the restrictive provisions are not imposed upon this particular sale. 
Shares are in a way thrown to a hypothetical open market where all the persons 
interested should have an opportunity to purchase. Therefore, in fiscal valuation the 
provisions in the articles are partly ignored: shares are supposed to be freely saleable 
even if they are not.
There are two important points that should be raised from the ruling of 
Crossman. First, under the articles the value of shares is set in accordance with the 
particular provisions that apply to the company and its shares. In general, auditors 
determine the basis of share valuation and the fair value of shares. By contrast, when 
estate duty is set, the valuation of shares is made on a different basis: the provisions of
201 Salvesen’s Trustees v Commissioners o f Inland Revenue [1930] SLT 387, 391 (Lord Fleming); Re Sir 
William Thomas Paulin [1935] 1 KB 26 (CA) 63 (Romer LJ): “An actual sale in open market is out of the 
question.”
202 [1901] 1 Ch 279, 291; Lynall v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1972] AC 680 (HL) 693 (Lord Reid): 
“In my view it is legally impossible for the shareholder to sell such shares in the open market or otherwise 
without first obtaining from the holder of the right of pre-emption an agreement not to exercise that 
right.”
2 [1930] SLT 387, 392; Attorney-General v Jameson [1905] 2 IR 218, 227 (Lord Ashbourne): shares 
absolutely free and unfettered in power of disposition are much more valuable.
204 [1937] AC 26 (HL).
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the articles and the auditors’ view do not have a central role in this valuation. As a 
result, the fair pre-emption price of shares can be different from the hypothetical value 
for the purposes of estate duty. In Crossman, shares were really regarded, for purposes 
of estate duty, as more valuable than their ‘fair value’ under the articles. So, it is indeed 
impossible to argue that there could be a single general objective value for shares. Share 
value is related to the context of valuation.
Second, when shares are valued under the articles, their value is fundamentally 
contractual in nature since provisions of the articles set the basis of valuation; 
furthermore, the auditor normally has discretion to choose the most appropriate method 
in share valuation. However, for the purposes of estate duty, the law rules the governing 
ideas of valuation, ie shares should be valued on the basis of a hypothetical sale on an 
open market. The basis set is a question of law, so in these cases the law determines the 
principles that should be applied to the particular facts. In essence, the valuation of 
shares distinctively becomes a mixed point of fact and law. Remarkably, it should be 
noted that share valuation is also this kind of mixed matter in other cases205. The role of 
law is not only to accept the value stated in the articles or whatever experts might find 
reasonable. As Crossman explicitly shows, law can rule how experts should perform 
share valuation in certain circumstances.
To conclude, I have analysed in this section three different objective values for 
shares, namely market value, value under the articles, and hypothetical value of shares. I 
summarise, on the one hand, that all these values are questions of fact. Moreover, it 
seems to be a widely accepted fact that majority shares may have a higher value per 
share than minority shares: this idea prevails, in particular, in the context of tax law. On 
the other hand, the value of shares is not purely a question of fact. For example, it is
205 See eg North Holdings Ltd v Southern Tropics Ltd [1999] 2 BCLC 625 (CA); Hicks, Andrew and Goo, 
S. H., Cases and Materials on Company Law (5th edn Oxford 2004) 235: “certain of the principles applied 
are said to be matters of law.”
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question of law that shareholders are bound to the value fixed by the auditor; 
furthermore, the courts decide when an auditor is negligent in his task. But more 
importantly, the law can set the basis of valuation as it does when the hypothetical value 
is determined for shares in a private company. Yet, it might be possible that the role of 
law in share valuation is not fully recognized. I propose that, in fact, company law 
generally accepts that the value of shares is equal. Therefore, I analyse the area of 
company law where this equal value of shares is a legal presumption.
7.4 The value of shares under CA 1985 s 459
The CA 1985 s 459 offers special protection to minority shareholders206. The most 
common remedy under these provisions is a buy-out order where court provides that 
majority shareholders or the company itself must acquire the petitioner’s shares. I next 
review how the courts see the value of majority and minority shares in these cases.
As mentioned above, judges have widely accepted as a matter of fact that 
minority shares may be less valuable than their proportional value. Significantly, there 
are cases with the same view in the context of CA 1985 s 459. For example, in Re a 
company207 Hoffmann J considered that it is common ground that an outsider would not 
be willing to pay more than a nominal sum for minority shares. Thus, he held that the 
potential value of the shares was lower in the hands of the minority shareholder. His 
conclusion was that “a discount from an aliquot share of the value of the business on a 
price/eamings basis is therefore required” when the fair value of these minority shares 
was determined208.
In Re a company (No 002612 o f 1984j109, Vinelott J shared Hoffmann J ’s view 
about the value of shares as a question of fact when he considered that the value of the
206 More above, chapter six 6.4.2.
207 [1986] BCLC 362.
208 Ibid 369; see also Re a company (No 005134 o f 1986), exp  Harris [1989] BCLC 383, where Peter 
Gibson J directed that the fair price for the minority shares should be fixed on the discounted basis.
209 (1986) 2 BCC 99,453; 99,484.
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minority shares is higher in the hands of a majority shareholder as part of a controlling 
interest. However, his conclusion was that it would be unfair if the minority shareholder 
were bought out on the fictional basis applicable to a free election to sell his shares, or 
on any other basis that would involve a discounted price. As he noted, it would be 
inequitable that a majority shareholder whose conduct had been found unfairly 
prejudicial should be allowed to purchase the shares at their investment value.
Therefore, he held that in these circumstances the fair value of the minority shares 
should be higher than the price available in a market transaction.
The same conclusion was earlier reached in Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltdr210, 
where Nourse J stated that the fair value of minority shares should be fixed pro rata 
according to the value of the shares as a whole without any discount. He regarded this 
as the correct course, although the fair value of shares should always be determined on 
the basis of facts in the particular case. Consequently, as he noted, there is no rule of 
universal application either that the price of a minority shareholding in a small private 
company should be fixed on a pro rata basis according to the value of the company as a 
whole, or that the price should be discounted to reflect the status of a minority holding. 
Yet, as a general rule, in the case of a forced sale in a quasi-partnership company, he 
saw that “the only fair method of compensating an unwilling vendor of the equivalent of 
a partnership share” is to fix the value pro rata without any discount due to the minority 
status211. On the other hand, when a minority shareholder has acted in a way to deserve 
his exclusion, he considered that share value could then be appropriately discounted 
since the shareholder could be treated as if he had elected to sell his shares, and so the 
selling price would be discounted too.
The respondents in Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd appealed against Nourse J ’s 
judgment. They argued that the fair purchase price for minority shares is their open
210 [1984] BCLC 195.
211 Ibid 201-2.
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market price, and thus there should be a discount in the case of a minority holding. But 
the Court of Appeal212 dismissed their appeal, and their Lordships explained that the 
judge was perfectly entitled to arrive at his conclusion. Under the statutory provisions, 
the court may exercise its wide discretion and order what is just and equitable between
213shareholders . The law does not require the court to fix the value of minority shares 
solely by reference to their market value as a minority holding214. Instead, the idea of 
CA 1985 s 459 is to give the court jurisdiction to put right and cure the unfair prejudice 
that a minority shareholder has suffered at the hands of the majority215. Following this 
ruling, due to fairness, the value of shares in these circumstances is fixed pro rata 
according to the value of shares as a whole. In consequence, the value of minority and 
majority shares is regarded as equal in law.
As Warner J noted in Re Elgindata Ltd:
In a ‘quasi partnership’ case, such as Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd was, it will 
often be fair to direct that the price of a minority shareholding which is to be
91 (\purchased should be fixed on the pro rata basis.
Equally, Balcombe LJ observed in Virdi v Abbey Leisure Ltd that s 459 case law, and in 
particular Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd, shows “a general inclination towards a pro
9 1 7rata basis of valuation” . Therefore, ordinarily the only fair course is to value shares
212 [1985] BCLC 493 (CA).
213 See also Re Elgindata Ltd [1991] BCLC 959, 1007 (Warner J): “the court has a wide discretion which 
it must exercise so as to achieve a result which is fair as between the parties in all the circumstances of the 
case.”
214 Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone [2000] 2 BCLC 516, 527 (Kim Lewison QC): “the court is [not] 
simply bound to award the market value of the shareholding at the selected valuation date.”
215 [1985] BCLC 493 (CA) 499-500; Re Cumana Ltd [1986] BCLC 430 (CA): a purchase order represents 
compensation for wrongs done to a minority shareholder.
216 [1991] BCLC 959, 1007.
217 [1990] BCLC 342 (CA) 350.
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on the pro rata basis218.1 summarise the current position of law in CA 1985 s 459 cases 
by quoting Lord Millett in CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Demarco
219Almeida : “normally the shares should be valued without any discount”. As a result, 
the value of minority shares under these provisions is “their full value”220.
Does the law then rule that in CA 1985 s 459 cases the value of shares must be 
equal? No, it does not, because, as mentioned, the value of shares is a question of fact. 
The value of majority and minority shares depends on the particular facts. In O ’Neill v 
Phillips221, which is one of the landmark cases in the area of s 459, Lord Hoffmann 
noted that “ordinarily” the fair value of minority shares is an equivalent proportion of 
the total issued share capital, ie shares must normally be valued pro rata and without a 
discount due to their minority status. As his Lordship considered, this pro rata basis is a 
presumption in the existing practice too. But he also stated that:
This is not to say that there may not be cases in which it will be fair to take a 
discounted value.222
Thus, first there is no general rule about the valuation of shares under s 459: the value 
of minority shares may be fixed on a pro rata basis, or their value may be discounted to 
reflect their status as a minority holding. The court has discretion to set the fair value for 
shares on the basis of the particular facts. Nourse J ’s view in Re Bird Precision Bellows 
Ltd223 is still current: there is no rule of universal application either way. Ultimately, the
218 Richards v Lundy [2000] 1 BCLC 376, 397; Re Ghyll Beck Driving Range Ltd [1993] BCLC 1126,
1134; Re London School o f Electronics Ltd [1985] BCLC 273, 282 (Nourse J): “it is clear that the price 
must be fixed pro rata according to the value of the shares as a whole and not discounted.”
219 [2002] 2 BCLC 108 (PC) 118.
220 Re Phoenix Office Supplies Ltd [2003] 1 BCLC 76 (CA).
221 [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (HL) 1107.
222 Ibid.
223 [1984] BCLC 195.
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fair value of shares is the value that the court determines to be fair with regard to all the 
circumstances of the case224.
Second, it is possible that a minority shareholder has acquired his shares at a 
discounted price. In Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd225, Nourse J noted that in these 
circumstances it might be fair that the minority shareholder is bought out on the same 
basis as he himself has acquired the shares. If the price paid for the shares did not 
initially represent their value on the pro rata basis, the price under CA 1985 s 459 can 
be discounted to reflect this fact226. The fair price is indeed related to the particular 
facts.
Consequently, it should be asked whether it is a fact that minority shareholders 
may generally acquire shares in a private company at a discounted price. I do not 
believe that it is so because minority shareholders’ bargaining position is weak. They 
are typically unable to get a full price for their shares on sale, and in a rather similar 
way, they are unable to get a discount when they acquire shares227, in particular when 
they acquire shares from a majority shareholder. Finally, commercial practice does not 
offer any minority discounts, for example in share issues, either. By contrast, all new 
shares are issued in rights issues at the same price228. In any event, the focus of the court 
must plainly be on the particular case where the price for shares is determined. 
Therefore, there is no need to set a fair price for shares in general.
Third, what does it mean that the fair value of minority shares in CA 1985 s 459 
cases is “ordinarily”229, “normally”230, or “often”231 their pro rata value, ie the equal
224 Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd [1985] BCLC 493 (CA) 500 (Oliver LJ).
225 [1984] BCLC 195,202.
226 Re Elgindata Ltd [1991] BCLC 959, 1007 (Warner J); on the other hand, it might be arguable that if a 
minority shareholder has initially paid more than a pro rata value for his shares, there should be a 
premium under s 459; see also Richards v Lundy [2000] 1 BCLC 376, 398 (Nicholas Strauss QC).
There are also commentators who argue that minority shareholders should get their shares at a 
discounted price as they bear a special risk of opportunism; see eg Gordon, Jeffrey N., ‘Ties that Bond: 
Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice’ (1988) 76 California Law Review 1, 
60.
228 See above, chapter five 5.5.
229 O ’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (HL) 1107.
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value? In brief, there is a presumption in company law that every share has the same 
value in this context232. Further, since this is a presumption, it is rebuttable, ie there 
may be cases where the fair value of shares is not their pro rata value. However, there 
should be special reasons for this conclusion. As explained above, one reason is that a 
minority shareholder has acted in a way to deserve his exclusion233. Another reason may 
be that a minority shareholder has not, quite exceptionally, initially paid the full price 
for the shares. But as this equal value is a presumption, the person who argues that a 
minority shareholder deserves his exclusion has to show the reason for this conclusion. 
Similarly, the person who argues that a minority shareholder has not paid a full value 
for his shares has to prove this point too234.
In summary, the general principle in CA 1985 s 459 cases is that shares are 
generally valued on a pro rata basis. The current law fundamentally proposes that every 
share has the same value in this context: the courts have accepted a pro rata valuation as 
the normal basis in these cases235. The fair thing is normally to treat quasi-partners in a 
private company equally . Since this is a presumption of law, not a rule of law, the 
court has discretion to decide that a discount should be applied to minority shares if 
justice in a special case requires it. Thus, in company law in this area shares principally 
have an equal value, but share value in a particular case still remains a matter of fact 
related to the particular circumstances.
230 CVC/Opportunity Equity Partners Ltd v Demarco Almeida [2002] 2 BCLC 108 (PC) 118.
231 Re Elgindata Ltd [1991] BCLC 959, 1007 (Warner J).
232 Eg Hollington (2004) 263: “there is a strong presumption that no such discount should be applied.”
233 Re Bird Precision Bellows Ltd [1984] BCLC 195; Re Planet Organic Ltd [2000] 1 BCLC 366, 
discount o f 30 per cent was applied.
234 See, in general, eg Fitzgerald, P. J., Salmond on Jurisprudence (12th edn London 1966) 73: a legal 
presumption means that “sufficient evidence” is required to establish the contrary conclusion.
Profinance Trust SA v Gladstone [2002] 1 BCLC 141 (CA) 149 (Robert Walker LJ): “In a ‘quasi­
partnership’ case where the petitioner is not at fault the court tends to favour an undiscounted share of the 
value o f the company as a whole.”
236 [2000] 1 BCLC 366, 371 (Jacob J).
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7.5 The value of majority shares and Short v Treasury Commissioners
Since my particular interest is the value of majority and minority shares, the ruling of 
Short v Treasury Commissioners237 is special in this area.
But first, it should be noted that Short is more a ‘war market’ than a stock 
market case. The case, whose ruling is strongly related to its particular facts and 
circumstances, is quite exceptional. Nevertheless, it is an important case in English 
company law; for example, Davies considers that it is the “most interesting” case 
explaining the juridical nature of a shareholder’s interest in the company238.
The legal issue in Short v Treasury Commissioners was the compulsory 
acquisition of a company’s shares, empowered by the Defence (General) Regulations 
1939, for efficient prosecution of the war. The company was quoted, and thus the 
transaction price of shares was fixed by reference to the Stock Exchange price on the 
so-called critical date when the acquisition legally took effect. But the stock market 
value at that date, and also the transfer price for the shares, was lower than their pro 
rata value calculated from the value of the company.
Still, in their judgments both the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords 
accepted that the value of shares could be less than their appropriate part of the value of 
the whole undertaking. Once the regulation ordered that the price was “the value of 
those shares as between a willing buyer and a willing seller”, the words ‘any shares’ 
referred to those individual shares, not to the company as a whole. In consequence, what 
was required was the valuation of shares, not of the company. The true method in 
valuation was share by share. Since this method had been used, the courts considered 
that the share price in the order was specified correctly.
237 [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA); [1948] AC 534 (HL).
238 Davies, Paul L., Gower and D avies’ Principles o f Modern Company Law (7th edn London 2003) 617; 
see also Gower, L. C. B., The Principles o f Modern Company Law (2nd edn London 1957) 322, where he 
points out that “the most important of these cases” are both Short and Crossman [1935] 1 KB 26 (CA); 
[1937] AC 26 (HL).
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What are the important points in Short v Treasury Commissioners? I think that 
the principal idea of the ruling can be found from the words of Evershed LJ:
Shareholders are not, in the eye of the law, part owners of the undertaking.239
Further, as Lord Porter explained in the ruling of the House of Lords: “a shareholder has 
no direct share in the assets of a company”240. As a result, the value of a company as a 
whole, or the value of its assets, does not show the value of shares241. Ultimately, the 
value of all the shares of a company can be different from the value of the company as a 
whole. I think that this is the most significant point in the ruling of Short.
Yet, the case has dicta that have raised particular interest, as Evershed LJ noted 
in the Court of Appeal:
If an individual shareholder in a company owns such a number of shares in that 
company as gives him effective control of the company’s affairs, it may well be 
that the value to be attributed to that holding, on a sale of it as a separate 
transaction, is a figure greater than the sum arrived at by multiplying the number 
of his shares by the ‘market’ value for the time being of a single share.242
Lord Uthwatt pointed out the same idea in the House of Lords in this way:
I desire only to add that if some one shareholder held a number of shares 
sufficient to carry control of the company, it might well be that the value proper 
to be attributed to his holding under the regulation was greater than the sum of
239 [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA) 122.
240 [1948] AC 534 (HL) 545.
241 More above, chapter three 3.4.1.
242 [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA) 123 (emphasis added).
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the values that would be attributed to the shares comprised in that holding if they 
were split between various persons. The reason is that he has something to sell - 
control - which the others considered separately have not.243
Therefore, for example, Sealy notes that “there are dicta in that case which strongly 
support the view that where a majority shareholding is sold by a single seller to a single 
buyer, it is proper to value the holding more highly”244. Certainly, he is right: these dicta 
might propose so. Their Lordships, like English judges in general, accepted that 
majority shares could be more valuable than minority shares245.
But there is a very important point to add: the value of shares is a question of 
fact. I think that is the reason why their Lordships used the words ‘may’ and ‘might’. 
Further, as Evershed LJ observed, it is possible to displace market quotations by 
evidence since the regulation stated that the value of shares should be their price 
between a willing buyer and a willing seller246. So, the dicta in the case merely 
emphasized that the value of shares must be decided on the basis of particular facts247. 
To repeat, the price available from shares was considered as a matter of fact.
Equally, their Lordships in Short v Treasury Commissioners stressed the 
importance of a stock market quotation as the true value of shares. Evershed LJ 
observed that:
243 [1948] AC 534 (HL) 546 (emphasis added).
244 Sealy (2001) 474.
245 See also Davies, Paul L., T h e Notion of Equality in European Takeover Regulation’ in Payne, 
Jennifer (ed), Takeovers in English and German Law (Oxford 2002) 9, 13, where he states referring to 
Short that “general British law accepts the idea that in principle controlling shares are worth more than 
non-controlling ones.”
246 [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA) 125.
247 It should be noted that the ruling was related to the wording of the regulation; see eg [1948] AC 534 
(HL) 543 (Lord Porter) : “if the regulation had stated that the shareholders were to receive the value of 
their shares calculated upon their value on the sale of their business as a going concern the appellants’ 
claim would be correct, but to my mind the regulation makes quite a different stipulation.”
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If a shareholder has 1,000 shares, then prima facie the price to be paid to him is
1,000 times the value of a single share.248
Furthermore, he noted that the Stock Exchange quotation was, “as a matter of law”, the 
value of the shares249. The market quotation can be regarded as the real value of 
shares250. But since the value is a question of fact, the Stock Exchange price can only be 
“the best”251 or most “cogent evidence”252 of share value. In sum, market price as real 
value is a central assumption in law, and the special regulation and the ruling of the case 
reflected this idea. Still, from the perspective of law, market quotations can be replaced, 
but the burden of proof rests on those who argue otherwise253.
The next point is whether the dicta in Short v Treasury Commissioners really 
propose that there is a presumption that the value of majority shares is higher than the 
current market quotation of shares. But as mentioned, the presumption of the law is that 
if a shareholder has 1,000 or 1,000,000 shares, prima facie the value of those shares is 
1,000 or 1,000,000 times the value of a single share. This principle also applies to 
majority shares, although Evershed LJ noted that the value of majority shares might be 
greater than the sum arrived at through the current market value254. It is important to 
notice that both Evershed LJ and Lord Uthwatt used in their dicta the words may and 
might.
However, Evershed LJ pointed out that a majority shareholder “is able to sell 
something more than a mere parcel of shares”255. Similarly, Lord Uthwatt stated that a
248 [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA) 124.
249 Ibid 125.
250 See also [1948] AC 534 (HL) 548 (Lord Morton): “I think that the Stock Exchange prices afford a fair 
criterion of the value of each block of shares.”
251 [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA) 125.
252 [1948] AC 534 (HL) 542.
253 See also above 7.3.1 and below 7.6.5.
254 [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA) 123.
255 Ibid.
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majority shareholder has something extra to sell, ie control of the company256. Do these 
dicta then demonstrate that majority shares are more valuable than minority shares? The 
answer is still clearly no. First, in an obiter dictum facts are applied to law, but their 
Lordships raised merely a matter of fact as they noted that majority shares may and 
might be more valuable than the prevailing stock market price. Their Lordships partly 
explained their opinion about the valuation of shares. In consequence, this makes the 
notion of their dicta distinct: company law accepts that majority shares might be 
regarded as more valuable than the prevailing market price for shares. Second, the value 
of majority shares, or of any shares, is a question of fact257. Incidentally, questions of 
facts are not decided on the basis of precedents, but with the support of evidence. 
Therefore, the dicta of Short are that the value of majority shares can be more than the 
current stock market price. In conclusion, and regardless of the dicta, the value of shares 
is a point of fact.
Finally, are majority shares really more valuable than minority shares? 
Significantly, there are, as explained above, experts who think so; moreover, legal 
authors often share this view too. For example, Pettet considers that it is “obvious” that 
the value of minority shares is less than their pro rata value258. In contrast, I think that 
the price available from minority shares in a private company is typically less than their 
proportional value since majority shareholders as obvious buyers can get them at a 
discounted price: there is no need to pay the full value for these shares. So, the value of 
minority shares is lower, especially if it is accepted that minority shareholders are, 
indeed, at the mercy of majority shareholders.
Undoubtedly, minority shareholders often have a weak position in a private 
company. However, for this reason special minority protection is required in company
256 [1948] AC 534 (HL) 546; ibid 543 (Lord Porter): a majority shareholder has “a potentiality of control” 
in a company.
257 See in particular Guinness Peat Group pic v British Land Co pic  [1999] 2 BCLC 243 (CA).
258 Pettet (2001) 253.
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law. The available protection, of course, has an effect on the value of minority shares: it 
can make their shares more valuable. On the whole, the protection in law may change 
shareholders’ position in fact.
The idea in law is not to fix the value of minority shares solely with reference to 
their market value. The courts may look behind the hypothetical market prices, which 
they do, in particular, in CA 1985 s 459 cases that do not support the idea that majority 
shares should generally be regarded as more valuable. By contrast, the value of majority 
and minority shares is then ordinarily considered equal259. In conclusion, I formulate the 
point that the higher value of majority shares might be from the perspective of the law 
‘weak’ as a fact.
But even more importantly, it should be stressed that the company in Short v 
Treasury Commissioners was quoted on the stock exchange. As noted above, it is 
considered that their Lordships even proposed that due to control of the company, 
majority shares should be valued above the current market price for shares. However, 
even if they really did so, the stock market considered was a market almost sixty years 
ago, and during wartime. The UK stock market is today very different from what it was 
in those days. Overall, their Lordships’ view about stock markets may be quite non- 
current today.
According to modem stock market theory, minority shares are regarded as more 
liquid than majority shares. In chapter four , I stated that in Anglo-American stock 
markets there exists a preference for liquidity, ie the liquidity of shares can be more 
valuable than the control of a company. Due to the importance of liquidity, it is possible 
to argue that minority shares should actually be considered more valuable than majority 
shares. Therefore, the prevailing facts on stock markets might be just the opposite, as
259 Above 7.4.
260 See 4.5.1.
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implied in Short, since the price available from majority shares is not generally higher 
than the current market price. As Glover explains:
On the stock Exchange large blocks of shares typically change hands at a 
discount to current market price.261
Consequently, the expected price from majority shares may, in fact, be less than the 
current stock market value. The reason for this is again the liquidity of shares. In sum, it 
seems to be that their Lordships in their opinions in Short strongly underestimated the 
importance of liquidity. Naturally, their view is quite understandable because, at the 
time of the case, the nature of stock markets was very different.
In summary, in Short v Treasury Commissioners it was considered that the value 
of shares can be different from the value of the company as a whole, or from their 
market price. Yet, the case also emphasizes the role of market quotation as the real 
value of shares. However, the case does not state that majority shares are more valuable 
than minority shares because that is a question of fact; it only accepts that any shares 
may be more valuable than the current stock market price. So, when this case is 
followed, the fundamental idea remains the same: the value of shares is a matter of fact 
and evidence.
7.6 Share value in takeovers
Shares are transferable personal property, which means that a shareholder may sell his 
shares to a new owner at a price that is a bargain between the buyer and the seller. Their 
price is primarily a point of company law only in those private companies that have a
261 Glover (1986) 30 (emphasis added); in addition, he says, ibid, that the reverse applies to unquoted 
shares: in private companies, large shareholdings “generally” have a higher unit price than small 
shareholdings.
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pre-emption clause in favour of existing members262. But the focus of this review moves 
on takeovers of public companies. My fundamental question is the value of shares in 
takeovers from the perspective of law.
A shareholder is entitled to sell all his shares or some of them. Similarly, a new 
shareowner can buy as many shares as he desires. Even if he buys all the shares from 
one shareholder, he is not required to buy any shares from other shareholders. Simply 
put, share transactions are individual bargains between a buyer and a seller.
Naturally, the majority of a company’s shares can be bought only from those 
shareholders who have them. The share price in these majority transactions is basically 
a matter of bargain since every shareholder may sell his shares at the best price 
obtainable. In addition, if somebody is willing to pay an extra price for majority shares, 
they can be regarded as more valuable. As noted above, experts and authors widely 
think that majority shares are, in fact, more valuable than their proportional value. It is 
often argued that in takeovers a premium should be paid for control of a company263.
The pivotal question is whether majority shares are more valuable in takeovers. 
My claim is that the answer is very clearly no, they are not; on the contrary, shares have 
an equal value in takeovers. The reason for this conclusion is that minority shareholders 
are specially protected in this area. In this section, I explain how and why this protection 
is available, but before that I review the value of control power and the possibility of 
‘squeezing out’ of minority shareholders.
262 Above 7.3.2.
263 See eg Sabine, Martin, Corporate Finance: Flotations, Equity Issues and Acquisitions (3rd edn London
2003) 323; Re John Reid & Sons (Strucsteel) Ltd [2003] 2 BCLC 319, 331; however, as explained above, 
chapter four 4.5.1, this study suggests that premiums are paid due to liquidity.
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7.6.1 The value of control power
Control of a company means power and extra freedom for those having it. Because of 
this power, a majority shareholder cannot be at the mercy of other shareholders. 
Ultimately, it is very true that both power and freedom are valuable.
In their famous book, Berle and Means state that:
a position of ‘control’ is a valuable piece of property to its holder, and so 
regarded; its value arises out of the ability which the holder has to dominate 
property which in equity belongs to others.264
The special value of majority shares is a consequence from majority rule since power in 
companies rests on a majority. Furthermore, it is generally accepted that the power that 
majority shareholders have is valuable.
First, control really has value. But it should be noted that shareholders’ property 
is their shares only: as a result, majority shareholders cannot ‘own ‘ control power in a 
company . This power does not legally belong to majority shareholders because they 
are only entitled to use it in the interest of the company as a whole
The fundamental point is whether majority shareholders can still sell the power 
they have. Significantly, in some states in the USA, it is considered that control belongs 
to the company, and therefore any premium paid for it must go to the company267. By
264 Berle, Adolf A., Jr and Means, Gardiner C., The Modem Corporation and Private Property (New 
York 1932) 244; in addition, they continue: “the law thus far has been unable to deal with the situation.”
265 Above chapter two 2.3.3; see also Levy v American Beverage Co (1942) 38 NYS 2d 517 (Supreme 
Court, First Department of New York) 526, where it was considered that the value of control is “a lawful 
property right o f the controlling stockholders”; Berle, Adolf A., ‘The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate 
Control’ (1965) 50 Cornell Law Quarterly 628, 638, where he points out that the capacity to control is not 
a “property right”, but rather “a corporate asset, not an individual one”.
266 See above, chapter six; and Berle (1965): “it is a corporate power, though exercised by individual 
stockholders.”
267 Johnston, Alexander, The City Take-Over Code (Oxford 1980) 203; see also Berle and Means (1932) 
244; Boyle, Anthony John, T he Sale of Controlling Shares: American Law and the Jenkins Committee’ 
(1964) 13 ICLQ 185.
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contrast, that is not the position in the UK, where it is approved that majority 
shareholders can get the premium. As Gower explains:
Can [majority shareholders] then sell their controlling block for a larger price 
than that which other shareholders can obtain? In England it has always been 
assumed that they can.268
Generally speaking, this idea follows the ruling of Short v Treasury Commissioners269: 
the law accepts that control of a company may make majority shares more valuable. It is
97 npossible to profit from trading in control . This is the conventional view of English 
law.
Second, it is, however, important to notice that, as Berle and Means point out, 
the special value of majority shares arises from the ability to dominate property that in 
equity belongs to others. This means that majority shareholders might be able to use 
their control position in a company for their personal profit at the expense of the 
company and other shareholders, which may even be called majority shareholders’ 
‘looting power’. It is possible to argue that these opportunities for personal profit, which 
are not available to minority shareholders, ordinarily give majority shares their 
increased value271. It can be the exploitation of disproportional benefits from a company 
that makes majority shares more valuable.
Does company law then accept this? No, it does not since majority power in a 
company must be used for the benefit of all shareholders. To secure this, company law
268 Gower (1957) 524.
269 [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA); [1948] AC 534 (HL).
270 See especially Jennings, Richard W., ‘Trading in Corporate Control’ (1956) 44 California Law Review 
1.
271 Ibid 16; see also eg Barclay, Michael J. and Holderness, Clifford G., ‘Private Benefits from Control of 
Public Corporations’ (1989) 25 Journal of Financial Economics 371, where they claim that majority 
blocks are priced at substantial premiums, if large shareholders have been able to use their voting power 
to secure themselves private benefits.
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offers protection to minority shareholders272. Remarkably, there are also special 
requirements concerning takeovers of public companies, ie these transactions are 
normatively regulated. In short, the regulation of takeovers does not support the idea 
that control power should make majority shares more valuable. Before analysing this 
regulation, I first review the compulsory acquisition of minority shares.
7.6.2 Squeeze-out of minority shares
The majority of a quoted company’ shares can be sold to a single shareholder but there 
might still remain minority shareholders who are unwilling to sell their shares. The 
fundamental idea in law is that every shareholder has a veto: when the buyer does not 
offer enough, there is no need to sell shares. As ruled in Brown v British Abrasive 
Wheel Co Ltdf273, if a majority shareholder fails to purchase the shares of minority 
holders by agreement, the majority cannot do so compulsorily through an alteration of 
the articles. This expropriation of individual shareholders through majority power was 
unlawful oppression274. The court interfered, and this requirement in the articles was not 
efficient.
Obviously, the law conferred on minority shareholders a ‘lock-up’ right in 
takeovers. A majority shareholder was thus unable to get the whole of a company’s 
shares in his hands without the consent of every shareholder. As a result, the power of 
minority shareholders was regarded as disproportional. The Greene Committee put it in 
this way:
It has been represented to us that holders of a small number of shares of the 
company which is being taken over (either from a desire to exact better terms
272 See above, chapter six 6.3.3 and 6.4.
273 [1919] 1 Ch 290.
274 See also Dafen Tinplate Co Ltd v Llanelly Steel Co (1907) Ltd [1920] 2 Ch 124
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than their fellow shareholders are content to accept or from lack of real interest 
in the matter) frequently fail to come into an arrangement which commends 
itself to the vast majority of their fellow shareholders, with the result that the 
transaction fails to materialise.275
The Committee considered that the minority was even able to oppress the majority. 
Therefore, a statutory provision requiring dissenting minority shareholders to sell their 
shares was proposed.
The compulsory purchase of minority shares was implemented by the
9 7  f \Companies Act 1928 , which as a statutory scheme made it easier to take companies
over. The legislation gave a majority shareholder the right to buy the shares of a 
dissenting minority. In practice, it offered a convenient method of eliminating the still- 
remaining minority277. Minority shareholders were no longer able to hamper a takeover 
scheme as their squeeze-out from the company became possible by the power of the 
law.
According to the statutory provisions, if the holders of not less than nine-tenths 
of the shares affected by the offer had approved it, the majority shareholder became 
“entitled and bound to acquire” those remaining shares “on the terms on which under 
the scheme or contract the shares of the approving shareholders are to be transferred to 
the transferee”278. The basic concept was that a majority shareholder could acquire the 
shares of dissenting shareholders on the same terms on which the other shares had been 
bought out. Consequently, the offeror was given the right to acquire other people’s
275 Company Law Amendment Committee 1925-26 Report ( ‘Greene Committee’) (Cmd 2657) (London 
1926) 43-44.
276 s 50; the Companies Act 1929 s 155.
277 Eg Flisfeder, A. Maurice, ‘Compulsory Acquisition of the Interest of a Dissenting Minority 
Shareholder’ (1973) 11 Alberta Law Review 87, 87.
278 The Companies Act 1928 s 50(1).
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97Qproperty. Yet, as the law gave this power, it also ruled the price for minority shares . 
As a result, share price in this context was no longer a matter of bargain and fact, but 
became a point of law.
The CA 1985 s 430(2) states: “The offeror shall be entitled and bound to acquire 
those shares on the terms of the offer.” Subsequently, the offeror must pay for the 
remaining minority shares the same price as he paid for the nine-tenths of the shares. 
There is no room to argue whether the value of these minority shares is less than the 
price paid for the nine-tenths majority. In sum, the law gives the majority shareholder 
the power to acquire these minority shares compulsorily but the law protects the 
dissentients from transferring their shares on less favourable terms than those given to 
the approving majority280.
However, the CA 1985 s 430C provides minority shareholders extra protection 
when they are bought-out: they are entitled to apply to the court to specify terms of 
acquisition different from those of the offer. As the Greene Committee stated, minority 
shareholders should have “a right of appeal to the Court on any question of value or 
oppression281. In Re Castner-Kellner Alkali Co Ltd, Eve J explained the point:
The function of the C ourt... is to determine on what terms the dissentients are 
to be dispossessed of their investment... it is for the Court to consider and 
decide whether [the offer] is an adequate and satisfactory one, and, if not, to 
substitute such other terms of purchase as in its discretion are fair and just.282
So, the court may order that the price of remaining minority shares should be higher 
than the price paid for the nine-tenths majority. This explicitly means that from the
279 Re Carlton Holdings Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 918, 925 (Brightman J): ’’The terms upon which that right is 
exerciseable ought therefore, in my opinion, to be defined with some strictness.”
280 Re Castner-Kellner Alkali Co Ltd [1930] 2 Ch 349, 355 (Eve J).
281 Greene Committee 45.
282 [1930] 2 Ch 349, 354.
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perspective of law the offer price for the majority of shares is not a maximum value of 
minority shares because the courts may order otherwise.
On the whole, when the law gave the majority shareholder the right to squeeze- 
out the dissenting minority shareholders, it also gave the minority a right to challenge 
these compulsory acquisitions in court. The idea was, in this way, to set a balance to 
protect the interests of different shareholders. Even so, it should be particularly noted 
that the law orders the dissenting minority to get the same price for their shares. In this 
context, the law so secures the equal value of every share.
7.6.3 The Takeover Code
Majority shareholders might be willing to get a higher price for their controlling stakes. 
To get a premium, they can use their hold-out power. Simply, if a premium is not paid 
them, they do not accept the offer and there will be no takeover.
Although the prime idea in company law is that controlling shareholders may 
sell their shares at the best available price, this position is problematic. For example, as 
Gower notes:
there are serious objections to allowing any shareholders to profit individually 
from the fact that they control the company.283
In general, the most serious of objections is that majority shareholders might get their 
premium by abusing their controlling position in the company. Therefore, the premium 
for majority shares might actually be paid for the possibility to loot the company by
283 Gower (1957) 573.
267 Chapter 7
stripping its assets or business opportunities. This point as a risk has been recognized, in 
particular, in American company law cases284.
As noted above, the law requires that dissenting minority shareholders must 
after a successful takeover sell their shares at the same price. Company law does not 
promote shareholders’ opportunism; in the same way, it should be asked why this kind 
of behaviour is accepted from majority shareholders. In short, should they really be able 
to get a higher price for their shares by the support of majority power?
It is true that the position of a majority shareholder has been used to gain 
personal benefits in takeovers. In consequence, majority shareholders have been able to 
get a higher price for their shares in takeovers. This often took place at the expense of 
minority shareholders. In the 1960s, there was mounting concern about unfair practices 
in the conduct of takeovers285. However, this problem was not settled through 
legislation but self-regulation, which has a central role in the governing of takeovers in 
the UK.
The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers has regulated takeovers since 1968 by 
providing an orderly framework for takeovers. As the Introduction para 1(a) states:
“The Code is designed principally to ensure fair and equal treatment of all shareholders 
in relation to takeovers.” In essence, the Code is an extension of this idea by offering 
equality of treatment and opportunity to every shareholder in public companies .
The Takeover Code is a standard of commercial behaviour287. It comprises 10 
General Principles and 38 Rules, which are further divided into sub-rules. In this brief 
review, the focus is on General Principles 1 and 8 .
284 Eg Levy v Feinberg (1941) 29 NYS 2d 550 (Supreme Court of New York) 556; see also Boyle (1964).
285 Eg Remnant, Philip, ‘The Takeover Panel’ in Button, Maurice (ed), A Practitioner’s Guide to The City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers 2002/2003 (Old Woking 2002) 1; see also Johnston (1980).
286 As stated in Introduction para 4(a), the Code applies to offers for listed and unlisted public companies; 
in contrast, it is important to notice that CA 1985 ss 428-30F apply to takeovers of all companies; see 
Fiske Nominees Ltd v Dwyka Diamond Ltd [2002] 2 BCLC 123.
287 The Code Introduction 3(a).
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General Principle 1: All shareholders of the same class of an offeree company 
must be treated similarly by an offeror.
This principle is the core of the Code: the prime idea is that every shareholder should 
get the same price for his shares288. In practice, this principle simply requires that the 
price of every share must be equal in takeovers. Consequently, in mandatory bids, the 
offeror must pay for all the remaining shares the highest price he has paid for the shares 
in the last twelve months289. Premiums must be divided among all shareholders since 
they should get the same deal290. As a result, the Code secures the equal treatment of 
every shareholder.
General Principle 8 : Rights of control must be exercised in good faith and the 
oppression of a minority is wholly unacceptable.
The intention of this principle is to make sure that minorities are not treated unfairly in 
takeovers. As Johnston notes, this principle might stem “from the widely held belief that 
minority shareholders are not as well protected under English law as under US and 
other codes of law”291. In sum, the Code strengthens minority shareholders’ protection 
offered by the law292, and it does so very explicitly by requiring that the price paid for 
every share must be equal in takeovers.
The area of the Code is the conduct of takeover bids. Thus, its does not govern 
the commercial merits of takeovers: it merely supports the free transferability of shares
288 See also CA 1985 s 428(1): a takeover offer is “an offer on terms which are the same in relation to all 
the shares.”
289 The Code Rule 9.5.
290 About this sharing rule, see also Davies, Paul and Hopt, Klaus, ‘Control Transactions’ in Kraakman, 
Reinier R. and others, The Anatomy o f Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Oxford
2004) 157, 177.
291 Johnston (1980) 202.
292 Re Chez Nico (Restaurants) Ltd [1992] BCLC 192, 209 (Browne-Wilkinson VC): the Code provides 
protection to the shareholders whose shares are the subject of a bid.
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by facilitating takeover offers. The rules of the Code do not include machinery for 
setting the bid price for shares293. The two central points in the pricing of shares are: 1) 
the bidder determines the consideration that he is willing to pay for shares294; 2) 
shareholders decide whether they accept the offered price. Takeovers clearly rest on the 
principle of shareholders’ decision making: the bid is successful if shareholders accept 
it. Naturally, the idea in takeovers follows majority rule: minority shareholders’ ability 
to get the equal price for their shares depends on the acceptance of the majority. Still, it 
is important to notice that the Code prevents controlling shareholders from negotiating a 
higher share price from the bidder than is available to every shareholder.
Next, the question arising is whether the Code is a part of law. Simply, it is not 
since it is self-regulation295. However, English law has a positive attitude towards stock 
markets’ self-regulation: the courts and legislation recognize the jurisdiction and 
authority of the Code. The general view can be found, for example from the Court of
296Appeal’s ruling in Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) .
Further, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000297 and the Financial Services 
Authority directly support the function of the Takeover Panel298. In sum, the Panel is 
able to exercise “considerable de facto power”, although it does not have any direct 
statutory basis for its operation299.
293 See the Code Introduction 1(a).
294 In mandatory offers, the bidder sets the price ‘indirectly’ by acquiring shares.
295 Re Chez Nico Restaurants Ltd [1992] BCLC 192, 209: “The code does not have the force of law ... 
[but] the code is a factor of great importance.”
296 [1982] Ch 204 (CA) 224: “In our view the voluntary regulation of companies is a matter for the City”; 
see also R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex p  Datafin pic [1987] QB 815 (CA); R v Spens [1991] 1 
WLR 624 (CA) 632, where it was considered that “the Code sufficiently resembles legislation”.
297 Eg s 143.
298 The Code “has been endorsed” by the FSA; see the Code Introduction 1(c).
299 Drayton, Patrick, ‘Regulatory Structures: The Relationship Between the Takeover Panel, the FSA and 
the Courts’ in Payne, Jennifer (ed), Takeovers in English and German Law (Oxford 2002) 65, 65; on the 
other hand, the term self-regulation is partly an overestimation; see eg Davies (2002) 3: “Whether these 
rules may be termed accurately an example of ‘self-regulation’ is very much open to doubt, though that 
term is often used to characterize them.”
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Yet, the regulation of takeovers is changing due to the implementation of the 
Takeover Directive300, which requires the introduction of a statutory framework for 
takeovers. As a result, takeover rules are cemented into European and English law. The 
regulation of takeovers will be part of the law, and the Takeover Panel is placed on a 
statutory footing . The regulatory change is significant, although no important 
material changes are expected in the UK to the current takeover rules302. But from the 
legal perspective, the protection of shareholders in takeovers will take place within a 
statutory framework. Indeed, the Takeover Directive enhances minority shareholder 
protection since takeover rules will have binding effect as a part of law.
The regulation of takeovers gives special protection to minority shareholders in 
public companies. Remarkably, these provisions secure shareholders’ equal treatment in 
takeovers as every shareholder should get the same price for his shares. In brief, under 
these rules the value of all shares is regarded as equal. Moreover, due to the Takeover 
Directive the regulation of takeovers will undoubtedly have the full force of law.
7.6.4 Takeover as collective action
It is sometimes argued that minority shareholders ‘free ride’ in takeovers since they get 
the same price for shares that might be less valuable. That can be true and problematic 
in certain cases. On the other hand, due to their better liquidity minority shares may be 
more valuable than majority shares. In effect, there are cases in which it is wrong that 
minority shareholders do not get a premium for their more liquid, and thus more 
valuable, shares. But the prime problem is that it is often quite impossible to say
300 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover 
bids ( ‘Takeovers Directive’) [2004] OJ L 142/12; it should be noted that the main aim of the directive is 
to protect, in particular, minority shareholders, and to afford them “equivalent treatment” and “equitable 
price” for their shares; see Recitals (1), (2), (9), and Articles 3(a) and 5.
The Directive has to be implemented by 20 May 2006.
302 Company Law Implementation o f  the European Directive on Takeover Bids - A  Consultative 
Document (2005 London) 4: the rules of the Directive “are considered to be broadly consistent with the 
existing Takeover Code provisions.”
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whether, in a particular case, liquidity or control is more valuable303. Even more 
importantly, determination of this point is not the task of law. I emphasize that the 
fundamental function of law is to set and protect rights, not to determine questions of 
commercial judgment. Consequently, shareholders themselves are entitled to value their 
property, which is the basic idea of property rules. Overall, I consider that takeovers 
should principally be explained as shareholders’ collective action.
But before analysing that idea, I raise the point whether it is right that all 
shareholders get the same price for their shares in takeovers. In short, I think that this 
question is basically very similar to whether shareholders should get the same dividend 
per share or whether they should equally share a company’s net assets in liquidation. 
Although a decision about dividends, or voluntary liquidation, rests on majority 
shareholders, this does not mean that majority power may be used to determine the 
distribution of dividends or a company’s net assets. In contrast, that is a matter of 
shareholders’ rights.
To illustrate, as Jessel MR explained in Griffith v Paget304, majority 
shareholders cannot decide about the distribution of assets among shareholders because 
the “only proper mode” is according to their rights. Majority power may not be used to 
take away the bulk of the property belonging to other people, ie to the company and 
indirectly to all shareholders through their shares. So, if majority power is misused, the 
law steps in to protect the minority. There is no doubt: the law rules that the distribution 
of dividends and net assets must take place in proportion to shares . I consider that 
shareholders’ rights should be stressed in the context of takeovers too .
303 See above, chapter four 4.5.1.
304 (1877) LR 5 Ch D 894.
305 Above chapter five.
306 See also Andrews, William D., ‘The Stockholder’s Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale of Shares’ 
(1965) 78 Harvard Law Review 505, 521: “each stockholder is entitled to share proportionately in the 
profits o f the enterprise; from the stockholder’s point of view a sale of stock is one very important way of 
realizing a profit on his investment; profits from stock sales ought to be regarded as profits o f the
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Of course, the basic situation in takeovers is not identical with dividends and 
surplus assets since the consideration is not from the company but from the offeror307. 
Freedom of exchange provides that majority shareholders should be able to sell their 
shares at a price as good as possible. Further, as stated in Short v Treasury 
Commissioners, the law accepts that majority shares can be more valuable than minority 
shares. Indeed, the law does not generally require that every share should have the same 
price and value.
But takeovers are fundamentally different from transfers of individual shares: 
they are collective actions supported by the law. These transactions’ “external facade” 
and their “freedom from specific normative restrictions” are misleading308. It can be 
argued that they are, in a way, alternatives to a company’s voluntary liquidation309: 
shareholders collectively decide to exit the company through a takeover scheme. Due to 
the statutory provisions concerning takeovers, it is possible by the support of a nine- 
tenths majority to decide that the offeror gets the right to acquire all shares in the 
company. Significantly, although shareholders do not vote in general meeting, they do 
so by accepting the takeover offer310. The prime point is that a widely supported 
decision on a takeover, as majority decisions generally do, binds every shareholder. In a 
takeover, shareholders can act as a single person311 since they accept the offer 
collectively.
enterprise subject to equal sharing among stockholders just as much as profits realized through corporate 
action.”
307 See eg Farrar, John H., ‘Fuzzy Law, the Modernization of Corporate Laws, and the Privatization of 
Takeover Regulation’ in Takeovers, Institutional Investors, and the Modernization o f Corporate Laws 
(Auckland 1993) 1, 6, where he notes that the internal relationship in the company and the external 
relationship in the markets are different issues.
308 Stern, Yedidia Z., T he Private Sale of Corporate Control: A Myth Dethroned’ (2000) 25 Journal of 
Corporation Law 511,512.
309 See also Rock Nominees Ltd v RCO (Holdings) pic (in liquidation) [2003] 2 BCLC 493; [2004] 1 
BCLC 439 (CA).
310 See Gower (1957) 523, where he discusses the relationship between majority and minority 
shareholders under a heading “Members’ Acts outside General and Class Meetings”.
311 See eg Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R., The Economic Structure o f Corporate Law 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts 1991) 185; Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, ‘The Sole Owner Standard for Takeover 
Policy’ (1988) 17 Journal o f Legal Studies 197.
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The principal idea of takeovers can be found from Re Hoare and Co Ltd312, 
where a majority representing over 99 per cent of shares accepted a takeover scheme. 
This acceptance by an overwhelming majority was the main reason for regarding the 
scheme as fair313. As Maugham J observed:
the view of the Legislature is that where not less than nine-tenths of the 
shareholders in the transferor company approve the scheme or accept the offer 
prima facie, at any rate, the offer must be taken to be a proper one.314
Naturally, this argument does not work if the price paid for every share is not the same: 
that kind of takeover is not a collective action either. Indeed, as Evershed LJ formulated 
in Re Press Caps Ltd315: in a takeover, all shareholders in a company “are being invited 
to join together in transferring to the transferee company the entire issued share capital 
and with it the control of the transferor company.” So, every shareholder should get the 
same invitation as they are ‘fellow’ shareholders in the company. Incidentally, the right 
to squeeze out the remaining minority shares explicitly requires that it must take place 
on similar terms to those at which the other shares have been bought out in a takeover 
offer316. In sum, it is possible to state that only takeovers that rest on the idea of an
- j  i  n
equal offer at the same share price have a binding force in company law .
The Takeover Code and the Takeover Directive require that in takeovers there 
must be an equal offer to all shareholders, who may collectively accept or decline it. 
Moreover, if an offer is accepted by shareholders representing nine-tenths of the shares,
312 (1933) 150 LT 374.
313 See also Re Bugle Press Ltd [1961] Ch 270 (CA) 276 (Buckley J): “In the ordinary case of an offer ... 
the court pays the greatest attention to the views of [the] majority.”
314 (1933) 150 LT 374, 375.
315 [1949] Ch 434 (CA) 445.
316 CA 1985 ss 428-30.
317 Eg Re Chez Nico (Restaurants) Ltd [1992] BCLC 192, where the method of acquiring shares did not 
constitute a takeover offer within the meaning of CA 1985 s 428, and therefore the statutory requirements 
for the compulsory purchase were not satisfied.
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the offeror gets the right to squeeze out the dissenting minority at the price which has 
binding force to every shareholder. Takeovers as collective actions operate in this way.
7.6.5 The burden of proof in takeovers
Shareholders accept a takeover offer, in a way, by special majority decision. The 
principal idea is that they decide whether an offer price is acceptable. On the other hand, 
if they decline a bid, its price is principally too low. Takeovers fundamentally rest on 
the concept that buyers and sellers determine prices in their transactions318.
As Maugham J stated in Re Hoare and Co Ltd319, the acceptance by a large 
majority of shareholders is itself prima facie evidence that the offer price is proper. In 
essence, determination of share price is a matter of commercial judgment. The court is 
not entitled to set up its own view of commercial fairness in opposition to the 
overwhelming majority of shareholders . The judge further observed:
Accordingly, I think it is manifest that the reasons for inducing the court to 
‘order otherwise’ are reasons which must be supplied by the dissentients who 
take the step of making an application to the court, and that the onus is on them 
of giving a reason why their shares should not be acquired by the transferee
321company.
318 As mentioned, the regulation of takeovers does not govern the merits of offers and their pricing; in 
addition, the idea in takeovers is not that an offeror should pay the full value of shares; eg Easterbrook, 
Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R., ‘The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender 
Offer’ (1981) 94 Harvard Law Review 1161, 1177, where they note that: “If the target’s shareholders 
obtain all the gains from the transaction, no one has an incentive to make a tender offer, and thus no one 
will offer a premium for the shares” (emphasis original); see also Rock Nominees Ltd v RCO (Holdings) 
pic (in liquidation) [2003] 2 BCLC 493, 517 (Peter Smith J): the offeror is not expected to pay “pound for 
pound for the synergies”.
(1933) 150 LT 374.
320 Re Lifecare International pic  [1990] BCLC 222, 224 (Hoffmann J): “The court naturally starts with 
the assumption that the other shareholders are likely to know where their own interests lie as well as [a 
dissenting minority shareholder].”
321 (1933) 150 LT 374, 375.
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In Re Sussex Brick Co Ltd, Vaisey J formulated the same point in this way:
I think that the applicant is faced with the very difficult task of discharging an 
onus which is undoubtedly the heavy one of showing that he, being the only man 
in the regiment out of step, is the only man whose views ought to prevail. That is 
the difficulty he is faced with in the present case.322
Where a takeover offer has been accepted by over 90 per cent of shareholders, there is a 
heavy burden on a dissentient shareholder to demonstrate that the offer is unfair and the 
price paid for shares is not the right one. Share price in a takeover is a current market 
price: in consequence, it is the true value of shares323. Although the offer price might be 
open to valid criticism, this price can still be fair and good enough324. In sum, those who 
want to show that the takeover price is actually wrong have a heavy onus if they try to 
challenge it in court325. There are very rare exceptions where minority shareholders 
have been successful in this task .
The correctness of a takeover price is, however, only a presumption since the 
pricing of shares is related to the particular circumstances. As Browne-Wilkinson VC 
explained in Re Chez Nico (Restaurants) Ltd:
In my judgment the approach in Re Hoare & Co Ltd cannot apply to a case 
where the bidder is already a director and shareholder in the target company 
and it is shown that the information made available to the assenting 
shareholders falls far short of what should have been provided. The fact that
322 [1961] Ch 289,291.
323 See also above 7.3.1.
324 [1961] Ch 289; Re Grierson, Oldham & Adams Ltd [1968] Ch 17.
325 See also Re Press Caps Ltd [1949] Ch 434 (CA).
326 Eg Re Bugle Press Ltd [1961] Ch 270 (CA), where, in fact, the aim o f the majority was merely to 
abuse these provisions.
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90% of the shareholders have accepted the bid cannot carry decisive weight if 
it is shown that their acceptance was obtained in ignorance of facts of which 
they should have been informed.327
A takeover offer cannot be fair and proper if shareholders do not receive enough 
information to be able to make an informed decision about whether to accept it. 
Obviously, shareholders’ acceptance in such cases is unable to show that the offer price 
is right in this particular case. Under special circumstances, which in Fiske Nominees 
Ltd v Dwyka Diamond Ltd 328was the close connection between the officers and 
shareholders in the offeror and offeree companies, the fact that 90 per cent of 
shareholders have accepted the offer does not have “any real weight, far less a decisive 
weight”329. Altogether, there are cases in which the onus of showing that the price is fair 
rests on the offeror. Furthermore, it should be noted that if the offer is not fair, the 
majority shareholder does not get the right to buy out minority shareholders under CA 
1985 s 429 at any price330.
But it should be emphasized that the offer price as share value also binds the 
majority shareholder. It is the requirement of the law that dissenting minority 
shareholders should get, at minimum, the offer price for their shares. Where a majority 
shareholder exercises under CA 1985 s 429 his right to buy out minority shareholders, 
the law is clear. As CA 1985 s 430(2) states:
The offeror shall be entitled and bound to acquire those shares on the terms of 
the offer.
327 [1992] BCLC 192, 207.
328 [2002] 2 BCLC 123.
329 Ibid 132.
330 On the other hand, minority shareholders can still under CA 1985 s 430A have a right to be bought 
out; see [2002] 2 BCLC 123, where the deputy judge thus ordered an independent valuer to value the 
minority shares.
277 Chapter 7
According to the law, the offeror must pay the offer price for minority shares: the court 
may order a different price per share only on an application made by a minority
331shareholder . The offeror may decide whether he exercises the power of compulsory 
acquisition under CA 1985 s 429, but there is no room for him to challenge the price 
paid for minority shares. Simply, the share price is set by the companies’ legislation.
On the other hand, when a minority shareholder exercises his right to be bought 
out under CA 1985 s 430A, the offeror is, in accordance with s 430B(2), entitled and 
bound to acquire a minority shareholder’s shares on the terms of the offer. However, 
both minority shareholders and the offeror may make an application to court to order the 
terms on which the shares shall be acquired332. Accordingly, the court has discretion in 
setting the share price; moreover, the companies’ legislation does not explicitly state 
that the court cannot order a lower price for these minority shares. However, the aim of 
the legislation is that a dissenting shareholder may not be penalised as a result of his 
dissent. As Brightman J pointed in Re Carlton Holdings Ltd’.
The Policy of the Act is that [a dissenting shareholder] shall receive no less 
favourable treatment than an approving shareholder.333
I understand this ruling meaning that in sell-out cases, which take place on request of a 
minority shareholder, share price should normally be the same as in the takeover offer. 
The general presumption concerning all cases is that the offer price is the right price. 
Therefore, if the offeror aims to challenge it under particular circumstances, he has an 
onus of proof. In addition, as noted, it is a heavy burden on every shareholder to
331 CA 1985 s430C (l).
332 Ibid s 430C(3).
333 [1971] 1 WLR 918, 925.
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demonstrate that the price paid for shares was not actually the right one. The governing 
idea in the takeover regulation is explicitly that all shareholders should get an equal 
price for their shares: as a result, it would be very surprising if the courts in certain cases 
accepted that the price of these shares can be lower only because they are, indeed, 
minority shares334. Due to the very limited number of reported cases, it is difficult to say 
anything firm about this point of the law335.
7.6.6 Takeovers concluded
There has been a statutory intervention in the area of takeovers in the UK. The first step 
in this process was giving majority shareholders the right to squeeze out the remaining 
minority shareholders on the offer terms when acceptances exceed 90 per cent in a 
takeover offer. The second stage was the introduction of the Takeover Code to govern 
the conduct of takeovers: the main aim was to ensure that shareholders get ‘fair play’. 
The fundamental idea in this self-regulation is that shareholders should be treated 
equally; in consequence, every shareholder should get the same deal. Third, rules of 
takeovers will next be implemented into English law by the requirements of the 
Takeover Directive. As a result, it will be the law that requires that shareholders shall be 
treated equitably in takeover offers.
In summary, the price paid for shares in takeovers is a point of fact: the bidder 
principally sets it, and shareholders decide whether they accept it. By contrast, the equal 
value of shares in takeovers is a rule of law: CA 1985 s 428-430F provides that the 
dissenting minority shareholders should get the same price for their shares, and the 
Takeover Code requires so as part of law that shareholders should be treated equally. 
Consequently, only takeovers that rest on the idea of an equal offer at the same share
334 Compare Re Grierson, Oldham & Adams Ltd [1968] Ch 17, 35 (Plowman J): “it is not unfair to offer a 
minority shareholder the value of what he possesses, i.e., a minority shareholding.”
335 For example, in Fiske Nominees Ltd v Dwyka Diamond Ltd [2002] 2 BCLC 123, the court denied 
giving any instruction to the independent valuer.
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price to every shareholder have a binding force in company law. Moreover, if a public 
takeover offer is carried out against this principle, it is against the Code and the law. In 
brief, this kind of takeover offer is illegal.
7.7 Share value in law
English law does not rule that the value of shares is their proportional part of the value 
of a company as a whole, or the value of its assets, which idea can be found, in 
particular, from the ruling in Short v Treasury Commissioners . Therefore, company 
law accepts that majority shares can be more valuable than minority shares.
The fundamental point is that share value is principally a matter of fact. In 
general, the value of shares is the price available from a willing buyer. This hypothetical 
value is ordinarily decided with the support of expert evidence. On the whole, experts in 
share valuation consider that majority shares have a higher value per share than 
minority shares simply since they carry controlling power in the company. In contrast, 
due to their status the price available for minority shares remains modest. Further, 
shares of private companies cannot be attractive as an investment, especially when their 
transfer is restricted under the articles of association.
Yet, the value of shares is not only a matter of fact. It is a point of law that in a 
private company, in the case of a pre-emption clause, shareholders are bound to the fair 
value fixed by the auditor. Further, the law determines the basis on which the 
hypothetical value should be set for shares. Significantly, share value is often a mixed 
question of fact and law. Moreover, since market quotation is the most objective value, 
and the best evidence of the value, for shares of listed companies, those who argue that 
the market price is not their real value have a heavy onus of proof. This fundamental 
idea prevails in takeovers too.
336 [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA); [1948] AC 534 (HL).
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The value of shares can be a point of fairness and equity. The courts do not 
regard as fair that minority shares in CA 1985 s 459 cases are bought out on a fictional 
market basis. They clearly favour the idea that every share should have a pro rata value, 
ie the value of majority and minority shares is equal under these provisions. 
Nevertheless, the court has discretion to determine what is fair under the particular 
circumstances of the case.
However, the equal value of shares is also a rule of the law. The provisions in 
CA 428-430F provide that the majority shareholder has to pay the same price for the 
dissenting minority shareholders’ shares. When a majority shareholder exercises this 
right, the equal value of shares is a rule without exceptions. But more importantly, the 
Takeover Code and the Takeover Directive require that all shareholders must be treated 
equally in takeovers. In short, every shareholder should get the same price for his share 
since the law rules it.
In conclusion, the equal value of shares has a dual role in company law. First, 
equal value can be a legal presumption, and therefore, in these cases, those who argue 
otherwise have to show that share value is not equal. Second, in certain cases, the same 
value of shares is a rule of law, ie their equal value is a requirement of law. In addition, 
there might still be cases where the value of shares remains a matter of fact; therefore, 
under these circumstances, the law cannot determine the value of shares, although the 
judges may have to set some value for them on the basis of expert evidence.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS
In this changed environment, the process o f discounting 
minority shares -  a major impediment to the minority 
shareholder receiving a fa ir price -  is no longer justified. 
Charles W. Murdock, Notre Dame Law Review (1990) 
429.
8.1 The role of shareholders’ rights
Shareholders participate in a company through their shares. The central idea is that 
ordinary shares rank equally, and thus shareholders have the same right to a company’s 
profits and assets. Yet, company law does not require that shareholders should always 
be treated absolutely in a similar manner; for example, in a reduction of capital it can be 
enough that shareholders are treated fairly and equitably1. In any event, there ought to 
be a good reason why they are not on the same footing. In addition, shareholders’ 
treatment must be economically equivalent: they should get equal proportions in 
“money or money’s worth”2.1 consider that shareholders’ rights are the most important 
point in share valuation: these rights should be taken ‘seriously’.
On the whole, it seems true that “the common law was originally a body of 
remedies, not a system of rights” . In a rather similar way, when the courts have valued 
shares, the focus of their judgment has been more on the ‘real’ share value than on 
shareholders’ rights. Company law does not generally rule that every share with similar 
rights should have an equal value.
1 See eg Re Thorn EMI pic  (1988) 4 BCC 698.
2 British and American Trustee and Finance Co Ltd v Couper [1894] AC 399 (HL) 415.
3 Simmonds, Nigel E., ‘Introduction’ in Campbell, David and Thomas, Philip (eds), Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld (Aldershot 2001) ix, xxiii.
282 Chapter 8
8.2 Value of shares as a fact
The traditional approach in English law is that the value of property is the price 
available, ie the price between a willing buyer and a willing seller. The hypothetical 
value of shares is mainly a matter of fact and opinion. In effect, in share valuation the 
courts have bowed to the wisdom of businessmen4: their main function is typically 
hearing expert evidence and weighing up professional advice5.
As noted in this study, there are experts who regard majority shares as more 
valuable than minority shares. Indeed, because of their control power, these shares 
might attract a higher price per share. For example, in takeovers it used to be the case 
that majority shareholders were able to get a better price for their controlling shares.
The value of shares is related to their return. As a result, it is arguable that 
majority shares may be considered more valuable only in the circumstances where 
majority shareholders are able to get some private benefits from a company by virtue of 
their power. Furthermore, quoted minority shares are normally more liquid than 
majority shares; due to the market ‘blockage’, the price available for majority shares 
may in fact be lower than the current stock market price. Significantly, the arguments in 
this study suggest that the higher value of majority shares is not a ‘real’ economic fact.
But even more importantly, the value of shares is related to available investor 
protection. Shareholders’ protection makes shares more valuable6. Further, if majority 
shares are generally considered more valuable than minority shares, the point might
n
show that the protection of minority shareholders’ rights is weak . Indeed, the position 
of minority shareholders, especially in private companies, has traditionally been
4 Flisfeder, A. Maurice, ‘Compulsory Acquisition of the Interest o f a Dissenting Minority Shareholder’ 
(1973) 11 Alberta Law Review 87, 105.
5 Gregory, Alan and Hicks, Andrew, ‘Valuation of Shares: A Legal and Accounting Conundrum’ [1995] 
JBL 56, 56.
6 See eg La Porta, Rafael and others, ‘Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation’ (2002) 57 Journal of 
Finance 1147.
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precarious; yet, it is true that the law currently provides more safeguards to minority 
shareholders. As an American commentator noted fifty years ago, the courts “are 
manifesting a greater willingness to protect the minority shareholders against 
overreaching by a powerful majority”8. In essence, it is important to note that English 
judges have not accepted the idea that the courts should fix the value of shares solely 
with reference to their hypothetical market value. Indeed, the law has a role to play in 
setting the value of shares.
8.3 Value of shares in company law
It is a settled principle that shareholders do not own the company or its assets; in 
consequence, company law does not rule that the value of shares is their proportional 
value of a company’s assets. In general, the courts consider that share value follows the 
fortunes of the company.
The market economy rests on the view that markets set values: in practice, 
shareholders as buyers and sellers determine share prices. Company law ordinarily 
accepts that a market price is the right value. However, as a matter of fact, market prices 
can be replaced with the support of evidence. Accordingly, in Short v Treasury 
Commissioners9 it was accepted that majority shares might be more valuable than the 
current stock market price. On the other hand, in the context of a takeover the court may 
also order that the squeeze-out price of minority shares should be higher than the price 
paid for the nine-tenths majority. In any case, those who argue that the market price is 
wrong have a heavy onus of proof.
Share value is a pivotal point for every shareholder. As I see it, the protection of 
minority shareholders can be efficient only when the value of their shares is protected.
7 Eg Bergstrom, Clas and Samuelsson, Per, Aktiebolagets grundproblem (2a uppl Stockholm 2001) 80.
8 Jennings, Richard W., ‘Trading in Corporate Control’ (1956) 44 California Law Review 1, 39.
9 [1948] 1 KB 116 (CA); [1948] AC 534 (HL).
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In my mind, the clearest way to protect their rights is to support the view about equal 
value in law. Remarkably, takeover regulation operates on the premise that every share 
is of equal value, and due to the Takeover Directive it will explicitly be a rule of law.
Shareholders are entitled to get their equal share when a company distributes 
profits or surplus assets. The principles of company law require that shareholders are 
treated equally. Obviously, it is coherent and consistent with this idea that the value of 
shares is considered equal in company law.
Ultimately, case law in CA 1985 s 459 cases supports share valuation on a pro 
rata basis. As noted in O'Neill v Phillips10, the fair value of minority shares is ordinarily 
an equivalent proportion of the company as a whole. The presumption of the law is that 
every share has the same value in this context. However, the protection against unfair 
prejudice is fundamentally “an equitable supplement” to company law11, and so the 
applicability of s 459 is a matter of equity. In consequence, the courts have discretion, 
and the value of shares is a point of equity. There cannot be a rule of universal 
application: the court determines the fair value of shares with regard to all the 
circumstances of the individual case. But the maxims of equity apply: equality is equity 
in share valuation too.
In summary, the governing idea in law is that shareholders may determine the 
value of their shares. Yet, in cases where share value is determined collectively, 
company law clearly supports the idea that every share has the same value, ie they are 
valued on a pro rata basis. The courts tend to favour this principle in CA 1985 s 459 
cases, a presumption which follows equality as a default rule. In addition, the current 
market quotation is the most objective value for shares: naturally, this value is the same 
for every share. Further, in takeovers, the law rules that every shareholder is entitled to 
get the same price for his shares.
10 [1999] 1 WLR 1092 (HL) 1107.
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I conclude this thesis stating that the value of shares is normally equal in 
company law. The root of my thesis is that the courts have generally adopted the correct 
approach towards the valuation of shares. The idea in law is that power itself in a 
company does not make majority shares more valuable than minority shares. For 
example, Roch U  explained in Re Legal Costs Negotiators Ltd, in a case in which it 
was recalled that no discount should be applied to the minority shares, that if the affairs 
of the company are conducted well and so it prospers, the value of both majority and 
minority shares increases12.
11 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360 (HL) 384.
12 [1999] 2 BCLC 171 (CA) 202.
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